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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Background and purpose of the investigation 
 
No one really knows the rate by which species go extinct by the hands of human 
beings. The estimations differ,1 but they seem to agree that it is a matter of 
extreme proportions. According to the Worldwatch Institute, we are now 
experiencing the worst case of mass extinction since the dinosaurs disappeared 
65 million years ago.2 For most of us, this is a depressing insight and many 
people seem to agree that to knowingly cause or significantly contribute to the 
extinction of entire species is (at least prima facie) not only bad. It is morally 
wrong. 
For someone with a philosophic curiosity, the question that immediately arises is: 
‘Why is it wrong’? 
Intuitively it seems obviously true that it is wrong, but why is it wrong, and 
how does it fit with formal ethical theories? These questions are more 
complicated than they may seem at first glance and they have been the object of a 
heated debate among both ethicists and environmentalists. This fact alone should 
be reason enough to pursue the question, but there are other reasons too. The 
clearness of and the wide agreement about the intuition that what we are doing is 
at least prima facie wrong, makes the extinction problem an excellent test case 
that any theory should be able to deal with in order to be taken seriously as a 
moral theory. 
Another strong motivation for studying the question of why it is prima facie 
wrong to cause extinction is that a better understanding of the ethical aspects of 
the extinction problem would increase our chances of dealing with the problem. 
Bryan G. Norton points out that environmentalists often put much effort into 
trying to explain why a species is instrumentally important for human beings, and 
they often use different approaches. This is a ‘strategy’ that usually gives a bad 
impression however. It also makes it harder to reach the common goal of saving 
the species.3 Failures of the environmental movement that can be traced back to 
the difficulties in agreeing on why different species and ecosystems are important 
enough for us humans to be worth saving, leads Bryan G. Norton to conclude 
that we need what he labels “a coherent rationale for environmental protection.”4 
                                                
1 For some estimations see: Aniansson 1990 pp.21, 25, 65, Bennett et al 2003 p.136, Callicott 1986 p.138, 
Cooney 2005 p.3, Daily 2000 p.333, Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990 p.96, 97, 99, Fagerström 2003, Heinzman 
1990 p.5, James 2002 p.55, Kellert 1986 p.51, Leitzell 1986 p.250, Lovejoy 1986 p.14, Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2005 pp.v, 2, 3, 4f, 42ff, Niklasson & Nilsson 2001 p.19, Norton 1986:1 p.120, 
Norton 1986:2 pp.3, 10, Norton 1987 p.65, Palmer 1995 p.31, Ricklefs 1997 p.597, Rolston 1988 pp.18, 
126, 133, 310, Rolston 1994 pp.36f, World Commission on Environment and Development 1987 pp.13, 
148, 150, Wramner 1990 p.5 
2 http://www.worldwatch.org/topics/nature 2004-06-04. Bennett et al (Bennett et al 2003 p.136), Norton 
(Norton 1986:2 p.270) and Whiteside (Whiteside 2006 p.31) reason along the same lines. 
3 Norton 1982 pp.18f, Norton 1984 p.72 
4 Norton 1982 p.20 
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This is underlined by Lori Gruen and Dale Jamieson who declare that: 
 
It is ironic that the destruction of biodiversity, which may be the greatest 
of human crimes against nature, is also one of the least understood. We 
do not have a good philosophical account of why biodiversity matters, 
and the steps that would have to be taken to protect it are, in the present 
climate, politically impossible.5 
 
Both Norton’s and Gruen/Jamieson’s remarks tell us that there is a great 
deal of work to be done in the field, and they also tell us that the work is very 
important. 
Finally, the problem of human-caused extinction also seems to be a good 
battleground for the more general question of what should count as criteria for 
moral standing. Actually, most of the ethical debate surrounding the extinction 
problem is concerned with this question, and this will also be salient in my 
investigation. 
The present debate around this question is mostly performed in polemic 
between advocates of holistic theories on the one hand, and advocates of 
individualistic theories on the other. 
The advocates of the holistic approach claim that we have moral duties 
directly to the species. They are primarily concerned that without a direct moral 
standing for species we will have to depend on their instrumental value for us 
humans in order to account for the wrongness of causing extinctions, and they do 
not believe that to be sufficient. 
The individualists on the other hand claim that only individuals can be 
moral objects. They are sceptical to the holistic approach, and to the possibility 
of ascribing moral standing directly to species. They especially find it difficult to 
comprehend how species can have morally relevant interests for us to consider. 
This investigation will scrutinise both the holistic approach and the 
individualistic approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2. The investigation 
 
In the first part of the book,6 I will examine the most common answer to why it is 
prima facie wrong to cause a species to go extinct, viz. because (and only 
because) the species is, directly or indirectly, instrumentally valuable to us 
human beings. 
                                                
5 Gruen & Jamieson 1994 p.334 
6 An earlier version of this part of the investigation has been published under the title: “What is Wrong 
with Extinction – The Answer from Anthropocentric Instrumentalism” Persson, Erik 2006 
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I will start with a general account of the idea. Then I will take a closer look 
at some of the ways in which other species can have instrumental value for us 
human beings, and at how these values can be expected to stand up in a trade off 
situation with other human values. I will then go on and investigate two special 
types of instrumental value that are suggested to be important in our relation with 
other species. 
It is also important not to forget that other species do not just supply us with 
value individually, but also in virtue of being a part of an ecosystem (or rather 
several ecosystems) and of the general biodiversity. I will therefore assign a part 
of the investigation to those kinds of values – called ecosystem values. 
Due to the large degree of uncertainty surrounding both the value and the 
function of species, I will assign one chapter especially to the issue of 
uncertainty. I will then discuss both the uncertainties as such, and how to deal 
with them. I will pay special attention to the so-called precautionary principle 
that has become increasingly popular as a tool for decision under uncertainty, but 
that is also subject to some serious criticism. 
An important part of the problem of extinction is that typically, it is now 
living human beings who benefit from the exploitation while future generations 
of human beings have to live with the problems. I will therefore assign a chapter 
to the question of whether we have a moral duty to preserve species for the sake 
of future generations of human beings. 
As we shall see, many species, as well as a generally high degree of 
biodiversity, are quite important for both present and future generations of 
human beings. This instrumental value in combination with our moral duties 
towards our fellow humans (both present and future) that are affected when 
species disappear seems to give us quite strong moral reasons to be restrictive in 
contributing to the extinction of species. This way we can account for a part of 
why it is morally problematic to contribute to the extinction of other species, but 
it will probably not give us the whole answer. We seem to need something more 
to fully account for our moral intuitions regarding human inflicted extinction. We 
need for example to explain why we should refrain from doing things that 
contribute to extinction even when we are positive that these things will gives us 
more value than we lose. 
It is therefore necessary to investigate also other theories than 
anthropocentric instrumentalism in order to gain a complete answer to our 
question. 
The next major contestant I will scrutinise is called ecocentrism. According 
to this idea, we have moral duties to the species themselves. This approach has 
the advantage that it aims directly at the species instead of depending on the 
species’ value for us, and on human obligations to other humans. It therefore 
looks like a more promising way of giving a complete account for the moral 
problems with extinction. It also has its fair share of problems, however, and I 
will look at some of the most important problems one by one to see if they are 
real, and if so, how serious they are and whether they can be solved. 
 6 
When analysing the idea of how species can have intrinsic value, we will 
find that this view might not be best expressed in terms of moral duties to the 
species, but in terms of end value of the species for human beings. We will thus 
turn back to the human-centred approach, but this time no longer just in an 
instrumental setting. By considering the end value of other species for human 
beings we will get a much more complete understanding of why it is wrong to 
cause extinction compared to what we could get by just referring to the 
instrumental value of species for human beings. At the same time we do not have 
to claim that the species have moral standing of their own. 
A clear disadvantage of the widened anthropocentric approach is that we 
will not be able to explain why it is sometimes considered immoral to contribute 
to the extinction of other species even when their final and/or instrumental value 
for us is smaller than the value we can get from the exploitation. In the last part 
of the investigation, I will therefore widen the individualistic approach further by 
taking it beyond anthropocentrism and also include other sentient animals among 
the moral objects. This approach is referred to as sentientism. The case for moral 
standing for all sentient animals is in fact much easier to defend than both the 
idea that entire species have moral standing, and the idea that only human beings 
have moral standing. Nevertheless, this extended individualistic approach also 
has its share of problems. I will scrutinize some of the most important ones and 
try to show how they can be solved. 
The investigation ends by concluding that anthropocentric instrumentalism 
does take us a part of the way, but leaves too many questions unanswered. The 
same goes for the idea that other species can have end value for us humans. 
Taken together, however, they can take us much further. The idea of moral 
obligations to species suffers from what looks like insurmountable problems, and 
can probably not form part of the final explanation. If we combine the idea of 
instrumental and final value of other species for us – human beings – with moral 
standing for at least some non-humans in the form of sentientism – we will, 
however, get a much more defendable, useful and complete account both of the 
general intuition that extermination is prima facie wrong, and of the dilemmas 
that we often encounter. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. The inter-disciplinary character of the investigation 
 
It is tradition in the academic world to choose a narrow topic – the narrower the 
better – and then dig into that topic and dig as deep as one can in order to really 
understand that particular topic. This goes for philosophy as well as for almost all 
other academic subjects. 
This digging is incredibly important for our understanding of the world and 
our place in it, but it is not enough. In order to really understand the world we 
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live in and our place in it, we also have to take the next step and glue all the little 
pieces of understanding together to get the whole picture. In fact, most of the 
really important questions in life cannot be answered just by digging in one 
place. One often has to dig out a whole area, and also place the area one has dug 
up in relation to many other areas. It is obvious that one person cannot do all the 
necessary digging by himself. It takes several dedicated teams of diggers to dig a 
whole lot of holes to get the relevant facts. Even this is not enough however. It 
also takes someone to connect the facts in the right way to achieve the best 
possible understanding. This too is a full-time job and a speciality in its own 
right. Unfortunately it is a task that has been shamefully neglected even by 
philosophers – the academic discipline that would be the most appropriate to take 
on this task. This in turn means that the carefully dug out holes and the facts thus 
collected have not been able to play the role they could have played. In this book 
I will attempt to make a small contribution to the ongoing campaign to change 
this. The character of the book is thus to a large degree both multi-disciplinary 
and inter-disciplinary. The tools used for the connecting work are philosophical 
but the holes I try to connect can be found in many different academic territories. 
In order to get the connections right it is probably necessary to have visited 
all the holes in order to achieve a satisfactory understanding of the facts. It has 
been my ambition to do so, and I have worked hard to live up to that ambition. 
No one person can, however, achieve expert status in all the different subjects 
needed to answer even a seemingly limited question as the one asked in the title 
of this book. Neither is it possible to account for all the facts, all the 
understanding or all the controversies that are dug up from even one single hole 
let alone all the whole complex system of holes. It is therefore important to 
discriminate and to choose carefully what to include and what not to include in 
the answer. Even with hard and dedicated scrutiny there are bound to be things 
that should have been accounted for but that have been missed out. That is 
doubtlessly the case also in this book. 
Undoubtedly some – both philosophers and scientists – will think that I 
have spent too little time at their particular favourite hole or even that I should 
have spent all of my time there. I hope, however, that some of you will think that 
even though only a small part of all the incredibly interesting things you have 
dug up have been accounted for in my answer, the total picture that will be 
presented here, and that it would not have been possible to achieve without 
moving between different disciplines and sub-disciplines, has a value 
(instrumental or final) that to some extent can make up for this. 
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2. Anthropocentric Instrumentalism 
 
 
2.1. The standard answer 
 
I have chosen to call the first and most common answer to our question 
‘anthropocentric instrumentalism’. ‘Anthropocentric’ because it only considers 
the value other species have for us human beings, and ‘instrumentalism’ because 
it does not conceive of other species as having value as ends, but only as a means 
to something else.7 
This answer has historically been seen as the most important, and often the 
only, reason for conservation.8 If we scrutinise official national and international 
policy documents that discuss the issue of species loss, we can see that 
anthropocentric instrumentalism clearly dominates – when the question of why 
we should preserve species is at all discussed. In most documents, it is not 
discussed at all, or just barely. In some cases, the documents explicitly state other 
reasons than anthropocentric instrumentalism.9 It is, however, quite clear from 
the reasoning in the documents that anthropocentric instrumentalism is almost 
always assumed to be the sole basis for their concern about other species. When 
other reasons are mentioned, they are with few exceptions only just that, 
mentioned, nothing more. The discussion, agreements, recommendations, etc. 
(depending on the purpose of the document) are imbued with the attitude that 
other species only have value as a means for other things that have value for 
human beings.10 
In scientific, educational or advisory articles, or textbooks discussing 
species loss and/or giving advice on species preservation, the question of why we 
should protect threatened species is in general not discussed. When it is, it is 
common to talk about “scientific”, “biological” or “ecological” reasons. What 
this means is seldom discussed, but it seems quite clear that these reasons are not 
conceived of as moral ones. In fact, most authors of this kind of text do not 
                                                
7 Many authors do not acknowledge the possibility that other species can have end value for human 
beings and therefore use the term ‘anthropocentrism’ as equivalent to the way I use the term 
‘anthropocentric instrumentalism’. 
8 Melin 2001 passim, Rundlöf 1999 p.12 
9 Melin 2001 passim Ann example of this is the Brundtland report (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987). 
10 For a more extensive investigation see Stenmark 2000 passim. Stenmark has studied several national 
and international policy documents and has reached the same conclusion as I have. See also Aniansson 
1990 p.123, Barton 1992 p.773, Gamborg & Sandøe 1995 pp.18f and Rolston 1994 pp.24f for shorter 
discussions. For a historical outlook from a Swedish perspective see Melin 2001 Passim. For examples, 
see e.g. The Bern convention 1979 pp.2f, Cal/EPA 2003, Interview with EU Commissionaire Margot 
Wallström in Sydsvenska Dagbladet February 9th 2004 
(http://w1.sydsvenskan.se//print/printarticle.jsp?article=10074604), Johansson, Birgitta 2003 pp.3, 8, 28, 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 passim, Various statements by MA board members on the 
official website of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, The Rio Convention 1992 §1 and passim, 
World Commission on Environment and Development 1987 pp.xiv, 13f, 136, 147ff and passim, The 
Swedish Environmental Agency web portal on environmental objective 16. 
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recognise them as value judgements at all. Obviously, they are value judgements, 
but disguised as scientific statements. The value judgements disguised as 
scientific statements are sometimes anthropocentric instrumental (“we need to 
study the species to determine how we can utilise them in the most effective 
way”, “ecology tells us that we need the species in order to survive”, etc.). 
Sometimes the reasons are based on the species end value for human beings (“the 
species is fascinating in its own right and therefore intrinsically worthy of our 
attention”), and quite often ecocentric (“we must respect the species for its own 
sake”). Sometimes the authors contrast their “scientific”(etc.) reasons for 
preservation with what they call “moral” or “ethical” reasons. Why their own 
reasons are not moral, and what they mean by “moral” and “ethical” reasons, is 
not clear though. When they use these terms, they most often seem to refer to the 
kind of reason for preservation that I will call subjective end value. Sometimes 
they seem to be thinking of a type of anthropocentric instrumental reason 
according to which nature or certain species are important for aesthetic, cultural 
or religious reasons. It is not clear though why these values are seen as moral 
while the so-called “scientific” (or “biological”, etc.) reasons for preservation are 
not. Sometimes the authors also contrast their “scientific”(etc.) reasons with what 
they call “economic” or “utilitarian”11 reasons. These reasons seem to be 
identical with what I have labelled anthropocentric instrumental reasons. Authors 
of scientific, advisory or educational texts that discuss the question of why 
species preservation is important are often very eager to find this kind of 
“economic” or “utilitarian” motive to justify their work, but it is in general also 
clear that these are seldom their own motives – at least not primarily.12 
Finding clear statements from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
concerning why preservation is important has proved to be surprisingly 
difficult.13 Most NGOs are of course focused on the means of protection, not the 
reasons, but it is still rather surprising that they do not spend more energy 
justifying their work. When they do, the reasons are typically anthropocentric 
                                                
11 They clearly do not use the term ‘utilitarian’ the way it is normally used within ethics, but rather as a 
synonym to ‘instrumental’.   
12 For examples of how these kinds of texts reason around the value of species preservation, see e.g. 
Aniansson 1990 p.31, Elmqvist & Johannesson 2005 pp.44ff, Farber 2000 pp.s492f, passim, From & 
Delin 1997 p.5, Gärdenfors 2005 p.120, 126, Ihse 2005 pp.62, 66f, 72, Johansson, Birgitta 2005:1 p.39, 
Johansson, Maria 2005 p.100, Lackey 1998 pp.329f, Niklasson & Nilsson 2001 pp.19f, Norton 1987 
pp.6f, Ricklefs 1997 p.597, Spellerberg14ff, Sörlin 1991 p.175. 
13 I have studied the official internet sites of the following organisations: BirdLife International 
(http://www.birdlife.org), BirdLife Malta (http://www.birdlifemalta.org), Defenders of Wildlife 
(http://www.defenders.org), Danmarks Naturfredningsforening (http://www.dn.dk/), Estonian Fund for 
Nature (http://www.elfond.ee/index.php?keel=inglise), European Centre for Nature Conservation 
(http://www.ecnc.nl), Friends of the Earth International (http://www.foei.org), Greenpeace 
(http://www.greenpeace.org/international/), Greenpeace Sweden (http://www.greenpeace.org/sweden), 
Miljöförbundet Jordens Vänner (http://www.mjv.se), Natur och Miljö – Riksorganisation för miljövård 
(http://www.naturochmiljo.fi), Norges Naturvernforbund (http://www.naturvern.no), Plantlife 
(http://www.plantlife.org.uk), Rainforest Action Network (http://www.ran.org), Svenska 
Naturskyddsföreningen (http://www.snf.se), Svenska Rovdjursföreningen (http://www.rovdjur.se), 
Sveriges Ornitologiska Förening (http://www.sofnet.org), Taiga Rescue Network 
(http://www.taigarescue.org), The World Conservation Union (http://www.iucn.org/), Wildlife Trust 
(http://www.wildlifetrust.org), World Wide Fund For Nature (http://www.panda.org/). 
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instrumental,14 but just like in the scientific texts, they sometimes also mention 
“scientific”/”ecological” etc. reasons for species protection, and now and then 
they appeal to, for example, “ethical”, “aesthetical” or “cultural” reasons, or the 
“intrinsic value” of nature, ecosystems or species – though without specifying 
what it means.15 
Personal experience tells me, however, that many people who are active in 
NGOs have reasons for their work that go beyond the anthropocentric 
instrumental reasons that are expressed in official national and international 
policy documents. Both ecocentric and individualistic non-anthropocentric (i.e. 
sentientistic,16 zoocentric17 or biocentric18) reasons are common, as well as 
reasons that have to do with the attribution of end value to the species. 
To summarize: The question of why extinction is a problem is not very 
deeply discussed among policymakers, or among scientists and NGOs dealing 
with preservation issues. From what I have found, it seems that both the NGOs 
and the scientific authors seem to be willing to admit a wider range of reasons for 
protecting biodiversity compared with the official national and international 
policy documents, even though the authors of scientific texts are more prone to 
hiding their own value judgements behind pretended scientific statements. Both 
NGOs and scientific authors tend ultimately to justify their commitment to 
saving endangered species by anthropocentric instrumental arguments. I guess 
that the main reason for this is that this type of argument is assumed to have a 
greater impact among both the public and the decision makers. That 
anthropocentric instrumentalism is more commonly accepted among decision 
makers – at least among the most influential ones – seems to be confirmed by the 
official national and international policy documents referred to above. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. The right answer? 
 
Sverker Sörlin, who has studied our attitudes towards the environment from a 
historical perspective, claims that the best reason to believe that we will establish 
what he calls “a contract with nature” is that the arrogance we have shown 
towards nature will eventually be detrimental also to our own species and our 
                                                
14 See e.g. Aniansson 1990 passim, Dahlerus 2007 p.1, Johansson, Birgitta 2005: 2 p.106f, Lindén 1990 
pp.72ff, Olsson 2004 p.43, Plantlife (http://www.plantlife.org.uk), Taiga Rescue Network 
(http://www.taigarescue.org), Wramner 1990 pp.4, 7 
15 See e.g. Aniansson 1990 pp.16f, 58, 80, 108, BirdLife International (http://www.birdlife.org), Dahlerus 
2007 p.1, Johansson, Birgitta 2005:1 p.13, Johansson, Birgitta 2005: 2 pp106f, Olsson 2004 p.43, 
Wramner 1990 pp.4, 7 
16 Sentientistic ethics assigns moral standing to all and only sentient beings. 
17 Zoocentric ethics assigns moral standing to all and only animals. 
18 Biocentric ethics assigns moral standing to all and only living beings. 
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culture.19 Sörlin thus seems to consider anthropocentric instrumentalism the 
correct – and the most instrumentally useful – answer to our question. He is 
apparently not alone in this. As we saw in the previous sub-section, arguments 
that have an anthropocentric instrumentalist character are very common. Among 
those who write in the field of environmental ethic there is a wide spectrum of 
different degrees of trust in anthropocentric instrumentalism as a basis for 
preservation. Most of those who take active part in the philosophical debate 
seem, however to be placed somewhere along the scale rather than at any one of 
its end points. Some are more optimistic than others but few believe that 
anthropocentric instrumentalism can be the whole truth, and no one, even among 
those who are strongly opposed to the idea that humans are the sole moral 
objects, seem to deny that human interests play at least some role in accounting 
for the wrongness in contributing to the extinction of species. 20 
The task in the first part of the book will therefore be to investigate what 
role anthropocentric instrumentalism can play in answering our main question: 
“What is wrong with extinction?” To do that, I will start by discussing some 
different ways in which other species can have instrumental value for human 
beings, and how these values stand up in comparison to the values we can get by 
contributing to their extinction.  
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Some forms of instrumental value of non-human species 
for human beings 
 
 
2.3.1. Food 
 
All our nutrients come from other species directly and indirectly. Most of the 
species used directly for food are domesticated but wild species also contribute to 
our food supply. This is especially the case in developing regions, but even the 
most technologically advanced countries depend in many ways on wild species 
for their food.21 All our domesticated species originate from wild species, and 
some of today’s wild species will probably be the basis for domesticated species 
                                                
19 Sörlin 1991 pp.273f 
20 For examples of statements regarding the usefulness of anthropocentric instrumentalism in accounting 
for our moral intuitions regarding extinction, see Leopold 1970 p.246, Luper-Foy 1995 p.91, Melin 2001 
p.15, Norton 1984 p.71, Regan, Donald H 1986 p.195, Rolston 1988 pp.127f, 130f, 137f, 313, 325, 
Schönfeld 1992 p.355, Webster 1992 p.89 
21 Almered Olsson 2005 p. 53, Aniansson 1990 pp.57, 59, 68, Bradley 2001 p.44, Gärdenfors 2005 p.119, 
Ihse 2005 p.62, Lindén 1990 pp.73, 77, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 pp.30f, Myers 1990 
pp.16, 21f, Söderqvist 2005 p.74, World Commission on Environment and Development 1987 pp.156, 
159 
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in the future.22 Since it is assumed by anthropocentrism that only human beings 
have moral standing, the fact that we are killing the proximate source of our 
nutrients (including killing and eating sentient animals) is not in itself a problem 
according to anthropocentrism as long as the species continues to exist and 
supply us with new individuals to eat. This will give us a strong incentive for 
conserving the species even without involving ethics. Rational selfishness alone 
is an incentive for conservation. If we also admit the moral responsibility not to 
deplete the food sources for other human beings, the argument will be even 
stronger.23 It also makes the argument more inclusive since we probably need a 
larger number of species (not just a larger number of individuals of the same 
species) to supply the whole of humanity with food than we need to satisfy one 
person. A species that is well suited for being farmed/hunted/gathered/etc. in 
Sweden may not be equally well suited for the same activities in for example 
India. Our moral obligations to fellow humans therefore seem to give us a strong 
obligation to preserve the future supply of a number of species. 
This looks promising, but the case is not as simple as it might look. That a 
species is found suitable as food for human beings has not always been good 
news from a preservation perspective. We have literally eaten a large number of 
species to extinction.24 Considering what we have just said, this looks imprudent 
or even irrational even from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view and 
not at all like something that necessarily follows from it, but maybe we do not 
need to save all the sources of a particular nutrient to secure the supply of that 
nutrient? Maybe we do not need to save all species that supply us with protein in 
order to secure our supply of protein, for example? Economically, it may well be 
rational in many cases to replace natural species with bred or cultivated ones that 
are more productive and easier to manage (as long as the wild species are not 
important for other reasons).25 This means that if we find one species that is a 
good provider of different nutrients and is easy to breed, etc. we have a tendency 
to domesticate that species and breed large numbers of it. At the same time other 
species that play the same role, but less effectively, lose their importance. 
It is also argued from an economic perspective that it can sometimes be 
perfectly rational to deplete a non-renewable resource if we know or at least have 
good reasons to believe that we can replace it with another resource. It may even 
be economically required to do so if extensive use of the first resource is 
necessary to drive the economical and technological development that is needed 
for us to develop the means of utilizing the other resource. This means that the 
existence of other species that can supply us with the same nutrients considerably 
                                                
22 Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990 p.102, Myers, 1990 p.16, Norton 1987 p.27, Rolston 1994 p.54 
23 It has to be pointed out however, that in the same way and for the same reasons that anthropocentrism 
provides a stronger incentive for preservation than egocentrism, an even wider account of who has moral 
standing , ecocentrism or non-anthropocentric individualistic theories,  would provide an even stronger 
incentive for preservation but it would complicate the question of whether it is ethically acceptable to eat 
the source of the nutrition. 
24 For some examples see e.g. Ricklefs 1997 p.606 
25 Luper-Foy 1995 p.97, Schönfeld 1992 p.355 
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weakens the argument that we need to preserve any given species as a source of 
nutrients for human beings. 
Over exploitation of wild species is not the only problem. If we find a 
species useful and want to continue using it, we will probably want to 
domesticate it.26 This in turn often leads to problems for other species. The 
modern intensive agriculture with simplified crop rotations, pesticides and 
synthetic fertilisers is in fact a major threat to many wild species.27 
Some of the problems that result from modern agriculture can probably be 
mitigated by converting intensive farming to organic farming.28 It will not solve 
all problems, however. When we domesticate and start breeding a species 
according to our preferences, we will probably change its genetic makeup (which 
so far is normally done by selective breeding). The properties that make it more 
suitable for human utilization may well make the domesticated form less suited 
for a life in nature. If this is combined with the usual human fear of competition, 
the result can be that other species including the non-domesticated relatives of 
the domesticated form are eradicated in order to protect or give room for the 
domesticated version. This behaviour is quite common and has, for example, 
resulted in destruction of forests and wetlands to gain land for different types of 
agriculture,29 as well as to fierce eradication campaigns against everything from 
plants and animals competing for nutrients, via plants and animals competing for 
space, to all kinds of predators that see domesticated animals as easy prey.30 
Domesticated forms of different plants, grasses and animals have taken over 
large areas of the planet. This has contributed substantially to the extinction of 
wild species. One illustrative example is when rain forests are cut down to grow 
soy used as fodder to cattle in order to provide us with meat and milk.31 
Because of problems like those listed above, some conclude that the 
economic value of different species for agriculture is not a good basis for 
protecting natural biodiversity.32 Since different species inevitably have different 
degrees of instrumental value for us, an anthropocentric instrumental approach 
will mean that some species will be favoured at the expense of others. Even if 
this does not mean that the less valuable species are exterminated, they will be 
strongly repressed and diminished. The genetic diversity of the species will 
decrease and the repressed species will risk extinction in the long run. 
One good reason for conservation based on our need for food, is that a 
larger degree of biodiversity among species used for food (both wild and 
cultivated) increases the food security. If one species is hit by, for example, a 
disease, we can get the nutrients from another species.33 
                                                
26 Rolston 1994 p.144 
27 Angermeier 2000 p.378, van Elsen 2000 pp.101, 103, 106, Hansen et al 2001 p.18, Jamieson 1998 p.46, 
Midgley 1992:1 p.63, Rolston 1994 p.144 
28 van Elsen 2000 pp.101, 104, 106, Hansen et al 2001 p.18 
29 Callicott 1995 p.30, Carpentier et al 2000 passim, Jamieson 1998 p.46 
30 Almered Olsson 2005 p.57, Ihse 2005 p.67, Jamieson 1998 p.46, Williams 1996 p.169 
31 Almered Olsson 2005 p.57,  Callicott 1995 p.30, Jamieson 1998 p.46 
32 Angermeier 2000 p.378, Ricklefs 1997 p.598 
33 Almered Olsson 2005 p.54 
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Two other important aspects of the “nutrient-track” deserve to be pointed 
out: As we said in the beginning of this sub-section, all our cultivated species 
originate from wild species. This means that the larger the biodiversity, the larger 
the probability that we will find new species that can be useful for us.34 It also 
means that in order to find new species to cultivate or to cross breed with our 
cultivated breeds, or just to transfer genes from, we need a supply of wild 
species.35 As an illustration, Norman Myers mentions the great corn blight in the 
U.S. that destroyed half of their 1970 corn crop. The problem was dealt with by 
interbreeding the cultivated corn with corn from its original growing place in 
Mexico.36 
This seems to be a good reason from the point of view of anthropocentric 
instrumentalism not to do things that might lead to the extinction of wild species, 
and may to some degree counterbalance the benefits we get from getting rid of 
competing species. Another thing we have to consider is that we really do not 
have any way of knowing today which genetic material will be useful in the 
future. This can be seen as an argument to conserve species “just in case”. I will, 
however, return to this strategy in chapter 3. 
We should also consider the fact that natural evolution goes on all the time, 
and “invents” new properties in both plants and animals, properties that can turn 
out to be very useful for us. In order for this evolutionary process to continue, we 
need to protect not only the species that are potentially useful, but also the 
ecosystems in which they live and evolve, and other species that may evolve 
useful traits in the future or just contribute to the selective pressure that drives the 
evolutionary process.37 
These last points are of course not just relevant when it comes to food, but 
also in other cases where nature contributes to human wellbeing. They are 
examples of so-called ecosystem services. The ecosystem services are important 
for our supply of food in several different ways. Most pollinators are e.g. wild 
insects and bats etc.38 Wild species improve the quality of the soil or help to 
spread the seeds of plants.39 A substantial degree of biodiversity is needed to 
keep the surrounding ecosystems working, to prevent our cultivated species from 
succumbing to diseases and “pests” etc.40 Monocultures can be very productive 
but they cannot sustain themselves for very long without human assistance. They 
need input of fertilisers and human intervention – generally powered by fossil 
fuels.41 The “input” independently of how it is substantiated must come from 
somewhere and it very often depends on some kind of ecosystem service. 
                                                
34 Norton 1986:1 pp.117f, Rolston 1988 p.6 
35 Almered Olsson 2005 p.54, Aniansson 1990 pp.59, 68f, 124, Johansson, Birgitta 2003 p.8, Myers 1990 
pp.16f, Rolston 1988 p.12, Williams 1996 p.169, Whiteside 2006 pp.11f 
36 Myers 1990 p.16 
37 Norton 1986:1 p.117f 
38 Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990 p.102, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 pp.25f, Johansson, Birgitta 
2003 p.2, Myers 1990  pp.21f, Prance 1990 p.57, Söderqvist 2005 p.75 
39 Johansson, Birgitta 2003 p.27, Johansson, Birgitta 2005:1 pp.8, 12, Söderqvist 2005 p.75 
40 Almered Olsson 2005 pp.55f 
41 Norton 1986:1 pp.129f 
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The ecosystem services are also important for other things than food and I 
will therefore discuss them separately and in more detail later. 
Before that, I will discuss a couple of other specific uses of other species 
that might make it important for us, from an anthropocentric instrumental 
perspective, to conserve the species. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Medicine 
 
Medical benefits are sometimes put forth as an important reason for preservation 
of species.42 Many of the medical drugs we use today originate from plants,43 and 
most plants have not yet been checked for medically useful substances.44 This 
obviously raises expectations about the pharmaceutical treasures still to be found. 
Even though some economists warn against exaggerated expectations,45 many are 
quite optimistic that we will find a lot of new medical drugs among wild species 
in the future.46 
Can this account for at least part of why it is considered morally 
problematic to contribute to the extinction of species? The situation seems to be 
very similar to the one we just discussed regarding food, and most of the aspects 
discussed in relation to food are also applicable here. One difference is that even 
though the human demand for medicine is large, it is probably not as large as the 
demand for food, which means that both the pros and the cons of referring to 
medical value are smaller in scope compared to when we refer to the value of 
species as food as an explanation for why the causing of extinction is morally 
problematic from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view. Another 
difference is that even though many medical drugs originate in wild plants, the 
plants are in general not utilised in the manufacturing of drugs.47 This means that 
utilising other species as sources of medicine will not be as exploitative as using 
them as food. 
The continued “invention” of new chemicals in the plant kingdom will be 
probably be at least as important when it comes to medicine as when it comes to 
food, which means that the point we made when we talked about food regarding 
the importance of other species as drivers of continued evolution will be at least 
as strong when we talk about medical benefits. 
                                                
42 Cooney, Rosie 2005 p.3, Johansson, Birgitta 2005:2 p. 107, Kellert 1986 p.53, Rundlöf  2000 p.13, 
Sober 1986 p.173, Sprigge 1991 p.109, World Commission on Environment and Development 1987 p.13 
43 Aniansson 1990 p.59, Daily 2000 pp.333f, Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990 p.101, Fagerström 2003, Garrod & 
Willis 1997 p.46, Lovejoy 1986 p.17, Ricklefs 1997 p.598 
44 Aniansson 1990 p.59, Rolston 1988 p.127 
45 Garrod & Willis 1997 p.46 
46 Aniansson 1990 pp.59, 68f, Myers 1990 p.17, Norton 1987 p.27, Regan, Donald H 1986 p.195, Rolston 
1998 pp.8, 12 
47 Lovejoy 1986 p.17 
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Medical aspects sometimes point in the opposite direction, however. I 
pointed out in the introduction that our intuitions tell us that it is prima facie 
wrong to contribute to extermination. This leaves room for saying that there may 
be cases when it is acceptable or even required to contribute to extermination. 
This is most salient when we deal with species that carry human diseases, like for 
instance the black rat (Rattus rattus), the malaria carrying mosquito (Anopheles 
maculipennis and other species in the Anopheles genus), and of course the 
malaria parasites themselves (a number of species of the genus Plasmodium) – 
not to mention several kinds of bacteria. 
On the other hand, according to the Millennium report, a larger diversity of 
wildlife probably decreases the spread of many wildlife pathogens to human 
beings.48 If this is correct, it means that even though the battle against diseases 
can in some circumstances be an argument in favour of exterminating certain 
species, it can also be an argument in favour of preserving a generally high level 
of biodiversity. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.3. Materials and fuel 
 
Many of the materials we use in our daily lives come from living organisms.49 
Most notably wood that is used in everything from paper towels to houses, but 
also plenty of other materials.50 
Wood and other organic products are also important as fuel.51 More than 
half of the fuel used in developing countries comes from wood. In some 
countries like Tanzania and Uganda, wood comprises four fifths of the fuel. Even 
in industrialised countries, wood is an important source of energy. In the 
relatively densely forested Sweden, it makes up 17% of the energy 
consumption.52 Bio fuel is a renewable energy source that many people see as an 
important alternative to the present non-renewables. 
In many respects, the harvesting of other species for material or fuel is 
similar to harvesting them for food. Just as with food, the usefulness of other 
species as material or fuel for human consumption has in many cases led to their 
extinction. One difference between using a species for food (and also as fuel) and 
                                                
48 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 p.31, Myers 1990 p.17 
49 Cooney 2005 p.3, Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990 p.101, Ihse 2005 p. 62, Leitzell 1986 p.245, Myers 1990 
p.17, Norton 1987 p.27, Rolston 1994 pp.143f, World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987 pp.13, 156 
50 Aniansson 1990 pp.59, 68, Daily 2000 pp.333ff, Gerstin 1990 p. 87, Leitzell 1986 p.245, Myers 1990 
p.17, Rolston 1994 p.126, 144, Rydberg 2001 p.1, Söderqvist 2005 p.74, Tucker 1990 pp.46f, World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987 pp.4, 155f 
51 Cooney 2005 p.3, Martinez-Alier 1994 p.31, Norton 1987 p.27, Rolston 1994 pp.143f, World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987 pp.189ff, 192f Åström 2006 p.3 
52 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 p.31, World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987 p.189
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using it for extracting materials, is that once the material is extracted, it can be 
used for a longer period of time. Once food is eaten or a fuel burned, it is gone 
and we need a new harvest. One might think that the pressure on the supplying 
species is smaller when it is used for extracting material, but unfortunately it is 
not so. The demand for materials that we find valuable is often close to 
insatiable, and our use of material resources is usually very wasteful. Many 
species have disappeared and even more are threatened as a result of our 
“hunger” for materials. The use of wood as paper pulp, timber, etc. has, for 
example, led to the cutting down of a large portion of the world’s forests in 
general and of the rainforest in particular. The latter is the world’s richest 
ecosystem, and many species have been brought down in the fall. Cutting down 
the rain forest, both in order to exploit the trees, and in order to make room for 
other more profitable tree species or for agriculture, might even be the most 
important cause of extinction today. 
Apart from wood, a number of animal and plant species are directly 
threatened because we value some material they supply. The use of wild animal 
products is in fact the primary factor behind the endangerment of many 
vertebrate species.53 Ivory and rhinoceros horns, for example, have been very 
popular among human beings. This popularity has nearly caused the extinction of 
both elephants and rhinoceroses.54 Some other species have already disappeared 
as a result of giving us valuable materials.55 
Maybe this can be explained as an effect of irrationality rather than as 
something that follows from anthropocentric instrumentalism? A species can 
supply us with more material in the long run if we are careful not to overexploit 
it. It therefore looks obvious at first sight that if we value the material we get 
from a species, it is irrational from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view 
to let the species go extinct. This is probably a correct observation in many cases. 
I am not sure, however, that all cases of extinction due to our utilisation of the 
species can be deemed irrational that easily from an anthropocentric instrumental 
perspective. We discussed the same problem briefly in the last sub-section when 
we talked about food and pointed out that there are probably cases where it is in 
fact rational from a strict anthropocentric point of view to use our sources of 
nutrient in such a way that some species go extinct. This is probably, at least 
sometimes, also the case with material and fuel. When the source of a material 
disappears, the material can often be substituted by another material that does the 
same job, maybe even better than the original.56 
The possibility of substituting a resource is an important issue in all cases 
when a species has instrumental value for us human beings – as food, fuel, 
material or any of the other instrumental uses we will investigate. I will therefore 
discuss that aspect a little more without delay. 
                                                
53 Kellert 1986 p.68 
54 Ricklefs 1997 p.599 
55 Prance 1990 p.59 
56 Callicott 1999 p.371, Farber 2000 pp.s495f, passim, Luper-Foy 1995 p.97, Martinez-Alier 1994 p.xxiii, 
Radetzki 1990 pp.51ff, Radetzki 2001 p.75, SLU 2006:1, SLU 2006:2, SLU 2006:3 
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The possibility of substituting one material for another is usually overrated 
by economists since in economic terms, everything is per definition replaceable 
by the right amount of anything else. One object with the monetary value of 100 
krona is per definition replaceable with any object or group of objects with the 
total monetary value of 100 krona. This is of course not the case in the real world 
(i.e. the world of physics and biology) were we have to consider other features of 
an object than just its monetary value. None the less, materials are constantly 
replaced by other materials, and this is something that has to be accounted for 
when we decide whether a certain species is expendable from the point of view 
of anthropocentric instrumentalism. This argument goes both ways, however: It 
is also possible to substitute material and fuel from non-living nature with 
material and fuel from living organisms.57 If we try to consider also future 
generations, things become more complicated. It is very difficult, not to say 
impossible, to foresee what material will in the future be substituted by what 
other material. We can therefore never know if a species that does not seem very 
valuable at the moment will not turn out to be very valuable in the future.58 
To this one might of course answer that it does not matter as long as there 
are other materials we can use instead. In fact, since we have the ability to use 
materials from the non-living nature, we can always use that ability to substitute 
a species.59 We have, for example, already substituted a lot of the wood and 
fibres we used for a multitude of different things with metal and various 
polymers. It might also be possible to genetically modify species to produce 
special materials more effectively than the natural species.60 On the other hand, 
we might not know now what materials we will need later. If we let species go 
extinct now we might also lose features that will be important later, and then we 
cannot transfer the features to domesticated species. The increasing ability to 
copy properties from wild to domesticated species can therefore also be seen as 
an argument in favour of preservation.61 
The risk of losing existing properties should be complemented by the risk 
of losing properties before they have even emerged. Nature is very “inventive” 
and as with medical drugs, it sometimes produces materials that we would not 
have thought of ourselves, or that would be very expensive to imitate. 
The economic value of these materials can probably not motivate a general 
moral condemnation of activities that might lead to extinction, however, even 
though it can motivate preservation of some very important species. 
Maybe we can single out some important species and grow them in large 
monocultures? Would not that be a more effective and profitable way of getting 
hold of the material we need? The economist Marian Radetzki is very optimistic 
about this possibility.62 After all, this is exactly what we have done with food, 
                                                
57 SLU 2006:1, SLU 2006:2, SLU 2006:3 
58 Lovejoy 1986 p.17 
59 Radetzki 1990 pp.51ff 
60 Fagerström 2003, Radetzki 1990 pp.51ff, Radetzki 2001 p.75 
61 Fagerström 2003 
62 Radetzki 2001 pp.74f 
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and also in large scale with trees for fuel and material. To suggest that this might 
work with all the species we need is, however, very ecologically naïve. Species 
do not work on their own but as parts of a system. A few monocultures clearly 
work, but only as long as there are natural environments in the vicinity. To 
substitute all natural environments with monocultures and to let all but the 
directly useful species go extinct would not work. The question that remains is: 
How much of the natural environment can we turn into monocultures and how 
many species apart from the species we harvest do we need? The most probable 
answer is that we will not know that until we reach the limit and then it will be 
too late. 
Another problem is that humanity is made up by more than 6 billion 
individual human beings – all with their own interests. When all individuals try 
to do what is best from their particular viewpoint, the result is not always ideal 
from the point of view of their fellow humans. Take a look at a simple cost-
benefit analysis for a project. Suppose it turns out when everything is taken into 
account that the project will generate an income of $10 000 while the costs will 
amount to $1 000 000. Is this a good deal? The way I have described it here, it is 
obviously not a good deal, but let us make a specification: Assume that the 
income from the project will fall on the decision maker while the costs will fall 
on the society as whole. Then the part of the costs that falls on the decision 
maker will be very small in comparison to the gain, and instead of making a great 
personal loss she will make a personal profit. An act that would look 
preposterous if all costs were taken into account may well look like a very good 
deal for the decision maker(s) if the profit falls on the latter while someone else 
has to pay the price.63 Unfortunately, this way of making decisions is very 
common. The Millennium Assessment report on biodiversity for instance points 
out that many people have gained quite a lot from activities that have contributed 
to the disappearance of species, including for example forestry and agriculture.64 
It also points out, however, that the gain often comes with a cost that has to be 
paid by someone else, often poor people, and which is not always factored into 
the decision.65 This way of making decisions is in fact very common,66 and the 
costs are paid both by other contemporary human beings, by future generations 
of human beings, and by other species. 
Effects that fall upon someone other than the decision maker are usually 
referred to by economists as external effects.67 The same is the case with effects 
that are not stated in monetary value. That they are seen as external is of course a 
result of the perspective we assume when we make the decision – viz. an 
egocentric economic perspective: Effects only count to the extent that they can 
be quantified in monetary terms and fall on the decision maker. As long as 
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65 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 pp.5, 30, 40, 80 See also Clarke 1995 p.43 
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decisions are made along these lines, it does not really matter whether it in many 
or even in most cases of harvesting material, food, medical drugs etc. from other 
species from an anthropocentric point of view would be more rational to 
preserve the species. The result will still be destruction if that is what gives the 
largest economic payoff for the individual who makes the decision, i.e. if it is the 
most rational thing to do from a strictly egocentric economic point of view. This 
may be an important explanation of many environmental problems. For our 
investigation, it means that many of the problems we have found in this and the 
preceding (as well as the following) sub-sections may be rooted not in 
anthropocentrism but in egocentrism. According to anthropocentrism (the way I 
use the term in this book), we do have moral duties to our fellow humans, and 
that is the basic idea behind using anthropocentric instrumentalism as an 
explanation of why causing extinction is a moral problem. Is it possible that the 
problems that have been imputed on anthropocentrism are in fact a result of 
egocentric and not anthropocentric thinking? Egocentrism and anthropocentrism 
are in my experience often unrightfully conflated in discussions about 
environmental ethics and the distinction between them deserves to be pointed 
out. In this case, it is especially important since it means that some of the 
problems we have found may actually be the result of egocentric rather than 
anthropocentric considerations, and should therefore not necessarily count 
against anthropocentric instrumentalism as the answer to our main question. 
It is sometimes proposed that the problem of external effects could be dealt 
with by being better at assigning a monetary value to biodiversity. It has, for 
instance, been claimed that biodiversity loss in connection with forestry in the 
tropic regions is at least partly caused by an inability of the markets to account 
for the benefits of biodiversity.68 
Sometimes it is suggested that if we manage to assign monetary value to 
species or to biodiversity as such, the problem of external effects can be dealt 
with within a system of rational egoism by constructing a system of property 
rights.69 I.e. all resources should be owned by someone. Usually, it is conceived 
of as ownership of land (and water) including animals, plants, etc. that inhabit the 
area, though the resources can of course also be divided in other ways. 
The idea that the problem can be solved by property rights is not universally 
agreed upon, however – even among economists.70 Even the most ardent 
advocates of strict property rights as a solution to the problem of external effects 
admit that such a system has limitations.71  One of the problems is that 
individuals of many species migrate between different areas and different 
countries. This means that if one individual property owner preserves the 
individuals while they are on her land, someone else might harvest them when 
they reach his land.72 Other problems include for instance that it would be very 
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impractical to distribute property rights over things like species, and that it would 
probably be considered too unconventional to gain enough support.73 To come to 
terms with these problems through a system of property rights would need a 
system of ownership of individual animals that trumps property rights connected 
to land ownership. 
One problem has to do with specialisation. When a resource is owned by 
someone who, for example, trades in one particular material, the species is used 
in a way that best suits that particular interest while other goods and services 
from the species do not count. This may lead to a higher degree of exploitation 
compared to a system where many different interests have to co-exist like 
subsistence farming where the owner has to be self sufficient in all kinds of food, 
materials etc. that she needs. 
Another problem is that some of the goods and services, like the ecosystem 
services we will look at later, will benefit everyone independently of who owns 
the species. 
There are also other suggestions for how to internalise externalities (as it is 
usually called in economic terminology) apart from strict property rights. Things 
like laws, taxes, fees, etc. are discussed.74 Finding the best method for 
internalising externalities does not have to concern us here, however. What is 
interesting, given our investigation, is whether any such measure can be 
motivated from a purely egocentric point of view and still give the same answer 
to our main question as the wider anthropocentric perspective. It is sometimes 
claimed that restrictions on our selfish behaviour can be rationally agreed on (at 
least hypothetically) for purely egocentric reasons.75 If this claim is correct, the 
distinction between egocentrism and anthropocentrism is not important – at least 
when we deal solely with intra-generational relations.76 
Whether such a system really works, and whether it always or even in 
general makes it irrational from an egocentric point of view to cause extinction, 
remains to be shown, however. The idea of rational egoism as a basis for moral 
principles as such is also very controversial. I will not go any deeper into this 
debate here since it would take us too far from the main purpose of the 
investigation. I will just point out some problems that are particularly relevant in 
connection with our investigation. One such problem is that the way of making 
decisions illustrated above is very common, and it is hard to believe that it would 
be that common if it were irrational from an egoistic viewpoint. Another difficult 
problem is that, even though in the above example it would be more rational to 
adopt a system that everyone follows as compared to a situation with no 
agreement at all, it would be even better for each individual to break the 
agreement: A system where no one generates personal profit in a way that also 
generates large costs for the rest of society is better for everyone compared to a 
system where everyone does it. It is, however, even better for each individual to 
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continue making a profit this way while everyone else does not. If everyone else 
goes on making a profit on other’s expense, it is even more important for each 
individual to go on and make profit any way they can even when it imposes a 
great cost on others. I.e., we are in a prisoner’s dilemma type of situation. 
A very important problem surrounding the notion of a contract between 
selfish individuals is that it presupposes a situation with equal bargaining power. 
Such an assumption is far from realistic – if nothing else, it is effectively 
frustrated by evolution. The lack of such equality in the real world is probably an 
important explanation of why in so many situations it is in fact rational for the 
egocentric to make decisions that imposes the costs on others. This ought to be 
the case both for those with much power and for those with very limited power. 
Those with much power can get away with quite a lot without the risk of being 
subjected to the same treatment. Those with limited power, in some situations, 
have to disregard the effects on others just in order to survive in the short term. 
As we will see later, it is also quite clear that this aspect is particularly severe 
when we deal with inter-generational relations – where the now living have all 
the power while future generations have absolutely no power. 
What all of this has shown us is that it is probably after all often rational 
from the perspective of a rational egocentric agent with a limited lifespan to 
engage in projects where the total costs are larger than the total profit, as long as 
the costs are external while the profit falls on the agent. This in turn shows us 
that at least some of the problems we have found should probably be imputed to 
egocentrism instead of anthropocentrism. This is good news for the advocates of 
anthropocentric instrumentalism as an explanation to why it is morally 
problematic to contribute to the extinction of other species. 
I do not believe that all problems we have found – and will find – can be 
pinned on egocentrism, however. It would probably be naïve to believe that we 
could blame egocentrism or irrational behaviour (from the point of view of 
anthropocentrism) for all cases of depletion of material resources that cause 
extinction of species even though they could probably be blamed for many. 
There is also another important aspect of the relation between egocentrism 
and anthropocentrism that we have to remember. Even if some external effects 
can be dealt with within an egoistic framework, the case for conservation would 
be even stronger if we also admitted that we have a duty to consider the interests 
of other human beings. We therefore have to admit that independently of the 
problems pointed out above, it is always – for purely numerical reasons – the 
case that anthropocentrism gives us a stronger reason for conservation than 
egocentrism. If we allow for duties to other people, the scope will also be wider 
as I pointed out when discussing other species as source of food, since people 
have different tastes and live in different environments with different conditions 
etc. This means that we need a larger selection of species for our consumption. 
This important aspect is a double-edged sword, however. It shows that 
moral respect for our fellow humans does supply us with much stronger reasons 
for species preservation compared to egoism, but we also have to remember that 
if we accept that not just human beings, but also non-human species and 
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individuals have moral status, then we have to admit that even more “payers” are 
paying even larger costs for our profits (often much larger costs since other 
species and individuals of other species are more strongly affected). This means 
that analogously we would find that even in cases where anthropocentrism 
favours conservation, non-anthropocentrism provides an even stronger argument 
for conservation. Therefore, if the scenario I have depicted above gives support 
to anthropocentrism rather than egoism as an answer to why extinction is wrong, 
it clearly gives an even stronger support to non-anthropocentrism rather than 
anthropocentrism as an answer to this question. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.4. Indicators 
 
Some species are important as indicators.77 I.e. they are particularly sensitive to 
some type of environmental change which if allowed to continue will affect us as 
well – directly or indirectly via other species or via a dramatic change of the 
ecosystem.78 These species can therefore be used as a kind of early warning 
system (in a way like canary birds were used in mines as indicators of a low 
oxygen level). This use gives certain species an extra dose of instrumental value 
for us. 
This may look rather cynical and seen in a broader (non-anthropocentric) 
perspective, it is, but this is nothing we need to worry about for the moment, 
since we are investigating how far we can get with a purely anthropocentric 
approach. The conclusion must be that the “indicator-track” is a clear case, 
although of a limited scope, of value that can be a part of an explanation of why 
extermination is a problem from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view: It 
is a foretaste of what will happen to us, and if we do not want that to happen to 
us we need to do something about the cause of the extinction of the indicator 
species. If we do not do so we will eventually be harmed ourselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.5. Some non-destructive uses 
 
Not all ways of using nature to promote human values are destructive. Non-
human species also have instrumental values for us in ways that are best utilised 
by letting them be. I am thinking of values like (non-destructive) recreation, 
excitement, inspiration, aesthetic experiences, silence, solitude, psychological 
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amendment, knowledge of how the world around us works, a sense of history, 
identity, national or regional pride etc.79 
One could also mention things like religious worship, but I will not include 
that kind of value in the investigation since I want to avoid grounding the 
instrumental value of species on cosmologies or views of nature that are not 
supported by science. 
Someone might be tempted to argue that some of the values mentioned 
above (such as aesthetic value) are in fact end values. I agree that species or 
members of species can have end value. I will take a much closer look at this 
type of value in chapter 7. Here, when I talk about aesthetics and other values of 
the type listed above, what I have in mind is the instrumental value of the species 
as a means to aesthetic, recreational or other values. A tree as a motive for a 
painting or an inspiration for a poem, for example, or an ant as an object of study 
that leads to increased knowledge. The knowledge, the painting and the poem 
may in their turn have end value and/or instrumental value in relation to 
something else that has end value etc. Either way, the value of the species is 
purely instrumental in relation to the knowledge, aesthetic value etc. that we 
might gain from it. 
When the Millennium report talks about spiritual and cultural values, these 
types of value are not seen as end values. Instead they are seen as instrumental in 
relation to, for instance, social stability.80 (It is not clear whether social stability 
in turn is seen as an end value.) This means that the species have instrumental 
value in relation to some other instrumental value, which in turn is instrumental 
in relation to something else, and maybe the chain continues even further. 
Can these types of non-destructive utilisation of other species be a part of 
an answer to our question? It seems quite clear that the values mentioned above 
are important to people, and it also seems quite clear that nature or different 
objects in nature can produce these values. Natural environments with much 
variation seem to improve the quality of human life,81 and it is well known within 
environmental psychology that many people prefer environments with elements 
of nature.82 In an investigation of attitudes regarding biodiversity among the 
inhabitants of Kristianstad in southern Sweden, the values I mentioned above 
turned out to be among the most widely held reasons for protecting 
biodiversity.83 
That the values are non-destructive gives them a much stronger position as 
potential bases for preservation compared to the uses we have discussed in 
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previous sub-sections. Eating an animal means that it cannot be eaten again later 
and neither can it be enjoyed aesthetically or in some other way after the 
gastronomic value or the animal has been utilized.  If we enjoy the destructive 
values too much even the basis for renewal, i.e. the continued existence of the 
species, will be destroyed. This is not the case with the non-destructive uses we 
discuss here. 
I believe that when people criticize instrumental value as a basis for 
conservation, what they often think about is destructive instrumental value. If 
you use destructive instrumental value as an argument for conservation, what you 
actually argue for is a more sustainable but still destructive use of the species in 
question. That is, however, not the case with non-destructive instrumental value. 
When you use non-destructive instrumental value as an argument for 
conservation, you have a basis for demanding a more genuine hands-off-policy 
concerning the species in question. 
The line between destructive and non-destructive use is not entirely clear. A 
utilisation that is non-destructive when enjoyed by one person can become very 
destructive when enjoyed by too many people. 
Even so, if a species is utilised in a non-destructive way, it can be enjoyed 
more times and by more people. This in turn means that we can get more value 
out of it in the long run. This is something that talks in favour of prioritising non-
destructive uses over destructive uses in cases where we have to choose. On the 
other hand, there is less demand for the types of values we discuss here compared 
to other values we have discussed (food, medical drugs, material and fuel). This 
means that in a trade-off situation, they risk ending up quite far from the top of 
the priority-list. Things like food, medical drugs, material and fuel are also more 
basic than aesthetic value, recreation, etc. You can hear from time to time that it 
is impossible to enjoy a beautiful landscape with an empty stomach. In other 
words, in order to appreciate more subtle values, you need to first fulfil your 
more basic needs. This is probably not universally true, but it probably contains 
at least a large element of truth. This in turn has fuelled a debate about protecting 
species. It happens, for example, that a preservation project with good intentions 
ends up as a conflict between the well-off who can afford the “luxury” of 
protecting aesthetic, historical etc. values, and the less well-off who want to 
harvest the species for food or fuel, etc. This is particularly salient when the 
preservationists are Westerners whereas the species they want to preserve are 
located in the third world.84 In this situation, the values we are discussing will not 
easily counterbalance the exploitative interests from a purely anthropocentric 
instrumental point of view. 
Another problem with the kind of values we are discussing here is that they 
have a tendency to get downplayed or even neglected in trade-offs. Anders Melin 
distinguishes between two types of anthropocentrism. One that accepts this kind 
of value (which he calls “non-material values”) and one that does not. He calls 
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the former kind “ideal anthropocentrism”, and the latter kind “material 
anthropocentrism”.85 
One reason for why the non-material values tend to get downplayed is 
probably that they are difficult to quantify,86 and to assess in monetary terms.87 
This in turn is probably partly due to their relative abstractness: Food or timber is 
easier to see as a real commodity compared to inspiration or relaxation. I believe 
there is also another explanation: Things like food and timber are easier to trade 
since they represent roughly the same value for most people, while the values we 
are discussing here are more personal. 
One way in which the non-destructive values can have economically 
measurable value and which is receiving more and more attention is in the form 
of tourism. It has become increasingly clear in most societies that the type of 
value we are talking about here represents a large economic value through its 
ability to attract tourists. In the next sub-section, we shall take a closer look at 
this special case of combined experience-value/economic-value that might help 
tip the scale in favour of preservation in at least some cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.6. Tourism 
 
Tourism is often put forward as an important instrumental reason for protecting 
species.88 A species can provide instrumental value for us humans both because it 
provides us as tourists with inspiration, recreation etc, and because it generates 
income by attracting others as tourists to our area. The tourist and travel business 
is the world’s third largest branch of business.89 Nature tourism in turn is one of 
the fastest growing branches of tourism and is a large source of income in many 
countries – not least in poor countries or areas.90 The income from tourism tends 
to provide a very strong and very direct incentive for protection even for people 
who would not otherwise care for nature preservation, or would even be against 
protection of at least some species.91 This goes for instance for big predators that 
might be a threat to human beings or their life stock, but that are also very 
attractive to tourists. In many cases, both these and other animals are actually 
more economically valuable alive as tourist attractions, than they are dead.92 
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Another gain from a protection perspective is that nature tourism might also 
influence the tourists by increasing their interest in the animals or plants they see 
(maybe even in species they did not come to see but as a bonus get to see 
anyway). It might also increase their understanding of the communities in which 
the species live, and make them more sympathetic towards conservation in 
general.93 
There is a risk that tourism also contributes to the destruction, however.94 
That is why some initiatives have been developed to counter the environmental 
impact of tourism. Both the UN and other organisations have held conferences 
and compiled policy documents aiming at sustainable tourism.95 The World 
Tourism Organization (WTO) discusses the matter actively, and there are several 
different types of labelling of environmentally friendly tourism – often referred 
to as “eco-tourism”.96 Obviously, the big bulk tourism can never be in the form 
of eco-tourism, and even eco-tourism is not without negative impact. Just getting 
to the destination often requires using plenty of energy, mostly in the form of 
fossil fuels. This in turn means plenty of pollution including carbon dioxide that 
increases the greenhouse effect with a tremendous impact on the environment, 
including on other species.97 
Setting the standards for what is to count as eco-tourism is not easy, and 
there will certainly turn up borderline cases where it is difficult to say how much 
encroachment is acceptable in order to stay in business.98 It is easy to fall victim 
to the “salami-principle” – i.e. finishing off the habitat one slice at a time, where 
every single slice is not in itself a cause of concern, and where it is impossible to 
say precisely at which slice we have gone too far. 
An inherent problem with eco-tourism is that it can never be allowed to be 
too successful, measured in the number of tourists. With too many tourists, the 
wildlife experience will inevitably be lost even if the impact on the environment 
can be held at a low level. It will therefore never be able to include the large 
masses of tourists.99 It may, however, be able to influence mass-tourism by 
showing that it is possible to pursue tourism in a non-devastating form, and by 
influencing mass-tourism to raise their standards of consideration for the 
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environment, even if their standards cannot be as high as that of certified eco-
tourism. Some believe that this might be the most important benefit of eco-
tourism.100 
One problem with tourism as an incentive for protection is that it is 
selective. Only some species are attractive enough for people to spend money 
and time to see them.101 This means that tourism can only account for the 
instrumental value of a limited number of species. On the other hand one spin-off 
may, as pointed out above, be that tourists widen their interest to include a larger 
number of species. Therefore, in order to entice the customers to come back, the 
enterprises must consider a larger number of species than the original “target 
species”. It is also obvious that the popular species cannot survive in the wild in a 
vacuum. They need a habitable environment, which includes a large array of 
other species that thereby indirectly also becomes instrumentally valuable to us. 
One risk we have to consider regarding both eco-tourism and other forms of 
tourism is that the tourists get an oversimplified or maybe romanticised view of 
the area they visit.102 The opposite is of course also a risk: That the inhabitants of 
the area get an overly romanticised view of life in the west by continually seeing 
rich westerners on vacation. 
Apparently, tourism too has pros and cons as a reason for preservation. Like 
many of the previously suggested instrumental values, it is partly self-defeating 
in that it will destroy its own basis if it becomes too popular. This is a strong 
argument for proceeding with caution, but it might not be strong enough in a 
trade off between non-exploiting (or more correct “less-exploiting”) eco-tourism 
and more exploiting mass-tourism. 
The effect on people’s minds may be the most important contribution of 
tourism. This change of mind can, however, go in both directions as we saw. 
Things and events that have the effect of changing people’s minds concerning 
what they value have been labelled “transformative value” by Bryan G. Norton, 
and it might play an important role of its own when it comes to accounting for 
our intuitions concerning extinction. We will therefore devote a section of its 
own to that kind of value later in the book. 
 
 
 
                                                
100 Hanneberg 2004 pp.70f, Hellmark 2004:1 p.134, Hellmark 2004:6 p.75 
101 Ricklefs 1997 p.600 
102 Doole 2005, Hellmark 2004:3 pp.22f, Olsson 2004 p.42 
 30 
2.4. Trade off103 
 
We have seen that many species do have instrumental value for human beings, 
but we have also seen that it is not always easy to tell whether this value is strong 
enough to account for the moral indignation many of us feel when our 
encroachments in nature cause species to go extinct. Encroachments that 
contribute to the extinction of species are done for a reason, and the instrumental 
value of the threatened species has to be weighed against the value of the things 
we will have to abstain from if we are to protect the species. I.e. the instrumental 
value of a species has to compete with other instrumental values.104 To 
complicate things further, the end values for which the species are instrumental 
also have to compete with other end values. 
To preserve species can also be quite expensive – both in terms of 
expenditure and in terms of opportunity costs.105 It is at least not inconceivable 
that the costs for preservation in some instances exceed the gains, especially if 
we also include lost opportunity value. Even though many of these cases 
probably can be conferred to short-sightedness,106 or to egocentric rather than 
anthropocentric motives as we saw in section 2.3.3, we cannot assume that it is 
always so. 
One environmental philosopher who is optimistic about the possibilities of 
trade-offs to favour conservation is J. Baird Callicott. He has gone from being a 
hardcore ecocentrist to being very optimistic about the general possibilities of 
anthropocentrism to account for the wrongness of extinction. Callicott believes in 
a win-win relation with nature,107 and he believes that it is possible to “make a 
good living” while still being in harmony with nature.108 
Alan Randall is conservatively optimistic regarding the outcome of trade-
offs between human values that favour preservation and human values that tend 
to lead to the extinction of other species. He argues that cost-benefit analyses109 
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often turn out in favour of the “pro-environment” alternative.110 He does not 
(understandably) attempt to estimate how often this happens, but he draws the 
relatively modest though very important conclusion that “… commercial interests 
do not hold a monopoly on economic arguments.”111 
Norman Myers supplies us with a real life example of a fruit called 
‘durian’. It is native to Southeast Asia, and is said to be most exquisite. It 
contributes (1990) with $100 million a year to the local economies. The problem 
is that it is pollinated by one particular species of bat, which is threatened by 
different kinds of human encroachment. The swamps where the bats find most of 
their food (apart from the nectar from the durian tree), is claimed for human 
buildings. Human constructions also threaten the caves where the bats live since 
the caves are exploited for limestone used to make concrete.112 
In order then to find out whether the disappearance of the trees and the bats 
is a bad thing according to anthropocentric instrumentalism, we have to weigh 
the positive effects of the buildings against the negative effects of losing the 
durian fruit. The negative effects for human beings are that many people will no 
longer be able to enjoy this exquisite fruit, and that the local economies will lose 
about $100 million a year. The positive effects for human beings are not clearly 
spelled out by Myers, but there ought to be a non-negligible economic gain. 
People in the area will get access to new apartments, and there will be quite a few 
more jobs available. On the other hand, there ought to be quite a few jobs that get 
lost if the durian disappears. Given the information we have got, it is not possible 
to say what the total result will be. It illustrates, however, that it is seldom 
obvious whether conservation or exploitation is the most rational option in a 
particular situation from the point of view of anthropocentric instrumentalism. 
This is obviously a problem for the usefulness of this theory when it comes to 
explaining why extinction is generally seen as morally problematic – especially 
since this intuition often appears as very clear while the outcome of trade-offs are 
often very unclear. 
Some of those who have thought about the subject of trade-offs between 
preservation and other values are quite pessimistic: 
Thomas Lovejoy believes that a choice between the economic value of a 
particular species and the economic value of an encroachment turning out to 
favour the species does not happen very often.113 
Petra Andersson considers it “not unbelievable” that if we cut down the 
forest of the Parc des Volcans national park in Rwanda, and have it cultivated by 
human beings, the total sum of happiness would be larger than if we keep it 
protected.114 
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Holmes Rolston III does not believe that the commercial value of nature 
gives sufficient account for the value of nature, and that win-win situations will 
not always be possible as long as we talk in purely economic terms.115 
The economist Kenneth Hermele believes that there is an opposition 
between economic growth and species preservation, at least in a short 
perspective, but he indicates some pessimism even in the long turn.116 
On top of that, Bryan G. Norton – who in general is positive towards the 
idea that anthropocentrism favours species preservation – points out that in a 
future with more humans, the negative instrumental value of a species that, for 
example, competes with human beings for food or habitat, will increase and 
maybe even override its positive instrumental value. Therefore, anthropocentric 
instrumentalism will, according to Norton, be a continuously weaker reason for 
preservation.117 
The scenarios of the Millennium Assessment report on biodiversity show 
that many of the things we need to do in order to counter human poverty and 
enhance development, are likely to further impoverish biodiversity.118 The report 
indicates that the development paths for relieving today’s poverty, hunger and 
health problems for human beings during the next 50 years also mean continued 
loss of biodiversity (even though the worst scenario in terms of achieving the 
human welfare goals is also worst in terms of species loss).119 This means that in 
at least some situations where we have to choose between preservation and 
extinction, the alternative that implies extinction will from an anthropocentric 
instrumental point of view actually be preferable. 
The Millennium assessment group also points out that even though it is 
often possible for a community to make money through preservation by, for 
example, ecotourism or a sustainable use of forest products, the communities 
would in general make more money by exploiting the area in a way that can lead 
to a loss of species.120 They also believe that if we only consider what they call 
“utilitarian”121 reasons for protecting biodiversity, we will actually get by with a 
lower diversity than we have today.122 This means that even though we will need 
some species, we will apparently not need all of them. 
The millennium assessors conclude that win-win situations may not be as 
common as has been hoped for in situations where both conservation and 
development is at stake. They also tell us that conflict between the two is more 
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common than interplay, and they finally claim that it would be naïve to believe 
that we can always have both. The Millennium assessors therefore advise us to 
think more of how to make trade-offs between development and species 
protection.123 
This list of pessimistic assessments concerning the outcomes of trade-off 
situations shows that we may do well in being careful in what we can expect 
from anthropocentric instrumentalism as a basis for preservation. 
Norman Myers writes that our lifestyle with “cheap supplies of hamburger 
beef, hardwood timber, and other tropical forest products” is a large threat to the 
rain forest.124 This goes not just for the rain forest, but for many other habitats 
and their species as well. Considering that our demands for food and other 
utilities from nature historically have been the main cause of human induced 
extinction (both directly and indirectly through habitat destruction), maybe 
references to these demands are not the best basis for a defence of biodiversity? 
On the other hand, Myers also claims that 
 
the continuing decline of tropical forests [and we might add other 
ecosystems and species] will eventually levy a heavy price on our 
temperate-zone lifestyles, through the loss of many potential sources of 
new foods, drugs, industrial raw materials, even sources of energy.125  
 
This is also an important point that seems to be right in line with the 
statements by Sörlin referred to in the beginning of this chapter. It also 
underlines the point we have made earlier that it is not necessarily always the 
case that our wasteful use of natural resources follows from anthropocentric 
instrumentalism. On the other hand, we could not exclude that what looks 
shortsighted and wasteful may in some cases actually be the most rational from a 
strictly anthropocentric instrumental viewpoint. In order to be able to continue to 
utilise other species we have to be aware not to use them faster than they can 
reproduce themselves. If we demand large quantities at a low cost of whatever it 
is that a certain species supplies, and the species cannot sustain that demand in 
the long term, we have to ask another question: Is it better to satisfy the demand 
to a high degree for a short time, or to satisfy it to a lower degree for a longer 
time? The answer is not as obvious as proponents of a sustainable use of natural 
resources often assume. It looks quite obvious that the latter option is the best 
one in the long term especially if the total amount of good we can get from the 
species in the long term is much larger than what we can get if we choose the 
more “short-sighted” alternative. If we take the actual behaviour by consumers as 
an indicator of their interests, however, the answer seems to be that they quite 
often prefer a high degree of satisfaction of a demand for a short time rather than 
a low degree of satisfaction for a long time. This could of course be explained by 
saying that people are irrational, but it might at least to some extent also be 
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explained by the instability of people’s preferences – at least of their instrumental 
preferences. There may be different ways of satisfying our intrinsic preferences, 
and if the favoured ways of satisfying the consumers’ preferences shift – as we 
know they do – then our case for conservation will turn out to be weak. The 
durian fruit mentioned by Myers may be exquisite, but there are many delicious 
fruits, as well as other means of pleasing our taste buds, and human taste tends to 
shift. So maybe in some situations it is best from an anthropocentric instrumental 
point of view to get as much as possible out of a species while it is in fashion 
even if it means that it will disappear eventually. We also have to remember that 
technology changes. If we do not use a resource now, it might be worthless or at 
least worth less in the future when the technology has changed.126 On the other 
hand, a resource that seems worthless today might become valuable later, and 
resources that today have an instrumental value of a kind that gives most 
satisfaction if it is utilised quickly may later turn out to have another kind of 
instrumental value that would give the most value if it is exploited in a more 
sustainable manner. This further increases the uncertainty we face when we try to 
make trade-offs between values that support conservation and values that tend to 
promote extinction. 
One aspect that may be important is that the less common something is, the 
higher the price usually is. This in turn means that when a species becomes 
threatened, its market value increases and it becomes more economically 
worthwhile to exploit the species.127 On the other hand, the exploitation also 
often means a larger cost since it takes more effort to collect the last specimens 
of a species. This is not always true, however. Lovejoy uses whales as an 
example of this phenomenon, but not all species are scattered over the world’s 
oceans. Technological improvement should not be underestimated either when it 
comes to increasing our capacity to exploit smaller and more scattered 
populations. 
It seems that the answer to whether sustainable use or fast exploitation of a 
species is the best option from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view to a 
large degree depends on the nature of the instrumental value of the species – and 
especially on whether it is exchangeable. Some demands can only be satisfied in 
one way. We should therefore distinguish between exchangeable and non-
exchangeable instrumental value. Exchangeable instrumental value comes in 
degrees. The size of an instrumental value is in part determined by the size of the 
end value it serves as a means to, and in part of how effective a means it is to 
promote this value, but it is also determined by the availability and effectiveness 
of alternative means to promote the same end value. Non-exchangeable 
instrumental value has only the first dimension: Its value is decided by the size of 
the end value it is a means to. 
Some things of course have both instrumental value and end value, and 
many things have instrumental value in relation to more than one end value. 
Often we are also dealing with chains of instrumental value. Finally, some (or 
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most) things seem to have both positive and negative values that have to be 
weighed together. 
The fact that there are non-exchangeable functions does not necessarily 
mean that there are non-exchangeable species but it is not implausible that there 
are. To identify the non-exchangeable species will, however, probably be quite 
difficult and it is uncertain how many species we are talking about. It will 
certainly not be all species. 
One thing that has to be remembered when we talk about exchangeability is 
that it is not possible to assign monetary value to non-exchangeable entities. To 
assign monetary value to something implies that we have also decided how many 
or how much of some other entity it takes to achieve the same value. If we put a 
monetary value on breathable air, no matter how high, it is always possible to 
accumulate enough of something that has a lower value per unit but that in 
sufficiently large amounts can outweigh the value of the air. This would be 
absurd. If we assign the value of $1 000 000 000 to breathable air we would in 
fact be able to say that we could substitute the breathable air if we instead 
manufacture one billion copies of a $1 pen. That would obviously be absurd 
since, if we do not have any air to breath, we cannot utilise the things we have 
manufactured anyway and the pen would in effect be worthless. The only thing 
that could replace breathable air would be something that can produce the same 
benefit, not something that just produces something else of equal economic 
value. It is very unlikely that we could find something that can give us the same 
benefits as clean air. 
This complicates further the already complex process of making a rational 
trade-off according to the principles of anthropocentric instrumentalism. My 
points are that it is hard to know the outcome of all trade-offs between acts that 
preserve and acts that contribute to extinction, and in some instances it might not 
even be practically possible. When it is possible, we can, however, expect that a 
number of trade-offs might favour encroachments that contribute to extinction if 
we look at them from a purely anthropocentric instrumental perspective, even 
though they intuitively seem at least morally problematic, and often as clearly 
wrong. This in turn seems to weaken the usefulness of anthropocentric 
instrumentalism as a way of answering our question. 
One thing we have to consider though is that there is no consensus in ethics 
that the rather utilitarian way of calculating we have used in this chapter is the 
correct way of making ethical decisions. If we accept a more deontological 
approach to ethics, we have to consider the fact that sometimes the best total 
trade-off can imply unacceptable costs to certain individuals.128 It might, for 
instance, on some occasions be the case that a project that results in the 
extinction of a species turns out to give the best total outcome, but also turns out 
to be a death blow to a small rain forest tribe whose life is dependent on the 
species. In that case, the extinction might be judged as immoral by a 
deontological version of anthropocentric instrumentalism even if it is judged as 
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morally acceptable or even morally required by a utilitarian version. On the other 
hand, this argument can sometimes also go in the opposite direction. In some 
cases, private persons or companies may have to pay a high price for the public 
good of preserving the species,129 or it might turn out that a certain insect species 
supplies humanity on the whole with more positive than negative effects, but at 
the same time causes great havoc for a local population of humans. In cases like 
that a deontological ethic based on anthropocentric instrumentalism might in fact 
be in favour of letting the species go extinct or even of active extermination. 
It seems that we have to conclude that it is not possible by means of cost-
benefit analyses to say that it is always right to preserve species or that it is 
always right not to. We clearly have to consider each case separately, and not 
even in all individual cases will it be possible to answer with an acceptable 
degree of certainty. As we will soon find out, however, things are even more 
complicated. There are, for instance, some special cases of instrumental value 
that are not easily accounted for in a trade-off. In the next two sections we will 
take a look at two such value types that have been suggested to be important in 
relation to conservation issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. Choice value 
 
The Millennium report points out that the stability of ecosystems is, apart from 
its other values, also important for what they call “freedom of choice and action”, 
defined as “opportunity to be able to achieve what an individual values doing and 
being”.130 
Bryan Norton reasons along the same lines as the millennium assessors, but 
focuses more directly on species. He points out that if we sacrifice a species for 
short-term gains, we also sacrifice what he calls “future options of the human 
race”.131 
We can call the type of value that Norton and the Millennium assessors talk 
about ‘choice value’ since what is valued in both cases is a larger array of 
choices. The definition of ‘choice value’ will thus be: ‘The value something has 
because it increases the array of choices for human beings.’ Having a large array 
of choices can have both instrumental value and end value. For many it seems to 
have a rather high degree of end value.132 Here I will mainly discuss choice value 
as an instrumental value but I believe that what is said can to the most part also 
be applied on choice value as an end value. 
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The value – both end value and instrumental value – of having a large array 
of choices may be an important reason for why it is seen as immoral to contribute 
to the extinction of species. Losing biodiversity tends to imply a loss of 
choices.133 In agriculture, larger biodiversity among the domesticated species 
gives the farmers a wider array of choices with regard to future crops. Thereby, 
the farmers also become less vulnerable to changes, and gain a sense of control. 
We could argue in the same way concerning most of the usages of other species. 
A larger selection of species gives us more options to choose from. This is 
interesting because it gives us a way of dealing with one of the more tricky 
problems we have encountered in the previous chapters, viz. exchangeability. We 
noted that there might be non-exchangeable species, and there certainly are non-
exchangeable functions, but we have also noted that some goods can be supplied 
by more than one species, and even that some things (like for instance many 
materials) can be substituted by non-living substances. We can call this ‘the 
redundancy problem’ since it indicates that some species might be redundant 
from an anthropocentric instrumentalist point of view. If a large array of choices 
is valuable, however, the redundancy problem will be much smaller. A species 
that has an instrumental value and is exchangeable will thereby automatically 
also have a choice value through its contribution to our array of choices. It will 
therefore never be really redundant even if there are several other ways of getting 
hold of the same good. If we lose the species, we have still lost choice value. The 
service can be upheld even if one of the species that supplies it disappears, but 
our array of choices between different suppliers of the service is diminished. 
Redundancy will therefore be something positive since it gives us a larger array 
of choices. 
On the other hand, in many cases we lose species because of a process that 
generates something else that increases our array of choices in another way or in 
another area. Money is a kind of universal instrumental value. Money can be 
transformed into many kinds of instrumental or end values. This means that 
money is, in a way, the “ultimate choice value”. This makes money a very 
difficult competitor in all cases of trade-off when we strive for a large array of 
choices. In today’s society it seems like this particular quality in money – its 
exchangeability into most other values – has made it the most sought after 
commodity. We spend most of our lives giving other people what they want in 
order for us to get, not things we value as ends, but money.134 We can then 
exchange the money for the things we want. This looks like a detour, but instead 
of aiming directly for what we want, we go via money not only because we know 
that we can get more of what we value by earning more money (we could 
achieve that without going via money), but because the money represents many 
different values. If we exchange a horse for a cow we have got a cow, but if we 
exchange a horse for money we can chose what to buy with the money. We can 
split it into many small sums and by many less valuable things, or we can save it 
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and add to it by selling more horses, and then buy something more valuable. 
Money is more flexible than goods in that way. By exchanging a service or a 
commodity for money instead of another service or commodity, we gain choice 
value. Exchanging goods or services for money has been a manifestly successful 
way for individuals to increase their array of choices. So successful even, that it 
has a tendency to make people forget about the areas where our choices get 
diminished by the process. Sometimes it seems that we are so eager in our hunt 
for “the ultimate choice value” that we do not notice the end values or 
instrumental values we lose along the way. 
The question we have to answer is if the loss of choice value in the form of 
lost species is so bad from an anthropocentric instrumental perspective that 
encroachments that contribute to the extinction of species can be seen as morally 
problematic for that particular reason. In the light of what I just said about money 
as the ultimate choice value, it can be difficult to maintain that we, all in all, lose 
more choice value than we gain by so to speak “transferring species into money”. 
One thing that talks in favour of our case is the quite obvious fact that in 
order for money to keep its choice value, the things we like to buy for the money 
have to exist. The value of money is only as large as the value of the things you 
can buy with the money. That is why just printing more money only leads to a 
decrease of the value of the currency. In the same way, the choice value of 
money is only as great as the number of different things you can buy with the 
money. The larger the variety of things we can buy with the money, the larger the 
money’s choice value. 
We therefore have to distinguish between (A) situations where I get money 
from you in exchange for giving you my work or some existing goods or goods 
that have been transformed in a reversible way – and (B) situations where I get 
money through an act that leads to irreversible destruction or depletion of 
something else (like a species). In both cases, I increase the number of options 
for my own part by getting more money to choose how to spend. The difference 
is that in (B), I decrease the choice value of money as well as the total choice 
value for everyone (including me). I take away one thing from the world 
permanently and thereby make it impossible for anyone to utilise it.135 
When you make money in a way that causes a species to go extinct, you 
may gain in net choice value for your own part since the choice value of the 
money may be larger for you personally than the choice value of the species 
would have been. You are, however, also decreasing the number of things that 
the money represents (in the form of choices of food, material, aesthetic 
experiences, etc.) for everyone. You therefore in one way decrease the general 
choice value of money by taking away a species. It is my impression that this 
aspect is often neglected in trade-off situations even when choice value is 
considered. 
Furthermore, when you take away a species you take it away forever. It is 
sometimes argued that encroachments that destroy nature but increase economic 
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growth may not be a big problem since it is always possible to use the money we 
gain to repair the damage.136 This is not possible when we talk about extinction, 
however – at least not yet and it might never be.137 
There are attempts to resurrect extinct species by cloning, but there has not 
yet been any success. Even if it does eventually work, there are other problems. 
Reintroductions of species have a low success rate and are very costly.138 Even 
reintroductions of species that are gone from one area but still exist in other areas 
are problematic.139 Reintroduction of species that have gone extinct, and 
therefore have not had the chance to evolve during this time, must reasonably be 
even more difficult and may even cause new problems. One important problem is 
that the environment might have changed while the species was gone.140 The 
niche that the species occupied might, for example, have been taken over by 
another species.141 This means that if we reintroduce a species we are introducing 
it to a system to which it is not adapted or to a system that is no longer adapted to 
the species.142 This in turn increases the possibility that the reintroduction will 
fail. It also means that if it works, it will inevitably interfere with the new order 
in the system, and it might affect species that have evolved in new directions 
after the extinction of the species we want to reintroduce. This in turn evokes 
new ethical questions. Is it, for instance, ethically acceptable to cause the 
extinction of one species in order to reintroduce another – even considering that 
the species that disappears has evolved in a direction it would not have taken 
without our interference? If the species on the other hand had existed in the 
environment during the changes, it might have been able to adapt (unless of 
course the changes went too fast). An important limiting factor is also that 
cloning is only possible if there is preserved DNA. Another problem is that some 
species are so to speak “more than their genes”. That is to say, some of the 
information that governs their behaviour (and thereby among other things 
constitutes their role in the ecosystem) is stored not in their genes but in their 
brains, and is passed on from generation to generation by the older animals 
showing the young. This information will inevitably be lost even if the 
information in the genes can be retrieved. 
Depending on what ontological status we give to species, it might in fact 
also be impossible per definition to revive an extinct species. If we see species as 
individuals, instead of, for example, classes or natural kinds, a once extinct 
species will be gone forever even if it would be possible to create an exact replica 
of the species, just as a dead human being would still be dead even if we could 
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take his DNA and make a clone. The clone would have much in common with 
the dead person before he died, but it would not be the same person.143 
Because of these and probably also other hitherto unknown problems, 
reviving species through cloning may never be a real alternative on a larger scale 
even if it is technically possible. The irreversibility of extinction is thus 
something we must consider a reality. There is (in general) no such thing 
involved when we lose money. If we miss an opportunity to make money, we can 
with few exceptions make money some other time and some other way. If we 
destroy a species, we can probably never get it back no matter how much money 
we have. 
That a loss is forever seems to be a very important psychological factor 
when we deal with species extinction.144 The discussion we have seen here may 
be one possible explanation. 
There is one more thing we have to keep in mind when we talk about choice 
value: Choice value for human beings is clearly important, but “choice value” for 
evolution is even more important. If we diminish biodiversity, the evolutionary 
process will have fewer genomes to “choose” from.145 This in turn means that we 
decrease the probability that the particular species with the particular property we 
need for food or medicine or any of the other uses we have discussed earlier, will 
turn up. It also means that possibilities for the biological communities to adapt to 
future changes (human induced or not) will be smaller. The members of some 
species obviously do not have any choice at all. They are totally dependent on 
one type of food, host, pollen distributor, etc. Members of other specie however 
do have a choice. When one or more of the species they utilise disappear, they 
have less of a choice. This in turn can make things more difficult for them in the 
long run. The species might become less abundant and they may eventually 
disappear. If this species is important for us, it means it is also important for us 
not to diminish the number of choices for the members of the species. We will 
discuss the matter of ecosystem stability and adaptation soon but before that, we 
will discuss another type of value other species can have for human beings. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6. Transformative value 
 
Bryan Norton distinguishes between strong and weak anthropocentrism. Both are 
instances of what I would call anthropocentric instrumentalism, but they differ 
from each other in that the weak version includes a type of value not included in 
the strong version. 
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Strong anthropocentrism the way it is defined by Norton sees nature as 
valuable only to the extent that it satisfies demand values. Weak 
anthropocentrism also admits for nature to have value for us by providing 
transformative value. A demand value is something that can provide satisfaction 
for a felt preference. Transformative value on the other hand is a type of value 
that something has when it makes us examine, and possibly alter our set of felt 
preferences.146 
To illustrate the concept of transformative value, Norton gives us two 
examples: 
The first example features a teenager who really wants to go to a rock 
concert, but instead of a ticket to the rock concert, she receives a ticket to a 
concert with a symphony orchestra. As a result, she becomes very disappointed. 
The ticket does not represent a demand value for her, i.e. it does not satisfy any 
of her preferences, and she wants to give the ticket away. After having been 
persuaded by her parents to attend the classical concert, she acquires a taste for 
classical music, which continues to give her much pleasure. Thanks to the ticket, 
she alters her set of felt preferences concerning music from only including rock 
music to also including classical music. The ticket therefore represents a 
transformative value for her. 
Norton also gives us an example of negative transformative value. This 
time the example is about a child whose friends are bad for him. The time spent 
with these people ultimately changes the demand values of the child in a 
direction that relative to some other basic value is negative for him. It is therefore 
an example of a negative transformative value.147 
I interpret Norton’s use of the term ‘weak anthropocentrism’ based on these 
examples as a kind of anthropocentric instrumentalism according to which 
nature, other species, etc. have instrumental value for us not just as a means for 
achieving what we already value, but also as having the potential to change these 
values. Thereby giving us the opportunity to value different things (that 
hopefully are more worthy of our preferences), or to value more things. Nature or 
different species therefore has instrumental value according to Norton not just by 
satisfying existing preferences but also by supplying us with new ones. 
Melin agrees with Norton that there are other values in nature that do not 
appear at first sight. He does not approve of the concept of transformational 
value, however. He does not agree that this is a special type of value that nature 
has due to its ability to change our preferences. Instead, what happens according 
to Melin is that we change our preferences, which in turn increases the value of 
nature.148 
I beg to disagree with Melin on this point, however. I believe that in many 
cases of changed preferences it is not something we choose to do but something 
that happens to us – imposed on us from the outside by the experiences that 
nature (for instance) causes us to have. Even when we want to change our 
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preferences, we often need some kind of input from the outside for the change to 
happen. It is probably rare that someone manages to change his preferences just 
as an act of will. In order to make a genuine change we seem to need some kind 
of imprinting experience. I therefore think it is appropriate to talk about things 
that can help us with this transformation as having transformative value. 
Another possible objection to Norton’s idea is that if we can show that a 
transformation is for the better, then we should not need to take a detour via an 
experience. We could use the proof directly. If we cannot show that the 
transformation is for the better, then we do not know if the transformative value 
is positive or negative. 
Let us again look at Norton’s examples. According to Norton, the 
transformation in the first example was for the better and in the second example 
it was for the worse. If we can know that a taste for classical music is good, then 
why is this not enough to adopt this taste? Why did she have to actually listen to 
a concert in order for the transformation to take place? 
I believe that the main answer to this objection is the same as the answer I 
presented in relation to Melin’s objection above. I.e. it is in general not enough to 
show theoretically that a transformation would be for the better – in most cases 
we need to be exposed to some kind of emotional experience to really change our 
preferences. I believe, in fact, that our attitudes towards the environment are an 
excellent example of this. 
There is, however, also another problem. In the objection above I assumed 
that we can know whether a transformation is for the better. It is not quite clear 
what this means. According to Norton the transformation in the first example 
above is better because it promotes a value that is objectively better, while the 
transformation in the second example is negative because it promotes a value that 
is objectively worse. He fails, however, to give a satisfying answer to why the 
transformation in the first story is objectively better while the transformation in 
the second story is objectively worse. Melin makes an attempt by interpreting 
Norton’s notion of objectively better values to mean values that are considered 
felt values and not just felt values, and therefore fits better with the general 
worldview including other preferences of the person who has the value.149 
Negative transformational value is thus presumably transformations that create 
felt values that fit less well with the worldview of the valuer. This seems like a 
plausible interpretation. It also has the advantage that we do not have to resign to 
objective values, or to meta-values. 
I would also like to suggest two more specific ways in which a 
transformation can be for the better.150 They are based on two distinctions that are 
easier to make than a general distinction between positive and negative 
transformative value, but they are none the less important for our investigation. 
First I would like to distinguish between ‘less-intrusive transformative value’, 
and ‘more-intrusive transformative value’. I will let the former term refer to 
transformations where the new set of preferences is overall less intrusive than the 
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set of preferences held before the transformation. For instance because a new 
preference is formed that is of a kind that is non-intrusive, or at least has a low 
degree of intrusiveness, or because more intrusive preferences are transformed 
into less intrusive preferences. By the ‘more-intrusive transformative value’ I 
will mean a transformation in the opposite direction. The idea is that demand 
values that are less intrusive on other demand values – including the demand 
values of others – are better than more intrusive demand values. This can be 
defended from a utilitarian standpoint since they allow more value to exist 
simultaneously and thereby maximises the sum of good. It can also be defended 
from a deontological standpoint since non-intrusive values break fewer rights. 
For us it means that a species has a less-intrusive transformative value if 
experiencing the species inspires people to enjoy its non-destructive values rather 
than its destructive values, something that seems rather plausible. 
The other distinction I would like to suggest is between ‘expanding’ and 
‘reducing’ transformative value. I will use the former term to mean that the 
valuer is transformed into valuing something she did not value before and the 
latter that the valuer is transformed into not valuing something she valued before. 
This means that additive transformative value increases choice value while 
subtractive transformative value decreases choice value – not by changing 
anything in the world outside the valuer but by transforming the valuer. The 
example of the teenager who acquires a taste for classical music in addition to 
her previous taste for rock music seems to be an example of this kind of 
transformation. As we will see soon, this distinction is quite important for our use 
of transformative value as a basis for preservation. 
By including transformative value in the realm of anthropocentric values, 
Norton hopes to be able to increase the use of anthropocentric arguments in 
favour of preservation. Others seem to believe in the opposite effect. Thomas 
Anderberg and Marian Radetzki do not use the terminology introduced by 
Norton, but they still seem to be thinking of something similar to the 
transformative values identified by Norton. Both Anderberg and Radetzki believe 
that lack of the things we value in nature will transform our preferences so that 
we in the end will not miss them but rather be glad that they are gone and 
replaced by whatever we have got instead.151 Future generations might e.g. 
according to Radetzki acquire a taste for the barren artificial environments they 
may have to live in and eventually even come to prefer that type of environment 
to the natural environment. In order to support his assumption, he points out that 
many people today prefer swimming pools to the ocean even at seaside resorts, 
despite the water in the ocean being as clean as the water in the pool.152 One 
might also add that the number of people who spend their time off at a shopping 
mall is much larger than the number of people who spend it in the nearest public 
wilderness area. 
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I am not convinced that this really grants the conclusion, however. The 
facts seem undisputable but the logic is not convincing.153 Even if many people 
today actually prefer the barren monocultures of a modern city, they might, in the 
same way be able to learn to appreciate a richer environment with larger 
biodiversity if they became exposed to it in a proper way and were provided with 
the basic understanding of biology that makes it possible to get more pleasure 
from the experience. This is in fact parallel to Norton’s example: Most young 
people today would not freely go to a classical music concert, but if they were 
exposed to it and got to learn about it, many of them might acquire a taste for this 
kind of music and as a result have a wider selection of music to enjoy. The thing 
is that if you start appreciating other species, you do not have to stop enjoying 
the pleasures of modern civilisation. In the same way, by getting access to the 
latter, you do not have to give up the former. By learning to appreciate both, you 
will rather have more things to appreciate.  We therefore have a case of what I 
above chose to call ‘expanding transformative value’. 
Anderberg’s and Radetzki’s argument seems to rest on the assumption that 
we can transform away preferences and, so to speak, “get over” things we do not 
have access to anymore. It therefore seems to be a typical example of ‘reducing 
transformative value’. Both directions are probably possible also in the case of 
biodiversity, but Norton’s direction seems more enriching while Anderberg’s and 
Radetzki’s seem to make our lives less rich. Even if we learn to appreciate what 
we have got, it seems quite clear that it would be even better if we got more to 
appreciate. 
All in all it seems clear that with more diversity we can learn to appreciate 
more things and therefore have a richer life, as with the teenage girl in Norton’s 
example who learned to appreciate both rock and classical music. Anderberg’s 
and Radetzki’s reasoning might be of some comfort if we lose diversity, but 
Norton’s reasoning shows us that more diversity is still better. This ought 
reasonably to count for biological diversity as well as for diversity in musical 
styles. 
Both the expanding transformation and the less-intrusive transformation is 
something that increases value. We can therefore conclude that if species have 
the ability to transform our preferences in these directions, they have a kind of 
instrumental value that is quite important and that has to be added to the other 
forms of instrumental value that we have listed. That species have the ability to 
transform our sets of preferences in an expanding direction as well as in a less-
intrusive direction seems to me very plausible. 
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2.7. Ecosystem services 
 
In this section I will take a closer look at the indirect instrumental value species 
have due to their role in the ecosystems that they are a part of. Ecosystems 
supply us with a substantial set of services.154 These services are often referred to 
as “ecosystem services” and some of them are extremely important.155 The 
ecosystem services include regulation of the oxygen content in the atmosphere, 
running of the water, coal, nutrient, and other cycles, photosynthesis, pollination, 
seed dispersal, pest control, regulation of the climate, keeping the soil productive, 
taking care of waste products, etc.156 It is quite clear that we as human beings to a 
large degree are dependent on biodiversity in general, and on some species in 
particular to uphold the ecosystem services. The coral reefs alone are said to 
provide ecosystem services amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars by 
providing habitats for fish, cycling nutrients, protecting human settlements 
against waves etc.157 Some calculations indicate that the economic value of 
ecosystem services is twice the size of the world’s total GNP.158  
The climate, to take one example is affected in many ways by biodiversity, 
especially by trees. Many trees are very “thirsty” organisms, which means they 
play an important role in the water cycle. Through their roots, the trees draw a lot 
of water from the ground – water that is then evaporated into the atmosphere.159 
Cutting down trees can mean drought in some places, and flooding in others.160 
Ehrlich and Ehrlich mention drought in Rwanda and Egypt, and flooding in India 
and Bangladesh as results of deforestation.161 Trees also bind large amounts of 
carbon, which means that they play an important part in regulating the amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This in turn means that trees are important in 
regulating the greenhouse effect and thereby the climate.162 They also contribute 
to climate control in other ways. The leaf surface, for instance, affects the 
amount of sunlight that is reflected back from the earth. 
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We could go on for quite a long time listing ecosystem services from trees, 
but to sum it up, we can without any doubt conclude that trees are very important 
for many climate functions, and thereby for human life as we know it. 
The same type of reasoning can, in different degrees, be applied to 
organism after organism. The ecosystem services are in general as basic and as 
important as food, and are probably more important than many of the other uses 
we have discussed. Among the ecosystem services are the basic life enabling 
services like photosynthesis and the circulation of nutrients without which our 
kind of life would be impossible. 
In fact, our wellbeing is more dependent on the biotic community than 
many people are aware of.163 Some authors, in fact, recommend that we consider 
the instrumental value of other species primarily in terms of ecosystem services 
rather than as suppliers of different kinds of goods.164 For instance, Bryan G. 
Norton suggests that the goal of species preservation should be “conceived as the 
goal of protecting total diversity”.165 He even argues that the value all species 
have by being part of the total diversity is sufficient for seeing them as worthy of 
protection.166 
He is not thereby denying that different species also have their own 
instrumental value for us because of their particular features, but he sees this 
almost as a bonus – a value that can be added on top of the general value the 
species has as being a part of biodiversity.167 Apparently, by taking departure in 
total biodiversity, Norton wants to lay a ground ensuring that all species have at 
least a basic equal value that we can set against the value of other human projects 
that might be detrimental to one or more species. The “bonus” value that many 
species have on top of that just strengthens its position in relation to other human 
values even further. 
When we talk about ecosystem services, we should not forget that evolution 
itself is a kind of ecosystem service. The natural evolution goes on all the time, 
and “invents” new properties in both plants and animals, properties that can turn 
out to be very useful for us. A large number of species also increases the chance 
of finding new useful species.168 This means that all species contribute to 
biodiversity in two ways: Directly by being a part of the diversity, and indirectly 
by interacting with other species and thereby contributing to their survival and 
evolution.169 When a species goes extinct, it therefore also means a change in the 
evolutionary process since it affects the selection pressure on the remaining 
species.170 In order for this evolutionary process to continue, we need to protect 
not only the species that are potentially useful, but also the ecosystems in which 
they live and evolve, as well as other species that may evolve useful traits in the 
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future or that just contribute to the selective pressure that drives the evolutionary 
process. As Alan Randall points out, we could talk about preservation of 
evolutionary processes just as we talk of preservation of species.171 This kind of 
ecosystem service is seldom mentioned, but should not be underestimated. 
Norton reasons along these lines when he points out that species with no 
direct instrumental value may still be indirectly useful by just contributing to the 
evolution and thereby to the emergence of new species that may be useful in a 
more direct way. His idea is that diversity contributes to diversity, and at least 
some yet to be evolved species will be useful for us. Therefore, all species are 
important by merely being part of the competition that drives evolution and 
contributes to future diversity.172 
One important conclusion one might draw from this reasoning is that it is 
therefore not enough to preserve a species in just one of the areas where it 
occurs, or in a zoo or a national park. It is important to preserve it in every 
ecosystem in which it plays a part.173 Even if a species is not globally but only 
locally extinct, the humans living in the area where it is gone still suffer the 
consequences of living in an environment with lower biodiversity.174 Ulf 
Gärdenfors from “Artdatabanken”175 makes an analogy with human professions. 
It is good that we have physicians but is not enough that they exist somewhere in 
the world. We need physicians in every area where people live.176 
It has been suggested that we might be able to replace some or even all 
ecosystem services by artificial means just as we can replace, for example, some 
materials with materials from non-living nature.177 This is probably not the case 
with most ecosystem services. It seems in fact to be an important feature of 
ecosystem services that they are typically non-exchangeable.178 Lovejoy contends 
the weaker but probably sufficiently strong idea that to artificially maintain the 
ecosystem services by a human design would take a planning effort that is totally 
overwhelming both scientifically and socially, and that will not be possible in the 
near future.179 
Exchangeability was one of the things that posed a problem for the 
anthropocentric instrumental approach when we discussed the use of other 
species as resources.180 The fact that this does not apply to the same degree to 
ecosystem services makes them a stronger basis for preservation according to 
anthropocentric instrumentalism than is the case with many of the other areas of 
use. To take away an irreplaceable service ought, in short, to be more wrong 
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from an anthropocentric instrumental perspective than to take away something 
that can be substituted. 
However, even though the ecosystem services are in general not 
exchangeable, some of the species that make the ecosystems work might be 
exchangeable. Let us return to the trees for a moment: Trees are important, but 
there are many tree species, and there is a lot of overlap in their ability to provide 
different ecosystem services. This means that even though we need trees to 
regulate for instance the climate, we probably do not need all existing tree 
species for this purpose. In fact, since some species are better at this than others, 
this particular ecosystem service could provide an argument to cut down trees of 
less effective species and substitute them with trees from the more effective 
species. 
Things are not that simple, however. There are many different types of 
environments on the planet and not all tree species thrive in all types of 
environment or play exactly the same roles in all types of environment. This 
means that even if we do not need all presently existing tree species for climate 
regulation, we definitely need a fair number of them. To this we should also add 
that species depend on other species for their continued existence.181 Some tree 
species, for example, depend on other tree species. In Sweden, The Pedunculate 
oak (Quercus robur) depends on The Norway Spruce (Picea abies) to be able to 
propagate: The oak propagates by acorns that grow after they have been hidden 
by the Eurasian jay (Garrulur glandarius) who use them as winter food but 
sometimes forget where they have hidden the acorns. If the acorn is not buried, it 
will probably be eaten by squirrels (Sciurus vulgaris), deer (different species of 
Cervidae) or mice (different species of Muridae) before they get the chance to 
grow. The jays, in turn, do not nest in oak trees but need thick spruce forests to 
nest, so therefore the spruce is important for the oak.182 
We also have to remember that trees play a role in many ecosystem services 
– not just climate regulation – and they played a large role in many of the 
previous discussions, (see the sub-sections Food, Material and fuel, Medicine, 
and Tourism, not to mention Some non-destructive uses of other species above). 
The tree species that have the highest instrumental value for one particular 
service are not necessarily the same species that best performs another particular 
service. Some species are very important in some ecosystems but not in others.183 
We will therefore still need quite a large selection of species to fulfil the different 
roles. It has also turned out that monocultures are not very sustainable, which 
means that we need more than one species for each type of ecosystem. Actually, 
we need quite a lot of species to get a working ecosystem – and not just tree 
species. Trees are heavily dependent on pollination, seed dispersal (see the 
example above that not only tells us that oaks depend on spruce, but also that 
oaks depend on jays), micro fauna in the soil, fungi that live in symbioses with 
many trees, etc. In short, to secure the ecosystems services, we need species that 
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are not directly involved in the services in question, but that are necessary for the 
system to work. Agriculture has showed us that even though monocultures can be 
very productive, they cannot sustain themselves for very long without human 
help. They in fact depend on the ecosystem services they are replacing.184 Thus, 
the function of things in nature tends to depend on there being other things 
functioning in a certain way.185 This should not be a surprise since the properties 
of different species have evolved as a result of interplay with the environment in 
which they live. There seems in short to be a very intricate web of dependency 
relations where species depend on each other.186 This means that we also have the 
problem of what we might call “domino effects”. One extinction can lead to 
another and then to a third and so on.187 This means that every loss will increase 
the probability for further losses.188 The disappearance of one species can thus 
have quite large effects and a small change of the ecosystem might lead to a 
bigger change in the long term. This means that even if the species that goes 
extinct as a result of our actions is not useful for us per se, it can cause another 
species that is important for us to going extinct further down the line as a result 
of the first extinction.189 In general we do not have enough knowledge about the 
connections in nature to say that the extinction of a certain species will not lead 
to such a downward spiral of extinction.190 
Norton also argues that even though most cases of dependence are not 
absolute, a loss of species makes the system less stable, and often involves a 
decrease in the population of the dependant species, which makes it more 
vulnerable to environmental changes.191 This in turn can affect other species and 
may eventually push some species over the edge.192 For instance, when 
deforestation affects the water cycle this may lead to further extinctions.193 In a 
simulation performed by Plotnick & McKunney 1993, the result was even worse. 
It turned out that an ecosystem could, depending on the relative rates of 
speciation and extinction, fall into a situation where the death of a single species 
could lead to a mass extinction.194 
According to many biologists and environmentalists, a larger biodiversity in 
general tends to increase the stability or the resilience of the ecosystems, while a 
lower biodiversity in the same vein decreases the stability or resilience.195 
According to one study by David Tilman and J.A. Downing published 1994, 
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spots with a larger number of species had a higher resilience against drought.196 
Another study by Tilman from 1996 indicates the same thing.197 Marine 
biologists Thomas Elmqvist and Kerstin Johannesson claim in a paper from 2005 
that it is becoming increasingly clear that the loss of biodiversity is a threat to the 
production of food and different materials but also to the supply of ecosystem 
services.198 They refer to reports from several European studies that indicate that 
larger biodiversity means increased biomass production (and thereby to a larger 
amount of coal bound by the trees which is important for counteracting the 
increasing greenhouse effect), smaller leakage of nutrients from the system, 
smaller risk of invasion by alien species, and larger stability over time.199 They 
are not sure, however, if the results can be generalised to the majority of the 
earth’s ecosystems.200 They also mention the existence of several cases where 
ecosystems have “flipped” (changed dramatically), and where decreasing 
biodiversity has been part of the cause.201 It is considered beyond doubt that 
biodiversity is important for the marine ecosystems but biologists are not sure 
precisely how.202 Elmqvist and Johannesson claim that more species makes the 
ecosystem more stable,203 though Johannesson believes that far from all existing 
species are necessary for the ecosystems to work.204 In an investigation of aquatic 
trophic systems, Ichiro Aoki and Takahisa Hamamatsu show that an increase in 
biomass diversity (which is not strictly the same as species diversity although 
they often coincide) in aquatic ecosystems increases the whole systemic 
stability,205 but point out that most investigations regarding the relation between 
diversity and stability only deal with one trophic level (in general herbivorous 
societies), and that we still need more thorough investigations of the relation 
between diversity and stability in whole systems involving different trophic 
levels.206 In a simulation study performed by Kaufman et al, the authors conclude 
that the best strategy to optimise the chances of survival for all species is to 
preserve a high degree of diversity.207 
The greatest importance of species richness when it comes to ecosystem 
services are, according to some sources, to be found in its contribution to the 
long time stability and resilience of the ecosystems.208 Other sources deny any 
connection between species richness and stability, while some even claim that 
there is a negative connection. It is, for instance, pointed out by some authors that 
the high degree of specialisation in ecosystems with many species means that the 
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species are extra sensitive to changes, which ought to make systems with a 
higher degree of biodiversity less instead of more stable and less instead of more 
resilient.209 
David Tilman presents a list of investigations with very differing 
conclusions. Some support the idea that larger diversity means a higher degree of 
stability. Some point in the opposite direction, and some have found no 
connection. It should also be remembered that relatively few investigations have 
been done in this field.210 
The Biodiversity syntheses from the Millennium Assessment Report, 
concludes that there is what they call “established but incomplete” evidence that 
a lower biodiversity means a lower resilience to, and ability to recover from, 
disturbances.211 They also acknowledge that some species are much more 
important than others, and that the composition of species has turned out to be at 
least as important as the sheer number of species.212 The latter point has also been 
made by Norton who none the less sees the number as the important question to 
concentrate on when we discuss preservation.213 
To sum up before we slide too far away from ethics and too deep into 
ecology: In order to secure the ecosystem services we need working ecosystems, 
and in order to secure working ecosystems in the long term, we inevitably need at 
least some degree of biodiversity.214 However, we cannot say for sure that the 
larger the biodiversity, the better for a steady delivery of ecosystem services, and 
we can probably not say that we need all species for this purpose. We can say 
with great confidence about some particular species that they are very important 
in this respect, while the confidence is much lower regarding other species, and 
there is great uncertainty concerning many species. There is also a great 
uncertainty concerning how many species it takes to make a certain system work. 
Norton believes that the contribution of each species is in most cases very 
small. There are many species and the systems contain much redundancy.215 
Therefore, the probability for each particular species to be the one that causes the 
system to break is extremely small.216 On top of that, many threatened species are 
naturally rare, which means that their contribution ought to be even lower.217 
Norton does not believe that these problems are devastating, however. He 
presents three reasons for that: 
1. Even though there is much redundancy in most ecosystems, this is not a 
reason to be less cautious. In fact, it is the redundancy that drives the 
competition, which in turn drives evolution. Redundancy is therefore very 
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important, and even if a species is rare, it may still be an important participant in 
the evolutionary process. Naturally rare species are often naturally rare because 
of their far-reaching specialisation. If a species is extremely specialised, the niche 
it inhabits is bound to be very small. A far-reaching specialisation can, however, 
be a strong evolutionary force in relation to other species that partly compete 
within the same niche, even though they are not limited to that niche. Even the 
extinction of rare species is therefore significant in terms of decreasing 
competition in relation to the characteristics for which it is specialised. 
2. Our knowledge of the evolutionary process is in general not good enough 
to specify the importance of every species, and therefore we cannot say that a 
certain species is redundant.218 
3. As we saw above, even if the disappearance of a particular species does 
not lead to the extinction of other species, it may well lead to a weakening of 
some populations. This in turn may contribute to a process that eventually pushes 
these species over the edge.219 In other words: When we are dealing with 
extinctions, it is probably a good idea to consider that even extinctions that have 
very small, or even no discernible effects, may have the effect of taking us closer 
to the point where the ecosystem breaks down, and when we reach that point (the 
“threshold”) an extinction that otherwise would go virtually unnoticed, can have 
a tremendous effect on the ecosystem and thereby on us. 
I believe that Norton’s answers are correct and to the point, and that they 
show that even though the probability that the disappearance of a particular 
species will be devastating is quite low, this cannot be used as an argument to 
disregard the species. 
There is one salient problem with the argument from ecosystem services, 
however, viz. that many species are in fact already gone and we seem to live on 
and prosper. Is this not an argument that we did not need all these species after 
all, and that it might not be such a big catastrophe if we lose some more?220 
To this one can answer: 
A. That we do not know what we could have gained from the species had 
they not disappeared. We are obviously alive without them, but we may have had 
better lives with them, and some humans who have succumbed might have 
survived if some of the species that have disappeared still existed. 
One might also answer: 
B. That there may be a time lag so that the effects do not show until later. In 
the next chapter we will see several examples of this. That time lag in nature is 
not unusual is also confirmed by fossil records.221 
Finally: 
C. We may find an answer in the threshold that Norton mentions. We may 
be fine so far, but we do not know for how long we can go on like this. There 
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might be a threshold somewhere, and the warning signals may come too late.222 
In the worst case, we might not even know where the threshold is – which looks 
like an argument to be extra careful. I will, however, come back to this problem 
in chapter 3 where I take a closer look at this and other uncertainties we have 
encountered. 
Both answers (B) and (C) means that even if we have not been seriously 
affected by the loss of a species, future generations might be affected by the loss 
that we have caused. I will discuss the moral implications of this in chapter 4. 
The conclusion of this section is that ecosystem services are important from 
an anthropocentric instrumental perspective – at least as important as any of the 
goods and services that different species contribute with. Some of the services 
are necessary for our future existence. Many of the services also seem to be 
irreplaceable. In order for these services to work, we need a certain – probably 
quite high – degree of biodiversity. We cannot say, however, how many and 
which species are necessary for a steady supply of ecosystem services. 
 
 
                                                
222 The concept of and problems related to threshold effects and other non-linear changes will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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3. Uncertainty 
 
 
3.1. Biodiversity and uncertainty 
 
In previous chapters we have encountered many situations where our attempts to 
assess the value of other species have been hampered by uncertainty. The 
uncertainties are found on many different levels. Our knowledge and 
understanding of the species as such, interactions between species, ecosystems 
functioning and what roles different species play, is still highly incomplete and 
full of uncertainties.223 The things we do know cannot always be generalised 
from one ecosystem to another with sustained precision.224 There is also much 
uncertainty about the long-term effects and side effects of what we do to nature, 
not least about the threats to the species, and the threats that the loss of species 
implies for other species and for the ecosystems.225 As we have seen, the 
uncertainties are not in any way smaller regarding the estimates of the 
instrumental value that different products and services from nature has for human 
beings.226 What complicates it even further is that many species have not even 
been discovered yet. How can we value the services or goods they may 
supply?227 
We will hopefully be able remove some of the uncertainty by more 
thorough investigations, but to remove all the uncertainties would clearly be very 
expensive.228 In fact, to get a perfect understanding of what is going on in the 
biological world, as well as of what will happen in the long term when we make 
as fundamental changes as removing species from the system, might not even be 
possible.229 The old view of nature as a machine – a clockwork with mechanic 
precision where a particular intervention necessarily leads to a particular, 
foreseeable effect – is replaced by a more modern conception of nature as 
something dynamic and complex, uncertain and chaotic.230 We have in other 
words started to realise that the way nature reacts to our treatment is not 
completely predictable. 
Donna Maher talks about a change of science from a situation where 
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Whiteside 2006 pp.xff 
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… prediction of system behaviour was a matter of having enough data, 
to a 'science of surprise', where chaos and unpredictability are endemic, 
with stability and predictability the exception.231 
 
Sverker Sörlin makes a similar point by referring to chaos theory and 
catastrophe theory when he tells us that the old fashioned linear models will not 
help us find out at which point the decreasing ozone layer, or the greenhouse 
effect, etc. will take an uncontrollable catastrophic turn.232 He does not mention 
loss of biodiversity, but the same reasoning can probably be used here. 
One of these nonlinear phenomena that we have to consider when we are 
dealing with complex things like living beings or ecosystems is (as we have 
noted earlier), the existence of threshold values.233 Normally we assume that 
cause and effect are proportional, and can be described by some linear equation, 
i.e. a certain change in the cause leads to a corresponding proportional change in 
the effect. However, in some situations all or most of the effect takes place when 
the causation power has reached a certain value – the threshold value. In these 
cases, most changes in the causation power do not have any visible effect at all, 
but still have the important indirect effect of taking us closer to the threshold 
value. This climbing closer to the threshold value is in many cases something 
that takes place invisibly.234 For a long time we will not see any changes at all (or 
only very minute and seemingly insignificant changes) either of the object we are 
interested in, or in its surroundings. We will thus not even have any indication of 
what will happen or when. When the threshold is reached, the next change in the 
causing power, however small, will mean all the difference in the world. Then 
the up to now only latent effect will suddenly occur all at once. 
In our case, it would mean that the disappearance of a single species, or two 
or three, from an ecosystem might not result in any discernible effects on, for 
example, the ecosystem services. This may go on for a while but when a 
threshold is reached, the results could be dramatic. 
Anne and Paul Ehrlich use an analogy about a person who pops rivets from 
the wings of airplanes. He sells the rivets for 50 cents each and he defends 
himself by pointing out that: 
 
I’ve already taken 200 rivets out of this wing, and nothing has happened 
yet. Lots of planes fly with missing rivets. They build a lot of redundancy 
into jet aircraft, partly because they don’t completely understand the 
materials and stresses involved, so nobody can prove that taking another 
rivet out will weaken the wing too much.235 
 
                                                
231 Maher 1999-2000 
232 Sörlin 1991 p.255 
233 Daily 2000 p.335. Clarke 1995 p.41, Herremoës et al 2001 p.193, McGarvin 2001 p.25, Norton 1986:1 
p.123, Whiteside 2006 p.33 (Clarke talks about them as “jump effects”.) 
234 This is not always the case though. Sometimes it is indicated by something else than the effect we are 
worried about (and do not see any trace of yet). 
235 Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990 p.95 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, decreasing redundancy might have 
unwanted consequences. One consequence that we touched upon was that we 
might be approaching a threshold. The story about the rivet popper illustrates this 
problem. 
As Bryan Norton points out, the assumption of the ‘rivet popper’ that the 
absence of any accident so far is an indicator that the risk of an accident in the 
future is very low, would be true if we were talking about a series of independent 
events. The problem is that we are not. For every rivet he pops, there are fewer 
rivets left, which means that the constitution of the plane is constantly getting 
weaker. The same goes for species: For every species that goes extinct above the 
speciation rate, there are fewer species left, and the ecosystem – even the global 
system – is weakened.236 
This is typical for threshold effects. Every change in the input takes the 
system closer to the threshold even though the effect is not noticeable until we 
reach the threshold. 
Margareta Ihse extends the collection of “threshold-analogies” with an 
analogy about a hammock where the species are the threads of the fabric that will 
hold us up for a while, but bursts when the fabric gets too thin.237 This is a very 
good analogy of ecosystems as well as of the circulation of nutrients, etc. in 
nature. They can be described as a web with many intertwined threads. This 
gives the system a certain amount of stability and resilience but we do not know 
when the web gets too thin to uphold its functions. It also illustrates that the 
resisting power of nature that is due to the redundancy in the systems is never a 
guarantee against severe changes. It holds back – and hides – the changes for a 
while and lulls us into a false sense of security. It does not stop the change 
forever though. When the threshold is reached all the accumulated change occurs 
at once. 
The Ehrlich analogy points at an important difference between the natural 
disappearance of species and the high extinction rate we are facing at the moment 
due to anthropogenic interventions: Normally the species that go extinct are 
replaced by other species just like lost rivets in an airplane are replaced by new 
rivets.238 At the pace by which species disappear today, the species cannot be 
replaced fast enough, however, and we face a net loss. 
There is one important difference between the analogy with the rivets and 
the loss of species, however. Unfortunately, this difference also makes the loss of 
species much more problematic than the loss of rivets. New rivets can be taken 
from the storeroom and the lost ones can be replaced. Species on the other hand 
are replaced by evolution. Instead of being taken from a storeroom, they evolve 
from the genetic basis that already exists in the existing species. This tells us that 
in order to replace lost species with new species that have a better chance of 
survival, we need above all a large selection of genes. I.e., we need a large 
biodiversity, and that is precisely what we are losing. 
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The non-linear aspect can be brought one step further and form another 
argument to consider: Sometimes a very small change in the input can have a 
very large effect on the output. If there are effects like this in ecosystems, it must 
be a very strong argument indeed for extra caution about all interventions in the 
ecological systems – including interventions that contribute to the extinction of 
species. 
Furthermore, if we take a closer look at the evolutionary process, we will 
find that one of its inherent features is that it has no predetermined direction. It is 
not the case that the individuals of a species always get bigger or faster or more 
intelligent. The direction in which the evolution takes a certain species depends 
on its environment and on chance. The environment changes all the time, and 
what “remedy” that evolves in a certain species as an “answer” to a particular 
change in the environment depends on what its gene pool happens to have in 
store, and on which re-combinations and mutations that happen to take place. 
Which of these “remedies” in turn that eventually are favoured by natural 
selection, depends not just on one single aspect of the environment in which the 
species live, but on the total selective pressure that the environment puts on the 
species. If rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) become faster, foxes (Vulpes vulpes) 
have to evolve too, but not just in relation to the rabbits. If they evolve a quality 
that makes them better rabbit hunters but also makes them less resistant to cold 
or easier prey for the lynx (Felis lynx), they will lose out in the evolutionary 
game anyway. All species are in fact at any given moment subjected to pressure 
of many different types from many different directions, and the sources of the 
pressure are also in their turn subjected to pressure of many different types and 
from a large number of different directions – including from the species they are 
exerting pressure on. If we were going to calculate the direction of evolution for 
the fox, we would have to consider the selection pressure that is placed on the 
fox by both the lynx and the rabbit, as well as all other species that interact with 
the fox directly or indirectly as well as all the non-living forces of nature. The 
rabbit and the lynx and the other species evolve too, however, and that has to be 
taken into account. The fox is putting both the rabbit and the lynx under selective 
pressure just as they do with the fox, but that is not all. The Lynx not only eat 
foxes but also rabbits so we have to look at the pressure they exert on each other. 
The Lynx eat other prey too and the rabbit is not just hunted by the fox and the 
lynx. It therefore does not just evolve in a way that helps the rabbits cope with 
the threat from these predators, but also as a result of how the golden eagle 
(Aquila chrysaetos) evolves since they eat rabbits too, etc. The pressure from the 
lynx and the golden eagle will inevitably also affect what options the genes of the 
rabbit have when it comes to “dealing” with the threat from the fox and so on. 
Then we have to put the result we get for the rabbit back into our equation for the 
fox together with the results from other prey species for the fox, and so on and so 
forth – only to find out that while we have been busy doing these calculations the 
whole scenario has already changed. 
In short, we have a problem that is infinitely more difficult to solve than the 
“three body-problem” in physics. 
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What this tells us is that we simply cannot know for sure what will happen 
in an ecosystem in the long run when we make such a radical alteration as 
changing the species composition. 
Changing the species composition can be done in different ways. It can be 
done, for example by causing a species to go extinct as we are discussing here, or 
by putting in a new species that was not there before (but that may well result in 
other species disappearing).239 
The best literary description of the latter is probably Michael Crichton’s 
book “Jurassic Park”.240 In this book, species of animals and plants that lived 
more than 65 million years ago are resurrected and introduced in a present day 
environment. As we know, it did not work out very well in spite of the 
guarantees from John Hammond and his bio-engineers. This was of course just 
fiction. We do not know what would really happen in a situation like this, but the 
point of the story was just that: We do not know, because we cannot know. It is 
impossible to predict the results from such a project, and therefore we should be 
more cautious. To recreate pre-historic organisms is quite extreme, but many of 
the interventions we make are almost as extreme, and as we saw above, our 
possibilities of foreseeing the results are limited. The best and most frightening 
illustration in the book is probably the absolute confidence by which Mr 
Hammond and his staff guarantee the safety of the arrangement. (What is 
particularly frightening is how easy it is to recognise this unshakable confidence 
in many people in the real world.) 
Michael Crichton’s description is very illustrative and very thought 
provoking. However, there are also many real-life examples of how we have 
intervened in nature and ended up very surprised over the results.241 The rabbit 
population explosion in Australia and the drought catastrophe in Sahel in Africa 
are both described as examples of catastrophic situations caused by our ignorance 
about ecology.242 A well-known example of how human beings have deliberately 
tried to engineer nature to suit our purpose by taking away a species from the 
system, is the wolves that were hunted virtually to oblivion in North America in 
order to protect both farm animals and game animals (or to be more precise, to 
protect human farmers and hunters from the competition). This resulted in an 
explosive increase in the number of deer, which in turn caused a lot of damage to 
the ecosystems (and to the deer population). It also had a negative economic 
effect on the human population since it destroyed the grazing for domesticated 
animals such as sheep.243 
All the examples above confirm the problem of predicting what will happen 
in an ecosystem as a result of human encroachment. The lesson that seems to 
emerge from this section, is that we will probably never reach a situation where 
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we have enough information to make a fully informed decision as to which 
course of action is the most rational from an anthropocentric instrumental point 
of view. The uncertainties are sometimes used as an argument against 
conservation, and sometimes as an argument in favour of conservation.244 What 
we need is a strategy that can tell us what the most rational behaviour is from an 
anthropocentric instrumental viewpoint, given these uncertainties. In the coming 
sections we will try to find such a strategy, and we will in particular take a closer 
look at the so called precautionary principle that has been much discussed 
recently. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Dealing with uncertainty 
 
There is, as we noted in the previous section (and have seen many examples of in 
the previous chapter) much uncertainty surrounding the things we have to 
consider in order to answer our main question. We also noted that it might not 
even be possible to totally get rid of all the uncertainty, or even to reduce it to a 
reasonable level. We therefore need a strategy for how to behave in situations of 
uncertainty. Åsa Mattsson identifies four different strategies:245 
I. One strategy is not to change anything until we have a better 
understanding. At first sight, this looks like the only rational strategy: If we lack 
sufficient knowledge to make a good decision, it must be better not to make any 
decision at all – at least until we have sufficient knowledge. 
It has also been suggested that lack of knowledge as such cannot be an 
argument in favour of acting in a certain way. 246 If that is correct, it is a strong 
argument for this approach. It would also be very important for our investigation. 
Lack of knowledge regarding the future value of a species is sometimes used as 
an argument for preservation.247 That argument would be refuted if we find that 
lack of knowledge cannot be an argument for any particular strategy – including 
preservation.248 There are problems with this strategy, however. The most 
important problem is probably that deciding to wait for better knowledge is also 
a decision, and waiting must mean something. In bi-polar decisions like 
preserving or not preserving, a decision to wait must still mean that we either 
preserve or not preserve while we wait. Waiting can for purely logical reasons 
not mean that we abstain from both until we have better knowledge. The question 
is therefore: Does waiting mean that we preserve the species until we know more 
or does it mean that we exploit the species until we know more? 
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The answer to the question “what do we do while we wait” is often very 
important. In situations where we deal with irreversible changes it is extremely 
important. That the “wait and see” strategy does not have an answer to this 
question (it cannot have one – that is the very point of the strategy) is very 
problematic. What is even more problematic is that this strategy, most of the 
time, in practice means that ongoing trends are allowed to continue while we 
wait for better information. Postponing the decision is thus in reality often the 
same as a decision to continue the ongoing practice.249  
Another problem with this strategy is that it is, as we saw in the previous 
section, possible that we will never reach an understanding that is much better 
than the one we have. This means that we will not gain anything by waiting. 
Finally, we have to be aware that there is a risk involved in waiting. In 
cases where it is possible to get more information, it is in general true that 
waiting for this information before we make the decision increases the 
probability that the decision will be better when it comes. On the other hand, 
there is a risk that it will then be too late. This can, in some situations, make 
waiting a very dangerous strategy – in particular when what is at stake is 
irreversible and/or irreplaceable. 
II. A slightly different strategy is to wait for a better understanding, but at 
the same time monitor what is happening while we wait and prepare for the 
possibility of problems materialising along the way. This strategy has the same 
advantages and drawbacks as the previous one, with the difference that we are 
better prepared to deal with problems as they appear. This does not seem like a 
good solution when dealing with nonlinear and irreversible changes though since 
we will not be able to act until the problem has already appeared and then it will 
be too late. 
III. Another strategy is to act immediately on the best available information, 
and hope it is correct. By doing that we will not lose any time, but we run the risk 
that the information turns out to be incorrect. There is also the drawback that 
since we are treating our inadequate information as adequate, we leave no room 
for precautionary measures in case it turns out to be wrong. 
IV. Finally, we have the strategy of making a decision based on the 
information we have but adapting it to the uncertainties, and building in some 
precautionary measures in case events turn out differently than predicted. 
There are different versions of this strategy but the version that has received 
the most attention recently is the so-called precautionary principle. This strategy 
is recommended or even prescribed by many official sources. These include 
international declarations and treaties such as the Rio declaration, Agenda 21, the 
constitution of the European Union and many others, and also national as well as 
regional and local legislation in many countries.250 If we can show that the 
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precautionary principle is ethically and rationally in accordance with 
anthropocentric instrumentalism, or even required by anthropocentric 
instrumentalism, and if we can show that it would require that we avoid causing 
species extinction, then we will have a good answer based on anthropocentric 
instrumentalism to why it is morally reprehensible to cause extinction. 
In the next section, I will try to produce an interpretation of the 
precautionary principle that is in accordance with basic moral intuitions. In the 
section after that, I will go on and take a look at some proposed problems with 
the principle. Finally, I will try to apply it to the species problem and see first of 
all whether it is possible, and in that case, what the result would be. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. The Precautionary Principle 
 
The precautionary principle has been formulated in several different ways. The 
most common formulation is from the Rio Declaration: 251 
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.252 
 
The Rio declaration in general leaves much room for interpretation, and the 
precautionary principle is no exception.253 There is a large flora of 
interpretations, and there is still no real consensus.254 The Rio formulation has 
also been criticised for being too weak, and for not really telling us what to do, 
but only what not to do (i.e. not to use lack of scientific certainty as an excuse for 
not acting).255 Nonetheless, it can be used as a good starting point for our 
investigation. It seems that the basic idea expressed by this formulation is that 
“business as usual” is at least in some situations – viz. in situations where we risk 
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serious or irreversible environmental degradation – not the best response to 
uncertainty. 
There are other competing formulations and they too are intensely 
debated.256 One formulation that is often referred to is the so-called Wingspread 
formulation.257 It was formulated six years after the Rio formulation at a 
conference with a number of scientists, activists, etc. from different countries 
(though mostly from North America). It states the principle as follows: 
 
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause 
and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.258 
 
Contrary to the Rio formulation, the Wingspread formulation is stated as a 
positive prescription. It is also somewhat more specific than the Rio formulation 
regarding what counts as scientific certainty. Finally, it widens the scope of the 
principle by being more general regarding the kinds of threat, and also by 
including human health among the relevant considerations for application. It 
seems clear, though, that the two formulations are built upon the same basic 
intuitions. 
Other formulations point clearly in the same direction.259 Grandjean et al 
interpret the Precautionary principle as: 
 
… a tool for avoiding possible future harm associated with suspected, but 
not conclusive, environmental risks.260  
 
Per Sandin defines the basic idea of the precautionary principle as follows: 
 
… on some occasions, measures against a possible hazard should be taken 
even if the available evidence does not suffice to treat the existence of 
that hazard as a scientifically established fact.261 
According to Whiteside: 
 
… the precautionary idea in risk regulation is at work whenever 
authorities take early preventive measures to forestall a potential, 
irreversible danger, even though causal links in the chain leading to that 
danger have not yet been firmly scientifically established.262 
 
Timothy O’Riordan and Andrew Jordan state: 
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At the core of the precautionary principle is the intuitively simple idea 
that decision makers should act in advance of scientific certainty to 
protect the environment (and with it the well-being interests of future 
generations) from incurring harm.263 
 
These are some examples of how different authors have tried to identify the 
core of the precautionary principle. The formulations differ, but the basic theme 
is the same: If we suspect that something is a threat to some important values – in 
particular to human health or the environment – we should do something about it 
even when we are not totally sure that it is a threat.264 
I think it might be a good idea to get some understanding of the intuitions 
behind the principle in order to gain a better understanding of how to use it. It is 
also important for our investigation to find out whether the precautionary 
principle is justifiable from the position of anthropocentric instrumentalism. The 
formulations we have seen so far seem to be consonant with a number of basic 
moral intuitions that would justify the precautionary principle, and help us 
specify what it means and how it should be applied. I will take a closer look at 
some of these intuitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1. Promoting the positive versus avoiding the negative 
 
It might be argued as a basis for the precautionary principle, that it is more 
important to avoid things that are negative than to promote things that are 
positive.265 This intuition could explain expressions like “err on the side of 
caution”, and “better safe than sorry”. It seems that the precautionary principle 
could be interpreted along these lines,266 but is it a reasonable position to hold? 
Kuntz-Duriseti reasons from an economic perspective and claims that the 
damage from a negative economic shock is larger than the value of a positive 
economic “shock” of the same size.267 Ingar Brinck on the other hand attempts to 
give an evolutionary account of the intuition. She believes that it has been more 
important for our survival to concentrate on negative events than on positive 
events.268 
Kuntz-Duriseti does not provide any argument for his claim other than his 
intuitions, but let us take a closer look at Brinck’s idea: If we are in a situation 
where we can make a decision we are obviously alive and we have at least some 
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degree of influence over our own lives. In such cases, it might be correct that we 
from a “survival perspective” are in a situation where we have more to lose than 
to gain. On the other hand, in order to improve our evolutionary fitness, there 
seems to be quite a lot more to desire. In order to propagate our genes, and 
thereby the inclination to be more negative towards harm than positive towards 
improvements, we need to mate, something we might have to be risk-taking in 
order to be successful at. In the evolutionary game, risk-taking individuals often 
lose, but when they win, the return is high. Therefore, it is not always an 
evolutionary advantage to be more negative towards harm than positive towards 
improvements – just as it is not always an advantage to be more negative towards 
harm than positive towards improvements. It seems that from an evolutionary 
perspective there is probably room for both attitudes in a population (a mix of 
“strategies”). 
Either way, an evolutionary explanation cannot on its own tell us whether 
the intuition is morally justified. 
One problem we have to face is that it is not totally clear what it means to 
say that it is more important to avoid negative values than to promote positive 
values. In one interpretation, going from where we are to a worse position is a 
less acceptable option than not going (the same distance) from where we are to a 
better position – other things being equal but independent of where we are on the 
positive-negative scale. If we, for example, talk in terms of happiness, this 
interpretation would mean that it is always worse to make someone less happy 
than to abstain from making someone more happy to the same degree no matter 
how happy they are to begin with. If we have to choose between an option (A) 
that will prevent a decrease in the level of happiness for someone who is already 
in a bliss by 5 “units”, and an option (B) that will increase the level of happiness 
for someone in great misery also by 5 “units”, we are obliged to chose (A). This 
looks quite counter intuitive. 
Another, and stronger, interpretation says that all changes for the worse are 
more important than any change for the better. If we use the happiness example 
above and adapt it to this interpretation it would tell us that in a choice between 
an option (C) that will prevent a small decrease in happiness for someone who is 
really happy (with say 1 “unit”), and an option (D) that would largely increase 
the happiness of someone who is really miserable (with say 100 “units”), we are 
obliged to chose (C). This also looks quite counterintuitive. 
Neither is it clear how to distinguish harm from lack of improvement. When 
we talk about harm versus improvement we have to ask “in relation to what?” 
Are we talking about a harm/improvement in relation to the situation which the 
affected person is in, or are we talking about harm/improvement in relation to 
some fixed baseline, and how, in that case should the baseline be fixed?269 There 
are also other complications: If we fail to prevent a pain, would that be an 
example of a harm or of a lack of improvement? The situation is getting worse 
than it is now and could therefore be seen as a harm. On the other hand, it is a 
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matter of something that would have been in a better state if we had intervened, 
which sounds like something we have failed to improve.270 We can even question 
whether an intervention that increases someone’s pleasure is just a matter of 
improvement or if it is also a matter of preventing a lack of enjoyment that she 
would otherwise suffer – i.e. of preventing a harm.271 Apparently, it makes a 
great difference if we consider a state of the world or if we consider an ongoing 
process. 
Another problem is that it is not quite clear what it means to say that 
avoiding negative values are more important than promoting positive values. 
Important in what sense? Are we talking of the same scale when we talk of the 
importance as when we talk about the positive and negative values in the phrase 
we are investigating? It might be that we have a meta-scale according to which 
moves on the lower scale get different values depending on which way they 
move or where they are on the scale. An alternative interpretation would be that 
the question about whether negative values are more important than positive 
values is a moral question, while the values we are comparing (the positive and 
the negative values) are about personal experiences. Such a move is not easy to 
justify. Why should negative experiences carry a larger weight than positive 
experiences of the same size from a moral perspective? We need independent 
justification in order to make such a controversial statement. 
The intuition saying that it is more important to avoid negative values than 
to promote positive values may well be an important explanation for the 
popularity of the precautionary principle. However, because it is so controversial, 
and because it is in itself in need of justification, I will abstain from using it as a 
justification or as an interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2. Irreversibility 
 
One common intuition that might help us justify and understand the 
precautionary principle, is that some outcomes are considered unacceptable and 
should therefore never be risked no matter what we could gain by risking them – 
or at least we need extraordinary security against them.272 In this section, I will 
discuss this intuition, and I will concentrate on one particular outcome that is 
often mentioned as being of this particular kind – viz. irreversibility.273 It is even 
explicitly incorporated in some official formulations of the precautionary 
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principle as one of the things we should take precautionary action against.274 
Since extinction, as we have seen earlier, probably is irreversible, it would also 
have immediate relevance for our investigation. 
When Per Sandin discusses irreversibility as an aspect of precaution, he 
follows Fleming in viewing it as one of three aspects of ‘threat’ that are relevant 
for our understanding of the precautionary principle. The three aspects are: 
Severity, irreversibility and preventability.275 If the threat is not preventable, it is 
meaningless to take precautionary measures even if it is irreversible (it would not 
even be possible to identify any measures as precautionary). That severity is 
relevant seems intuitively plausible as well. The more severe an outcome is, the 
more important it must be to take precautionary measures against it. It is also 
intuitively plausible that a certain degree of severity is a necessary prerequisite 
for invoking the precautionary principle. An event that is irreversible but not 
negative hardly calls for precaution, and an event that is only slightly negative 
but can quite easily be counterbalanced by the positive effects you get from the 
process in question (or from abolishing a process), should reasonably be treated 
as one value among others and be dealt with in a normal cost/benefit-analysis. 
Sandin illustrates the importance of severity by an example of a boulder that is 
crushed in order to get gravel.276 This is clearly an irreversible act, but it is not 
very severe (or in general bad). 
In fact, irreversibility might even on some occasions be a good thing. If we 
manage to get permanently rid of some great evil, that is surely positive. 
It thus seems that irreversibility cannot be a sufficient reason for invoking 
an extra precautious decision procedure. It has to occur in combination with 
preventability and some degree of severity. Perhaps it is not that simple though. 
Can irreversibility not be considered as something that is negative in its own 
right, and thereby automatically fulfils the severity criterion just by being 
irreversible? Obviously, irreversibility can have a negative intrinsic value for 
some people, but probably not a great enough negative intrinsic value to fulfil the 
severity criteria in its own right. 
Another alternative is that something else has a very high intrinsic value, 
and that irreversible changes by necessity destroy this value. That way, 
irreversibility would not have a negative intrinsic value, but by being inherently 
destructive in relation to something that has a positive intrinsic value, the effect 
would be very similar in that irreversibility would be necessarily instrumentally 
negative. I can imagine two widely held values in relation to which irreversibility 
is necessarily negative, namely choice value and democracy. The reason why 
irreversibility is necessarily negative in relation to these two values is the same in 
both cases: An inherent feature of irreversibility is that it limits our future range 
of choices. This means that irreversibility always has a negative choice value. 
This in turn means that we take decisions on behalf of all future generations – 
decisions that they will never be able to change. Therefore, it is a democratic 
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problem as well. In relation to both these values – choice value and democracy – 
irreversibility seems to be necessarily negative. This means that if we value 
freedom of choice or democracy, the fact that a certain decision is irreversible, is 
by necessity an argument against it. 
Is this a sufficient reason for removing irreversible decisions from the realm 
of acceptable choices or at least to grant it extra ordinary treatment? I do not 
believe it is. Choice value and democracy are two of many values that might be 
affected by, and therefore should be considered in a decision. Even if they are 
important values, we may assume that they can be overridden by other values. It 
does not justify that we give irreversibility any extraordinary standing in the 
decision process. That something is a problem by necessity does not tell us 
anything about how severe the problem is. The problems we have discussed do 
not seem to be severe enough to grant irreversible changes the special status we 
are looking for. 
I do not believe we need to claim that irreversibility is a sufficient 
prerequisite for inferring the precautionary principle, however. When we are 
dealing with a problem that is severe in its own right or for some independent 
reason, and it turns out to be irreversible as well, the irreversibility can be a 
factor that enhances the problem to such a degree that it gives the problem a 
special status. Clearly, a decision that might lead to a severe problem, and that is 
also irreversible, must be treated with extra care. This could be handled by 
demanding that the burden of proof (in the form of showing that the suspicions 
are unfounded) should rest on those in favour of the irreversible alternative. 
For instance, in a situation where we suspect that a certain resource might 
become very important in the future, it seems reasonable that we should be extra 
careful not to irreversibly destroy it even if we lack strong evidence about its 
future importance. It even looks reasonable to say that if we suspect that 
something will be more important in the future than the gain we will get from 
destroying or depleting it today, then we need extra strong proof against this 
suspicion if the destruction or depletion would be irreversible. This means that 
apart from being a problem due to its special relation to choice value and 
democracy, irreversibility is also a problem when combined with something that 
may turn out to be problematic for some other reason. This brings us back to the 
discussion about the boulder: Smashing the boulder would be an irreversible act. 
Therefore, if we suspect that the boulder might turn out to be more important in 
the future than the gravel is today and in the future, then we must not destroy the 
boulder unless we have very good arguments against this suspicion. Generally, if 
we suspect that something would be of higher value in the future if it remains 
unchanged compared to the goods or services we get now and in the future from 
changing it, then we should not change it in an irreversible way unless we have 
very good arguments against this suspicion. If we go for the reversible alternative 
instead of the irreversible, we have an option to choose the irreversible 
alternative later if further investigations show that it is safe.277 
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Irreversibility can therefore in many cases of uncertainty, for instance about 
the future value of different resources, justify a change in where we place the 
burden of proof. 
Irreversibility does not just have a tendency to complicate decisions about 
resources. It seems to have effects that go even deeper. Per Sandin compares the 
precautionary principle with a decision principle used by insurance companies: 
When making business decisions, the insurance companies try to “…maximize 
expected monetary value, but only if bankruptcy is not one of the possible 
outcomes.”278  
This seems like a sensible decision principle: Use cost/benefit-analyses but 
make no decisions that if they fail will result in bankruptcy. 
The question is: What makes bankruptcy so special? Irreversibility probably 
plays a substantial part: It is bad if we lose money on a deal, but we can come 
back and make money on another deal. It is also a pity if we stay out of a deal 
that would have rendered us a great profit, but we can, in general, make money 
on another deal (even though we have lost some opportunity value). If we go 
bankrupt on the other hand, it is over.279 It is true that ordinary business 
opportunities may also be irreversible in a weak sense meaning that this 
particular opportunity will never come back. A bankruptcy seems to be 
irreversible in a stronger sense, however, since it means that the company can 
never do business again at all. I believe that what makes the stronger version 
stronger is that the change is not just irreversible but the thing that is irreversibly 
changed is also irreplaceable in relation to some important intrinsic value. A 
bankruptcy is treated as a change of this second type by the representatives of the 
company because from “the point of view of the company”, the company is 
irreplaceable. From the point of view of certain individual employees or of other 
members of the society this is not necessarily the case, but as an analysis of the 
company policy I believe the irreplaceability aspect plays the role we are looking 
for. Ordinary cost-benefit analysis may well be the most rational decision method 
when we talk about “ordinary” events such as recurring economic deals. In these 
cases, expected value is probably a good account of the long-term gain or loss, 
and extremes that happen quite seldom are in general outweighed in the long 
term by the sum of the smaller but more common events. On the other hand, if 
we are talking about bankruptcy or about the irreversible loss of irreplaceable 
life-supporting systems (the “ultimate bankruptcy”), the situation is extra tricky 
in that this particular type of effect cannot be allowed to happen even once. In 
situations like these, it seems rational to adopt an alternative strategy for 
decision-making. 
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The conclusion has to be, that apart from being inherently bad in relation to 
choice value and democracy, irreversibility also has the property of making bad 
things worse in a way that is particularly significant for both the general 
understanding of the precautionary principle and for our investigation. This goes 
especially (but not exclusively) when the thing or system in question is 
irreplaceable. That is: For situations that cannot even be allowed to occur once. 
Is irreversibility then a necessary prerequisite for applying the 
precautionary principle? The Rio formulation can be interpreted that way, but is 
it a reasonable interpretation of the principle? Suppose we substitute the smashed 
boulder in Sandin’s example with a species that is pushed to extinction. Let us 
also add the assumption that we could recreate it exactly as it was (and at the 
same time make the highly unrealistic assumptions that the problems about 
reintroduction pointed out earlier – e.g. that the environment in which it lived has 
not changed, etc. – can been avoided).  Let us also assume that the loss of the 
species has some very bad effects. 
The intuitions part ways here. On the one hand, irreversibility does seem to 
be relevant. On the other hand, if a certain state of the world is bad, then it is bad 
even if it is just temporary. If we are dealing with a species that is instrumentally 
important for us, is the state of the world not then worse for us during the time 
the species is gone even if we know that we can get it back? We would in any 
case lose what the economists call opportunity value, that is to say, opportunities 
for utilisation of the species. Some people with a disease that could have been 
cured by a medical drug from the species would die. This is bad even though we 
will be able to cure future people once we have revived the species. 
Imagine that we exterminate a species that could, but will not, be revived. It 
seems to me that this cannot be accepted at the same time as we maintain that the 
effects of an irreversible extermination are unacceptable. I therefore believe that 
it would be unreasonable to consider irreversibility as a necessary prerequisite. 
The conclusion is that irreversibility is not sufficient and not necessary for 
the precautionary principle to be justified. It does, however, provide a very strong 
justification for the precautionary principle, and it also tells us some things about 
how the principle should be interpreted: When we deal with a decision that is 
suspected to lead to severe problems and to be irreversible, then we need extra 
strong evidence against these suspicions. If we are dealing with a decision that 
might lead to the loss of a thing or a system/process/etc. that is irreplaceable in 
relation to the protection or promotion of an important value, the burden of proof 
must be extra heavy on those in favour of the decision. 
Since both severity and suspicion come in degrees, the evidence we need 
against the suspicion should also come in degrees, depending both on how strong 
our suspicion is and on the severity of the problem.280 
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3.3.3. The value of human health 
 
It is sometimes claimed that values like human health and the environment tend 
to be downplayed in traditional decision procedures.281 Threats against human 
health or the environment are also explicitly stated in many formulations of, and 
discussions around, the precautionary principle, as cases where it should come 
into play.282 
This indicates that one of the intuitions behind the principle is that human 
health and the environment need to be better protected than has been the case in 
traditional decision procedures. 
If this is correct, it means that the precautionary principle indicates a change 
of value. Not just like in 3.3.1, a change in how we weigh positive and negative 
value, but a change in what we find most important. 
Since this part of the investigation is a search for duties to protect species as 
a result of purely anthropocentric instrumental values, and I do not want to beg 
the question by building on an assumption that the environment ought to be 
protected, I will here concentrate on the idea that human health ought to be better 
protected as a basic value behind the precautionary principle. 
That human health should be highly valued from an anthropocentric 
vantage point seems obvious, but it is not obvious how it should be valued in 
relation to other human values. In cases were human health competes with other 
values some kind of trade-off must be done. Maybe one motive behind the 
precautionary principle is to be found in the way the trade-off between human 
health and other human values is normally done. It seems that the value people 
place on human life and human health is ascending, and it may therefore be a 
general intuition that when economists and decision makers make comparisons 
between human health and other human values (whether these comparisons are 
expressed in monetary terms or not), human health is assigned a value that is too 
low. Some authors believe that problems in connection with the trade-off 
between different values including human health, are a major motive behind the 
precautionary principle,283 maybe even more important than uncertainty.284 
The question that immediately arises is whether this change in value cannot 
be dealt with in a simpler way by just assigning a higher value to human health in 
an ordinary cost-benefit analysis. The answer is that the problem might be 
inherent in the model. The entire decision procedure seems to be biased to the 
disadvantage of values like human health. 
In order to be fitted into the decision model, the value of human health has 
to be translated into monetary value. How this should be done is far from clear, 
however. Values like this are notoriously difficult to express in monetary terms. 
Some even claim that it is genuinely impossible. Even so, it is frequently done, 
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though the usefulness of the result is debated.  If it is not really possible to totally 
account for the value of human health in monetary terms, then cost-benefit 
analyses will be systematically misleading in cases were human health is one of 
the affected values. 
The uncertainty whether values like human health can be totally accounted 
for in terms that are useful in cost-benefit analyses can be used as an argument to 
give these kinds of values the benefit of the doubt. 
There is also another problem: Traditionally, the burden of proof has been 
placed on those who want to decide against an enterprise that is, or has a good 
chance of being, economically profitable. It seems to be consciously or 
unconsciously assumed that economic gain is the default reason for acting or not 
acting in a certain way and very good reasons are needed for those who want to 
change or abolish a money generating practice.285 A particular preference order is 
in other words built into the process reflecting how we distribute the burden of 
proof. One important intuition behind the precautionary principle seems to be 
that this needs to be changed. 
Both this and the previous problem point in the direction of changing the 
burden of proof. This solution is, in fact, suggested quite often when 
environmental or health aspects are discussed, and it is very common to interpret 
the precautionary principle as consisting of, or at least implying, a change of the 
burden of proof.286 In the last sub-section we saw one precautionary reason (the 
risk of irreversible outcomes) for changing the burden of proof. A change in our 
priorities might be another such reason. 
It seems reasonable that the question of where we place the burden of proof 
does – and should – reflect how we prioritise between the alternatives we are 
deliberating about. It therefore also seems reasonable that the question of where 
we place the burden should be openly discussed, and should not be seen as 
something that is fixed once and for all. This applies especially since the default 
alternative is probably not the result of a thorough deliberation. The normal 
decision procedures in the form of cost/benefit-analyses are performed in terms 
of maximising economic value. It is therefore not surprising that when economic 
value is to be compared to other values, the economic value is still the default 
value, and the burden of proof is placed on the competing value. However, this 
only tells us how things have happened to evolve. It does not tell us that this 
distribution of the burden of proof is the one that best reflects our preferences. In 
order to accomplish such a distribution we have to be able to question the default 
distribution. 
The precautionary principle in the form of assigning the burden of proof in 
such a way that it tends to minimise the risks for human health, may thus be 
justified by the intuition that when human health is at stake, that should be the 
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default value instead of economic profit. That in turn means that we can interpret 
the precautionary principle as telling us that when we suspect that a decision 
might be detrimental to human health, the advocate of this suggestion should be 
assigned the burden to disprove this suspicion. In the same way as in the previous 
sub-section, it also seems reasonable to say that the burden of proof should be 
heavier the stronger the suspicion, and the more detrimental the decision is 
suspected to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.4. The cost of being late 
 
The traditional formulations of the precautionary principle, like the Rio 
formulation and the Wingspread formulation, talk about the importance of not 
waiting for conclusive evidence before taking measures, and they mention the 
importance of considering the value of what we might lose if we do not take 
measures. This looks reasonable but is not sufficient to form a justification. That 
it is important to consider the values at stake can just as well be an argument for 
taking the extra time needed to make sure that an intervention does not worsen 
the situation. In order to get to the conclusion they promote, we need an 
additional argument stressing the importance of timing when it comes to securing 
the values in question. 
We have seen that traditionally a useful or economically profitable 
substance or process can only be banned or regulated on behalf of other values 
like human health, if we have very strong evidence of the risks presented by the 
substance or process. Gathering the necessary evidence may take some time, 
however and much can happen during this time.287 The situation can grow much 
worse, and irreversible damage may occur.288 In recent history, both people and 
the environment have often suffered (and in many cases still suffer) unnecessary 
harm because the decision makers have waited for more conclusive evidence 
before dealing with the problem. The EEA report on the precautionary principle 
Late lessons from early warnings describes several such cases in detail, and the 
content as well as the title of the report states very clearly that the editors 
consider the cost of time loss to be a very important motivation for the 
precautionary principle.289 The ozone depleting CFC is one example. If we had 
not waited so long for conclusive proof that CFC destroys the ozone layer, we 
could have banned it earlier and avoided some of its long-term effects.290 
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Benzene, asbestos, and lead additives in petrol are some other well-known 
examples,291 and there are probably many more.292 
The time factor is especially important when dealing with complex things 
like ecosystems or the human body. The effects often do not show until the 
substance or process has been in use for a while (for instance because of the 
threshold effects we discussed earlier).293 This means that we will in general not 
have conclusive evidence that a substance is dangerous until it is already in the 
system (maybe in large quantities) and we may have to live with the problem for 
a long time. When we deal with nonlinear relations, it is also very difficult to 
establish a clear cause-effect relationship, and we may have to wait even longer 
than normal for conclusive evidence.294 
The idea that we under certain circumstances should not wait for conclusive 
evidence before taking action seems to be a very rational decision rule. All “real 
world” decision-makers worthy of the epithet, from stock traders to military 
commanders, know that even though it is important to have accurate information, 
it is at least as important to act in time. As a result of what we have seen in this 
sub-section, it also seems reasonable to conclude that taking action before we 
have conclusive evidence is in some cases not only acceptable, but required by 
anthropocentric instrumentalism (as it would be by any moral theory). 
This rule is also, as we saw in the beginning of this section, very central in 
all formulations of the precautionary principle. The problems connected with 
time loss is thus probably an important justification for the precautionary 
principle – maybe the most important. 
Maybe the tendency to give an unreasonably high priority to accurateness 
over acting in time, has been uncritically adopted from the realm of science and 
philosophy? In our “world”, the search for knowledge and understanding is the 
ultimate goal. In society in general, there are many other goals and the relative 
cost of losing time in relation to being wrong is sometimes much higher. 
Decision makers in society need information, and the best way of getting reliable 
information is to turn to those who have the formation of knowledge and 
understanding as their ultimate goal. However, since the goal of the decision 
makers is not precisely the same as the goal of those who provide them with 
information, we need a transformation rule. I believe it is very important that this 
is not done by changing the rules or the aims of science. Instead, we need an 
adaptor between the two realms – the realm of science and the realm of practical 
decision-making. It seems that the precautionary principle could be such an 
adaptor. 
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Timing is not just important or not important, but more often more or less 
important. I therefore suggest that we use a gradual scale just as we have done in 
the previous two sub-sections. When we make a decision where timing is 
essential and important values are at stake, we have to move our priorities further 
towards the “being-in-time” end of the “being-in-time/being-right” scale. The 
stronger the suspicion that timing is essential and the more essential we suspect it 
to be, the closer we ought to move towards the “being-in-time” end of the scale. 
The opposite is also true. The stronger the suspicion that correct 
information is essential and the more essential we suspect it to be, the closer we 
ought to be to the “being-right” end of the scale. Where the cut off point lies, i.e. 
when it is, to put it crudely, time to “stop thinking and start acting”, will then 
have to be decided in each particular case based on the relative importance of 
these two factors – timing and accuracy of information – for the value at stake. 
Since there have been quite a few cases where a lot of damage has been 
caused because regulators have waited too long before taking action, extra 
attention probably has to be given to the timing aspect for pure pedagogic 
reasons – in order to increase the awareness that timing does play an important 
role. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.5. False positives versus false negatives 
 
Scientists do not like to be wrong. In the scientific world, being wrong is, in 
general, worse than not being right. This does not only mean that scientists prefer 
to postpone their judgement until they have more evidence. It also means that 
they are biased to err in favour of false negatives over false positives. It is worse 
for a scientist’s career to be exposed as having claimed something that turns out 
not to be the case (a false positive), than to be exposed as having denied 
something that turns out to be the case (a false negative). 295 
Birgitte Wandall calls the bias towards false negatives the “conservative 
burden of proof”, since it confers the burden of proof on those who make a 
positive claim.296 She also points out that the reason for this tendency is probably 
that one of the main values guiding science is to keep the scientific corpus (the 
body of statements accepted by science) as free as possible from false 
statements.297 This is the scientific community’s own version of “erring on the 
side of caution”, and it is doubtlessly a good reason to trust science: If something 
is claimed by the scientific community to be true, it probably is true. This also 
means, however, that if the scientific community does not want to exclaim 
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something as true, it does not necessarily mean that it is false. To believe that it 
does seems to be an all too common mistake that in some situations can cause a 
good deal of harm.298 It is, after all, not obvious that the goal of avoiding false 
positives is always a super ordinate goal in society at large. In many cases where 
other values are at stake (values, like human health, that may not be basic 
epistemic values but are important values in anthropocentric instrumentalism as 
well as other moral theories), false negatives can have at least as severe effects as 
false positives. The effects of not regulating or banning something that is 
dangerous can be at least as bad from a moral point of view as the effects of 
regulating or banning something that is harmless. If we accept the intuition from 
sub-section 3.3.3 that human health needs to be assigned a higher value than has 
traditionally been the case, it is probably in many cases more important to avoid 
false negatives than to avoid false positives.299 We therefore have a case that is 
parallel to the intuition discussed above regarding the value of acting in time. 
The conclusion must also be the same: We need a decision rule that can 
compensate for the difference in goals between science and practical decision 
making,300 and the precautionary principle seems to be precisely cut out for that 
job. The cost of false negatives for a host of human values, including human 
health, seems just like the cost of time loss, to be a strong argument in favour of 
the precautionary principle: Just as it is sometimes more important to act in time 
than being exactly right, it is sometimes more important to avoid false negatives 
than to avoid false positives – depending on the values at stake. 
It is therefore reasonable to handle this intuition in a similar way: When we 
make decisions in matters where some important value is at stake (e.g. human 
health), and when we suspect that a certain decision may result in serious damage 
to this value, and when we suspect that a false negative is a more substantial 
threat to the protection or promotion of this value than a false positive, then we 
should move our priorities from being biased towards avoiding false positives in 
the direction of avoiding false negatives. 
It is important to see that it is not a matter of going from a system that is 
totally immune to false positives to one that is totally immune against false 
negatives. A system immune to false positives would not produce any statements 
about the world at all (only analytical statements would pass the test), while a 
system that is immune to false negatives would not be able to exclude anything 
other than pure contradictions. Everything would be considered as possible, and 
no possibility could ever be excluded from our considerations. 
Changing priorities from being right in the direction of acting in time can be 
done simply by taking action sooner instead of waiting for more reliable 
information, but how do we, in practice, move our priorities from avoiding false 
positives to avoiding false negatives? 
One way would be to transfer the burden of proof from those who claim 
that the practice or substance is dangerous to those who claim that it is safe in 
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relation to the values in question. Instead of asking, “is this dangerous?”, we ask 
“is this safe?”. This is the solution Wandall suggests.301 Analogously to her 
categorisation of the scientific urge to avoid false positives as a “conservative 
burden of proof”, we might call this a “precautionary burden of proof”. 
The idea of shifting the burden of proof can be interpreted as an “either/or-
solution”. Either we place the burden of proof on one side, or we place it on the 
other. I think it would be more fruitful to go for a successive solution – as we 
have done in the previous three subsections. Just as something can be more or 
less valuable, a threat can be more or less severe, and timing can be more or less 
important, avoiding false negatives can be more or less important. What we need 
is a method that allows us to change focus in proportion to the importance of 
avoiding false negatives relative to the importance of avoiding false positives. 
We need to be able to increase or decrease the burden of proof successively on 
the different sides. One way of doing it could be by moving the confidence level. 
This will by no means capture the whole problem, which is quite complex and 
involves much more than just choosing the confidence level. Moving the 
confidence level must therefore not be seen as the whole solution. It is, however, 
a relatively simple method to start with. The scientist can, for instance, supply 
the decision makers with a set of answers based on different confidence levels. 
This would allow the decision makers to choose a confidence level that fits the 
distribution of the burden of proof that is appropriate given the importance of 
avoiding false negatives in relation to false positives. At the same time, the 
scientific community can choose to include only the answers based on the most 
conservative confidence level in the scientific corpus. It would also make the 
procedure more transparent and reduce the power that scientists have over 
deciding the relative importance of avoiding false positives versus avoiding false 
negatives on behalf of the entire society. 
A weakness in this suggestion is that people lacking insight in how science 
works and what it is about, could point at the discrepancy in confidence level 
between the assertion incorporated in the scientific corpus and the assertion on 
which policy/legislation is based, and claim that the latter is not based on sound 
science or at least does not fulfil the most rigorous scientific demands. It is my 
humble hope, however, that it is possible to explain the process to these people. 
We need to point out the distinction between the scientific method and the choice 
of confidence level, and we also need to point out the difference in goals between 
science and society, i.e. keeping the scientific corpus clean on the one hand and 
protecting/promoting a host of other important values on the other. It would thus 
hopefully be possible for the public to understand that making decisions based on 
a confidence level that is less biased in favour of avoiding false positives is not 
the same as making decisions based on a less scientific method. Instead, it is a 
matter of making the scientific results more useful in relation to the different but 
just as legitimate goals of society in general. 
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3.3.6. Conclusions 
 
One important result from this section is that the precautionary principle in at 
least some decision situations seems to be acceptable – and probably even 
required – by basic moral intuitions. We have identified some such situations, 
viz.: 
* When we deal with important values that tend to be systematically 
downplayed by traditional decision methods – such as human health. 
* When we suspect that the decision might lead to severe consequences, 
especially when the consequences are suspected to be irreversible, and even more 
so when what we risk to lose is also irreplaceable. 
* When timing is important. 
* When it is important to avoid false negatives. 
As we can see, the precautionary principle is based on a number of different 
intuitions. What we call the precautionary principle is therefore a conglomerate 
of several principles that has precaution as a common denominator.302 
We have also found that precaution in relation to these intuitions is in 
general best expressed through moving the burden of proof. Since the values and 
problems we are dealing with can be more or less important or more or less 
severe, the burden of proof should be more or less heavy. In some situations it is 
rather a matter of gradually moving our priorities on the scale of timing versus 
accurateness, or on the scale of avoiding false negatives versus avoiding false 
positives depending on their relative importance for the values at stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Problems with the precautionary principle 
 
There are some frequently occurring objections to the precautionary principle.303 
It has been accused of being ill defined, un-scientific or even anti-science, of 
hindering progress, increasing the total risk instead of decreasing it, and of trying 
to substitute science-based decision making by value-based or ideology-based 
decision making. In order to come to a reliable conclusion of whether the 
precautionary principle really is in accordance with basic moral intuitions, we 
have to take a closer look at these objections. I will start with the question of 
whether the precautionary principle is too poorly defined to be of any use. 
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3.4.1. Is the precautionary principle ill defined? 
 
Many observers have pointed out that the meaning of the principle is unclear.304 
Some authors believe that this is an inherent trait in the principle,305 while others 
are confident that it is possible to come to terms with the obscurities.306 
In the previous section, we also noticed that more work is needed in order 
to clarify the precautionary principle. On the other hand, we did manage to 
identify some basic intuitions behind the principle. Based on these intuitions in 
turn, we also managed to sketch out some ideas of how the precautionary 
principle should be interpreted and implemented. 
The fact that there is more than one intuition behind the principle, and that 
the intuitions need to be accounted for in different ways, shows that what we call 
the precautionary principle is better thought of as several principles brought 
together under one heading. This may remove some of the confusion. 
Are the remaining obscurities a terminal defect in the principle? I do not 
believe they are First of all, it seems clear that much more can be done in terms 
of clarification than we have done here. What is even more important is that the 
obscurities of the precautionary principle are not more serious than in most 
ethical norms. Even if ethical norms present us with difficulties when it comes to 
interpretation and implementation, it would not be advisable to stop using them. 
We also have to be aware that to compare the precautionary principle to the 
more simplified traditional decision methods, only in terms of clarity would not 
be fair. The precautionary principle is invented in order to handle situations 
where the simpler solutions do not work. It is therefore only to be expected 
(though it is not a necessary truth) that the precautionary principle is more 
difficult to formulate in a clear and simple manner. To the extent that the 
traditional decision methods are clearer and simpler than the precautionary 
principle, it is so, to a large degree because they ignore the intuitions that the 
precautionary principle accounts for. 
In the good tradition of Ockham’s razor, simplicity makes a solution better 
than the alternatives only if the solution in question is also as good as, and as 
comprehensive as, the alternatives. A cost/benefit-analysis is not satisfying in 
those situations the precautionary principle is cut out to deal with, which means 
that its simplicity will be of no help. 
Our conclusion is that the precautionary principle is ill defined and needs 
much improvement, but the problem does not seem to be fatal, and can probably 
be improved quite a lot. The precautionary principle is also better than the 
simpler alternatives when it comes to accounting for many basic moral intuitions 
– in spite of its obscurities. 
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3.4.2. Is the precautionary principle anti-science? 
 
The precautionary principle has been criticised for being unscientific and of 
marginalising the roll of science.307 It has even been accused of being “anti-
science”.308 
The precautionary principle tells us among other things not to wait for 
incontestable scientific proof of the dangerousness of a process before we take 
action against it. This clearly looks like the principle urges us to pay less 
attention to science – at least when we are short of time. Is this not an 
unscientific – not to say anti-scientific – way of making decisions compared to 
the more traditional method of scientifically analysing the risks and putting the 
probabilities into a cost/benefit-analysis? Not necessarily. The latter method 
works best when we virtually have the knowledge we need.309 The question we 
have to answer is what to do when we do not have the information we need. 
As we saw in section 3.2, there are different strategies for dealing with 
insufficient knowledge. Two of the strategies involve that we do not intervene 
until we know more. This may well be the most prudent choice in some 
situations of imperfect knowledge, for instance, if we are in an acceptable 
situation and suspect that any change can cause serious damage if it is not 
properly thought through. However, not all situations are like that. As we saw 
before, it is not uncommon that quite severe problems have been allowed to go 
on and in some cases to become even worse because we have waited for better 
evidence. In situations like that, the strategy of waiting for better knowledge does 
not seem like a good idea. 
An alternative strategy presented in section 3.2 was to act from the best 
available information and hope it is correct. We saw then, however, that there are 
serious drawbacks in the form of risks that we do not do anything to protect 
ourselves from. 
The fourth alternative was to use the precautionary principle. The way we 
have interpreted the principle, it tells us, among other things, that in situations 
when being too late is at least as problematic as being wrong, we need to adjust 
our decisions towards the “being-in-time” end of the “being-right/being-in-time” 
scale. The adjusting should be made according to how important it is to be in 
time relative to how important it is to be right in relation to the values at stake in 
the situation we are dealing with. 
To decide the importance of being in time relative to the importance of 
being right is not easy. It is, none the less, routinely done by various decision 
makers. We do it every day. Businessmen and -women have to judge between 
being in time and being right in a market that constantly changes and where 
opportunities get lost. Military commanders have to make that kind of judgement 
as a part of almost every tactical and strategic decision, and so on. It is quite 
obvious that this kind of judgement cannot always be correct. However, if we 
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avoid the problem and simply assume that being right is the only important thing, 
then we have deliberately excluded an indisputably important dimension of the 
decision, and it is hard to see how that could be an improvement. 
What is important as well is that the precautionary principle does not 
belittle the importance of being right. It claims that it is sometimes even more 
important to be in time. It is, so to speak, better to be approximately right and in 
time than being absolutely right but too late.310 
It is also important to note that the precautionary principle does not tell us 
to stop searching for a better understanding.311 An important implication of the 
concept of precaution is that decisions should be reviewed periodically in the 
light of new scientific findings.312 This means that using the precautionary 
principle could even lead to more – not less – research being done.313 It could 
therefore be argued that in this respect, the precautionary principle is promoting 
science rather than opposing it. Without the precautionary principle, we have the 
opposite situation: As long as we lack sufficient knowledge things can go on as 
usual, while more research might find out that what we are doing is dangerous. 
This gives an advantage to those who do not produce sufficient data to make a 
risk analysis,314 which in turn seems to be a tempting incentive to block scientific 
progress. This is especially tempting in the frequently occurring situations where 
those who benefit from the practice are not the same people as those who run the 
risks if the practice turns out to be dangerous. In these cases, new information 
would be in the interest of the possible victims but not in the case of those who 
benefit from the practice. It is therefore probably tempting for those behind the 
practice to be less eager to find new information or even to try to block further 
research in the matter. 
The precautionary principle does not stand in the way of science but advises 
us on what to do about a problem while we wait for the new information and the 
better understanding. There must reasonably be a policy for that – in addition to, 
not instead of – the policy that we should try to improve our knowledge. The 
time we have to wait for better knowledge is sometimes quite long, and what 
happens during that time may have rather far reaching consequences. I cannot see 
that it is more rational to have decision makers sitting down in inertia than to 
have them act in the most rational manner possible during the time it takes the 
scientists to form a better understanding of the situation. If we see someone 
drowning and wait until we are absolutely sure that she will in fact drown if we 
do not help her, then we will probably not get there in time to save her. If our 
criteria are really strict, we may not even be convinced until we have seen her 
drown – and then it is definitely too late. I believe that in good decision-making 
we always have to weigh the advantages of high certainty against the advantages 
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of acting fast. True, acting on incomplete knowledge can worsen the situation, 
but so can inertia as we have seen. We have thus returned to the question: Which 
aspect – the being-right aspect or the being-in-time aspect – is the most important 
one in the situation at hand given the values at stake? The precautionary principle 
lets the being-in-time aspect enter the procedure without excluding the being-
right aspect. 
It could be argued that just by letting in the “being-in-time” aspect we do in 
fact marginalise science since it means that we allow for the possibility of 
moving our priorities at least to some extent away from the “being-right” aspect. 
It is also quite reasonable to believe that the quality of the decision will decrease 
if we base it on less scientific evidence.315 It can therefore not be denied that the 
precautionary principle to some extent diminishes the role of science and that 
this is bad. We have to remember, however, that not using the precautionary 
principle diminishes the time aspect and that this is bad. We are therefore back to 
the conclusion in 3.3.4: Both being-right and being-in-time is instrumentally 
valuable, but we cannot always achieve both to the same degree and sometimes 
one is more pressing than the other and it is not given beforehand that it is always 
the former. 
Sandin et al point out another thing that is important to remember when we 
discuss the relation of the precautionary principle to science: The term 
‘unscientific’ can be interpreted in a weak way and in a strong way. A decision 
is, according to this distinction, unscientific in the weak way if it does not build 
on scientific evidence, while it is unscientific in the strong sense if it disregards 
scientific evidence. Since the precautionary principle tells us what to do in 
situations where there is insufficient scientific evidence, it is unscientific in the 
weak sense of the word, but not in the strong sense.316 
We should also point out that not using the precautionary principle and 
doing nothing until we are totally sure, would, in fact, also be unscientific in the 
weak sense. It tells us to make a certain decision (in this case to wait) that is not 
based on science (remember that the reason for the suggested inertia is that we 
lack scientific evidence). 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3. Values instead of science 
 
The precautionary principle is sometimes seen as an attempt to substitute science 
with values, which is considered as a strong objection against the principle.317 
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I think it is quite clear that the precautionary principle contains value 
statements and that the motives behind the principle are a matter of values (see 
section 3.3). However, the precautionary principle is not supposed to be a 
description of the world, but a decision method. All decisions are valuations. If 
we have no values, we cannot make any decision. To say that we should do A 
rather than not-A is to say that A is better than not-A. I.e. we have made a value 
statement. Any alternative decision procedure must also be based on values, and 
as a matter of fact, the existing alternative decision procedures, like risk analysis, 
are based on values as well.318 
One important motivation behind the precautionary principle is to promote 
or protect certain values like human health, but – again – decision procedures 
that do not tell us to be particularly careful when, for example, human health is at 
stake are equally evaluative – only in another direction. Not to be particularly 
careful about human health is also a value. In section 3.3.3 we saw that the 
traditional decision methods are biased in favour of economic profit. We may 
also remember that the criteria for what statements to incorporate in the scientific 
corpus are, in fact, based on values (so called epistemic values).319 In section 
3.3.5 we saw an example in the form of the evaluation that false positives are 
worse than false negatives. The scientific community even evaluates how much 
worse a false positive is when they chose a particular confidence level. I believe 
that one of the major virtues of the precautionary principle is that it takes the 
evaluative aspect that is already there in all decisions whether we like it or not, 
and brings it out into the open and makes it a subject of discussion and 
deliberation. 
To base decisions on sound science is excellent and should always be 
strived for, and there is nothing in the precautionary principle that tells us not to 
use the best available scientific evidence, or to look for better scientific evidence. 
To hide evaluative considerations behind a veil of quasi objectivity, on the other 
hand, is not an acceptable way of making decisions, and it does not make the 
decision more scientific. It only makes it look that way and is thereby less 
honest. It has been, and still is, very easy to brand decision criteria and decision 
methods that favour the environment or human health as being evaluative while 
the promotion of economic profit is seen as the default value or even as no value 
at all. This is a way of making decisions that is worrying, and if the precautionary 
principle can contribute to bringing the hidden values out in the open, it must 
reasonably be an argument in favour of the principle – not against it. 
The precautionary principle is thus not a matter of substituting science with 
values but of substituting values with values – and of making the values more 
clearly visible. 
There is still one aspect of the precautionary principle that may be 
interpreted as substituting science with values. We have seen that when 
important values are at stake and the uncertainty is large, we should, according to 
the precautionary principle, be extra careful not to jeopardise the values. This can 
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be interpreted as saying that if the uncertainty regarding the probability part of a 
risk assessment is large, then we should give less weight to the probability part of 
the equation, and more to the value of the possible outcome. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a matter of substituting science with values 
since the precautionary principle does not tell us to stop looking for better 
predictions – or to disregard the evidence we do have. What it tells us to do is to 
distrust uncertain results (which seems like a sound scientific approach), and to 
adjust our decision method in light of the uncertainties in the predictions. 
Uncertainties concerning a scientific result must be a part of the scientific result 
and therefore accounted for by the researcher and used in the decision procedure. 
If the uncertainty is such that an error in one direction would be worse than an 
error in the other direction in relation to the values at stake, it would no doubt be 
irrational not to account for that in the decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.4. Favouring the status quo 
 
It is often claimed that the precautionary principle demands an unreasonably high 
degree of certainty from new methods and technologies, and therefore is biased 
in favour of the status quo and against progress and innovation.320 It is even 
claimed that if the precautionary principle were consistently applied, it would in 
effect lead to a halt for all innovation.321 
One part of the explanation why many people have made this interpretation 
might be that people believe ‘precaution’ to simply mean ‘prohibition’.322 That is, 
however, a clear oversimplification. Being cautious is far from the same thing as 
banning all new ideas.  Precaution also includes a lot of other things than 
prohibitions. In many cases it demands more research and innovation in order to 
deal with uncertainties regarding already existing substances or ongoing 
practices. 323 
Another explanation for why people believe that the precautionary principle 
is biased in favour of the status quo might be that people associate ‘precaution’ 
with ‘caution’ and ‘caution’ with ‘inertia’.324 The precautionary principle has 
probably been used in that way at least occasionally by political decision 
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makers.325 I do not believe that this is the proper way of using the principle, 
however. In fact, none of the classical formulations even indicate such an 
interpretation. For instance, the Rio formulation explicitly urges us to “take 
measures”. That is difficult to interpret as favouring inertia. 
If the precautionary principle told us to take precautionary measures only 
when it comes to new ideas, or demanded a higher degree of security for new 
ideas than for old,326 it would be correct to say that it is biased towards status 
quo. However, nothing in the classical formulations – or in my conclusions – 
points in that direction.327 
Consider the intuitions we discussed in section 3.3. Only the first of the 
investigated intuitions seems to indicate a bias towards status quo. If the main 
motivation behind the principle were the intuition that avoiding the negative is 
more important than promoting the positive, it would probably, depending on 
how we interpret the idea (see section 3.3.1), make sense to be more cautious 
against new ideas than against old ones.328 However, as Munthe points out, it 
would not always make sense. In some cases we could use a new invention or 
idea to stop an ongoing change for the worse. This means that even the intuition 
that the negative carries larger weight than the positive can in some cases favour 
innovation (again, depending on how the intuition should be interpreted). 
However, in most cases a precautionary principle based on the intuition that it is 
more important to avoid the negative than to promote the positive, would be 
biased towards the status quo.329 
The intuition that it is more important to avoid the negative than to promote 
the positive is, however, as we saw in sub-section 3.3.1, very controversial, and it 
suffers from problems concerning both how it should be understood, and how it 
should be justified. I therefore chose not to use that intuition in my conclusions 
of how the principle should be interpreted and applied, and I will not use it here 
to open up for an interpretation of the precautionary principle that favours the 
status quo. Even if it was used it would not be the only principle, however, and in 
most cases the other principles would probably overturn the bias for status quo 
exerted by that intuition. 
One reason why the precautionary principle has been seen as a threat to 
progress and innovation might be found in the way we define ‘progress’ or 
‘innovation’. There is a considerable difference between stopping progress or 
innovation, and redirecting them.330 The precautionary principle will probably 
stop some innovations that are deemed less safe. On the other hand, it also ought 
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to give a competitive advantage to those who develop safer alternatives, and 
thereby in fact encourage some types of innovation.331 
People who profit from a particular development probably tend to see it as a 
progress even if other people suffer from it or would gain much more if the 
development took another direction. In the same way, people who profit from a 
particular development might see any deviation from that particular development 
as an obstacle for development, period, even if it as a matter of fact means a 
promotion of other types of development. 
This is reminiscent of the problem discussed in sub-section 2.3.3 that 
decisions are often based on an egocentric definition of ‘profit’ and ‘loss’. The 
definitions of ‘progress’ and ‘innovation’ may suffer from the same problem.332 
If so, it may be that at least some of the worries regarding the precautionary 
principle are due to some people’s worries that technology will develop in a 
different direction (that is less profitable from their own perspective) rather than 
a worry that development and innovation in general will be hindered. From an 
utilitaristic viewpoint that kind of worries is unproblematic as long as the 
development is progressing in a way that is generally an improvement. From a 
deontologic viewpoint we should be able to compensate those who lose out on 
the deal – if we feel that someone should be compensated for the loss of a profit 
that otherwise would be made on behalf of the safety of the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.5. Ignoring other risks 
 
One argument that has been launched against the precautionary principle is that it 
neglects the fact that by focusing too much on one risk we may increase another 
risk or even the total sum of risks.333 According to the critics, the precautionary 
principle may, for example, urge us to spend so much money on avoiding one 
risk that we do not have enough money left to deal with other, maybe even 
larger, risks.334 It might also be that putting too much effort into avoiding a 
certain risk means that we will have to abstain from projects that would all things 
considered render more positive than negative effects. I.e. we risk losing 
opportunity value.335 It might even be that by banning one particular substance or 
process, we will end up in a situation that is actually worse.336 If we for 
precautionary reasons stop using a certain pesticide, it may increase the risk for 
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crop failure and as a result cause famine.337 If we say no to a certain genetically 
modified crop, it might lead to a continued use of pesticides and fertilisers that 
we could have avoided by genetic modification,338 and if we abstain from using a 
certain chemical because of its neurotoxicity the result may be that we instead 
use another chemical that is carcinogenic.339 
Sandin’s way of dealing with this problem is simply to be very clear that 
the precautionary principle is precautionary in relation to a particular risk, not to 
the total sum of risks.340 By being clear about this, we avoid a situation where 
people are misled to thinking that we have attacked all risks while we in fact 
have discussed one particular risk. 
Sandin’s suggestion would make the shortcomings of the principle clearer 
and therefore the principle more honest, but it does not, as Sandin admits,341 help 
us get rid of the shortcomings. If the precautionary principle persistently tends to 
increase the total risk, it does not help to point out that it is not meant to deal with 
the total risk. The principle will still be worthless and should not be used. What 
we need, in order to save the principle, is rather a formulation that acknowledges 
and handles the fact that some ways of dealing with some risks may increase 
other risks. That does not seem like an impossible task. What we have to do is to 
formulate the principle in such a way that it is applicable to the whole situation. 
I therefore prefer Sandin’s et al earlier analysis in which they point out that 
if we stress one risk too strongly and therefore neglect another risk, we have a 
too narrow horizon. They also point out that this is not just a problem for the 
precautionary principle. It is, in fact, something that has to be dealt with by all 
decision principles.342 We have the same problem if we base our decisions on the 
strategy “always try to maximise utility”: If we concentrate too much on 
maximising utility in one situation, we may fail to maximise total utility.343 This 
is not an argument against trying to maximize utility, however. It is only an 
argument against being too narrow in our considerations. The solution in this 
case is to include as many factors as we can in the decision. 
We can reason in the same way regarding the precautionary principle: If we 
concentrate too much on avoiding a certain risk, we may increase the total risk. 
This is not an argument against trying precaution, however. It is only an 
argument against being too narrow in our considerations. The solution in this 
case, just like when we talked about utility maximisation, is to include as many 
factors as we can in the decision. 
Whiteside goes about the problem in a similar manner. He points out that 
the habit of looking at risks in isolation is no more attributable to the 
precautionary principle than it is to traditional risk assessment.344 On the contrary 
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he claims, decisions under the precautionary principle are more prone to look at 
the whole picture contrary to traditional decision-making that, according to 
Whiteside, is more reductionist.345 
Including more factors seems to make the principle considerably more 
complicated. The precautionary principle is invented in order to be used in 
situations where we have incomplete information about the risks involved. This 
in turn makes it difficult to include more information in the decision. There are 
other kinds of information that can be included, however, and that would help us 
make a more rational decision regarding the total risk. If we look at the 
interpretations in section 3.3, the precautionary principle tells us to consider 
things like the values at stake, the importance of being in time, the degree of 
suspicion, etc. All these considerations can be applied to the whole situation. We 
can compare the values at stake and we can compare the importance of being in 
time for different values, etc. It makes the decision more complicated, but no 
more unfeasible than a traditional utilitarian calculation. 
Consider the example of genetic modification versus pesticides and 
fertilisers: If we say no to a certain genetically modified crop, it might lead to a 
continued use of pesticides and fertilisers that we could have avoided by genetic 
modification. If we apply the precautionary principle to the situation as a whole, 
we would have to compare the risks we run in the different situations. Let us 
assume that we know approximately what risks we run by continuing the use of 
pesticides and fertilisers, but that we only have some unconfirmed suspicions 
about the risks we would run as a result of genetic modification. If we do not 
apply the precautionary principle, the solution is simple: We do not know for 
certain that there are any risks involved in genetic modification, so we have no 
reason to avoid it. 
What, then, if we apply the precautionary principle? The principle does not 
tell us always to avoid the uncertain risk and run for the known risk. At least that 
does not follow from the conclusions in this work, and I have found nothing in 
the standard formulations pointing in that direction. Neither should we just wait 
and see while continuing with “business as usual”, or be satisfied with just 
making our decisions based on the present state of knowledge regarding the 
probabilities. Instead, the precautionary principle exhorts us to make a decision 
involving all relevant factors that were identified in section 3.3. We have to look 
at the values involved, and at how the different values can be threatened by the 
use of pesticides and fertilisers, and by genetic modification respectively. We 
would also have to factor in the uncertainties regarding our suspicion against 
genetic modification. We would of course have to look at the expected benefits 
of the different approaches – and at the uncertainties regarding our expectations 
of the benefits. We would have to consider whether any of the potential harms 
would be irreversible, and we would have to consider whether time is particularly 
important somewhere in the process, etc. All these considerations would need a 
lot of research and deliberation, and it would certainly not be possible to be 
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correct all the time. It still seems like a more rational alternative compared to 
disregarding these aspects and only looking at how well identified the risks are 
for the respective alternatives. 
In the previous sub-section, as well as in the sub-section on irreversibility in 
section 3.3, we pointed out that an important aspect of precaution is that we have 
to be prepared to re-evaluate our decision in the light of better knowledge. This is 
also relevant in relation to the present problem.346 If we chose an attitude of 
precaution, we should be able to re-evaluate and, if necessary, reverse the 
decision if better knowledge shows that it has increased the total risk. This shows 
– again – that irreversibility is an important aspect to consider when we make 
decisions that are potentially harmful. We should make sure that it is possible to 
change a decision in the light of better knowledge, and therefore try to avoid 
irreversible effects – at least when we suspect that the irreversible effects can be 
unacceptably harmful, and the more severe they are suspected to be and the 
stronger the suspicion, the more careful we should be to avoid irreversible 
effects. 
Let us finally take a look at the claim that the principle pays too much 
attention to potential harm and forgets the potential benefits.347 It is claimed that 
if we are too aversive towards risk, we will miss out on many benefits – 
something that is seen as irrational. Elliot Sober, for example, argues that most of 
us are prepared to accept a small chance for a great disaster in return for a high 
probability for a modest benefit. He makes an analogy with flying where he 
points out that most of us believe it is rational to fly in order to save time even 
though there is a small probability we will crash and even though there are safer 
but less convenient alternatives.348 He also extends this reasoning to the question 
of preservation of species, and argues that it is not rational to preserve a species 
solely because we do not know whether it may turn out to be valuable later. He 
points out that if we do not know the future value of a species, the value can just 
as well turn out to be negative.349 
Interestingly, Sober is actually contradicting himself when he turns from 
flying to species preservation since the latter is in fact not an example of how we 
put larger emphasis on harm than on benefit, but, given that he is right in his 
reasoning, instead an example of how we only consider potential benefits and not 
potential harm. 
I believe that the argument for preservation based on our ignorance of the 
future value of a species is neither a matter of emphasising potential harm over 
potential benefit, nor the opposite. I believe instead that it has to do with 
irreversibility. If the species goes extinct, we cannot get it back if we would need 
it. If we save it, on the other hand, it is easier (though not necessarily easy) to 
exterminate it later if it turns out to be harmful. 
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Nevertheless, the precautionary principle has doubtlessly in some cases 
been used in a way that gives priority to avoiding harm over promoting benefits. 
If we had accepted the intuition that it is more important to avoid negative 
events, it would be perfectly rational. Since we have chosen not to accept that 
intuition, however, there seems to be no reason why the principle should pay 
more attention to potential harm than to potential benefits. 
One alternative, or complementing, explanation as to why the precautionary 
principle has been perceived as giving more weight to potential harm than to 
potential benefits might be found in what is considered to be a ‘harm’ and what is 
considered to be a ‘benefit’. We saw above (sub-section 3.3.3) that the value of 
the environment and human health has often been downplayed in traditional 
decision methods. The precautionary principle is often evoked in situations 
where the potential benefit from a decision is economic while the potential harm 
concerns human health or the environment. It may therefore look like harm gets 
more attention than benefit by the precautionary principle. Though what actually 
happens, I believe, is that the values that have been notoriously subjected to harm 
get upgraded and better protected – not as a result of changing the way we weigh 
harm in relation to benefit, but as a result of how we value human health and the 
environment. 
Herremoës et al also point out that claims to the effect that a process has 
certain benefits actually do need more attention. Not in the way of being assigned 
more weight, but by being subject to more thorough investigation.350 They argue 
that there should be a burden of proof placed on those who point out the potential 
benefits and not just on those who point out the potential harms. 
Such a demand seems reasonable and does not presuppose an asymmetric 
weighing of positive and negative effects. On the contrary, if we put equal weight 
to positive and negative effects, it is very reasonable that the burden of proof 
should not fall exclusively on one side. Instead, claims of potential harm and 
claims of potential benefit should be subject to equally hard scrutinising. Since 
the burden of proof, up to now, has been almost exclusively placed on those who 
express worries regarding human health and the environment, and since much of 
the harm that has resulted from different projects has fallen upon human health 
and the environment. A more equal distribution of the burden of proof 
necessarily means a larger weight on those pointing out expected economic 
benefits. That does not mean that the distribution was fair before and is now 
askew, however. On the contrary, the precautionary principle, used correctly, 
corrects the prevalent distortions. 
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3.4.6. Does the precautionary principle lure us into a paradox? 
 
It has been argued that the precautionary principle demands that we forbid 
everything,351 and that this leads to a paradox by demanding that we ban every 
action as well as every non-action.352 
One of the basic features of the precautionary principle is said to be that we 
take the burden of proof from those who want a ban and place it on those who do 
not want a ban. Instead of demanding proof that something is dangerous before 
forbidding it, we demand proof that it is safe before allowing it. However, 
abstaining from an act – any act – will also involve risks, which means that we 
end up with a ban of both the performance and the non-performance of all acts. 
353 
Sandin considers this an argument against formulating the precautionary 
principle in global terms, and in favour of formulating it in terms of precaution 
against some particular potential harm.354 This will not help us though. Even if 
we concentrate on one particular harm, the decision we are considering will still 
carry some very small probability of bringing about this harm. Every act – and 
non-act – can, by some weird chain of coincidences, result in just about anything. 
For instance, we may follow Sandin’s advice and use the precautionary principle 
only for some particular risk, say the possible extinction of mankind. Me putting 
on the right shoe first instead of the left may under some extreme circumstances, 
and by some weird chain of coincidences lead to the actualisation of this risk. We 
would therefore have to prohibit me from putting on the right shoe first. In fact, 
we would also have to prohibit me from putting on the left shoe first – and from 
not putting on any shoe at all as well as from not wearing any shoes. Since all 
these alternatives have some minute probability of causing the extinction of 
mankind, we would thus be left in the dilemma we started with. 
Maybe we can adapt Sandin’s proposal to limiting the scope of the 
precautionary principle, not to one particular outcome, but to one particular 
decision. The decision can be in the form of performing a particular act or of not 
performing that act, but it cannot be applicable to both alternatives. We might 
then say that “prohibiting me from putting on the right shoe first or not putting on 
the shoes at all can have negative effects, but this does not have to concern us 
since we are only discussing precaution in relation to putting on the left shoe 
first”. This way we would avoid the paradox. It would, however, also make the 
precautionary principle rather uninteresting. 
Sandin et al do point to an important fact however: None of the 
authoritative formulations of the precautionary principle, in fact, require absolute 
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proof of safety.355 This is important, since the opponents of the principle have to 
assume that it does demand absolute, or at least, very extreme levels of proof. 
I.e., in order to end up in the situations described above, we must have an 
extreme epistemic threshold, at least when it comes to convincing us that 
something is safe. The classical formulations of the precautionary principle do 
not assume such a high epistemic threshold, however, and neither do my 
interpretation from section 3.3. The argument that the precautionary principle 
will lead to a ban of everything and ultimately end up in a paradox therefore 
looks like a “straw man-argument”. That is, it attacks an enemy that is just made 
up by those launching the attack. The paradox-objection argues against a position 
(the extremely high epistemic threshold) that is in fact not a part of the 
precautionary principle. 
We must also remember that the precautionary principle is intended to 
come into play in situations where we have some indication that the act in 
question is a threat to some important value. Just as there must be a correlation 
between the importance of a value and the proof we demand that a process is not 
a threat to this value, we also need some correlation between these things and the 
strength of the indication that the process in question might be harmful.356 
Sandin et al suggest that we apply a de minimis principle, i.e. a limit on 
how small probabilities that should be counted.357 The question is what would be 
a reasonable limit. My suggestion is that we use a flexible system in which the 
limit is decided by the value at stake, the severity of the potential harm, and the 
degree of suspicion against the process we discuss. That is to say, the more 
important the value at stake, the more severe the suspected outcome, and the 
stronger our suspicion, the lower the probability we should accept. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.7. How do we prove a negative? 
 
Shifting the burden of proof is one of the main features of the precautionary 
principle. There is one seemingly important problem, however. The problem is 
that we have an asymmetry in the very nature of “showing something to be the 
case”. It only takes one incident to show that a certain process can harm a 
particular value, while we can never be absolutely sure that a process is safe in 
relation to that particular value – especially in the long run. 
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The question is therefore: How do we prove that something is safe? In other 
words, how many negative results does it take to prove that there are no severe 
effects?358 
The answer is, once again, that this is a problem only if we have an 
extremely high epistemic threshold, e.g. if we demand absolute certainty. We 
have seen that none of the classic formulations of the principle urge us to adopt 
such an extreme threshold, and the same goes for my interpretation of the 
principle. In my interpretation it is a matter of a gradual change of the burden of 
proof in relation to the values, threats etc. that are at stake. The more valuable, 
the larger our suspicion, and the larger the suspected threat, the higher the 
threshold ought to be. Absolute certainty is not possible and cannot be 
demanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5. What can the precautionary principle do for us? 
 
Is the precautionary principle applicable to the subject of extinction? It has, in 
fact, been applied to this question by several official documents.359 In order to 
motivate the precautionary principle, the Wingspread document explicitly 
mentions extinction as one of the areas where traditional decision methods have 
failed.360 The Rio declaration does not explicitly talk about extinction, but claims 
that the precautionary principle should be used in situations of (a) serious 
damage, (b) irreversible damage, and (c) lack of full scientific certainty. These 
are all salient aspects of species extinction: The extinction of species is typically 
irreversible. There are many uncertainties concerning the species issue. There are 
suspicions that extinction will harm some very important values. There are 
nonlinear effects that increase the uncertainties,361 and make the question of 
timing extra important. If the species loss results in a loss of an ecosystem 
service, that too, will typically be an irreversible loss, and a very serious one. All 
of the things mentioned here turned out in section 3.3 to be precisely the kinds of 
things that the precautionary principle is meant to deal with. 
Bryan G. Norton compares the rivet popping analogy by Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich (see section 2.7 above), to a phenomenon called “zero-infinity 
dilemmas”.362 A zero-infinity dilemma is a situation in which the probability for 
something to go wrong is very small, while the effects if it does are 
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catastrophic.363 If too many species disappear from an ecosystem, the ecosystem 
may break down. The same could, according to Norton, be the case with the 
entire biosphere. For each single species, the probability that the extinction of 
that particular species would cause the breakdown is very small, but if it does, 
the consequences would be very serious indeed.364 
This too, looks like a good reason for applying the precautionary principle 
to the question of extinction. The important thing to note is that the principle tells 
us not to be satisfied with an ordinary risk analysis. It urges us to take into 
account the uncertainty concerning the probability (there is no way we can know 
in advance whether the species in question will be the one that causes the break 
down). It also urges us to consider both the value of the ecosystem at risk, the 
harm that may be caused to this value, the uncertainties concerning these aspects, 
and the aspect of irreversibility. It finally tells us that as a result of these 
considerations we must adjust, and quite possibly, the burden of proof for those 
who want to take the risk. 
Norton is not alone in concentrating on the possible breakdown of 
ecosystems and the loss of ecosystem services. The UN Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment group also belongs to this category. They reason in three steps: 
2. They start by pointing out that working ecosystems provide us with 
many important ecosystem services. 
3. They then stress the importance of biodiversity for properly working 
ecosystems. 
4. Finally, they argue that since so much is at stake, and since we have 
good reasons to believe that biodiversity is important for the ecosystems 
to work, but do not know exactly how, we ought to apply the 
precautionary principle. 
In our case, since the ecosystem services are very valuable and since there 
is a strong suspicion that loss of biodiversity may eventually be detrimental to 
this value, we should demand very strong evidence that the species under 
consideration will not be the one that breaks the neck of an ecosystem service. 
However, since we cannot know that in advance, we ought instead to demand 
good evidence that a certain practice will not cause extinction. 
Protection of ecosystems and ecosystem services is not the only reason to 
apply the precautionary principle to the species issue, however. Other species 
supply us with a host of different instrumental values. In some cases the 
exploitation of these values risk causing extinction of the species. As we have 
seen, exploiting a species to the degree that it goes extinct may in some cases be 
economically rational from an anthropocentric viewpoint. This is, however, 
something we do not always know for sure. In sub-section 3.3.2 we noted that 
when an act might result in an irreversible change, we need extra strong evidence 
against any suspicion that the change will result in serious problems, for 
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example, by destroying or depleting a resource that would afterwards turn out to 
be more valuable in its original state. This is clearly applicable to the situation we 
discuss here. Extinction is, as we have seen, irreversible (at least in practice if not 
in theory) and we cannot know now what the value of the species will be for 
future generations of human beings. We also have to remember that there are 
much uncertainty regarding the function of ecosystems and the relations between 
different species. We have not even discovered all species yet, and many of the 
species that are discovered are quite poorly described. Many of these species 
may, in the future, turn out to be important e.g. for medicine or agriculture,365 and 
at least some of the species for which we have found no direct use, may in the 
future evolve in such a direction that they will become useful. Some species are 
probably also important for the future existence or development of other species 
that in turn will become useful. When combined with the irreversibility of 
extinction, and with the extensive historical evidence that species have time and 
again turned out to be valuable in unexpected ways,366 it seems that we have a 
strong reason to place a rather heavy burden of proof on projects that might result 
in the extinction of species. 
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4. Future Generations 
 
Ghillean Prance believes that we would manage the rainforests very differently 
(presumably better) if we thought more about our “great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren”.367 That might be true, but do we have a moral duty to change our 
management of the rainforests out of concern for our great-great-great-great-
great-grandchildren? Do we, to put the question in terms more suitable for our 
investigation, have a moral duty to preserve species for the benefit of future 
generations of human beings? Political and legislative documents sometimes 
express such a duty. Both the Brundtland report and the Rio declaration for 
instance explicitly tell us that we do have such a duty,368 and the Swedish 
national goal for protecting plants and animals is partly motivated by a concern 
for future generations of human beings.369 In his survey of official governmental 
and intergovernmental policy texts, Mikael Stenmark has identified a general 
idea of what he calls ‘intergenerational justice’, meaning that we have a moral 
obligation to consider the needs of future generations of human beings.370 
It is not totally clear what this means. The official policy documents seldom 
state very precisely how they conceive of our duties to future generations.371 I 
think it is quite clear though, that most people do recognise some kind of moral 
duties towards future generations. It also seems quite clear that for many people 
this is a strong argument for nature conservation.372 It is not uncommon to hear 
people argue that we need to preserve nature, ecosystems or species for the sake 
of future generations. 
According to Stenmark, the idea that we have duties not just to our children 
and grandchildren, but also further into the future, was a genuinely new idea in 
international policy when it was promoted by the Brundtland report. Stenmark 
believes that the change is induced by necessity due to the new insights in our 
dependence on nature, of the possibility that some natural resources will 
eventually run out, and of the fact that there are limits to what nature can absorb 
in terms of human interference.373 He also puts his finger on the question of how 
far into the future our concerns should reach, and the question of whether our 
concern for future generations should decrease with time.374 
Our concern is whether a duty towards future human generations can 
explain at least a part of why extinction is conceived of as a moral problem. In 
order to answer that question we have to investigate whether we have such a duty 
at all, and also its possible scope and demands. These questions have been the 
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subject of an intensive debate and I will discuss here what I believe are the most 
serious objections and proposed limitations to the moral standing of future 
generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. The asymmetry problem 
 
 
4.1.1 The auditorium dilemma 
 
One salient feature in most of our relations with future generations is that they 
work only one way: Much of what we do will affect them, but almost nothing 
they do can affect us.375 Parfit illustrates our relations to future generations with 
‘the auditorium dilemma’.376 In some auditoriums, the first row can gain a better 
view by standing. Standing up is less comfortable than sitting down, but in some 
situations it might be worth the discomfort to get a better view. This presents a 
problem for the second row. They originally had a view that was good enough 
and they had no reason to endure the discomfort of standing. It was therefore in 
their interest to remain seated. If the first row stands up, however, the second row 
will not see anything. Therefore, they also have to stand up in order to regain 
their view. This will make their situation worse compared to how it was from the 
beginning. By standing up, they will have the same view as before but they will 
be less comfortable. The same goes for the row behind them and so on for the 
rest of the rows. When all rows are standing up, all but the first row will have the 
same view as before but be less comfortable. The first row will be less 
comfortable but have a better view. The result is that the first row will be better 
off while all other rows will be worse off. 
We can see this as an analogy to intergenerational relations where the first 
row is the present generation and the second row the generation after that, etc. 
What the first row does will have effects on the next generation and so on but 
what a later generation does will not affect the generation before it. 
The ‘auditorium dilemma’ differs from, for example, the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ by having one group that is untouchable by the others (being the 
“outsiders” as Parfit calls it).377 This means that there is no way we can make a 
deal that will be acceptable to everyone based on strict rational egoism. 
Another salient feature of this dilemma is that the luxury of being 
untouchable is transferred from row to row together with the bad effects of the 
acts done by the first row. This means that there is always a very strong 
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temptation for every row to deal with the problem created by the row in front of 
them in a way that makes the situation worse for the row behind them. Even 
though it is worse to stand and have a good view than to sit and have a good 
view, it is even worse to sit and have a bad view. Analogously, it is always a 
tempting alternative for every new generation to soften the impact from the 
things done by the previous generation by passing on as much as they can of the 
bad effects to the next generation. 
The auditorium dilemma is a good analogy for the case of future 
generations and natural resources, ecosystem services, etc. We can improve our 
lives by over exploiting resources (including other species) in a way that will 
affect future generations. The only thing they can do to deal with the situation we 
have put them in is to continue consuming resources as long as there are any left, 
and thereby pass as much as they can of the problem on to future generations. In 
fact, the intergenerational problem is worse than the auditorium dilemma since 
by consuming resources at a pace that exceeds the regeneration rate or by 
consuming non-renewable resources, the problem will not just be passed on. It 
will also be worsened. If we add a growing human population it will become 
even worse. 
The asymmetry problem does not present an obstacle for including future 
generations in the realm of moral objects as long as our criteria for being a moral 
object do not presuppose a reciprocal relation between the object and the agent. 
For theories that do demand a reciprocal relation – like contractualism and 
communitarianism – it is problematic however. I will therefore look at some 
attempts to fit inter-generational duties into these theories. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Contractualism 
 
Both Derek Parfit and Brian Barry claim that the asymmetry problem in fact 
shows that contractualism does not admit to duties to future generations since 
future people are not able to enter into mutual contracts with us.378 Barry Gower 
points out that it is possible to have a reciprocal arrangement between over-
lapping generations, but not between non-overlapping ones. He therefore 
concludes that there cannot, according to formal theories of justice, be such a 
thing as justice or injustice in our relations with generations further into the 
future.379 Gower’s conclusion is thus just a little weaker than Parfit’s and Barry’s, 
but he seems to agree with their main idea. 
Is this conclusion correct or is there any way in which a true reciprocal 
theory can deal with the asymmetry problem? 
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One author who believes there is such a way is Jan Narveson. According to 
him, the overlapping can be used to solve the problem also in the general case. 
There is always overlapping between generations (since one generation is born 
by the previous one), and just as one generation takes care of the next one during 
the latter’s childhood, the latter takes care of the former during their old age. 
Therefore, he claims, it is not really true that the intergenerational relations only 
work one way.380 
This could not be a general solution, however, since it cannot deal with 
situations where the time lap between the act and the effect is so long that there 
will be no overlapping between the generation that causes the problem and the 
generation that experiences it. These situations are probably not uncommon when 
dealing with environmental changes, including changes that cause species to go 
extinct, which means that Narveson’s solution is of limited use for us. 
There are also other problems that tell us that Narveson’s solution might not 
even work in the particular case where generations overlap. The relation between 
generations that Narveson points out does not, in fact, make the relation totally 
symmetrical. The parent’s care of the child takes place before the child’s care of 
the parent. There is thus still a time asymmetry. Time asymmetries always 
present a problem for theories based on reciprocity since it puts a heavy pressure 
on the trust of the first agent in the second (potential) agent, and also puts a 
heavy burden on the sense of duty of the latter to fulfil her part of the deal even 
though she has already received what she wanted. But basing the argument on 
this sense of duty would make contractualism superfluous. 
There is also another problem: If children are not well taken care of, the 
effect is in general shown immediately or at least within the lifetime of the 
parent. This is not always the case when we deal with environmental problems, 
and when it is the case it tends to make the intergenerational aspect less 
interesting. If the consequences turn up within the lifetime of the causing 
generation we do not need to involve duties to future generations in order to 
establish that there is a moral problem. 
There might be a certain degree of interesting overlapping though, since it 
is possible that the bad consequences begin to show in the later years of the 
inflicting generation without outweighing the earlier benefits they have already 
gotten, while the younger generation will have to live with the negative 
consequences for a long time. In these cases, contractualism would give us a 
reason to constrain ourselves in our dealings with nature, since the members of 
the future generation still have time to retaliate if we break the hypothetical 
contract. 
The negative effects often do not turn up until after the inflictors are dead, 
however, and if they turn up earlier, they might still not overshadow the positive 
effects until later. This is probably the most common setup in cases of human 
inflicted extinction. It normally takes a while for a species to disappear 
completely after a fatal blow, and the disappearance of one species will not 
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always have any perceptible effect (consider the threshold effects discussed 
earlier).381 In these situations, we lack the overlapping that Narveson’s argument 
hinges on. 
Another possibility is mentioned by Brenda Almond. She suggests – 
inspired by Dworkins and Rawls – that justice obliges us to repay future 
generations for what we got from past generations.382 
I am not convinced that this can help us solve the problem. How can justice 
demand that we pay back – not to those we received the benefit from – but to 
someone else? 
There is also another serious problem: We live in a world with an 
increasing greenhouse effect as a result of what our parents and grandparents did. 
Would that make it all right for us to increase the greenhouse effect further? Are 
we even obliged to do it and thereby punish future generations for the acts of 
previous generations in order for justice to be done? Previous generations have 
driven a large number of species to extinction. This could, if we follow Almond’s 
idea, be a reason or even an obligation for us to do the same. 
One could say that we should do to future generations what we wish that 
previous generations had done for us, but this cannot be defended from the point 
of view of rational selfishness. We are back where we started: We need an 
account of moral standing for future generations that does not depend on what we 
can actually get from them in terms of benefits or retaliation. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3. The veil of ignorance 
 
Christian Munthe and Anders Melin are of the same mind as Parfit and Barry 
when it comes to contractualism in general, but they believe that John Rawls’s 
version is more successful and can actually account for moral duties to future 
persons.383 
The persons behind the veil of ignorance do not know to which generation 
they belong.384 “They must choose principles the consequences of which they are 
prepared to live with whatever generation they turn out to belong to.”385 The idea 
is that they will therefore prefer an equitable distribution of resources between 
generations as well as within generations.386 
Initially, this seems plausible given the idea of a veil of ignorance. There 
are, however, problems that we need to look into. I will start with a problem that 
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I believe is of crucial importance if we are to establish a just distribution of 
resources between generations. The people in the original position do not know 
to what generation they will belong, but do they know how many generations the 
resources are supposed to be distributed among and how large each generation 
will be? Rawls does not mention anything about this, and to assume such 
knowledge would be utterly unrealistic. We do not even have this knowledge in 
the real world. If the people in the original position do not know these things, 
how can they decide what will be a just distribution? Robin Attfield believes that 
the impossibility to know is a serious problem for Rawls’ theory – especially 
since the number of generations will partly depend on the decisions of earlier 
generations.387 
Luper-Foy believes that the people behind the veil will adopt a policy 
regarding, for example, consumption and pollution that can be indefinitely 
sustainable.388 Such a policy would take care of this problem even though it 
would be suboptimal for the people behind the veil. It is not optimal since it puts 
harder restrictions on people than would be necessary if they knew how many 
generations there would be, but given that they do not know and given that no 
one would like to be born in generation X+1 after having agreed to base the 
calculations on X generations, this principle still seems rational given the original 
position.389 
Luper-Foy’s suggestion would not take care of the problem regarding the 
number of people per generation. We could, of course, quite simply transform the 
idea of infinite sustainability into a policy that assumes an infinite number of 
people. The problem is that such a policy would not allow for any consumption 
at all. A better solution would be to approach the question of population size 
from a prescriptive rather than a descriptive angle; that is, the problem could be 
solved by having the people behind the veil of ignorance adopting a policy for 
how large a generation is allowed to be. 
An alternative way to solve both problems would be to assume that 
everyone that will ever live takes part in the decision behind the veil. This, 
however, is forbidden by Rawls in his restrictions for the veil of ignorance. He 
presents different reasons for this restriction. One is that it would stretch our 
imagination too far. Another (which Rawls himself apparently sees as the 
strongest) is that the question about who takes the perspective of the original 
position and when, should not be able to influence the conclusion. Any randomly 
selected person should be able to go behind the veil and reach the same 
conclusion.390 Robin Attfield also points out that the number of future people will 
depend on the decisions behind the veil. This in turn means that if everyone who 
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will ever live were to take part in the decision behind the veil the number of 
people behind the veil of ignorance will depend on the decisions behind the veil 
and we would end up in a paradox.391 
A possible solution to the problem concerning the number of generations 
would be to let all generations have their own representatives behind the veil. 
This alternative is also ruled out by Rawls for the same reasons: It would to 
demand too much of our imagination to imagine people from different generation 
conferring behind the veil of ignorance, and it would break the rule that it should 
not matter for the conclusion who meets behind the veil.392 It is also excluded by 
the rule that everyone behind the veil belongs to the same generation. This rule is 
in fact very problematic. It does not just exclude a simple solution to the problem 
presented above. In fact, it also threatens to decrease the motivation for the 
parties behind the veil to consider the interests of future generations at all. The 
parties in the original position cannot affect the policy of previous generations 
(who’s decisions they cannot change), and they do not have to care about future 
generations. If they agreed on a principle of inter-generational justice, they would 
have to start saving for future generations but they would not get anything from 
previous generations, so their generation would have the worst deal. 
Rawls is aware of this.393 In order to deal with the problem, he initially 
suggests that the parties in the original position have duties to their immediate 
descendants, but this solution is dismissed because it does not follow from the 
conditions in the original position.394 Instead, he suggests that we see the parties 
in the original position as representing a continuous time line stretching over at 
least two generations. This means, according to Rawls, that we have an overlap 
where everyone will be cared for by someone in the previous generation. Since 
generations overlap, everyone will be accounted for.395 
This method of overlapping does not always work, however. Many 
problems related to extinctions take a longer time than two generations. One 
generation might cause the extinction but it does not always become a serious 
problem until two generations later – or more. Maybe it takes that a certain 
(unknown) number of species disappear for an ecosystem service to stop 
working. Then the process can be started by generation G but neither generation 
G nor generation G+1 experience the consequences, and generation G+2 or 
maybe G+5 is not covered by Rawls method. Even if we assume that the 
members of generation G+1 represent the future members of generation G+2 in 
the same way as the members of generation G represent all members of 
generation G+1, it will not help us since in the case described above, the effects 
skip one generation and the overlapping is therefore broken. Everyone behind the 
veil of ignorance belongs to generation G and everyone in generation G+1 is 
represented by someone in generation G but Generation G+1 will not be affected 
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by the decision. That the people in generation G+1 represent the members of 
generation G+2 does not help since the no one in generation G+1 will themselves 
have any say in the original position. It is therefore necessary that the timeline 
goes on for a longer time than two generations. This in turn obviously presents its 
own problems. It is a stretch of the imagination already when we talk about two 
generations and the imagination becomes even more stretched when we talk 
about a larger number of generations. 
There is also a general problem with the solution of one generation 
representing one or more future generations. It does not tell us anything about 
how the representative should handle conflicts between her (yet unknown)396 
interests and the interests of those she represents. The situation differs essentially 
from the intragenerational setting where the reasoning behind the veil takes 
place. In that setting, the parties are indifferent to each other’s interests. In the 
inter-generational situation the parties are representing the interests of everyone 
along the same lineage. Rawls does not explain how this representation should be 
done and thus does not really present any solution to the problem of 
intergenerational justice. 
Another problem is that the solution is not genuinely reciprocal. It is an 
exception from, rather than a result of, Rawls reciprocal basis, which means that 
it does not really help us find a reciprocal solution to the asymmetry problem. 
Even though Rawls’ theory as a whole is contractual by building on an 
agreement in an original position, our relation to our descendants will not be 
contractual if we choose the suggested solution. This means that Rawls’ theory is 
only a contractual solution to the asymmetry problem in a very weak sense – if at 
all. 
It is also a very strong concession by Rawls and means that care for future 
generations does not follow from the circumstances in the original position but is 
added in order to save the theory. In his later writings, he therefore chose another 
solution. Instead of allowing the people behind the veil of ignorance to have 
emotional bonds towards their descendants, he infers a rule that their agreements 
must be such that they would want everyone to follow it independently of what 
generation they belong to.397 This means that instead of making an exception to 
the restriction against knowing their interests, Rawls chose to make an exception 
to the restriction against having any moral inclinations. 
I do not know if this is a smaller concession for Rawls. This solution too 
means that instead of deriving a duty to care for future generations from his 
theory, he introduces this principle in an ad hoc manner explicitly in order to 
save the theory. To say that the agreement made by the parties behind the veil 
must be acceptable also to others that are not present, is in fact a way of saying 
that we have a moral duty to consider the interest of these people even though we 
know that we will never turn out to be in their shoes. That is, we have a duty that 
is assumed and not agreed upon by all those concerned by the agreement. We are 
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therefore facing the same objection as before – the solution to the problem of 
future generations is not genuinely reciprocal and only contractual in the very 
weak sense of being added to an otherwise contractual theory. The solution itself 
is not contractual at all. 
One could object that Rawls’s aim is to find a theory of justice between 
contemporaries such that everyone would accept it if they take an impartial view. 
His aim is not to find a reciprocal solution to the asymmetry problem. However, 
Rawls states explicitly that he considers intergenerational relations a question of 
justice.398 In fact, he has to if he wants to be true to his view that questions of 
justice are something that emerge where there are conflicting interests,399 as it is 
quite clear that there are conflicting interests between generations. 
It is clearly stated by Rawls that he wants his theory to be genuinely 
contractual.400 He also states that reciprocity is the basis for the theory. For 
example, he says that the idea of reciprocity is implicit in his notion of a well-
ordered society,401 and that the parties in the original position try to advance their 
good the best they can without being bound by any moral ties to each other.402 
True, Rawls claims as well that his theory is not an egoistic theory or a 
theory about what rational egoists would agree upon:403 
 
One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial 
situation as rational and mutually disinterested. This does not mean that 
the parties are egoists, that is, individuals with only certain kinds of 
interests, say in wealth, prestige, and domination. But they are conceived 
as not taking an interest in one another’s interests.404 
 
Rawls’ definition of egoism seems unconventional. Only to have certain 
kinds of interests like those mentioned above seems more like shallowness or 
single-mindedness than egoism. In fact “…not taking an interest in one another’s 
interests” if anything, looks like a very accurate definition of egoism. 
There is another way in which Rawls’ theory can be said to be non-egoistic. 
405 One basic condition for people in the original position is that it should be 
possible to formulate their principles without reference to proper names or to 
rigid definite descriptions.406 This means that it is not possible to agree on 
principles that are restricted for instance to the generation to which the parties in 
the original position belong. The point of this principle is obviously to achieve 
the impartiality that is the very point of the veil of ignorance, and so it can be 
said to be non-egoistic. But this goes for the system – not for the individuals. In 
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fact, the entire point of Rawls’ manoeuvre is to show that it is possible to achieve 
a non-egoistic system that is acceptable to everyone without assuming that 
people care about anyone but themselves. Rawls thus makes it absolutely clear 
that the concept of justice as fairness is supposed to be contractarian in the 
traditional meaning. 
Rawls also stresses that even the most basic principles of justice have to be 
the result of the choice situation presented by the original position.407 This 
includes the so-called “natural duties” such as the duty not to be cruel. These are 
special in that they do not have to be voluntarily agreed on in the actual world – 
we are bound by them anyway.408 
It thus seems quite clear that Rawls’ solution to the problem of 
intergenerational justice is a break with his intentions and his basic demands on 
principles of justice. 
The general conclusion is that in spite of Rawls’ efforts to find a genuinely 
contractual theory of justice as fairness that includes intergenerational justice, he 
has failed to do so since his way of dealing with intergenerational relations is not 
derived from his original position. 
Other contractarians not discussed here have offered different solutions to 
the asymmetry problem, but none have been able to produce any working 
solution.409 I believe that the approaches I have discussed explicitly in this and 
the previous sub-section are the most promising ones, and since they have failed, 
I believe we have to conclude that contractualism does not supply us with any 
rational reason to preserve species for the benefit of future generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.4. Communitarianism 
 
Avner de-Shalit tries to solve the asymmetry problem from a communitarian 
vantage point, which he thinks gives the best account of our duties to future 
generations.410 He claims that even though we live at different times we are part 
of the same community. For example, parts of us survive in the form of our 
achievements and in the form of other people’s memories of us.411 This is a kind 
of cultural interaction between the generations: We interact with them by 
creating and inventing ideas and things that will live on during their lifetimes. 
They interact with us by upholding the memory of us and by using and refining 
the things and ideas we have passed on to them.412 This also goes for ethical 
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norms. We pass on ethical norms to them. They share, apply, and reflect on the 
norms.413 This means that we are part of the same community. 
Eventually this will fade off, however. Their reflecting on the common 
values together with external influences means that after a number of generations 
we will no longer be members of the same moral community.414 From this de-
Shalit concludes that we do have duties to consider the interests of future 
generations, but that these duties gradually fade away as we gradually become 
members of different communities.415 
This gives us three degrees of duties: 
To contemporary people we have far-reaching positive duties. 
To those who will live in the near future we have almost as strong positive 
duties. 
To those living further off into the future we have much weaker and only 
negative duties. Moreover, if it is not a matter of very strong remote future 
interests competing with very weak present-day interests, the remote future 
interests will not outweigh the interests of contemporary people.416 
I find de-Shalit’s solution problematic. We are not part of the same 
community on the same premises. We can pass on norms to them, but they 
cannot pass on norms to us. No matter how much and how well they reflect on 
our norms they can still not impose them on us. The asymmetry problem 
therefore does not disappear. 
In addition, it is not obvious to me that sharing the same ethical norms 
could tell us anything about what the norms should imply. It does not seem to 
exclude, for instance, that we share the norm that there are no duties to future 
generations. It is odd to claim that moral standing is decided, not by the content 
of our ethics, but by whom we share it with. Furthermore, de-Shalit’s 
communitarianism is hit by the argument from marginal cases. Some 
contemporary human beings are not able to reflect on moral values or fulfil any 
of the other criteria de-Shalit has placed for being part of the same community. 
They will therefore fall outside the community and have no standing. 
De-Shalit also argues that we want future generations to conclude that our 
values are good.417 Why? It is probably not because we fear their reactions. The 
explanation cannot be that we care for them, since that would beg the question. If 
we do not care about future generations to begin with, we are not likely to care 
about what they think about our values. 
He refers to the existence of guilt feelings and to our interests in the welfare 
of future generations as arguments for his idea of a transgenerational 
community.418 However, these feelings do not show that we regard future 
generations as moral objects. It may be that we have these feeling towards them 
                                                
413 de-Shalit 1995 pp.45ff. See also Melin 2001 pp.125f 
414 de-Shalit 1995 p.47 
415 de-Shalit 1995 pp.53f 
416 de-Shalit 1995 pp.54f. See also Melin 2001 pp.125f 
417 de-Shalit 1995 p.48 
418 de-Shalit 1995 p.18f 
 106 
because they are valuable to us. We can have an interest in just about anyone and 
anything from stalagmites to extraterrestrials. If we weaken the criteria for what 
it takes to be a part of a common community that much, the term would lose all 
meaning. 
It is also a problematic fact that all duties in the transgenerational 
community are aimed in one direction. De-Shalit uses our upholding of traditions 
as an argument for claiming that we identify ourselves as being part of a 
transgenerational community together with past generations of practitioners of 
the same traditions.419 If anything, however, this illustrates how interactions 
between generations move only in one direction. By upholding the traditions of 
our forefathers, we clearly see that we are influenced by those before us in a way 
that they can never be influenced by us. De-Shalit talks about a cultural 
interaction in the form of discussions aiming at finding “a common set of ideas 
which determine a common good”.420 It is difficult to see how such a discussion 
can take place between individuals living in different generations, however. 
Melin also points out that since de-Shalit demands shared values in order to be 
part of the same community, it must be difficult to perform the kind of critical 
debate he talks about as something that binds us together.421 
I have found nothing in de-Shalit’s arguments that helps us in our dealings 
with the asymmetry problem. The general result in this section is that neither 
communitarianism, nor contractualism can demand from us that we care for 
future generations. The failure of contractualism also underlines our previous 
conclusion that rational egoism does not seem to give us much reason for 
avoiding extinction. Since the asymmetry problem is a problem only for theories 
that demand some kind of symmetric relation between the moral agent and the 
moral object however, it is not a devastating drawback to the idea of moral duties 
to future generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. The non-identity problem 
 
One problem that has been widely discussed in relation to future generations, is 
the so-called non-identity problem pointed out by Thomas Schwartz and Derek 
Parfit among others. 
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4.2.1. How it is handled by Thomas Schwartz 
 
Thomas Schwartz argues that because of this problem, we cannot have moral 
obligations to posterity other than to our “near posterity”.422 He uses the question 
of population size to illustrate the problem, but claims that his point can be 
generalised to cover all kinds of duties to future generations. His reasoning goes 
as follows: Assume that we do not limit the size of the population and as an 
effect of that, the lives of future generations of human beings will be less 
enjoyable. If we take any future person X, it would be very probable that X 
would not have existed had we adopted a more restrictive population policy. Not 
only because there would be fewer people, but also because the events leading up 
to the birth of X would be significantly different. This in turn means that X 
would probably not be identical to anyone of those who would be born if we 
were to live according to the stricter policy.423 The people that would have 
benefited from the stricter policy will not be the same as those who actually get 
to live. Therefore, we have not failed to do our duty to those people by not 
adapting the stricter policy.424 
He believes that in the first generations after our own, there will still be 
people who would be identical independently of our choice. We should therefore 
assume some duties to our immediate posterity. After that, the duties will fade 
very fast as a result of the exponential increase of differences between the 
actualised and the non-actualised populations.425 
This reasoning is then generalised, and Schwartz claims to have shown that 
it covers all alleged duties to future generations – not just duties concerning 
population size.426 
Schwartz is not satisfied with having shown that we do not have any duties 
to make sacrifices on behalf of future generations – other than possibly the 
immediately following generations. He also claims that to put restrictions on now 
living human beings in order to benefit future humans cannot even be morally 
permissible, since it would mean that we put restrictions on now living 
individuals, although there is no one to whom we owe these restrictions.427 
It could be argued against Schwartz that even though no individual member 
will be the same under the different policies, the society will be the same. One 
could therefore object that even if no particular member of the society is better 
off than she would be had we adopted a more restrictive policy, the society would 
be better off. 
This idea differs from the communitarianism discussed in the previous 
section. Here we are not talking about duties to particular individuals based on 
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their belonging to the same community, but about duties to the communities as 
such. 
One thing that speaks in favour of this approach is that when we talk about 
future generations, we spontaneously tend to talk about them not as individuals 
but as a group. Stenmark explains this habit by pointing out that future humans 
do not yet have an identity, which makes it easier to conceive of them as a group 
than as individuals.428 
Schwartz does not believe that referring to the whole society can solve the 
non-identity problem, however. His argument is that it does not matter morally if 
the society is better off when no individual is.429 This objection seems reasonable 
although not everyone would agree. We do not have to go into that question here, 
however.430 We are investigating whether anthropocentrism, can answer the 
question of why it is morally problematic to cause extinction. Anthropocentrism 
does not admit moral standing for anyone or anything but human beings. That 
excludes the possibility of accepting moral duties to societies. This means that 
we cannot find any help in the idea of moral duties to societies in order to 
support anthropocentrism even if moral duties to societies would against all odds 
turn out to be a reasonable position. 
Schwartz concludes that we do not have any moral duties to future humans. 
Instead, he suggests that we presently living humans have a moral duty to each 
other to adopt policies that contribute to a better life for future generations. Most 
now living human beings wish that future generations will prosper far into the 
future. In order to secure this wish, we need to make sacrifices. In order to secure 
a fair distribution of these sacrifices, we all have a moral obligation – not to 
future generations but to each other – to contribute.431 
We would, in other words, have no duties towards future generations of 
human beings, but only duties regarding them, just as we, according to 
anthropocentrism, have no duties towards other species but might have duties 
regarding them. The difference is that our valuing of a good life for future 
generations of human beings is probably intrinsic rather than instrumental 
(although Schwartz does not discuss this question). It is not very probable that 
people who are unable to affect us would have instrumental value for us.432 
For our investigation, Schwartz’ solution means that we have a duty to 
other now living human beings to share the burden of considering the well-being 
of future human beings to which we have no moral duties, but who have intrinsic 
value for us. This might, among other things, imply a duty to preserve species 
that have instrumental value for future generations of human beings. 
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4.2.2. How it is handled by Derek Parfit 
 
Derek Parfit’s conclusion is radically different. The basic story is the same: If 
someone had not been conceived at the time she was actually conceived, she 
would not exist at all. If the conception had taken place earlier or later, it would 
have involved two other gametes, and therefore the resulting foetus would have a 
perhaps slightly, but still different, genetic makeup.433 Parfit sets the time limit at 
a month (obviously to be on the safe side, but he also hints that the real time 
interval after or before which we would not have existed had we not been 
conceived within it, may actually be much shorter).434 
If we try to benefit a future individual by doing something that will also 
change the time of “his” conception, we have not benefited him at all – we have 
benefited someone else who is born instead. This in turn means that if we neglect 
to take this step, no one is made worse off since he would not have been born at 
all if we had acted in the less depleting way.435 
We can complicate the situation further by adding that if we choose 
different lifestyles, it will also affect whom we meet and have children with, 
which further strengthens Parfit’s point that different lifestyles will lead to 
different identities of future individuals. 
These things taken together mean that if we choose to live a less destructive 
life, the future people who will benefit from this will not be the same as would be 
born had we instead chosen a more wasteful lifestyle. If we choose the wasteful 
lifestyle, it will therefore not be worse for those humans that will actually live in 
the future as long as their lives will be worth living.436 If we assume that it is 
possible to benefit someone by bringing her into existence, we could even claim 
that we have benefited her by living a wasteful life since if we had not done that, 
she would not have existed at all.437 
Should we therefore follow Schwartz and conclude that we have no moral 
duty – other than a duty to other contemporary humans, and possibly to the 
immediately following generations – to make any sacrifices for the sake of 
coming generations? Not according to Parfit. He regards the intuition that we 
have a moral duty to consider future generations to be a very basic intuition – too 
basic to give up. He illustrates this by the following imagined situation: 
There are two different conditions – K and J – that give the same handicap 
to the child of a woman who is the bearer of either K or J. The difference 
between them is that J is curable, while K is not curable but disappears by itself 
within two months. A programme (let us call it J) is set up to cure women with 
condition J. Another programme (let us call it K) is set up to test women for 
condition K, and if they have it, advice them to wait for two months before 
getting pregnant. Both programmes will, if performed, have the result that 1000 
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more healthy children and 1000 fewer severely handicapped children will be 
born. Unfortunately, there is not enough funding to go through with both 
programmes, so one of them has to be cancelled. If we choose to carry out 
programme J, the same children will be born, but they will not suffer from the 
handicap. If we choose to carry out programme K, different children will be born 
and thereby benefit from the programme. We could therefore say that we have a 
duty to the would be victims of the handicap caused by condition J to perform 
programme J, but we have no duty to anyone to perform programme K. 
What do our intuitions tell us? Is there any moral reason to prefer one 
programme rather than the other? 438 Parfit’s intuition is that there is not. If we 
disregard the obvious fact that there are more risks involved for the prospective 
mother in having an operation or undergoing medical treatment, compared to just 
waiting two months before becoming pregnant, I share this intuition. If we do not 
disregard these things Parfit's point will be even strong because our intuitions tell 
us to put our money in programme K. In any case it seems clearly 
counterintuitive to claim that we have a duty to go through with programme J but 
not with programme K. I suppose most people would agree, in spite of the fact 
that alternative K is vulnerable to the non-identity-problem while alternative J is 
not. The fact that our intuitions do not distinguish between the two programmes 
indicates, just as Parfit points out, that what matters intuitively in this example is 
that independently of which programme we choose, 1000 more healthy children 
and 1000 fewer handicapped children will be born. The identity of the children 
does not seem to be relevant. 439 
Parfit’s conclusion is that we have to stick to the intuition that we have a 
moral duty to consider the good of future generations. In order to be able to do 
so, however, he concludes that we have to reject what he calls the person 
affecting principle, that is, the idea that “what is bad must be bad for 
someone”.440 
The idea that what is bad must be bad for someone is also a very basic 
intuition, however. I would claim that it is more basic than the intuition that we 
have a moral duty to consider future generations. It is very difficult to make 
sense of what it would mean for something to be good or bad if it is not good or 
bad for someone. By this, I mean that for it to be meaningful to call something 
good or bad, it must in some way relate to a subjective I, that is, to a centre of 
experience, from which the judgement springs. If there is no centre of experience 
that judges the event or its effects as bad, it is very difficult to comprehend in 
what way it could be bad. 
I do not believe it is necessary, however, to go as far as to deny that what is 
bad must be bad for someone, in order to maintain that we have a moral duty to 
choose the less depleting lifestyle in Parfit’s example for the sake of future 
generations. Parfit himself suggests but dismisses a solution to the non-identity 
problem based on adopting a wider version of the person affecting principle. 
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According to this version, something can be worse for people in the wide total 
sense if 
 
… the total net benefit given to the X-people by the occurrence of X 
would be less than the total net benefit given to the Y-people by the 
occurrence of Y.441 
 
He also identifies an average version, but dismisses both versions due to 
their inability to deal with the repugnant conclusion.442 However, this inability is 
not due to the wide person affecting principle, but to the basic principles of 
utilitarianism regarding how to calculate total or average benefit. Since this 
investigation is not about utilitarianism as such or about problems particularly 
related to utilitarianism, we do not have to concern ourselves with them here. 
What is relevant for us is not how to calculate the total or average net benefit. 
What is relevant is instead that the wide person affecting principle gives us the 
possibility to use interpersonal comparisons. We can thus keep the notion that 
what is bad must be bad for someone and still claim that the fact that our way of 
life affects the welfare of future generations – whoever they will be – gives us a 
moral duty to adopt a non-depleting lifestyle. This can be done by pointing out 
that a situation S1 is (or would be) worse for X than a situation S2 is (or would 
be) for Y, meaning that X is (or would be) suffering more or in some other way 
experience the situation she is (or would be) in as worse than Y experiences (or 
would experience) the situation she is in (or would be in were it to be realised). 
In this way we keep the principle that something must be subjectively 
experienced in order to be valued, but add that it does not have to be subjectively 
experienced by the same person to make a comparison of the experiences. This 
means that the agent can make a comparison of how different moral objects 
would experience the different alternatives. Based on that comparison, she could 
decide which alternative would be experientially worse. It seems, for instance, 
totally reasonable to say that it is worse for Anna to experience severe torture 
than it is for David to experience a slight scratch on his arm. 
We can thus deal with the terms ‘worse’ and ‘better’ by widening the 
person affecting principle instead of discarding it. We cannot make the same 
manoeuvre with the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ since the manoeuvre assumes a 
comparison. This is not a problem for us, since the non-identity problem is a 
problem only because we are dealing with two different possible populations 
under different possible outcomes. If it was just a matter of one population and 
one outcome, the outcome would be bad if it was bad for the only involved 
population and the non-identity problem would never occur. We can thus keep 
the idea that what is bad must be bad for someone. In the same vein we can keep 
the idea that what is good must be good for someone. It will not affect the 
question of inter-generational ethics. 
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Someone might be tempted to protest that by adopting the wider notion that 
for S1 to be worse than S2, S1 has to be worse for someone than S2 is for someone 
(else), we still make an unacceptable sacrifice by giving up the idea that for S1 to 
be worse than S2, S1 has to be worse than S2 for one particular person. However, 
the reason why it was unacceptable to give up the notion that what is bad must be 
bad for someone, was that it would render ‘bad’ meaningless if it is not 
connected to a subjective experience. In the wide person affecting principle the 
situations are still subjectively experienced and judged to be good to a certain 
degree or bad to a certain degree. To say that S1 is worse than S2 is thus not a 
non-subjective statement but an inter-subjective statement. 
Nevertheless, is this not bad enough? We are comparing subjective 
experiences but the result of the comparison is just estimated. It is not 
experienced by anyone. Nobody is actually experiencing S1 as worse than S2. 
I do not believe this is a serious problem. An inter-personal comparison is 
just an inter-personal comparison and that is all we need. We do not need an 
inter-personal experience in order to say that one of two possible courses of 
action would be right and the other would be wrong. I can sympathise with those 
who feel uncomfortable with using the word ‘worse’ for describing the result of 
such a comparison. This can easily be dealt with, however by keeping the 
comparison and using another – strictly descriptive – terminology.  Parfit did not 
use the word ‘worse’ in the quotation above, and we do not need to do so either. 
We can say, for example, that the individuals experiencing S1 are experiencing a 
smaller degree of good than those experiencing S2. The word ‘worse’ is not 
necessary for our project. Our aim is not to describe S1 as being worse than S2 but 
to say that it is wrong to cause S1 rather than S2 if we have a choice. Other things 
being equal, establishing that the individuals experiencing S1 are experiencing a 
smaller degree of good than those experiencing S2, seems to be a sufficient 
argument for concluding that it would be morally wrong to choose S1 over S2 if 
we can choose differently. 
One who does not accept Parfit’s solution of giving up the person affecting 
principle is Jan Narveson. He claims that: “Duties that are not owed to anybody 
stick in the conceptual throat”.443 The way it is stated, as an attack on the idea of 
impersonal duties, it is not just a dismissal of Parfit’s solution, but also of my 
suggestion. I believe, however, that the reason why the impersonal duties stick in 
Narveson’s conceptual throat is that when he is uttering them, he is not 
distinguishing between ‘right/wrong’ on the one hand and ‘good/bad’ on the 
other. If doing one’s duty is to do what is right, then it has to be about what is 
good or bad for someone, but it does not has to be expressed as a duty to 
someone. To talk about things as being good or bad without being good or bad 
for someone would stick in my conceptual throat too. However, this is not the 
same as talking about duties that are not owed to a particular person. When we 
discuss the non-identity problem, we are as a matter of fact discussing how we 
ought morally to behave. It is therefore reasonable that we shift our attention 
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from what is good/bad or better/worse to what is right/wrong. If we distinguish 
between good/bad and right/wrong, we will be able to keep the sentence Parfit 
rejected (“what is bad must be bad for someone”), and instead sacrifice the 
sentence: “what is wrong must be wrong to someone”. It seems reasonable to say 
that what is wrong does not have to be expressed in terms of ‘wrong to 
someone’. In fact, it seems intuitively more correct to say about an act that ‘it is 
wrong’ than to say ‘it is wrong to someone’ (or ‘it is wronging someone’), even 
though it concerns what is good or bad for someone. That is, an act can be 
considered as right or wrong without being right or wrong to someone, but it has 
to affect (the quality or quantity of) things that are subjectively good or bad for 
someone even though the identity of the ‘someone’ is unimportant. 
If we apply this to Parfit’s example, we could say that choosing a depleting 
lifestyle would be wrong because it would mean that some people would 
experience less good than some people would if we choose a less depleting 
lifestyle, where ‘some people’ may or may not be the same individuals. The 
important thing is that we are still talking about things (food, energy, clean air, 
wellbeing, happiness, fulfilment of preferences or rights, etc.) that are good 
because they are good for someone, and our behaviour is wrong because it means 
less of something that is good because it is good for someone (or more of 
something that is bad because it is bad for someone) independently of the identity 
of the experiencing individuals. We do not have to infer some kind of objective 
good that exists independently of a perspective that experiences it as good. We 
just have to declare the question of identity as irrelevant. We reserve the term 
‘good’ for things that are good for someone, and talk about ‘right’ when we talk 
about how we should act. 
Parfit’s solution has been criticised for excluding non-consequentialistic 
aspects in ethics.444 My solution is much less affected by that criticism. The only 
thing we have to accept in order to avoid the non-identity problem is that it is 
possible and meaningful to make interpersonal comparisons. We do not have to 
assume the full load of utilitarianism. We do not, for instance, have to assume 
any particular way of comparing good or bad. We do not have to accept that we 
can or should add the good or bad of different people. We do not even have to 
accept that we are always obliged to make interpersonal comparisons, or that we 
have to aim for the maximum quote of good over bad in order to accept this 
solution. The solution ought therefore to be acceptable even for those who have a 
more deontological view of right and wrong – as long as they accept that 
interpersonal comparisons are possible, meaningful and at least in situations 
involving different possible future populations also morally relevant. 
The conclusion is that the situation that arises in the future if we chose a 
more depleting lifestyle today is not bad as long as the population will at least 
have a life worth living (since it in that case is not bad for anyone), but to make 
this choice would be wrong because it results in a situation that is less good for 
the people affected than the alternative would have been for the people that 
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would have been affected had we chosen differently – independently of the 
identity of those affected. Therefore, as long as we do not have a very strong 
aversion towards interpersonal comparisons, the non-identity problem does not 
relieve us from having duties to consider the good of future generations – 
whoever they will be. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. The problem of overwhelming sacrifice 
 
For those who have a utilitarian approach to ethics there is another possible 
problem to consider. If our aim is to maximise happiness (or well-being or 
preference satisfaction etc.), we get into a problem if we count and give equal 
weight to all happiness/suffering or preference satisfaction/preference frustration 
independently of when it occurs. If we show equal consideration to future 
generations and avoid messing things up terribly by, for example, destroying 
essential ecosystem services in the near future or start an atomic war, there will 
be a multitude of generations ahead of us. This means that almost any sacrifice 
we can make that will benefit future generations is morally required no matter 
how small the benefit, since there will be many more who enjoy the benefits than 
who make the sacrifices.445 Therefore, it seems that we have a duty to live very 
modestly indeed, and save almost everything to future generations – and so 
should the next generation, and the one after that and so on. This in turn means 
that as long as people can expect there to be several generations ahead of them, 
every future generation would have to abstain from harvesting what was saved 
by the previous generation, and just hand it over to the next generation.446 
This seems like an unreasonably large sacrifice, and it has therefore been 
suggested that we discount the interests of future generations,447 or even 
disregard them totally. 
Derek Parfit does not agree with this solution. He claims instead that our 
problem calls for a general limitation on how great sacrifices someone can be 
asked to make for someone else – independently of whether we talk about inter- 
or intragenerational issues. He also thinks that if we believe that trying to 
maximise the total sum of good leads to inequality between generations and if we 
find this problematic, we should not solve the problem by discounting but by 
adopting a principle of fair distribution.448 If we discount, we may occasionally 
end up in situations where we could avoid a larger catastrophe in the future by a 
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relatively modest sacrifice today but find that it is not worth it since the bad 
effects in the future carry less weight.449 
I believe that Parfit is right when he points out that the problem of 
overwhelming sacrifices is a general problem of distribution and that it is not 
particularly related to intergenerational matters. We have a similar problem in 
intragenerational ethics: There is an almost endless amount of poverty in the 
world, and almost any krona I make would generate a larger benefit if I give it to 
charity than if I spend it myself. Do I have to give up everything? This is a 
difficult question for utilitarianism, but no utilitarian would seriously propose 
that we solve it by not counting, or by discounting, the interests of our 
contemporaries. If it is not justifiable to use such a method in intragenerational 
dealings, it cannot reasonably be justifiable when we are dealing with the same 
problem on an intergenerational level. If we want to claim that it is, we need an 
independent reason why intergenerational relations are relevantly different from 
intragenerational relations when it comes to the question of limits to sacrifices. 
Since the question of overwhelming sacrifices occurs in both inter- and 
intragenerational affairs it cannot in itself motivate a difference in how we should 
handle the two situations. 
The point is that if we accept the overwhelming sacrifices in 
intragenerational relations then we have no excuse for not accepting them in 
intergenerational relations. If we do not accept such large sacrifices then that is a 
problem for both inter- and intragenerational ethics alike and it has to be dealt 
with in a way that would work both within and between generations. Discounting 
does not seem to be considered acceptable within generations and should 
therefore not be used between generations. 
Robin Attfield and Avner de-Shalit point out a tension between 
intragenerational and intergenerational equity when they argue that it would not 
be reasonable to demand from those contemporary people who have less than a 
fair share of resources that they further decrease their use of resources for the 
benefit of future generations.450  
In order to deal with this tension de-Shalit suggests a compromise. He 
suggests that when duties to future generations conflict with “a genuine need to 
improve the welfare of contemporaries”, we should look for what he calls “a 
middle way”.451  
When our 
 
… obligations to very remote future generations do not contradict 
obligations to contemporaries, we have no excuse not to fulfil them. If 
these obligations to very remote future generations clash with certain 
obligations to contemporaries, and especially to the worst off among our 
contemporaries, it is reasonable to argue that in some cases our 
obligations to contemporaries have some priority (although this 
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difference by no means cancels out our obligations to very remote future 
generations).452 
 
It is not easy to draw any conclusions from this, however, and it is even 
harder to find any useful advice on how we should actually behave. Attfield’s 
solution is that we put an upper limit on how large sacrifices one can demand in 
order for the demands not to be unbearable and therefore ignored.453 
A simpler solution would be to point out that intergenerational duties are 
not about one group being sacrificed for another. It is about giving equal 
considerations to the interests of individuals whether they live at the same or at 
different times. It is therefore just as unacceptable to discount the interests of a 
certain group of contemporaries to favour the interests of other now living or 
future individuals, as it is to discount the interests of future individuals to favour 
the interests of now living individuals. 
Gregory Kavka suggests that we use Locke’s principles of just acquisition, 
and adapt them to an intergenerational setting. This means that it would be 
acceptable for us to use resources as long as we do not waste them and as long as 
there is “enough and as good” left for others.454 This in turn implies that we 
should leave the next generation at least as well off regarding resources as we 
were.455 
What does it mean to leave enough and as good of a non-renewable 
resource? One way of doing so could be to limit the number of people, i.e. to 
limit the number of competitors for resources, in the future, and thereby 
decreasing the pressure on the resources.456 That is probably not what Locke had 
in mind. In addition, for non-renewable resources this would not be enough if we 
want to uphold Locke’s proviso. Even if we use the resources very sparingly, 
there will be less and less, and sooner or later, it will be totally depleted. Before 
that happens, there will be less left for each person than each of us living at the 
moment has used, and therefore Locke’s proviso will no longer hold. 
One way of dealing with this would be to decrease the number of people in 
each generation and eventually let the species disappear when the resources are 
exhausted. 
Kavka is opposed to exterminating humanity,457 but what other alternatives 
are there? Kavka talks about recycling and using technology to increase the 
output of resources,458 but that is probably not enough. Even if we get better at 
extracting a non-renewable resource, it will disappear eventually and we cannot 
recycle everything. Some resources are destroyed when we use them. In fact, 
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even for the resources we can recycle, the second law of thermodynamics will 
eventually claim its due. 
Species are special in that they are in fact renewable up to a certain point. 
Locke’s proviso would therefore allow us to us the individual members of a 
species as long as there are enough left to secure the future existence of the 
species. This investigation is, however not about how to use species in a 
sustainable way but about the problems involved in causing the extinction of 
species. What we therefore need to ask ourselves is if it is in accordance with 
Locke’s proviso to actually cause the extinction of species. Kavka’s suggestion is 
therefore just not applicable to our question. 
An alternative would be to widen the interpretation of Locke’s proviso and 
allow for substitutes.459 This approach is often advocated by economists (see 
chapter 2 above), and would be in accordance with, for example, the Brundtland 
report, which tells us that we may use or even deplete a resource as long as we 
compensate for the loss.460 
Let us take fuel as an example. One way of leaving enough fuel to future 
generations is to see to it that all future generations will have as much fossil fuel 
at their disposal as we have had at our disposal. However, since we cannot 
produce fossil fuel, and since it takes nature millions of years to do so, it means 
that given a stabile population, we will not be allowed to use any fossil fuel at all 
if we have a duty to leave as much and as good for future generations as we have 
possessed. However, if we allow for substitutes, we can use all the fossil fuel 
there is, given that we find an alternative that will do the same job to the same 
extent and just as well. This modification of Locke’s proviso seems more 
reasonable, and would just take a small amendment. We only need to shift focus 
from the resource to what we can get from it. 
What would this shift mean for our investigation? The answer is that it 
would reaffirm a suspicion that has been brought up before: That it seems to be 
acceptable from an anthropocentric instrumental perspective to drive a species to 
extinction as long as the service or goods we get from it can be substituted by 
another species or by a non-living source. This means that if we allow for 
substitution and concentrate our concern on the goods or service rather than on 
the resource as such, even in an intergenerational setting our theory will be a 
weaker defence against extinction, and may not be able to entirely account for 
the intuition we aim to explain. 
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4.4. Mental impossibility 
 
It is not easy to imagine or to reason about things that will take place very far in 
to the future. It is probably even more difficult to mobilise real emotions towards 
events that are far into the future even if it is possible to reason around them in an 
abstract way. This problem has been pointed out by Avner de-Shalit and Jan 
Narveson among others. According to both of them, it means that we cannot in 
practice demand from now living humans that they make sacrifices on behalf of 
future generations that are comparable to the sacrifices we can demand on behalf 
of their contemporaries. 
Avner de-Shalit argues that we should discount the interests of future 
generations (by not adjudging them with positive duties more than a few 
generations into the future) because duties that reach too far into the future would 
demand what is for most people inconceivable.461 
Narveson claims that a principle that gives future generations the right to an 
equal share of resources that are basic for life, would be “impossibly abstract or 
obscure or both”.462 He also claims that this principle will be “self-
extinguishing”. The reason for that is that we are deciding the size of the next 
generation. Narveson asks us to consider a scenario where we cut the next 
generation by half. The question will then be: What does that mean for our 
resource use? Does it mean that the members of the next generation will be able 
to enjoy twice as much of the resources, or does it mean that we will be able to 
spend more of the resources?463 
Parfit and Melin do not agree with these objections, however. Parfit claims 
that the fact that future individuals cannot be identified is no more relevant than 
that we might have difficulties identifying individuals who are geographically far 
away.464 
The question is undoubtedly interesting: Do our limited imaginative 
faculties justify a discounting or even non-counting of the interests of future 
generations? 
Melin points out that to base the answer to whether we should care about 
future generations on whether presently living people think that we should care 
about future generations is to beg the question that it is the values of now living 
people that count while the future only counts if we think they should count.465 
Both Melin’s and Parfit’s objections seem valid, and in addition, one can 
point out another thing that I believe is crucial. I believe that as long as it is 
mentally possible to rationally understand that even future people will have 
interests and that the future realisation or frustration of these interests can be 
affected by what we are doing now, we have a duty to consider this in our 
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decisions even if it is a difficult intellectual process and even if it is not possible 
to fully take in emotionally. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5. Uncertainty 
 
According to the Brundtland report, sustainable development is a development 
that “ensures that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”466 To be able to live up to 
that, we need to know what the needs of future generations are. This looks like a 
very difficult task. There is a large degree of uncertainty regarding the needs or 
the interests of future generations,467 and this problem is also accompanied with 
some other problems. Avner de-Shalit, for instance, points out that even if it was 
possible to foresee the interests of future generations (which he does not believe 
it is) it would be complicated to compare and weigh their interests against the 
interests of our contemporaries.468 
Another problem is that we do not know for sure what life will be like in 
the future, how the technology will develop, or even how long the human species 
will survive. 
This inability to make reliable forecasts not just about the preferences of 
future generations, but also about the future in general is commented by G. I. 
Simmons who argues: 
 
There is time for caution here: if we define justice to include future 
generations, but cannot forecast the nature of that future at all accurately, 
then how do we know what to avoid?469  
 
Simmons does not want to see this as an excuse for a laissez-fair attitude in 
relation to future generations, but how do we avoid such an attitude? When we 
look at the problems presented here, one might be tempted to limit our concerns 
to the present, and possibly to the immediately following generations while 
leaving the rest to their destiny. Another approach would be to discount our 
concern for the future at a rate representing the degree of uncertainty. This last 
approach is used by many economists and some philosophers.470 One thing that 
talks in favour of successive discounting rather than a more abrupt cut-off point, 
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is that we are dealing with predictions that tend to get more uncertain the further 
into the future we stretch them. Discounting would make it possible to lessen our 
concern successively in proportion to the increasing uncertainty. 
Another possibility is put forward by Jan Narveson who suggests that our 
almost total lack of knowledge of the future can be seen as an argument for 
confining our concern for the future to approximately the next 50 years.471 His 
argument is that since we are next to totally ignorant, “no rational consideration 
of the problem is possible …”.472 
 One might point out here that if “no rational consideration of the problem 
is possible” how can he then conclude that confining our concerns to 50 years is 
better than any other solution? I think Narveson is too pessimistic, however. In 
the previous chapter we noted that inertia is not always the best way of handling 
uncertainty. We found that in situations where for instance important values are 
at stake, it is more rational to take precautionary measures such as demanding 
extra high degrees of certainty in order to go through with a project that might 
threaten the value in question. If we have a situation where our decision may 
threaten important future interests although we do not know if they will, the 
conclusion must be the opposite of what Narveson recommends. I.e. in order to 
be justified to ignore future generations, we should demand a high degree of 
certainty that future generations will not be harmed by the project in question. 
Lack of knowledge should count against ignoring them, not the other way 
around. The degree of certainty we demand should of course as argued earlier 
stand in proportion to how important we suspect the interest to be. This is 
complicated since that is one of the things we do not know. This too seems to 
talk in favour of being extra careful with what we subject them to. 
 Parfit is in general negative to discounting the interests of future 
generations, and he makes no exception when it comes to discounting because of 
uncertainty. He follows the same strategy as before and points out that we have 
to distinguish between (1) the fact that our predictions get less certain over time, 
and (2) whether, given the assumption that a prediction is correct, we are entitled 
to discount the weight of the effect just because it takes place in the distant 
future. He admits that (1) is often the case, but does not believe that this can 
answer (2).473 
According to Parfit, this is important for two reasons: Both because we 
should be careful not to “miss-state our moral view”, and because there are 
situations when predictions do not get less certain over time.474 
I agree with the first reason: We should be more cautious about the 
terminology we use and not claim that we discount on the basis of time as such 
when we are actually discounting on the basis of diminishing certainty. Never the 
less, if we clearly state that we discount because of diminishing certainty and our 
prognoses as a matter of fact do get less certain over time, the result will still, in 
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practice, be that the interests of future generations will get less attention further 
into the future. 
How about Parfit’s second reason? Even if he is correct and there actually 
are such cases, we still have to admit that most prognoses do get less certain over 
time. That there are a few instances when prognoses do not get more uncertain 
over time shows us that uncertainty is not always a good reason for discounting 
the future, but maybe the reliability of our prognoses declines with time often 
enough for discounting a good general rule? If that is the case, duties to future 
generations might in general not be a good basis for claiming that it is immoral to 
contribute to the extinction of species. 
On the other hand, it might be that the few things we can predict with a 
higher degree of certainty are important enough to make a difference even if the 
uncertainty is great in the general case. Several authors point out cases where our 
knowledge about future generations is not so bad.475 Kavka, for example, points 
out that we do know that future generations will need “enough food to eat, air to 
breathe, space to move in, and fuel to run machines”.476 Fenner in turn states that 
we can know that future people will need air and water, etc. but we cannot know 
anything about their aesthetic preferences.477 Rolston goes a step further and 
argues that we cannot doubt that they will need “water, soil, rain, photosynthesis, 
or enjoy sunsets, mountains, seashores – or bird watching”,478 and that some 
resources like water, air etc cannot be substituted – which means that contrary to 
oil, for example, we can be sure that future generations will need them.479 
I believe that Fenner is more correct than Rolston regarding the uncertainty 
of the preferences of future humans, but the statement that all three agree upon, 
viz. that there are certain basic things that future generations will need to the 
same extent as we do seems very plausible. The question is: What does this tell 
us? Even if we agree that they will need fuel for their machines, we do not know 
what kind of fuel. While I write this, a large variety of alternatives are being 
developed, and I would not like to bet much money on which of these will be the 
fuel of the future. Maybe a combination? Maybe something completely different 
that no one has yet thought of? Our need for things like food, air and water on the 
other hand is biologically determined and we can assume that these things will 
not change substantially in the future. All life forms on the planet need water and 
nutrients, and all “higher” life forms need oxygen. This may not seem like much 
information to base our concern on, but for this investigation it is very central. 
These interests are very basic and they are directly related to some of the ways in 
which we have already found that other species are most important to us. In order 
to have food, a working water cycle, sufficient levels of oxygen, suitable climate, 
etc. we need working ecosystems and we need other species. This means that the 
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few things we do know about the needs of future generations are still very 
important for our investigation. 
The conclusion seems to be that we are not justified in using the lack of 
certainty concerning future generations as an excuse for discounting their 
interests concerning other species. We only have some knowledge about a few 
things but these things are on the other hand very important – and directly 
relevant for our investigation since they imply that species that have a high 
instrumental value for us will also have a high instrumental value for future 
generations of human beings. When it comes to the things we do not know, it 
seems most reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle. We do not know 
whether a particular species will be important for future generations, but we have 
a strong suspicion based on historical evidence that many species will turn out to 
be important for future generations – probably in ways we cannot yet imagine.480 
We should therefore be very restrictive when it comes to doing things that risk 
leading to extinction, and the burden of proof should lay on the shoulders of 
those in favour of exploitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6. Democracy 
 
A possible argument for discounting is that most people living today seem to be 
less concerned with the further future compared to the immediate future. We 
could claim that we, for democratic reasons, have to respect this and discount the 
future.481 
However, Parfit points out that this argument only exhorts us to follow the 
majority view concerning whether we should discount the future. It does not tell 
us what this view morally ought to be – and this is the question we are concerned 
about.482 I agree with Parfit that there is a distinction and that it is relevant. Since 
we are performing a moral investigation, the relevant question is whether it is 
right to count the interests of future generations for less than the interests of 
contemporary people. This question cannot be answered by an election. 
There is also another problem with the argument from democracy. It begs 
the question of whose interests should be considered. A basic assumption of the 
argument is that most now living people are less concerned with the further 
future. If we base our decision solely on the concerns of now living people, we 
have excluded the interests of future generations already in the decision process. 
It is in fact a serious problem for present versions of democracy that they 
seem incapable of dealing with this kind of questions: They are not democratic 
over time. We do many things today that have been decided by “democratic” 
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methods by now living human beings, but most of the people who will be 
affected by the decisions are not represented in the decision process simply 
because they are not yet born.483 Since the normal democratic process is 
inherently biased in favour of the present population, we cannot rely on the 
normal democratic process in intergenerational issues. If we want a reason to 
exclude the interests of future generations, it has to be an independent argument 
why their interests should not count. It cannot be based on a process where future 
generations are already excluded in the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7. Loss of opportunity value 
 
A common reason for discounting the future is based on the issue of opportunity 
loss. A thing that (like money) represents an instrumental value has value 
because of what you can get out of it (in the form of end value or of another 
instrumental value – like more money). The earlier you get something, the more 
utility you can extract from it. If you get it later, you will not be able to use it 
while you wait, and you will therefore lose opportunities.484 This is an important 
reason for economic discounting, but is it applicable to the question of whether 
and to what extent we should consider the interests of future generations? 
Alan Randall does not think so. He points out that market economy has a 
tendency to handle questions of resource use over time as investment problems, 
but he is not convinced that this is a useful approach in situations like extinction 
that has effects for a very long time and are irreversible.485 
Parfit points out in the same way as he has done with the other arguments 
for discounting, that it is important to keep in mind the reason for discounting. If 
we think it reasonable to discount for opportunity losses, we should be clear that 
it really is a matter of opportunity discounting, not temporal discounting as such. 
Parfit stresses the importance of being clear about this both in order for us not to 
be led astray in our moral reasoning and because he does not believe that 
opportunities always decrease over time. For instance, some investments do not 
bring any return, and things we consume do not decrease in opportunity value if 
we receive them later (we can only consume them once anyway). Furthermore, 
when we deal with trade-off-situations, we will continue to get value out of what 
we started with until we trade it in. This will compensate for the value we should 
have extracted from the thing we are going to trade it for. Assume that we are 
going to exploit a beautiful landscape in order to build an airport, but the 
exploitation is delayed. We will then lose opportunity value because we cannot 
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use the airport but we will also gain opportunity value because the landscape will 
be intact and can be used for other things like recreation.486 
Parfit’s way of reasoning seems reasonable up to a certain degree, and I 
think he is right in pointing it out since it is often forgotten in real life decisions. 
We have to admit, however, that if we find the trade-off worth doing in the first 
place, i.e. if we value the airport higher than the unspoiled landscape, we have 
presumably decided that there is more value in the airport than in the unspoiled 
landscape. We will therefore lose net opportunity value by delaying the 
exploitation even if we can get some value from the unspoiled landscape while 
we wait. 
What does this mean for our investigation regarding intergenerational 
ethics? Let us assume that building the airport in the example above will lead to 
the extinction of a species that has its last refuge in the area. Let us also assume 
that the species supplies some kind of good but that the airport will be more 
valuable for us than the species. Let us finally assume that by the time the last 
contemporary human has died, the airport has become obsolete but that the 
species would have continued to produce the good had it been allowed to 
survive. That would mean that even though its value for us is smaller than the 
value for the airport, its value for future generations will be larger than that of the 
airport. These are the assumptions. The reason for the last assumption is to create 
an intergenerational conflict. The question would then be: What alternative 
would give the largest amount of opportunity value? 
An aspect that seems to be important when we apply the question of 
opportunity value on intergenerational relations is that the receivers of the value 
will change during the process. If we build the airport, we will receive a higher 
opportunity value. Future generations will not get anything and since they will 
not have the species either, they will lose out on the deal. It therefore looks like 
discounting on the basis of opportunity value assumes that future generations do 
not have any moral standing or at least a lower moral standing.487 There might be 
another explanation, however. It may be that we do count future generations but 
realise that we will get more out of the airport if we build it than they would get 
from the species. I.e. we will win more than they will lose. In that case, we do 
not have to assume that future generations are without moral status in order to get 
the result that it is better, all things considered, to build the airport. In fact, we 
have not even reached the conclusion that the interests of future generations do 
not count. We have considered their interests but concluded that it will be more 
in our interest to drive the species to extinction than it is in their interest that we 
preserve it. That way, opportunity value is not really a basis for discounting the 
interests of future generations, but in practice it will, at least in some cases, still 
make references to the interests of future generations less useful for those who 
claim that we should protect species for anthropocentric instrumental reasons. 
The reasoning above presupposes a strictly utilitarian outlook. It might, 
however, be that we hold a moral conviction about what counts as a just 
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distribution of harms and benefits between moral objects, or any type of principle 
with the effect that there are limits to what we can subject a moral object to in 
order to benefit someone else. Then we cannot dismiss the fact that we will get 
the benefits of the higher opportunity value while future generations will not get 
anything, as easily as we did above. I.e. we cannot get rid of the problem that we 
get all the benefits from the airport and they get none of the benefits (since they 
have no use for the airport and the species is gone), by referring to the fact (when 
it is a fact) that the total sum of good will be larger that way. 
In cases like this, it therefore seems that a deontological approach would 
mean larger consideration of future generations, and also a stronger reason to 
avoid extinction. 
Even from a utilitarian perspective, however, we have to remember that it is 
not necessarily always the case that the total value will be higher from decisions 
like the one above. Not even the opportunity value would always be higher that 
way, and even when it is higher, it can in many cases be outweighed by a higher 
total value over time if we utilise the species in a sustainable way. The important 
point here is, however, that there will probably be some cases where a utilitarian 
anthropocentric instrumental approach – even if we accept moral standing for 
future generations – will accept that we drive a species to extinction even when 
the moral intuition we are investigating in this book tells us that it would be 
wrong. I do not know how often this will happen in reality, but it still weakens 
the position for anthropocentric instrumentalism in our investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.8. Distance 
 
Parfit is very careful to point out that we should not claim to be discounting 
because of time when our reason for discounting is, in fact, something else. In 
this sub-section, we shall ask whether it is reasonable to discount because of the 
distance as such between the decision-maker and the affected person. We can 
imagine different kinds of distance. One type is temporal distance. Another is 
genetic distance (distance of kinship). 
Parfit claims that discounting because of kinship is not strictly the same as 
discounting because of temporal distance though in practice they always coincide 
since the degree of kinship decreases from generation to generation.488 
However, temporal discounting may well play a role of its own 
independently of kinship or other forms of distance discounting. If one believes 
that the distance between the agent and the object is important for moral 
considerations, why should genetic distance be more important than temporal 
distance? I guess we should rather say that temporal discounting is a sub-
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category of distance discounting just like genetic discounting (or kinship 
discounting) is. Even if these two sub-categories in general coincide, they do not 
always coincide and have to be handled separately. 
The most interesting question is whether any form of discounting for 
distance is morally acceptable (or even obliged). 
Parfit compares time discounting and spatial discounting. He claims that no 
one accepts spatial discounting, and believes that temporal discounting is equally 
unacceptable.489 Gregory Kavka and Jan Narveson reason along the same lines. 
Narveson argues that the fact that people differ by their location on the planet 
does not grant that we should treat them differently and the same should apply to 
future people who differ from us when it comes to their location in time. The 
same rules that guide our dealings with contemporary people should thus apply 
to our dealings with future generations just as the same principles apply to all 
presently living people, even though some live quite far from us in geographical 
terms.490 Kavka in turn notes that spatial location is not morally relevant, so why 
should location in time be? 491 He also considers it part of rational prudence to put 
equal weight on one’s own present and future, and thinks that analogously 
rational morality should put equal weight on present and future generations.492 
Mary Warren makes an analogy with different kinds of non-acceptable 
discrimination forms of now living people. She claims that “the historical period 
in which they exist” is no more relevant as a basis for moral standing than are 
other “accidental properties” such as age, race or sex.493 Shrader-Frechette makes 
the same analogy with irrelevant properties but from a contractual perspective.494 
Sumner points out that to favour someone just because of her location in time is 
to count someone for more than one, which cannot be acceptable according to 
utilitarianism.495 Kavka’s comparison with rational prudence does not seem 
relevant here since in his example we are talking about one and the same person, 
not about our duties to consider other people’s interests. The other arguments 
seem valid, however. Not least the comparison between geographic distance 
discounting and temporal distance discounting. If we are not allowed to 
discriminate because of spatial distance as such, we should not be allowed to 
discriminate because of temporal distance as such, and I cannot think of any 
relevant difference between the two cases that would make it acceptable to treat 
the cases differently. 
How about kinship distance then? Can we apply the same reasoning there? 
Intuitively, it does not seem unreasonable to treat one’s own family different than 
others, at least in some respects. I believe very few people would find it immoral 
if someone feeds her own children rather than sending food to distant children if 
we have to choose between the two options. In fact, many people are inclined to 
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find it morally questionable not to take special care of their own family. This 
does not seem to be a matter of strict proportional discounting, however, and it 
apparently does not apply to all situations. Even if it is morally required to give 
certain benefits to your closest kin or to give priority to your closest kin in some 
situations, you may not do so generally and you are not allowed to harm others in 
order to benefit your closest kin, at least not if the harm done exceeds a certain 
magnitude. Parfit suggests that the kinship discounting in analogy with spatial 
discounting (which he now surprisingly seems to accept) should not apply to 
inflicting of great harm. I.e., even if it is acceptable to give larger benefits to your 
closer kin, this way of reasoning is not acceptable when we talk about large 
degrees of harm. To cause great harm to anyone is never acceptable, according to 
Parfit, independently of how distantly related the victim is.496 This statement 
obviously needs to be more specified since we need to establish how much harm 
we are talking about. It might also have to be widened since it is not always 
acceptable to give larger benefits to your closer kin either. Parfit’s solution does 
seem to be generally acceptable, however. 
Another thing we have to add, which is also pointed out by Parfit, is that the 
discounting should probably only apply up to a certain distance.497 Even if it is 
reasonable to treat your own child differently than a much more distantly related 
child, it is not acceptable to treat that child differently than an even further 
related child. Discounting is therefore reasonable only up to a point. The 
alternative would be a discounting that decreases exponentially with decreasing 
degree of kinship. This alternative could be made to coincide closely with the 
exponentially decreasing degree of genetic kinship. 
Our conclusion is that discounting based on distance might be reasonable 
when it comes to kinship distance, but only up to a certain point and only in some 
situations, and never when we are talking about great harm. No discounting is 
acceptable on the basis of temporal distance as such. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9. Will they need our sacrifices? 
 
Another thing to consider is that although many natural resources decrease and 
are eventually depleted, other types of good actually increase. Knowledge, for 
example, is typically increasing. With the help of knowledge, we can find 
substitutes for some of the depleted resources. We also invent new technologies 
that utilise other (and possibly less) resources compared to the old 
technologies.498 This means that we could compensate for at least some of the 
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demise we have caused by accumulating knowledge and improving science and 
technology that benefits the lives of future generations.499 Since we constantly 
create new knowledge and since knowledge can be transferred from the present 
to the future but not the other way around, it is highly probable that future people 
will have more knowledge than we do. That way, they may figure out remedies 
to the problems we have already caused.500 It is even claimed that the increase of 
human knowledge might be more important than natural resources for the 
economy.501 
This is sometimes seen as an argument not to restrict ourselves for the sake 
of future generations,502 or at least to discount the future negative effects of our 
actions. Parfit identifies two principles that support this reasoning: 
1. Diminishing marginal utility. They will be better off than we are. 
Because of that, a certain resource or other benefit would be relatively less 
important for them than for us. It is therefore reasonable that we use the resource 
instead of saving it for future generations. 
2. Distributive justice. If they will be better off than we are, we cannot be 
morally required to redistribute our more limited resources to benefit them.503 
By now, we know Parfit's position. First, to discount because of (1) and (2) 
is not the same as discounting for temporal reasons and we should be careful to 
state the correct reason for our discounting. Second, the overlapping is probably 
not perfect. In this case, because some future humans are likely to be less well 
equipped than some present day humans.504 
An interesting problem with (1) as an argument against making sacrifices is 
pointed out by Avner de-Shalit. Thanks to technological progress, the resources 
we leave to future generations may well be worth more to them than to us.505 This 
means that from a utilitarian perspective, the accumulation of knowledge and 
improvement of technology can be an argument in favour of preservation. 
Another author who is not satisfied with the appeal to knowledge 
accumulation is Shrader-Frechette. She is not explicitly talking about species 
extinction, but attacks the assumption that future generations might be better 
equipped to deal with nuclear waste than we are.506 Her arguments could also be 
useful in a discussion about species extinctions however. 
She launches four arguments: 
The first one resembles Parfit’s second objection above: We cannot know 
that future generations will be better equipped than we are to deal with a certain 
problem. She mentions that things like overpopulation and depletion of resources 
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as well as the possibility that the problem as such gets worse over time, may 
actually make it harder for them to deal with the problem. 
Secondly, she invokes an argument from justice: Even though another 
person is better equipped to deal with a problem than I am, I have no right to 
expose this person to the problem. 
Her third argument is that the appeal to increasing knowledge is self-
serving by being clearly in the interest of those who make the decision. 
The fourth argument says that we are dealing with a case of misplaced 
priorities. She argues that it is more important to protect someone from harm 
than to promote welfare and if a person is harmed, she cannot be compensated by 
enhancing the welfare of someone else.507 
Let us take a look at these arguments: In her first argument, Shrader-
Frechette questions the assumption. I find it very difficult to assess the 
probability of the assumption in the long term. So far the accumulated knowledge 
of humanity has increased tremendously and seems to increase exponentially. As 
a result, our technological capacity has skyrocketed (not just literally). If this 
continues, there seems to be almost no limit to what future humans may be 
capable of. Not everyone is convinced that this will be enough, however. Luper-
Foy, for instance, is rather pessimistic about the possibility of solving the 
problems we have caused by improved technology. He claims, for example, that 
there is not much room for improvement of the food production.508 I am not sure 
that he is right on that particular point. The same thing has been claimed before 
and they have been proved wrong. We have to remember, however, that the 
assumption that the capacity of future generations to solve all problems we may 
throw at them is based on simple extrapolation and we ought to be careful about 
what we impose on posterity with reference to such an unsophisticated 
forecasting method. There have been periods of stagnation in the history of 
human thought. During the middle ages, the Catholic Church put a very strong 
lid on human thinking, which in effect meant that intellectual progress in many 
areas was made virtually impossible for a long time. We cannot be totally sure 
that this will not happen again, even though it seems unlikely. Had, for instance, 
Nazi-Germany been victorious in World War II, we might have ended up in a 
situation where new thinking would have been impossible in many areas and old 
knowledge would have ended up in the flames. We can also imagine that 
catastrophes like atomic war or extensive climate change (or indeed serious 
depletion of biodiversity) may be at least as effective lids on human progress in 
the future. The very behaviour we are trying to defend by the argument from 
increasing knowledge may eventually undermine the argument by prohibiting the 
progress. It might therefore be a good idea to apply the precautionary principle 
again. Since we do not know what capacities future generations will hold, and 
since large values are at stake, we should not use this uncertainty as an excuse for 
not taking the necessary measures to avoid imposing the problems on them. 
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Let us now have a look at Shrader-Frechette’s second objection: It does 
indeed seem unacceptable in intragenerational relations to go around and cause 
problems for other people and excuse oneself by pointing out that they have the 
ability to handle the problems we throw at them. It is one thing that someone is 
capable of dealing with a problem. It is another to say that it is acceptable to 
expose him to the problem (whether I too have this capacity or not) – at least as 
long as it actually is a problem. If future generations were to have such powers 
that problems that seem overwhelming to us are not even problems to them, then 
maybe it would be justified to say that we have done nothing wrong by exposing 
them to these “problems” simply because they would not be problems. 
What, then, if they are still problems but so insignificant that future 
generations will be able to deal with them in a few seconds by a simple and 
cheap operation, or that their society or technology will be so different from ours 
that they would be able to live with the “problems” with only a small 
inconvenience? Then I suppose we would be justified in saying that what we did 
was a little selfish, but not that bad. What if the problem would take a little more 
effort to solve or make their lives somewhat more inconvenient? Then one 
should probably say that what we did was not very nice, but no serious crime. So 
we could go on. My point here is that we are dealing with a matter of degree. The 
question is: Where should we draw the line? 
A utilitarian will clearly draw the line where the total expense for future 
generations will be larger than the gain for us. From a deontological perspective, 
this is not acceptable. According to Shrader-Frechette, it is intuitively obvious 
that we have to consider basic rights before we try to maximise the total 
welfare.509 Thereby we have slid into her fourth objection. I will not enter the 
debate of deontological versus consequentialist ethics here. I will just note that if 
we assume a deontological position, our answer would not so much depend on 
how much we can gain from imposing this problem on future generations. 
Instead, we would have to accept that imposing problems on future generations 
for our own gain is not a just behaviour even if the problems we cause are 
relatively small. Exactly where the limit should be placed is, however, a question 
that remains to be answered. 
Let us turn to the third objection: The fact that a decision favours the 
decision-maker is not in itself an argument against it. Considering what our 
experience tells us about human beings, however, we must be aware of the risk 
of bias. This is a reason for some degree of healthy suspicion. When dealing with 
future generations we also have to take into account the fact that we, for obvious 
reasons, cannot mitigate the risk by letting them take part in the decision. 
The fourth objection is in fact two: That it goes against the principle that 
harm is more important than benefit, and that it goes against the principle that it 
is wrong to let one person pay for someone else’s benefit even if the benefit is 
larger than the harm. 
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I have already discussed both these intuitions. The second one is discussed 
above and the first one is discussed in section 3.3.1 where we concluded that it 
was in need of better justification before we dare to accept it and we therefore do 
not want to rely on it in this investigation. 
The conclusion from this sub-section must be that the accumulation of 
knowledge is very large and it is reasonable to assume that it will increase the 
capacities of future generations to deal with problems that seem overwhelming to 
us, but that we cannot straight off take this as a valid excuse for downplaying our 
responsibilities. There are still moral problems with imposing the costs of our 
progress on future generations even if they can handle it. We have also seen that 
there are uncertainties regarding the future development – especially since our 
acts might seriously change this development, and that the accumulation of 
knowledge may even in some cases be an argument in favour of preservation. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.10. Conclusions 
 
For anthropocentric instrumentalism, it is important to show that we have moral 
duties to consider the interests of future generations. In this chapter, we have 
seen that there are many difficulties, but that it is quite reasonable to assume that 
we have such duties as long as we do not adhere to a contractarian or 
communitarian approach to ethics, and as long as we accept interpersonal 
comparisons. We have also found some reasons to restrict our duties to future 
generations in certain situations, e.g. by discounting, which weakens the power 
of anthropocentric instrumentalism somewhat. On the whole it seems, however, 
that the duties we have to consider the interests of future generations give us 
relatively strong moral reasons not to contribute to the extinction of other 
species. 
We have to add, however, that if duties to future generations of human 
beings is a good reason to consider extinction a moral problem, a non-
anthropocentric view that also accepts duties to future generations of non-human 
life, would give us an even stronger reason to condemn acts that contribute to the 
extinction of species. 
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5. Something is lacking 
 
Alan Randall tells us that: “The earth’s biota may be viewed as a resource or a 
complex group of resources.”510 The question is, may it exclusively be viewed as 
a resource or a complex group of resources – or are there other types of value 
that have to be considered in order to answer the question of what is wrong with 
extinction? Maybe it is problematic in itself to regard other species just as 
resources? We have, up to now, assumed an anthropocentric instrumental 
vantage point in order to test what obligations anthropocentric instrumentalism 
place upon us regarding other species. As philosophers, we cannot stop there, 
however. We must also ask whether there is something in our moral intuitions 
that cannot be captured by the view of the earth’s biota as a resource or as a 
complex group of resources, even if this view supplies us with strong reasons for 
preservation of the biota. Let us illustrate this with an analogy: 
Imagine a meeting in the southern part of USA some time during the first 
half of the nineteenth century. A group of slave owners has gathered to discuss 
some disturbing rumours about the slave trade. These rumours say that the slave 
ships are coming in less and less frequently. Presumably because the slave 
traders have to travel further and further inland on the African continent to find 
new slaves. There are even worries that if they continue to harvest slaves at the 
same pace, Africa will soon run out of humans suitable for slavery. At the same 
time, the cotton harvests have been larger than ever, so the economy is going 
great. As a result, the slaves who have done the harvesting are completely worn 
out. Many have become sick or permanently crippled. Some have even died, and 
“to be honest”, one of the slave owners admits, “we have mistreated our slaves”. 
“In fact”, he continues, “some of us do have a tendency to use the whip a little 
too much. Not that the slaves didn’t deserve it, but we have noticed that the 
slaves that have been too severely punished have had trouble working after a 
while. So maybe we should try to treat our slaves a little more wisely? After all, 
the slave system has worked well for us and we want it to work well even for our 
children and grandchildren, and we should definitely develop this system so that 
more white people can have their own plantations and prosper economically. In 
short, we need a more sustainable development of the slave trade!” 
For a present day observer, it is immediately obvious what is wrong with 
this picture. The slave owners regard the slaves as merely resources for them to 
use, and instead of abolishing a genuinely immoral system, they are looking for 
methods to prolong it. 
There are obviously many differences between the picture above and the 
problems we are dealing with in this investigation, but I trust the reader does not 
let the main point of the analogy get lost among the differences: The slave 
owners in the story did not really care for the slaves. They just cared for the work 
they could do, and the reason for lessening the pressure on the slaves was 
exclusively about productivity. In the same way, according to anthropocentric 
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instrumentalism, other species should be preserved not out of concern for the 
species or their individual members, but only out of concern for ourselves and 
future generations of human beings. 
What this story shows is that a full account of why it is morally problematic 
to contribute to the extinction of other species possibly involves more than 
instrumental values for human beings. Even if that value is enough to establish 
that something is wrong, it may not give the whole moral picture. 
Even so, could we not just play along and appeal to the instrumental value 
of the species for tactical reasons? When we started our investigation of 
anthropocentric instrumentalism as an answer to our main question, we noted 
that this answer has a dominating position in national and international policy 
documents. Could we not use that fact in order to get the protection we want 
even if it is not (totally) for the right reasons? It is not uncommon to hear phrases 
with that purport from active environmentalists, but there are risks connected 
with this strategy. One risk is that by using this tactic we will get what we ask 
for, but not what we want. It happens now and then that environmentalists and 
environmental groups seemingly successfully use anthropocentric instrumentalist 
arguments to back up their claims but when they finally get what they asked for 
they are still not happy. The government, city council or company they have been 
negotiating with cannot understand why the environmentalists are still 
complaining since they got what they asked for. Sometimes even the 
environmentalists themselves have difficulties explaining what is wrong. They 
may disagree among themselves about why, but they at least agree that 
something is wrong. The problem might be that the environmentalists want to 
preserve an area or a species because they see some kind of value in it that 
exceeds the human resource value, while what they got (and what they probably 
argued for) is a law (/policy/agreement/etc.) that preserves the species in order to 
use it more efficiently by the human society. 
Very often, it seems that a species is preserved only as a way of producing 
new individuals that can be utilised. For many, this is counter to their moral 
intuitions, and it seems that even if this way of handling nature is rather prudent, 
there is something wrong with it. Many would say, like in the example with the 
slave owner convention above, that it is something morally wrong. 
J. Baird Callicott makes an analogy with space travellers who find life on 
another planet, and after having established that it is life, they eradicate it. 
Intuitively, there seems to be something wrong about this – something morally 
wrong. Callicott claims that this would be more wrong compared to if they had 
eradicated some interesting geological patterns.511 Apparently, this 
extraterrestrial life form does not have any greater resource value for us so why 
is it still wrong? 
 
                                                
511 Callicott 1986 p.142 
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6. Ecocentrism 
 
An alternative way of accounting for the intuition that we are doing something 
morally wrong when we cause other species to go extinct is presented by the 
moral theory that goes by the name ecocentrism. Ecocentrism claims that we 
have moral duties to the species as such. It also claims that we have moral duties 
to other wholes such as ecosystems, but for the purpose of this investigation I 
will limit the discussion to the question of species. The idea is that species are 
holistic systems with intrinsic value that endow us with moral duties to the 
species directly. The species have this status among other things because they 
have morally relevant interests. All species have interests of their own in virtue 
of being species. These interests are independent of our interests in the species, 
and they are not reducible to, or a function of, the interests of individual 
organisms.512 
This theory stands in sharp contrast to anthropocentric instrumentalism that 
claims that we have moral duties regarding species in virtue of our interests in 
them. It also stands in equally sharp contrast to the wider version of 
individualism that we will investigate later, that claims that we have moral duties 
to individual members of different species. According to ecocentrism, we have 
duties to species and ecosystems in a way that is not reducible to and not a 
function of duties to individuals.513 This means that we cannot account for these 
duties by considering, for example, the interests of the majority of the individual 
members of the species. When ecocentrists talk about something as being good 
for a species, they do not mean the same thing as, for example, Paul W. Taylor 
does when he says that the good of a community or a population consists of 
 
… the population or community maintaining itself from generation to 
generation as a coherent system of genetically related organisms whose 
average good is at an optimum level for the given environment.514  
 
Where ‘average good’ means that 
 
… the degree of realization of the good of individual organisms in the 
population or community is, on average, greater than would be the case 
under any other ecological functioning order of interrelations among 
those species populations in the given system.515 
 
According to Taylor’s view, the good of a species is a function of the good 
of the individual members of the species. According to ecocentrism on the other 
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hand, it is actually possible that the good of a species in some circumstances can 
go against the good of every individual member of the species.516 In these cases, 
ecocentrism often (but not always) assigns a higher priority to the interests of the 
species or the ecosystems, than to the interests of the individuals. 
The ecocentric belief that species have interests that are not reducible to, or 
a function of, individual interests also means that the ecocentrists believe that 
some problems in environmental ethics (like the one we are investigating) cannot 
be accounted for, or dealt with, by using individualistic moral theories.517 Instead, 
they claim that duties to species and ecosystems as such, is the only way of fully 
accounting for our moral concerns regarding species extinction. 
There are different versions of ecocentrism, and the versions differ in many 
ways. The position outlined above is, however, something they all share, and it is 
also directly relevant for our investigation. I will therefore limit my discussion to 
these particular aspects of ecocentrism. 
Since ecocentrism aims directly at the species, it looks like ecocentrism 
would be the most suitable theory for our purpose,518 given of course that it is a 
feasible theory. The talk about duties to species looks like something that could 
cause problems already on account of something we have already discussed: As 
we found in sub-section 4.1.2, talking about duties to someone would, if we 
mean it literally, fall victim to the non-identity problem. I therefore suggested 
that we instead talk about duties to consider the interest of someone. As we saw 
above, the purpose of the ecocentric claim that we have duties to species is to 
deny that species are morally relevant only to the extent that they occur in the 
interests of individuals, and instead affirm that the species have interests of their 
own that we have a duty to consider.  I therefore believe that the ecocentric use 
of the phrase ‘duties to species’ can be reformulated along the lines I have 
suggested without losing any of its meaning, and that it therefore does not fall 
victim to the non-identity problem. The main tenet of ecocentrism will thus be 
that we have a moral duty to consider the interests of species. 
There are several other problems connected with ecocentrism, however, and 
many writers on the subject are very sceptical to ecocentrism.519 In this chapter 
will take a look at two of the most important problems in order to figure out 
whether they are real problems, and if so, if they can be remedied. 
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6.1. What is a species? 
 
The ontological status of species is rather unclear. It is sometimes claimed that 
the species concept is just something we have invented to aid our thinking and 
talking about nature, and that species do not have any independent existence 
outside of our brains.520 It is, for example, suggested that our division of nature 
into species might be an evolutionary adaptation of our thinking that has resulted 
from our practical needs to identify the plants and animals we interact with.521 
The problems do not stop there, however. Even if species do exist outside 
of our minds, in what sense do they exist? Are they individuals in some meaning, 
or are they classes or natural kinds? Are they discrete entities or is the transition 
between species only a matter of degree or even just a matter of convenience? 
Independently of why we want to preserve species, it is important to have 
some idea of what a species is. The ontological status of species is, however, 
much more important for the ecocentric approach than for the others. If we find it 
important to preserve species for anthropocentric reasons, it is important to know 
what different life forms contribute with for us humans. The properties of the 
species are important but their ontological status is not particularly important. It 
does not matter very much where we draw the lines between different species as 
long as we manage to preserve enough organisms with features that are important 
for us. If we concentrate our concern not just on humans, but on a wider selection 
of individual organisms the ontological status of species is, even less important. 
What is relevant then, is the moral status of the individuals. The question of what 
species they happen to belong to is only interesting in so far that it tells us 
something of their needs. The ontological status of species is not relevant at all. 
If we instead claim, as the ecocentrists do, that the species as such are moral 
objects, then the ontological status is crucial. To begin with, it is very difficult to 
maintain that we have moral duties to species if they have no existence 
independently of our imagination. It is difficult to imagine what it would mean 
for something that does not exist, and will not exist, to have interests that make 
moral demands on us. 
Even if species do exist independently of us, the problems are not over for 
the ecocentrist. How they exist is also important. It is not much easier to imagine 
a class as having morally relevant interests than to imagine the same of a 
construction of our fantasy, even if classes have an objective existence. If species 
are just conveniently cut out stretches of a continuum of related organisms, it is 
also problematic to claim that we have duties to a particular stretch. 
Holmes Rolston III, who is one of the most prominent advocates for 
ecocentrism, does not believe that the problems involved in finding one universal 
species concept is a threat to his theory, or that it matters too much which species 
concept we use. He acknowledges, however, that it is necessary for his theory 
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that species have an objective existence.522 He also admits that there are problems 
in saying what a species is, and that some see species as just a convenient way of 
grouping individuals,523 and he does admit that this is a problem for his approach: 
 
Nobody doubts that the individual bear exists, but if the various species 
are only the arbitrary groupings of biologists, one can seriously doubt 
whether there is a duty to endangered species.524 
 
Rolston and the other ecocentrists I have investigated argue of course that 
species do exist independently of us. They are not alone, however. Many other 
philosophers as well as biologists claim the same thing. On the other hand, there 
are as we saw above also a host of philosophers and biologists who dispute such 
claims.525 
Since I, contrary to Rolston, suspect that both the choice of species concept 
and the ontological status of species are relevant for his theory, and for 
ecocentrism in general, I will investigate both these questions. Considering that 
the species concepts tell us what criteria are used to divide organisms into 
species, it is reasonable to assume that different species concepts present 
different problems and possibilities for ecocentrism. 
What species concept we chose has direct bearing on the question of 
species ontology. I will therefore start with the species concepts, and then go on 
from there to the ontologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.1. “A plethora of species concepts” 
 
As the headline indicates, there is a large selection of different species 
concepts.526 David L. Hull from whom I have borrowed the headline of this sub-
section talks about a plethora, or a myriad of definitions of species.527 We have, 
for example, the morphological species concept, the biological, the phenetic, the 
ecological, the evolutionary, the evolutionary significant, the typological, the 
genetic, the phylogenetic, the polythetic, the cladistic, the genotypic cluster, the 
cohesion, the isolation, the recognition, the reproductive competition, the 
composite, the autamorphic, the nominalistic, the internodal, the genealogical, 
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the successional, the taxonomic and the Hennigian species concepts, etc.528 These 
can in turn be divided into different versions and grouped into different types. 
Henry K. Svenson groups the different concepts into three categories: 
Resemblance among the organisms, phylogenetic ancestry, and arbitrary 
grouping depending on whom you ask.529 David L. Hull has grouped the species 
concepts along a different axis. He distinguishes between interbreeding, ecologic, 
and phylogenetic species concepts.530 He has also attempted a bipolar 
classification: One group based on structural similarities and the other on 
phylogenetic relationship. These two groups can in turn be divided into several 
subgroups.531 John Dupré talks about three categories of species concepts: 
Morphological, evolutionary and pluralistic.532 Robert Wilson and Marc 
Ereshefsky divide the species concepts into two groups along the same lines. 
Wilson uses the terms ‘genealogical’ and ‘reproductive’, while Ereshefsky calls 
them ‘phylogenetic’ and ‘interbreeding’. The distinction is the same, however. 
The genealogical/phylogenetic species concepts are based on genetic descent 
while the reproductive/interbreeding species concepts are based on reproductive 
isolation.533 
The question of how to classify species is usually called “the species 
question”. In 1953, Svenson claimed that there was, at that time, no answer to the 
species question.534 Reydon claimed the same thing more than 50 years later.535 
Between those years, the number of species concepts has not decreased. Instead 
it has increased, and is still increasing.536 The same goes for the number of 
arguments for and against the suggested concepts. It thus seems that we are no 
closer to a definite answer to the species question today than we were in 1953. If 
anything, we might even be further away.537 
Historically, when people have divided organisms into groups, they have 
been mostly concerned with the most salient properties of the organisms.538 The 
properties could be of different kinds. E.g. the way the organisms look (big, 
small, fury, four-legged, two-legged, etc.), the way they behave (swimming, 
crawling, running, hunting, grazing, burrowing, etc.), in what environment they 
live (the forest, the field, the mountains, the sea, in the wild or on a farm, etc.), 
and not least, what useful or dangerous properties they have from an 
anthropocentric instrumental perspective. Some of the classifications are quite 
well in phase with modern classifications, but not all of them. Whales are, for 
example, not classified as fish by any of the modern species concepts even 
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though they swim, are equipped with fins and live in the sea. The modern species 
concepts often coincide with each other in practice, though they never 
completely overlap.539 For our purpose, the degree of overlap in practice is not of 
primary importance, however. In order to figure out whether species can be 
moral objects, it is the theoretical basis for the taxonomy that is important. 
Some claim that only one species concept can be correct (monism), while 
others claim that we need different species concepts depending on what aspects 
of living nature we want to talk about or study (pluralism). 
If we take a monistic approach, we have to choose one concept as the 
correct one. I will look at three of the most discussed concepts and briefly present 
the most notable advantages and disadvantages of these species concepts, in 
particular from an ecocentric perspective. After that I will do the same with 
pluralism. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.2. The phenetic species concept 
 
The first species concept I will have a look at is the so-called phenetic species 
concept. As with most of the species concepts, it comes in different versions. 
What all versions of this concept have in common is that they group organisms 
into species based on their overall similarity in terms of morphological and/or 
genotypic properties.540 It is thus the modern species concept that most closely 
resembles the more traditional way of conceiving of species depicted above. It is 
also the easiest one to apply and is therefore often the method used in practice by 
field biologists to distinguish between species.541 Even so, it is rarely used for 
defining species. It is not particularly popular as a species concept (as opposed to 
a rule of thumb) among biologists or philosophers of biology today. 
One problem with the phenetic species concept is that you need to study a 
large sample of a population to find useful and relevant morphological gaps.542 
This means that it is relatively easy to apply to organisms that we have much 
experience of, but it is rather difficult to apply to new found life forms. It is also 
considered too uninformative from a scientific point of view. The overlap 
between phenetics and evolutionary history is, for example, not good enough for 
the phenetic species concept to be useful when it comes to identifying relevant 
units in evolutionary biology. It is also a problem to decide what kind of and how 
much similarity should be enough to form a species. The problem of finding 
good demarcation lines is, however, a problem that is not unique for the phenetic 
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species concept, and we will look at that problem separately at the end of this 
section. 
Another problem is that it is difficult both I theory and in practice to make 
sense of the idea of an overall similarity. What does it mean that two organisms 
have a greater overall similarity then two other organisms, and how do we in 
practice weigh and combine the different characters of each organism into a total 
picture that can be compared between organisms?543 
From an anthropocentric perspective, the phenetics species concept has the 
advantage that it informs us of to which degree different species possess different 
useful properties or properties that convey end value to the species. The 
drawback is that it is not very informative when it comes to how the species fit in 
the evolutionary context or how they interact within or between groups. This is 
information that is useful even from an anthropocentric perspective, both because 
it helps us assess the role of the species in question as suppliers of ecosystem 
services, and because it helps us determine how best to preserve the species. 
From an ecocentric perspective, the phenetic species concept is more 
problematic, however. One problem is that if we base our criteria on the overall 
similarities, it is not clear how species are special in relation to any other taxa.544 
By that I mean that it does not explain why species are assumed to have interests 
but not sub-species or genus. 
None of the ecocentrists I have looked at explicitly endorse the phenetic 
species concept, but it seems to be crucial for one of the main arguments 
presented by Holmes Rolston III. He argues that there is such a thing as an 
objectively and clearly observable good state for everything in nature – “a good 
of its kind” – that is supposed to explain how we can identify interests in species 
and non-sentient organisms.545 This good state is apparently signified by the 
properties of the members of the species. Rolston says, for example, that “… as 
soon as one knows what a blue spruce is, one knows what a good blue spruce 
is.”546 If we would accept a species concept that is not based on the properties of 
the individual members of the species, but on properties of the population (like 
genetic descent or reproductive isolation) this kind of manoeuvre would not be 
possible. The “good of its kind”-argument therefore seems to presuppose a 
phenetic species concept. On the other hand, if we do accept a species concept 
that is based on the properties of the individual members of the species, it will be 
difficult to claim that the species as such have interests that are not reducible to 
interests of its member organisms. 
That we decide which properties are relevant and what degree of similarity 
is enough for a group of organisms to form a species according to the phenetic 
species concept, also makes it very difficult to make sense of the idea that the 
interests of the species are independent of our interests. 
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The conclusion seems to be that even though there is large overlapping of 
the groups we get by applying the phenetic species concept and the groups that 
ecocentrists want to preserve, phenetic species do not look like good candidates 
for being moral objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.3. The biological species concept 
 
The species concept that has been the most popular during the second half of the 
previous century is the so-called biological species concept (there are also 
different versions of this concept).547 It is together with, for instance, the 
recognition and the reproductive competition concepts an example of the 
interbreeding approach to species concepts.548 It tells us that what makes up a 
species is the gene flow between its members, and what distinguishes a species 
from other species is the lack of gene flow between them. Species are therefore 
according to this species concept identified as interbreeding populations. An 
interbreeding population in turn is a group of individuals that together can 
produce viable offspring.549 The basic idea is that the interbreeding makes the 
population evolve together as a unit.550 The fact that there are populations of 
organisms that are reproductively isolated from each other is explained by the 
evolutionary forces. Geographic isolation makes a sub-population evolve in a 
different direction from other sub-populations and maintain the properties that 
are useful in their environment. When the members of the different populations 
become more different, genetically, physiologically and in terms of behaviour, 
individuals from different populations will be less likely to mate even if they 
meet, and if they do mate, the probability that it will result in a viable offspring 
will be smaller. The latter means in turn that selection will favour individuals that 
are less interested in mating with members of the other population, and the 
isolation will become permanent.551 For short: What starts out as a contingent 
external geographical barrier evolves into a permanent intrinsic reproductive 
barrier. We can therefore say that the biological species concept is based on how 
evolution creates isolated and objectively distinguishable groups. 
This looks like a reasonable way of dividing organisms into species. It also 
carries some information that is useful when studying evolutionary biology. 
There are problems with the biological species concept, however, and it has 
started to lose its popularity in recent years.552 One problem is that it is difficult 
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to use in practical taxonomy. Both biologists and palaeontologists often use 
morphological features to decide the species of an organism even if they try to 
place the specimens into the biological species concept. This is in particular the 
case with palaeontology where we are dealing with fossils, where it is impossible 
to know whether two organisms were actually interbreeding.553 Walter J. Bock 
believes that this is just a problem for practical identification and not for the 
theoretical definition.554 I am not sure, however, that it is entirely unproblematic 
to use one set of criteria for practical identification and another for species 
definition. The correlation between the two criteria will probably never be 
perfect which means that when biologists make observations of what they 
identify as a species and then draw conclusions based on these observations, the 
entities they observe will not be exactly the same as the entities to which they 
confer their findings. It also ought to be problematic from an ecocentric 
perspective that the entities pointed out by their theory will not be exactly the 
same entities as will be protected in practice. 
There are also degrees of interbreeding, which means that the borders 
between species can be quite arbitrary.555 The problem of drawing the line 
between species is, as we saw above, something that it shares with the phenetic 
species concept – and in fact with all other species concepts. I will therefore 
come back to this problem in a later sub-section. 
The problem that has gotten the most attention is also a problem that is both 
salient and quite serious: The biological species concept is based on reproductive 
barriers, which means that it is not applicable to life forms that do not reproduce 
sexually.556 
A simple way of dealing with this problem is to just deny that asexual 
organisms form species at all. This way out has also been used by some of the 
proponents of the biological species concept.557 It is not a very satisfying 
solution, however. It is both counter-intuitive and impractical, and most 
biologists do not accept it.558 From the ecocentric perspective it would also mean 
that a large part of biodiversity would be left out of their system, which is clearly 
contrary to their intentions. 
One might attempt to make the biological species concept applicable to 
asexual species by, for example, stating that a population of asexual organisms 
constitutes a species if it is sufficiently isolated in other respects (geographically, 
physiologically, genetically) that its members would have been reproductively 
isolated had they been able to reproduce sexually.559 
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However, I suspect that few biologists or philosophers would be satisfied 
with this type solution. The solution is clearly ad hoc and counterfactual. It is 
also a step away from one of the main motives behind the biological species 
concept by allowing species that are not bound together and isolated from other 
groups by gene flow. For ecocentrism it is unsatisfying to identify their object of 
moral concern as a group of individuals that would have been an interbreeding 
population if they reproduced sexually. It is just very difficult to understand how 
this could generate non-reducible and morally relevant interests. It is also 
generally unsatisfying to base something as important as moral status on a purely 
hypothetical consideration. 
Another general problem with the biological species concept is that there is, 
in fact, a gene flow over the accepted species boundaries.560 For instance, what is 
conceived of as different oak species, have a tendency to share genes quite 
frivolously. That they are still conceived of as different species suggests that total 
reproductive isolation is not necessary for us to talk about different species.561 
This is in particular a problem for the idea of genetic isolation, which, as we saw, 
is central to the biological species concept.562 
Sober does not believe that this is a problem. He believes the biological 
species concept can accept that species hybridize, and he makes an analogy with 
Siamese twins and with nations whose territories overlap. In both these cases, 
there is an area that belongs to both Siamese twins or to both nations but this 
does not mean that we cannot still distinguish between the nations or persons in 
question.563 The obvious weakness in this defence is that in these two cases we 
can and do use other criteria than bodily or geographical isolation to define the 
individual person or the individual nation. It is much more difficult to deal with 
the problem of gene flow between populations for a theory that uses genetic 
isolation as the definition of individual species. 
We also have the opposite problem: The gene flow within species (e.g. 
between different local populations of what is conceived to be the same species) 
is sometimes relatively small, but in spite of that, the populations do not always 
evolve any inherent reproductive barriers and therefore continue to count as one 
species. The common muzzle (Mytilus edulis) is but one example of this. It exists 
in isolated populations in different parts of the world. They are genetically very 
different but they still count as one species.564 
In some cases, populations are strictly geographically isolated, which means 
that there is no gene flow between the populations, and in spite of that, they 
continue to count as one species.565 
What stops us then from just re-classifying these species and count each 
sub-population as different species even though the barriers are just geographic, 
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not physiologic or genetic? This solution has been promoted by, for example, 
Elliot Sober and Kim Sterelny.566 Sterelny thinks that the demand for intrinsic 
barriers is puzzling since the consensus view of the biological species concept is 
that it is the relation between organisms, not their intrinsic properties, that define 
species.567 
One problem with this solution pointed out by Sterelny himself, is that 
extrinsic barriers in some cases are only temporary.568 This means that accepting 
geographical barriers as species boundaries could at times lead to the strange 
situation that a species splits into two and then merge back into one species. Both 
Bock and Sober accepts that this can happen. Bock does not seem to find this at 
all problematic,569 while Sober speculates that the cases where populations are 
geographically isolated without evolving internal reproductive barriers only exist 
during so short times that they do not matter.570  
Another reason for why many are dissatisfied with external barriers as 
borders between species is that it is seen as too counterintuitive. There will be an 
inflation in the number of species, and the resulting species do not fit with how 
biologists or the public conceive of species.  This in turn also means that they 
might not coincide very well with the groups that ecocentrists (or people in 
general) feel morally obligated to preserve. 
Counting external barriers as sufficient for distinguishing between two 
species also raises some other difficult questions. Do, for instance, two individual 
organisms who live at different, non-overlapping, times belong to the same 
species? Time seems to be an absolute external barrier. In order to get around this 
problem we could limit our criteria to only consider geographical, not temporal 
external barriers. This solution would work for this particular problem but it 
seems quite ad hoc. Why should geographic barriers be more important than 
temporal barriers? Walter J. Bock goes the opposite way. Instead of trying to get 
around it, he simply accepts that only organisms living at the same time belong to 
the same species.571 Species can, according to this idea, not be compared over 
time. To ask if two populations living at different times belong to the same 
species is, according to Bock, a “non-question”.572 This sounds rather odd and 
not very fruitful. Assume, for instance, that we have three generations of 
organisms where generation G1 overlaps with generation G2 and generation G2 
overlaps with generation G3 but generations G1 and G3 do not overlap. Then the 
organisms belonging to G1 and G2 would be of the same species and so would 
organisms belonging to G2 and G3, but the question of whether organisms of 
generations G1 and G3 belong to the same species would be a “non-question”. It 
would also cause serious problems for palaeontology since it would be 
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impossible to ask whether two fossils from different eras represent the same 
species. 
Another problem with relying on external barriers is that it will be 
impossible to identify museum specimens if we do not know where they come 
from.573 This is particularly problematic considering the habit of appointing “type 
specimens” as representing species. Sterelny dismisses this particular worry as a 
leftover from an outdated system,574 and I am inclined to agree. Contrary to 
Sterelny, however,575 I believe that the general problem of not being able to tell 
which species a specimen belongs to without knowing where it is collected 
seems like a reductio ad absurdum-argument against the suggestion that external 
barriers are sufficient. This argument can be augmented if we also consider not 
just specimens in museums, but also living individuals in botanical or zoological 
gardens. We would have to know where they came from in order to identify the 
species. It gets even worse if we are dealing with individuals that are born in a 
zoo.576 Individual animals that are born in different zoos and kept isolated would 
count as different species even if they would have belonged to the same species 
had they been born in the same zoo or in the wild. In fact, every group of 
organisms or even single organisms isolated behind a fence or in a cage in e.g. a 
zoo would make up its own species. We would also have to stop claiming that 
individual animals born in a zoo represent species existing in the wild. 
All of this seems quite counterintuitive and it would pose an interesting 
question for the ecocentrists: Do we actually have an obligation to isolate as 
many organisms as we can in order to create more species – or at least try to keep 
already geographically isolated populations that do not have an internal 
reproductive barrier between them isolated in order to save these species from 
merging into one species? Ecocentrism does not demand that we create new 
species or that we protect species from going extinct from “natural” causes, but it 
does demand that we do not actively contribute to extinction. An interpretation of 
the biological species concept that accepts external barriers as sufficient would 
thus imply that we, according to ecocentrism, would have a moral obligation to 
avoid destroying non-intrinsic barriers between populations. From an 
anthropocentric perspective this would only follow if the populations have 
different properties that are important to us, and that would be lost if the 
populations were to merge. From an ecocentric perspective, we would always 
have such an obligation. Is this in accordance with the basic ideas of 
ecocentrism? It seems that this is not something the proponents of ecocentrism 
have considered. If they accept this version of the biological species concept, it is 
apparently something they will have to consider. In particular, they would have 
to deal with the seemingly absurd consequence that even though we have no 
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obligation to create new species by isolating populations, once we have created 
them (e.g. by isolating them in a zoo) they would, according to ecocentrism, have 
their own morally relevant interests. So by just isolating sub-populations we 
could create new interest bearers. This would make the ecocentric notion of 
‘interest’ even more difficult to comprehend. It also confronts the ecocentrists 
with the following question: Do we have a moral duty to protect these new 
species once we have created them? Do we, for instance, have a duty not to 
exchange genetic material between zoos as is often done in order to prevent 
inbreeding? If we do not have such a duty, then why not? If species have morally 
relevant interests qua species, and the miniature populations in zoos are species, 
then reasonably they must have morally relevant interests too. If we do have such 
a duty, we will have to protect every miniature population in every zoo. This 
goes expressively against the ecocentric tenet that preserving species in zoos 
does not count as an acceptable form of preservation. To let them out would also 
go against ecocentric principles. In fact, letting them out would be equivalent to 
exterminating the species since it would mean that we take away the isolation 
mechanism and they would cease to be a species. Letting them out would thus 
mean automatic extinction of the species even if the individuals survive – which 
in itself seems very counterintuitive. The most theoretically interesting question 
is of course: How can the production of external barriers between populations 
create new interests? 
It is, in fact, quite common that the species we get even with the standard 
notion of the biological species concept (that demands intrinsic reproductive 
barriers between species) diverge from how biologists and the public would like 
to distinguish between different species.577 It would also, in many cases, give us a 
classification that would not be the most informative. The co-variation between 
interbreeding groups and morphological or evolutionary groups is not as good as 
was once thought.578 This in turn is a serious problem for those who want to 
promote the biological species concept as the universal species concept, since it 
shows that there are some relevant and informative groupings that cannot be 
achieved by the biological species concept.579 
Donohue even concludes that the biological species concept creates 
confusion by assuming that there is a correlation between interbreeding on one 
hand, and morphological and ecological distinction on the other hand, even 
though there is no causal relation,580 which in turn will make it harder to 
understand the causes of evolutionary change.581 
From an ecocentric point of view, the counter-intuitiveness ought to be 
quite problematic since it means that the species and therefore the moral objects 
will not totally coincide with the units they want to preserve. An advantage with 
the biological species concept is that it clearly points out the species taxa as the 
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only real taxonomic level.582 Other taxonomic levels like sub-species, genera, etc. 
can be seen as conventions, but reproductive isolation produces (according to the 
theory) objectively distinguishable groups.583 This is an advantage from an 
ecocentric perspective since it is important for them both that species have an 
objective existence and that species can be justifiably seen as relevantly different 
from the other taxonomic levels – which we, according to ecocentrism, do not 
have any duties to. 
The most difficult problem presented to the ecocentrists by the biological 
species concept is essentially the same as with the phenetic species concept: How 
do they connect the general idea of species as interbreeding populations with 
their idea of species as moral objects with a non-reducible, independent and 
morally relevant interest in continued existence? How do gene flow and 
reproductive isolation generate this kind of interests? I suspect that finding such a 
connection will be quite a challenging task for the ecocentrists. 
This, together with the other problems we have found, means that we have 
to conclude that the biological species concept might be at least as problematic as 
the phenetic species concept from an ecocentric point of view. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.4. The phylogenetic species concept 
 
A competitor to the two species concepts we have just investigated is the 
phylogenetic species concept. Contrary to the biological, the phylogenetic species 
concept has increased in popularity.584 Like the previous two concepts we have 
discussed, this concept too comes in different versions.585 The basic idea that all 
versions of this concept have in common is that species are made up by 
organisms who share the same ancestor. This is usually depicted in the form of 
segments of a phylogenetic tree.586 There are more or less strict versions of the 
phylogenetic species concept. According to the most common version, only 
monophyletic groups qualify as species.587 This means that two branches on the 
evolutionary tree can only belong to the same species if there is no other branch 
between them that is not a part of the species. 
The big question is where to divide the segments.588 Why do we cut the 
segments at one particular level and not at another? Lineages can be more or less 
inclusive. Lineages can also include other lineages where both lineages are 
monophyletic and both the included and the including lineage are equally 
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cohesive and integrated. The phylogenetic species concept cannot point out one 
level as more important than others.589 Why, for instance, do two brothers not 
make up a species? They share a common ancestor that they do not share with 
their cousins. We can also ask: why do all primates not count as a species? We 
clearly have a common ancestor some millions of years down the evolutionary 
tree and there is no other evolutionary linage between us. Indeed, it seems that 
the phylogenetic species concept could accept everything from individual 
organisms to the whole biosphere as species. It thus seems that the problem of 
drawing the line between species that we have seen in both the phenetic and the 
biological species concepts is also present in the phylogenetic species concept. 
The only difference is that the problems in this case are along the vertical plane 
as well as the horizontal. 
It is mainly the different ways of answering the question of where to draw 
the line that divides phylogenetics into different versions. One simple way of 
cutting the segments of the phylogenetic tree into species is to count all 
distinguishable monophyletic groups with invariable traits as one species.590 This 
is the case in some versions of the phylogenetic species concept but it has some 
drawbacks. One problem is that we will end up with a very large number of very 
small species.591 Another problem is that the species category will not be an 
evolutionary unit.592 The latter problem is particularly serious for the ecocentrists 
– both because it makes it less reasonable to talk about species as individuals, 
and because much of their reasoning is supposed to have an evolutionary basis. 
There are many other suggestions, but to give a detailed account of them 
would take an investigation of its own. I will therefore confine myself to the 
example above as an illustration of how to cut the segments, and stress that there 
is no consensus among the advocates of phylogenetics regarding how to solve 
this problem. 
None the less, the phylogenetic species concept has some advantages over 
the biological species concept. For instance, in many cases it has turned out to be 
more practical.593 For some systematists, strict genealogic groupings are 
important, which makes the phylogenetic species concept a better choice.594 The 
proponents of phylogenetics also like to point out that the biological species 
concept can accept non-monophyletic groups as species.595 This means that 
individuals on different branches of the evolutionary tree might form 
interbreeding populations even though there are other branches between them on 
the evolutionary tree that are not included in the species. This in turn means that 
an organism can be closer related in terms of common ancestors to some 
organisms outside the species than to some organisms within the species. 
Donoghue considers this to be a very serious problem that shows the biological 
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species concept to be arbitrary, misleading and counterintuitive.596 On the other 
hand, the advocates of the biological species concept can defend themselves by 
pointing out that this argument begs the question in that it is only a problem for 
those who already believe that phylogenetic descent is more important than 
belonging to a reproductively isolated population. It does not supply any 
argument to why phylogenetic descent should be more important than 
reproductive isolation. 
There are other independent arguments for that, however. One thing that is 
seen as an advantage of sorting organisms by their evolutionary history is that it 
accounts for the importance of evolution as the process behind biodiversity.597 
There are different opinions regarding the general appropriateness of the 
phylogenetic species concept when it comes to studying evolutionary processes, 
however. Grandcolas believes it is very well suited for that purpose,598 while 
Dupré claims that we may have to divide the organisms into groups that crosscut 
phylogenetic lineages in order to study their evolutionary roles.599 
Another problem regarding the phylogenetic species concept is that actual 
classification is in practice made by DNA-analysis, but genetic similarity is not 
always a guarantee for evolutionary relatedness. Genes can, for example, transfer 
spontaneously between different species of micro-organisms (and possibly also 
between other species), which makes it difficult, in practice, to make the 
theoretically important distinction between genetic similarity and evolutionary 
relatedness.600 
From an ecocentric viewpoint it is an advantage that the phylogenetic 
species concept fits very well with the ontological notion of species as 
individuals or lineages. This is also claimed to be the case with the biological 
species concept,601 but the phylogenetic concept is probably even more suited for 
giving species the ontological status as individuals. The notion of species as 
individuals is a favourite among ecocentrists and we will have a closer look at it 
later. The biggest problem with the phylogenetic species concept from an 
ecocentric perspective ought to be to figure out how the property of ‘being made 
up by organisms with a common ancestor’ can generate non-reducible and 
morally relevant interests. It does not look much easier to show how a common 
evolutionary history can generate such interests than how reproductive isolation 
or morphologic or genetic similarity may do so. 
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6.1.5. Pluralism 
 
All species concepts have their problems, and people in different fields of 
biology seem to demand different things from a species concept.602 Some 
philosophers and biologists even doubt that it is possible to find one universal 
species concept that is applicable to all organisms, and that can play all the roles 
we want it to play in all fields of biology.603 Robert A. Wilson for example, notes 
that different species concepts concentrate on different questions. He therefore 
concludes that we need different species concepts for different purposes, where 
which concept we choose is a matter of our interests.604 
Robert Sokal underlines this point by noting that species are defined and 
named according to one set of criteria, and then they are worked into an 
evolutionary theory that works with rather different concepts.605 He also points 
out that different species concepts suit different organisms,606 and that both 
species and speciation are complex phenomena. It is therefore, according to him, 
unlikely that they can be accommodated by one single concept.607 
Rossello-Mora believes that pluralism in species concepts is necessary to 
account for the variation in nature.608 To try to lump all relevant differences into 
one concept will, according to him, only cause confusion.609 
Kim Sterelny believes that it is not possible to find one species concept that 
can both classify all organisms according to species, and at the same time 
maintain that ‘species’ is a biologically important concept. If the property of 
being a species is evolutionarily significant, it must, according to Sterelny, have 
been “invented” by evolution several times in different ways and to different 
degrees – just as with the property of being an organism. There are many 
different ways of being an organism so there should be different ways of being a 
species. As a result, Sterelny insists that we need to either accept different 
species concepts, or accept that there are living things that do not belong to 
species.610 
John Dupré claims that there is no reason why all divisions of organisms 
into kinds should have the same basis (e.g. reproductive isolation).611 Darwinism 
has, he claims, showed us that there is not one unique structure in nature for 
science to discover.612 He also believes that no single species concept can be 
found that is optimally informative for all aspects of biology. How to classify an 
object can, according to him, only be answered based on what the purpose is of 
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the classification – and what is interesting depends on the circumstances. 
Therefore we need different species concepts depending on what we want to 
study.613 
Thomas Reydon claims that his own view does not belong to pluralism, but 
that it takes one more step and goes beyond pluralism.614 He claims that the 
different species concepts do not just represent different ways of classifying the 
same thing, but that they in fact deal with four different scientific questions.615 
The term ‘species’ is according to him used both for units of classification, and 
for units of generalisation. As units of classification, species are used as the units 
to which we attach our knowledge of the living world. As units of generalisation, 
species are used as the units of scientific explanations and predictions. He does 
not believe that the same concept can play both roles.616 
An interesting example of the problems of squeezing all life forms into the 
same species concept is ciliates. Ciliates are very difficult to classify, and David 
Nanney, who studies them, asks why we believe that we should be able to use the 
same taxonomy to organise ciliates as we use for organisms with a much shorter 
evolutionary history.617 This looks like a reasonable question. Why would all life 
forms divide themselves in distinguishable groups along the same principles 
when they do not evolve along the same lines in other respects? 
As a result of these considerations, not only the authors mentioned above, 
but several others as well advocate pluralism regarding species concepts.618 It has 
also become more popular in recent decades.619 According to pluralism, there is 
not one universally correct way of classifying organisms into species. Instead, 
there are many equally legitimate ways of classification – different systems for 
different purposes.620 
Pluralism would help us deal with the problems above by letting us use 
different species concepts for different purposes or different life forms. It also 
lets us account for the flexibility and dynamic in nature,621 and it would help us 
adapt theory to practise. When biologists talk about species they are quite 
pluralistic.622 There also seems to be a difference between ordinary language 
classification and scientific classification. This is according to Dupré an 
argument for pluralism. We need different classifications not just for different 
scientific studies, but also for ordinary life. It is, for instance, rational to 
distinguish between onion and garlic in gastronomy but not in biology.623 
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Not everyone agrees that pluralism is a good idea, however. Christopher 
Horvath argues that the primary role of the species concept is to identify a unique 
biological unit. This does not work if we resort to pluralism.624 On the other 
hand, it is questionable whether finding a unique biological unit is particularly 
important for biology. 
Wilkerson is very critical against pluralism in general and against Dupré in 
particular. He denies that scientific classifications (contrary to ordinary language-
classifications) are a matter of differing human interests.625 
I believe, however, that Wilkinson has misunderstood Dupré's point. 
Scientific taxonomy reflects the interests of those who make the classification in 
the sense that depending on what you study you might need to divide the natural 
world in different ways. Wilkerson divides the world of human interests 
regarding taxonomy into groups such as zookeepers, cooks, taxidermists, 
gardeners – and biologists.626 He agrees that the former groups have different 
interests but he seems to deny that the last group have any interests at all, and in 
particular that different biologists have different interests. To assume that 
biologists have no interests seems odd and that they do not have different 
interests is also difficult to believe. 
When it comes to the question of whether biologists have interests at all, 
Wilkinson suggests “biological classification”, “producing a classification that is 
usable” and “to gain prizes and honors …” as possible human interests among 
biologists, and he concludes that none of these answers are worth taking 
seriously, since the first is circular, the second trivial and the third just cynical.627 
The interesting thing is that he has forgotten the most obvious answer: Biologists 
want to study nature. That is their interest.628 Studying nature can, however, be 
done in different ways, and most importantly, one can study different parts and 
different aspects of nature. Two biologists who want to study different aspects of 
nature obviously have, at least partially, different interests and it might be that 
these different interests call for different classifications. Biologists too come in 
different types. There are ecologists, geneticists, evolutionary biologists, etc. Just 
like zoo-keepers and cooks have reasons to divide the living world in different 
ways because they are interested in different aspects of the organisms they work 
with, so do evolutionary biologists and ecologists have reasons to divide the 
living world in different ways because they too are interested in different aspects 
of nature. 
A more worrying problem with pluralism is that it might be rather 
confusing to use different species concepts for different purposes. Before 
Linnaeus, almost every biologist had his own taxonomy and Linnaeus’ big 
achievement was that he changed that. To resort to pluralism looks like a big step 
backward in that respect. David L. Hull exclaims: “We are drowning in a sea of 
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species concepts”. For him, the cumbersome excess of species concepts is a good 
reason to be more monistic.629 
Hull has tried to find the best compromise species concept by testing 
different concepts against three basic criteria: Applicability, significance and 
universality. It turned out that concepts that were easy to apply had a low 
significance, and conversely, concepts with a high significance turned out to be 
difficult to apply. There also seemed to be no covariance between the degree of 
universality and the other two criteria. Thus, he did not manage to find any 
concept that managed to cope better than the other concepts with all three 
criteria.630 This is of course a big problem for the monistic approach. In spite of 
that, and in spite that he agrees that classification systems are theory 
dependent,631 Hull maintains that even if he cannot find one taxonomy that is 
equally useful for all purposes, it is at least in principle possible to find one 
single taxonomy and even if it is not possible to find one system that fits all 
purposes equally well, it is still better to have one taxonomy than to have 
several.632 He compares taxonomy with the periodic table.633 There are many 
possible ways of ordering the elements, and clearly there are other ways of doing 
so that would be more useful for certain purposes, but it is still a good idea to 
have one universally accepted classification. 
Even Dupré acknowledges that it would be good if we could have one 
universal species concept, but he does not believe that nature works that way or 
that the consequences of not having a universal species concept are as bad as 
some have suggested. Instead he believes that the advantages outweigh the 
confusion of having more than one concept.634 On the other hand, in spite of his 
pluralism, he talks about the desirability of a lingua franca in which specialists 
from different disciplines can speak with each other.635 
The practical difficulties in using more than one species concept might be a 
good pragmatic argument in favour of monism but it is probably not enough for 
ecocentrism. In order to be able to claim that species have morally relevant 
interests in their own right, we need something more solid than a pragmatic need 
for a common terminology. 
What would pluralism in general mean from a preservation perspective – 
and in particular from an ecocentric perspective? In order to know what is wrong 
when a species goes extinct, we need to know what we lose. Is the problem that 
there will be no more flying fury things, or is the problem that there will be no 
more representatives of a certain branch of the evolutionary tree, or that no one 
will fulfil the function of eating insects and pollinate plants, or that a group of 
genes will disappear, or that there will be one less interbreeding population in the 
                                                
629 Hull 1999 p.44 
630 Hull 1999 pp.41f 
631 Hull 1999 p.36 
632 Hull 1999 p.35 
633 Hull 1999 pp.35f 
634 Dupré 1993 p.52 Rossello-Mora (Rossello-Mora 2003 p.325) agrees about the unimportance of finding 
a universal species concept. 
635 Dupré 1999 p.18 
 154 
world? From an anthropocentric perspective, one can imagine different answers 
to this question that are all relevant. As we have seen in previous chapters, 
different life forms represent a wide range of different values for human beings. 
It therefore seems that pluralism would work very well from an anthropocentric 
perspective. From that perspective it can be problematic if a certain phenetic 
species disappear and it can be just as problematic if a certain biological or 
phylogenetic species disappear, or if the number of biologic, phenetic of 
phylogenetic species decreases. 
From an ecocentric perspective things are different. It is not really the 
properties we are interested in.  The problem is not that a certain function will be 
lost, as such, or that a certain interbreeding population or evolutionary lineage 
will be lost as such. What we need to know is what it is that generates morally 
relevant interests. Is it the interbreeding population, or the gene sequence type, or 
the property of being furry and able to fly … etc.? The way we answer this 
question will decide how easy or how difficult it is to establish that species have 
interests, and it will decide what we have to do to establish that they do. The 
thing is, however, that the ecocentrists have not attempted to answer this 
question. 
If we accept a pluralistic approach, the ecocentrists will have to explain 
how groups defined by the common properties of their members, how 
interbreeding populations, and how gene sequence types, etc. can have interests. 
The more pluralistic we are the bigger the task of establishing moral standing for 
species will be. 
Accepting pluralism therefore looks very problematic for the ecocentrists, 
but it might not have to be devastating. If nature is in fact divided in different 
ways, ecocentrists will have to accept that but they do not necessarily have to use 
all species concepts that are found in nature. As we saw above, several of the 
pluralists argue that we need different species concepts for different purposes. 
The ecocentrists could agree with that, accept pluralism, and find one species 
concept (not necessarily an already existing one) that fits with their purposes. 
This presupposes of course that this concept represents a division that actually 
exists in nature. If it is just a theoretical construct it will be of no use for the 
ecocentrists. It will also have the drawback that the resulting species might differ 
substantially from the species that results from other species concepts. The units 
that gain moral standing might therefore not have much in common with the 
units that biologists work within their theories or the units people in general see 
as suitable for protection. 
Rolston is, as far as I have found, the only ecocentrist who mentions 
pluralism regarding species concepts, though he only mentions it briefly. He 
acknowledges that it is problematic to define what a species is, and that a 
pluralistic species concept may be called for.636 He does not discuss any possible 
problems for his theory, but as we saw in the beginning of this section, the only 
thing he worries about regarding the species category is that species exist 
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independently of us. Does pluralism has any bearing on this particular question? 
If it is impossible to find one correct way of classifying nature, maybe there is no 
correct way of doing it? Scott Atran, for example, suggests that we abandon the 
species category in the same way as, for instance, ‘ether’ has been abandoned by 
physics.637 
Even if we do not go that far, it might still be quite difficult to maintain that 
species exist independently of us and that we can have moral duties to them if we 
take a pluralistic approach. McAlester believes that if species are real there can 
only be one best species definition.638 Hull, who is a monist himself, is also 
pessimistic regarding the possibility of being both pluralist and realist regarding 
species. He associates monism with realism and pluralism with antirealism, and 
he believes that the opposite combinations – monism/non-realism and 
pluralism/realism would be quite peculiar.639 
Nonetheless, there are writers who claim to be both pluralists and realists. 
Dupré and Horvath are both examples of this,640 and according to Horvath most 
monists are in fact realists.641 This looks plausible as long as one sticks to the 
idea that nature divides itself along different lines. There is no problem in being 
both pluralist and realist if one assumes that there are just several ways of 
classifying nature that all correspond to the real world.642 
This is apparently not true for all pluralists, however. Marc Ereshefsky 
agrees with Hull and claims that pluralism inevitably leads to the conclusion that 
species have no independent existence at all.643 According to Ereshefsky, the 
different species concepts do not have a common theoretically important feature, 
which he sees as a requirement for a category to exist.644 According to Reydon, 
there are two different kinds of pluralism. One that is pluralistic relative to the 
aim of those who classify, and one that is pluralistic in relation to the organisms 
that are classified. According to the former, any organism can belong to more 
than one type of species simultaneously. According to the other, a particular 
organism can only belong to one type of species but different species concepts 
are used to classify different organisms.645 It seems that the latter but not the 
former version of pluralism can be realistic. 
From an ecocentric perspective it is absolutely vital that species have an 
independent existence. Otherwise it is impossible to see them as moral objects 
that have interests independently of our interests. This means that if Hull and 
Ereshefsky are right, ecocentrism cannot accept pluralism. If pluralism is correct 
and pluralism entails non-realism, then ecocentrism is doomed. If, on the other 
hand, pluralism is correct and can be combined with realism as claimed by, for 
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example Dupré and Horvath, ecocentrism still has to deal with the problem of 
finding moral standing in more than one type of entity. The larger the number of, 
and the more diverse species concepts we accept, the more difficult it will be. If 
there really are several types of species out there and only one or a few of these 
types of species can be a basis for moral status, then ecocentrism will have to 
leave many existing species with no moral standing. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.6. Species as classes 
 
Different species concepts apparently pose different problems for ecocentrism. 
Now it is time to look at species ontologies. In what way – if any – do species 
exist? 
Because species are made up of organisms grouped together by certain 
criteria, it seems quite natural to conceive of species as classes. This is also the 
way species traditionally have been perceived.646 It has turned out that there are 
some serious problems with this answer, however. Even though the idea of 
species as classes is often mentioned in relation to the ontology of species, it is 
not particularly popular among both biologists and philosophers today. 
From an ecocentric perspective we have the problem that it is quite hard to 
conceive of classes as having interests. Even though it is possible to claim that 
species are classes with an interest in not being empty classes, it seems very 
farfetched, and far from intuitively appealing. It would also be difficult to explain 
why only species have this interest and not other classes. 
Rolston equates the idea of species as classes with the idea that species are 
human inventions.647 As we have already seen, this is the only problem Rolston is 
concerned with when it comes to the ontology of species. It is therefore easy to 
understand why he is not very fond of the idea of species as classes.648 
Callicott, on the other hand seems to accept the idea of species as classes 
even though he sees it as problematic for at least some forms of ecocentrism. He 
believes that it excludes the possibility that species can have rights but not that 
they can have intrinsic value.649 He briefly mentions David Hull’s idea of species 
as individuals as an alternative to the idea of species as classes, but he does not 
discuss Hull’s idea and he does not seem to pin much hope on it. He just points 
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out that species as classes is the traditional answer,650 while Hull’s idea is 
controversial.651 
For Lawrence E. Johnson it is essential that species exist as individuals, and 
he therefore attempts to produce some independent arguments against the idea 
that species are classes.652 In order to do that, he presents three different and more 
or less acknowledged methods for arranging particulars into classes, and he 
concludes that none of them are suitable for arranging organisms into species. 
The first of these methods is to find one particular feature and create the 
class of all things that has the feature in question. The second is to use family 
resemblance, and the third is simply to use an ostensive definition.653 
The first method when applied to organisms/species is identical to the 
phenetic species concept as we discussed above. We saw then that this method is 
beset with difficulties. Johnson concentrates his criticism on the problem of 
finding a common property that is not too inclusive and not too exclusive, and 
still interesting enough to use as a basis for division.  He asks us to consider the 
fact that many species are "highly variable or even polymorphous, contain 
radically different life stages, or are beset with anomalies."654  This seems to be a 
correct observation, and I believe it is a good argument against this method of 
ordering organisms into classes.655 
Phenetics and species as classes are two ideas that are seen as going hand in 
hand. Dismissing phenetics is therefore often seen as enough for dismissing the 
idea of species as classes. There are other ways of doing it, however. As we saw, 
Johnson also mentions two other options. The second method he mentions is 
family resemblance. This method is also mentioned by others,656 though it is not 
very thoroughly discussed in the literature in connection with the idea of species 
as classes.657 Johnson dismisses it because if we use it, "we do no longer have the 
characteristic of a species" as Johnson puts it, and 
 
[i]nstead of the species being what it is because it has certain characteristics, 
a scheme of characteristics is settled upon describing what the species 
happens to be.658  
 
I can see that this is a problem for Johnson since it would make the species 
more “cluster-like” and less like an individual with its own interests. I am not 
totally convinced that this is a fatal blow against the idea of species as classes, 
however. It is true that a division based on family resemblance would go against 
the traditional Aristotelian and Linnaean idea of species as having essences. The 
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question is: Is essentialism necessary for the idea of species as classes? It is in 
general assumed that it is,659 but it has, as far as I know, not been properly argued 
for. If essentialism is necessary, then family resemblance will clearly not work. If 
essentialism is necessary for classes, then the only way of ordering organisms 
into classes would have to be by finding the common property of all organisms 
that is essential for the classification but that alternative was just dismissed. It 
would also mean that we would have to restrict the selection of species concepts 
we can use. Of the three we investigated above, only phenetics would work, and 
we would be committed to accept it in spite of the problems we found that this 
concept would have for ecocentrism as well as for biological science. 
If essentialism is not necessary, then maybe family resemblance is not a bad 
way of doing the classification? 
The third way of classifying objects into classes mentioned by Johnson was by 
ostensive definition. That method is dismissed by Johnson on the simple ground 
that the members of species are constantly changing.660 That organisms die and 
new ones are born seems indeed to make the ostensive method very cumbersome 
for pointing out which organisms belong to which species. On the other hand, we 
could let the organisms do the sorting for us by saying that “being born by an X 
Y is to be pointed out as belonging to the class of X Y”. This could work once 
we have done the original sorting. A serious problem with this method is that it 
would not allow for any new species to evolve. It would also have the effect that 
for sexually reproducing species we would be committed to the biological 
species concept including the problems we found this concept to have for 
ecocentrism. 
A general and serious problem with the idea of using an ostensive definition of 
species is that it would be a very uninformative way of classifying organisms 
since it does not really say anything about why they are to count as one species. 
This way of dividing organisms into classes would therefore be quite useless for 
biologists. It would also be quite useless as a basis for assigning moral standing 
to species since it does not tell us anything about how this grouping can generate 
a morally relevant interest in continued existence. 
The fact that the individual members of the species are constantly substituted 
by new ones is used by Johnson not just as an argument against the ostensive 
method, but also as an argument against species as classes in general. In fact, he 
seems to consider this to be the primer argument against the notion of species as 
classes.661 I am not sure why this would make it impossible to see species as 
classes, however. It is not unusual that things are exchanged in classes. The class 
of all blue things also has its members exchanged. New blue things are produced 
and things that originally had other colours are sometimes painted blue. In the 
same way, originally blue things sometimes get painted in other colours and 
some blue things get destroyed. 
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I believe that the simple fact that members of species are constantly 
substituted is not a problem as such. The problem is rather how members of 
species get substituted. Blue things come and blue things go but species evolve. If 
all blue things are successively substituted with green things, the class of blue 
things will be smaller and eventually become empty. When we talk about species 
we need to allow for the species to evolve. To see species as classes would, as 
Bradley E. Wilson points out, make us unable to account for the role of species in 
the evolutionary process. If a species is defined based on what properties its 
individuals have, then the species cannot evolve with respect to those properties 
without thereby immediately turning into a new species.662 
In this way, the notion of species as classes resembles the suggestion that 
species should be conceived of as Platonic ideas. J Baird Callicott discusses this 
idea as a way of circumscribing the ontological problem in a way that would suit 
ecocentrism.663 If species are seen as ideas, the species will be more real than the 
individual organisms that instantiate the idea. This would clearly favour 
ecocentrism. As Callicott also points out, however, if we see species as Platonic 
ideas, there would be no point in protecting species since the ideas can never be 
threatened by extinction.664 We seem to have the same problem if we see species 
as classes. Classes do not cease to exist even if they are empty.665 The class of all 
blue objects in my apartment exists even if I do not have any blue objects in my 
apartment. It will be an empty class but the class will still exist. Correspondingly, 
if the red kite species (milvus milvus) is a class then the class will continue to 
exist even if all red kites are dead. This clearly makes the idea of species as 
classes unsuitable both for ecocentrism and for preservation purposes in general. 
Bradley E. Wilson also presents another argument against species as 
classes. He points out that it does not account for the genealogical relations 
between the members of a species, something that is very important for 
understanding the concept of species.666 We would thus if we see species as 
classes, not be able to use the phylogenetic species concept. Whether this is a 
good argument depends of course on whether you accept the phylogenetic 
species concept as at least a realistic contender, and what purpose you have with 
your classification. If your purpose is to use species as units of evolution Wilson 
is clearly right, and to adopt a species concept that would make species useless 
for that very important task looks like a good argument against that concept. 
According to ecocentrism, the evolutionary process is very important, and I 
therefore suspect that this last argument by Bradley E. Wilson is a rather 
important reason for ecocentrism to reject the notion of species as classes. 
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6.1.7. Species as natural kinds 
 
One idea that is adjacent to but more elaborate than species-as-classes, is the idea 
that species are natural kinds.667 This idea has more supporters among modern 
biologists and philosophers of biology than the idea of species as classes. 668 It is 
also embraced by at least one ecocentrist, viz. Rolston.669 Callicott accepted, as 
we saw above, the idea of species as classes, but he seems to see the ideas of 
species as classes and species as kinds as equivalent.670 Johnson, who argued 
against species as classes, will probably not be much more positive towards the 
idea of species as natural kinds considering that these two ideas have quite a lot 
in common. The first two methods that Johnson discussed above of how to divide 
organisms into classes are for instance also used to divide organisms into natural 
kinds. The idea of species as natural kinds is also in general seen as a competitor 
to Johnson’s favourite theory that conceives of species as individuals. On the 
other hand, Rolston seems to be able to embrace both these ideas. He does not 
elaborate on the relation between the two ideas, but it is clear from his reasoning 
that he sees them at least as strongly related, and possibly even as identical.671 It 
is also clear, however, that the idea of species as natural kinds is very important 
for Rolston’s theory, not least in connection with his idea that morally relevant 
interests are about having a good-of-one’s-kind.672 
Just like when species are conceived of as classes, species conceived as 
natural kinds are grouped together because of some common property or set of 
common properties. There are differences, however. When we talk about natural 
kinds not any property or set of properties will do. Natural kinds are seen as the 
basic units of natural laws and scientific explanations.673 The demands are 
therefore much more elaborate and rigorous than with classes where any property 
that we find interesting enough will do. This also means that the notion of natural 
kinds is necessarily realistic.674 If species are classes, they might be real but they 
can just as well be something dreamt up by us, and as we remember from the 
previous sub-section, Rolston believed that seeing species as classes was 
equivalent to seeing them as man-made. If we treat species as natural kinds with 
essences, which traditionally is the standard way of thinking about natural 
kinds,675 they must have an independent existence. 
The idea behind essentialism is basically that some entities have a common 
set of intrinsic non-contingent properties that they have independently of us (and 
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of whether we have discovered them or not), and independently of their relations 
to other objects.676 These properties are seen as the essence of the natural kinds. 
All entities that are members of the same natural kind share the same essence. 
They have the same set of intrinsic properties where each property in the set is 
necessary and the whole set of properties taken together is sufficient for making 
the object that has it a member of a certain natural kind.677 
Species are often seen as paradigmatic examples of natural kinds together 
with, for example, chemical elements.678 Apart from these examples, different 
authors count different things as natural kinds. Wilkerson and Dupré, for 
instance, count not just chemical elements, but also chemical compounds (like 
water) among the natural kinds.679 
Rolston sees landscapes but not cancer cells as natural kinds,680 and 
correspondingly the former but not the latter makes preservation demands on us. 
For Rolston, the connection between being a natural kind and having moral 
standing seems to be very close. It is apparently not just a matter of the former 
being a prerequisite for the latter. Being a natural kind seems to be sufficient for 
having a good of one’s kind. Neither chemical elements, nor chemical 
compounds are seen as moral objects by ecocentrism, however, which means that 
just as with classes, the ecocentrist that, like Rolston, accepts the notion of 
species as natural kinds has to explain why only some natural kinds give rise to 
morally relevant interests. 
Even though species as natural kinds is a more popular idea than species as 
classes, many philosophers have concluded against it,681 and most biologists do 
not actually treat species as natural kinds.682 The similarities with the species-as-
classes idea make it vulnerable to many of the same objections. Kinds can, for 
instance, just as classes, have zero members.683 This is, as we saw above, a rather 
serious problem from an ecocentric perspective since it means that if we accept 
that species are natural kinds, the species as such can never disappear even if it 
no longer has any members. 
There are also other problems with the idea of species as natural kinds. It is 
sometimes claimed that natural kinds is an improper way of conceiving of 
species because species are limited in time and space, while natural kinds are 
not.684 Species appear, exist for a while in a certain area and then disappear. The 
area can be as small as the interior of another organism or as large as the entire 
planet, but it is always possible, at least in theory, to point out its location. This 
cannot be the case with natural kinds if we wish to maintain that they are the 
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basis of natural laws. Natural laws are conceived of as universal and cannot be 
limited to particular places or points in time, or particular objects.685 In order to 
play the role of basic units in universal natural laws, natural kinds can therefore 
not be limited in time or space.686 
Even if gold atoms were to only exist in some parts of the universe, the 
natural laws that govern gold are still universal. If gold atoms turn up in a part of 
the universe where there has never been gold before, they still behave exactly as 
all other gold atoms in the universe in relation to different physical circumstances 
and they all have atomic number 79. Even if it would happen that all now 
existing atoms with atomic number 79 would disappear and then new ones 
emerge from a supernova many eons later, the new atoms will be gold. If all 
exemplars of the fairy tern (gygis alba) were to disappear and then as a fluke of 
nature eons later on another planet, new organisms with the same genetic makeup 
and the same morphological properties turned up, would they be fairy terns? Not 
according to either the biological or the phylogenetic species concept. The new 
populations would have no interbreeding connections with the fairy terns now 
existing on the Seychelles, and they would not descend from them. The only 
species concept of those we have discussed that could fit with the idea of species 
as natural kinds would thus be the phenetic species concept. The other concepts 
do not classify species based on common properties of the members of the 
species.687 As we remember, however, phenetics is the least popular concept, 
both in general and among ecocentrists. 
In a nutshell, the problem is that if we define species based on essential 
properties, then anything that has these properties will be a member of the 
species independently of whether it has any relation at all with other members of 
the species – spatially or temporally. For many who see species as something that 
is bound and limited in both space and time, that is quite bluntly at odds with 
how they conceive of species. 
As Dupré points out, however, this is only a problem given a particular way 
of conceiving of species, viz. that species are in some way individuals. The 
problem thus assumes that we have already decided to see species as individuals 
and not as natural kinds.688 If one does not see species as individuals but as 
natural kinds, then the effects above will just not be a problem. The thing is, 
however that if we do not see species as in some way bound together, it is quite 
difficult to see them as having interests qua species. 
There is also another problem: The explanation why natural kinds cannot be 
spatiotemporally bounded is, as we saw, that they are the basic units of universal 
natural laws. It is often denied that species are being subject to universal laws 
however.689 Biology as opposed to, for example, physics is said to be a historical 
science. This means that its aim is not to discover laws that govern the species, 
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but to produce descriptions of the species and their evolutionary history.690 This 
in turn means that species are often used in biology as historical entities and not 
as natural kinds.691 
Not everyone agrees about this. A number of biologists and philosophers 
believe that biology does produce natural laws and therefore requires species to 
be natural kinds.692 Griffiths believes that it is possible to make law like 
constructions about species even though there are many exceptions to the laws. 
For instance, he points out that it is possible to make predictions about future 
members of a species.693 Marc Lange and John Dupré are on the same track and 
they motivate their belief by claiming that natural laws can have exceptions and 
that it therefore is possible to form natural laws concerning particular species.694 
Marc Lange also suggests that natural laws can refer to particular times and 
places and to individual objects and that there can therefore be natural laws 
concerning particular species.695 
These assertions are controversial and there is a large debate over whether 
natural laws can be exceptionless. Dupré refers to social science and meteorology 
as examples of other subjects where laws have exceptions.696 The reference to 
social science does not do much good since there are no natural laws in social 
science. Whether there are exceptions from the natural laws used in meteorology 
depends to a large degree on where we stand in relation to the question of 
reductionism in science, i.e. on whether we can reduce all meteorological 
phenomena to basic laws of physics. 
Dupré also suggests that there are generalisations about species that are 
always true. “All humans are mortal” is an example of this. He concludes, 
however, that this type of generalisation does not give us what we need since it 
has nothing to do with us belonging to a certain species. The law operates on a 
much higher level.697 
Boyd attacks the problem from a third direction. He argues that it is not 
necessary to be the subject of natural laws to be a natural kind.698 Instead he 
claims that for something to be a natural kind, it is enough that the reference to it 
is important for the formulation of natural laws.699 The question one then has to 
ask is what we would gain by seeing species as natural kinds. The only thing that 
would be left of the idea that species are natural kinds if they are not to be used 
as units of natural laws is that species have essences. As we will see later, 
however, Boyd is prepared to give up that too as a response to the next problem. 
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When we looked at the phenetic species concept we realised that the variety 
between different individuals of the same species is sometimes so large that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to find a set of properties or even a single property 
that all individuals of a species share.700 We also found that this was a serious 
problem for the most common way of dividing organisms into classes. This 
problem becomes extra serious if we want to conceive of species as having 
essences in the form of necessary and sufficient intrinsic properties.701 For the 
idea of species as classes, it was enough to find shared properties and we saw 
that this did not work very well. For the idea of species as natural kinds, we need 
the common properties to be essential which makes it even more difficult. This is 
– not surprisingly – used as an argument against the very idea of species as 
natural kinds.702 It is, in fact, common to state that Darwinism makes essentialism 
impossible by showing that variation is an unavoidable part of life.703 
Even though Dupré is very sceptical to essentialism,704 he tries to defend it 
against this argument by pointing out that no natural kinds are totally 
homogenous. Not even atoms. There are different isotopes and different energy 
levels of electrons in an atom.705 This is not enough to make species analogous 
with atoms when it comes to essential properties, however. Even though there is 
great variation among atoms of the same element, they keep their identity in the 
periodic table as long as they have the same atomic number. We have no such 
property in species. The variation among atoms of a certain kind is also much 
smaller than the differences between atoms of different kinds. Different elements 
have dramatically different properties. For some species on the other hand, there 
is more variability within species than between species.706 As Robert A. Wilson 
points out, the sexes are often quite different – sometimes very different. In many 
species, two individuals in different stages of their life cycle can also be very 
different.707 In fact, for some species the difference between sexes or between the 
different stages of the life cycle of the same species can be larger than the 
difference between organisms of different species but of the same sex or in the 
same stage of their life cycle. The morphologic differences between a caterpillar 
and a fully evolved butterfly of the same species are, for example, larger than the 
differences between two caterpillars of different species. The morphological 
differences between a male duck and a female duck of the same species are also, 
in some cases, larger than between two female ducks of different species. 
This is true not only for morphological characters. There are also genetic 
differences between individuals of the same species that sometimes exceed the 
                                                
700 See also Wilkerson 1993 pp.3, 7, and Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.190 
701 Boyd 1999 p.145, Dupré 1993 p.53 
702 Dupré 1993 pp.39, 53 
703 Dupré 1993 pp. 38, 54, Ereshefsky 1997 pp.493f, Ereshefsky 1999 pp.287, 294, Reydon 2005 pp.138, 
145 
704 Dupré 1993 p.6 
705 Dupré 1993 p.39 
706 Dupré 1993 p.54 
707 Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.190 
 165 
genetic differences between individuals of different species.708 In fact, we cannot 
even refer to the number of chromosomes as the essence of species since there is 
variation within species also in that respect.709 
A proponent of the biological species concept might want to claim that 
reproductive isolation can be an essential property in species. Unfortunately, not 
even that works, however. Reproductive isolation is never absolute. 
Hybridization happens in all of nature (though especially among plants, fishes 
and amphibians).710 This means that reproductive isolation cannot be an essential 
property in species.711 
Even though Wilkerson is expressly aware that the genetic variation is 
sometimes larger within species than between species, he still wants to maintain 
that biological natural kinds are determined by their genes.712 As a result, he 
admits that there are more natural kinds than species. He even admits that there is 
a real but small possibility that there are as many kinds as there are individuals.713 
This solution is quite puzzling. It looks like Wilkerson in fact tries to save the 
idea of natural kinds in biology by disconnecting it from the ‘species’ category. 
This clearly makes the suggestion less biologically interesting. It also means that 
even if his suggestion turns out to be viable, we cannot use it for our purpose. It 
is highly unlikely that any ecocentrist would give up species as their object of 
concern and substitute it with a concept of natural kinds that is disconnected from 
species and might even lead them to place their concern on the organism level 
rather than on the species level – even though Wilkerson judges that the latter 
probability is small. 
When we discussed species as classes, we found that the fact that species 
evolve makes them unsuitable as classes. We have the same problem when it 
comes to natural kinds: Species evolve while kinds do not.714 The essence of the 
natural kind ‘gold’ is said to be that it has atomic number 79. If some gold atoms 
end up in a supernova and change their atomic number they are no longer gold 
but some other element. Even so, gold as a natural kind still has the atomic 
number 79. The kind is rigid in relation to what properties its members have but 
it is variable in relation to what members belong to the kind. The instances of the 
kind on the other hand are variable in both respects. They might change their 
properties and as a result cease to be a part of the class of which they were 
previously members. With species it is quite different. In a way it is actually the 
opposite: Species are variable in relation to properties but rigid in that if an 
organism is a member of the species, it always will be as long as the organism 
exists. The organisms in turn might change their properties, but are rigid in the 
meaning that an organism that belongs to one species never moves to another 
species no matter how much it changes. 
                                                
708 Dupré 1993 p.54, Wilkerson 1993 p.7, Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.190 
709 Wilkerson 1993 p.8 
710 Dupré 1993 p.56 
711 Dupré 1993 p.56 
712 Wilkerson 1993 p.16 
713 Wilkerson 1993 pp.16f 
714 Dupré 1993 pp.39f, Griffiths 1999 p.211, Sober 1993 pp.146f 
 166 
As Dupré points out, natural kinds do not have to be totally unchangeable. 
Water is according to Dupré an example of a natural kind that changes. It can be 
created and destroyed, heated and cooled, etc. and still retain its identity. He 
claims that the same is true for species, as long as we can identify the kind 
independently of the changeable properties.715 
Dupré is clearly right that natural kinds do not have to be totally rigid. Only 
the essential properties have to be unchangeable. This clearly limits the problem 
but it does not totally solve it. What do we do if the essential property changes? 
All species still have to have at least one property (probably more) that will never 
be allowed to evolve without the species immediately turning into a new species 
and that no member of the kind can lose without losing its species membership. 
When black members of the peppered moth (biston betularia) first turned up 
and eventually became quite common in industrialised parts of Britain as a result 
of increased pollution, they were not classified as a new species. Instead it was 
accepted that the species had gone through changes but was still the same 
species. It was still biston betularia. Almost a hundred years later following the 
clean air act in Britain, the percentage of black peppered moths decreased and the 
percentage of “peppered” peppered moths increased. The species changed again 
but still remained the same species.716 
This type of change could only occur within a natural kind if the property 
“pepperedness” is not an essential property. We would therefore have to choose 
carefully what to consider an essential property when we define a species. We 
saw above that we need a set of intrinsic non-contingent properties that all 
members of the species have in common. Apparently we need to see to that it is a 
set of properties that is not only shared by all species members who happen to 
live at the time when we name the species, but also of all future organisms that 
we want to include in the species. This looks like a very difficult problem 
considering that evolution does not seem to have any limitations regarding what 
properties to change. 
Elliott Sober does not believe that the occurrence of new organisms with 
new properties is a devastating problem for the idea that species are natural 
kinds. He points out that an atom of one kind can change into an atom of another 
kind without this interfering with the statement that all gold atoms share the same 
essence. That a population of organisms can give rise to another population is not 
a problem according to Sober. There is, he claims, nothing strange about an 
object and its descendant falling into different categories.717 
In other words, Sober’s strategy is to accept that whenever organisms turn 
up that have changed with respect to the essential properties, we have a new 
species. This would mean that if “pepperedness” is an essential property in 
peppered moths, the black “peppered moths” in the example above would not be 
peppered moths at all but a new species. This move is clearly possible and in 
many respects perfectly acceptable. There are two problems, however. One is 
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that we would have an immense inflation of the number of species. The other is 
that it would have quite serious consequences for biological science, and I do not 
expect that many biologists would accept them. Many statements made in 
biology would have to be branded as false and evolutionary theory would have to 
be modified. Most biologists would probably not be prepared to pay this price. I 
also suspect that advocates of ecocentrism would deem this way of “creating” 
new species as too superficial for the new species (like the “black peppered 
moths”) to fit into their theory of species as moral objects. 
Sober’s solution would also lead to some odd effects. Let us say that we 
have a species of which the essence is the property X. Let us then assume that 
one day a member of that species gives birth to an offspring that lacks X. Then 
we have a new species. Let us then on top of that, assume that the brothers and 
sisters of this individual have X. Then we would have individuals that are 
siblings but belong to different species, which seems quite counterintuitive. If 
then the offspring of the X-less individual are in their turn born with the property 
X, we would have a new species that exists for only one generation, is made up 
of only one individual, and all the relatives of this individual would belong to 
another species – which in turn also means that it would exist within both the 
phylogenetic branch and within the reproductive population of another species. 
There might be another and more radical solution, however. Some 
proponents of natural kinds have in fact argued for non-essentialist versions of 
the theory. It takes us quite far from the traditional way of conceiving of natural 
kinds. It also takes away any opportunity for the ecocentrist to refer to essences 
or to universal natural laws concerning species, but maybe it can save the notion 
of species as natural kinds. 
As we have seen above, ‘natural kinds’ and ‘essentialism’ are very 
intimately connected concepts. Some authors even treat them as synonyms.718 
Even so, it is probably true as both Boyd and Robert A. Wilson point out that 
essentialism and what it stands for is a burden for the idea of species as natural 
kinds.719 The question is therefore: Is it possible to keep the idea of natural kinds 
while discarding that of essentialism? 
Boyd believes it is. He believes that most of the objections discussed above 
are based on an “outdated positivist conception of kinds”.720 The outdated 
positivist conception that Boyd refers to is explained as a tendency to see the 
criteria for natural kinds as being “eternal, unchanging, ahistorical, intrinsic, 
necessary and sufficient conditions” together with the role of natural kinds as 
stating laws that are “exceptionless, eternal and ahistorical generalizations”.721 
He argues that natural kinds ought not to be conceived of in this way. Instead, he 
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has formulated an alternative non-essentialist concept of natural kinds.722 The 
idea is that species are what he calls homeostatic property cluster kinds.723 
According to this idea, natural kinds are defined, not by a set of essential 
properties, but by a cluster of homeostatic properties. It is not the case, according 
to this concept, that any one member of the kind must possess the whole cluster 
of properties to be a member, but all members of the kind must possess enough 
of the properties. That the properties are homeostatic means that they work in 
such a way that they increase the probability that the other properties of the 
cluster will also be instantiated in the same entity.724 No single property is 
essential and no property can be called the essence of the species.725 This way, 
the homeostatic property cluster view allows for variation among entities of the 
same kind.726 We will thus stay clear from one of the major problems of 
essentialism. 
Species is, according to Boyd, one of the things that count as natural kinds 
in the form of homeostatic property clusters.727 In their case, because they exhibit 
homeostatic mechanisms like 
 
gene exchange between certain populations and reproductive isolation 
from others, effects of common selective factors, coadapted gene 
complexes and other limitations on heritable variation, developmental 
constraints, the effects of the organism-caused features of evolutionary 
niches, and so on.728 
 
I interpret this to mean that species are homeostatic due to the mechanisms 
that keep the species together but also isolated from other species. Obviously this 
will not work with all natural kinds (for example chemical elements), but as I 
understand Boyd, that is not necessary. Kinds can be homeostatic in different 
ways. 
A problem with Boyd’s theory is that it is not obvious that the homeostatic 
property cluster view manages to distinguish between closely related species. If 
we use clusters of non-essential properties, it is not at all clear how we are 
supposed to draw the line between different species without overlap. 
Another problem is how to decide how much and how many of the 
homeostatic properties are enough for an organism to belong to a certain species. 
Robert A. Wilson does not believe that this problem is a serious threat to the 
idea. He does not believe that there needs to be one universally applicable answer 
to the question: How much is enough? Instead, he believes that how much is 
enough will differ from case to case in a way that reflects the structure of the 
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world.729 He admits that there will still be indeterminable cases, but that this also 
reflects the real world since there in fact exists intermediate cases in the world, 
for instance, as a part of the speciation process.730 
An interesting aspect of Boyd’s version of natural kinds is that he follows 
Dupré in claiming that even categories in nature that are not classified as species 
or even as a taxon by science can be natural kinds. Lilies are seen by most people 
as a category of plants although the borders of this category do not coincide with 
the borders of any recognised species or higher taxa.731 Even so, ‘Lily’ is, 
according to Boyd, a natural kind.732 
That “folk biological” concepts like ‘lilies’ count as natural kinds, 
according to Boyd’s interpretation, looks like a good thing from an ecocentric 
perspective. I believe that the intuition that there is something morally wrong in 
causing the extinction of species would insist that this also goes for the category 
‘lilies’ as well as other “folk biological” concepts. It becomes more problematic 
if we look at what other units the list of natural kinds includes. Even the 
traditional concept of natural kinds includes other things than species. We have 
seen that chemical elements are seen as paradigmatic cases of natural kinds. It 
seems very reasonable to assume that from a strictly anthropocentric instrumental 
perspective, the permanent loss of a chemical element would warrant concern of 
about the same kind and partly for the same reasons as the extinction of a 
species. It is more difficult to see how chemical elements can be moral objects, 
however. This is a general problem regarding natural kinds, but if we accept 
Boyd’s version that problem tends to be even worse. Boyd considers even 
historic periods and concepts like Christianity, empiricism, behaviourism, etc. to 
be natural kinds.733 If it is difficult to see chemical elements as moral objects, it is 
even more difficult to include things like behaviourism or historical periods 
among the moral objects, and I seriously doubt that this would be accepted by 
most ecocentrists. We therefore seem to face the same problem we faced when 
we discussed species as classes: If species are natural kinds, then why are species 
moral objects while other natural kinds are not? 
The number of natural kinds, according to Boyd’s definition, might also 
increase for another reason. According to Griffiths, Boyd’s idea takes away the 
difference between natural kinds and artificial kinds. If natural kinds do not need 
to have essences and do not need to be basic units of natural laws, anything that 
can play the relevant causal role and thus be referred to in the formulation of 
natural laws will be a natural kind – even if it is a manmade object.734 
If Griffiths is right, Boyd’s version of natural kinds implies that the number 
of objects that have to be excluded from the realm of moral objects by some 
other means than their ontological status will be quite extensive. This is not 
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necessarily a devastating problem, since we might find other ways of excluding 
the non-species. Considering, however, that the morally relevant interests that all 
species are claimed to have according to ecocentrism must be intrinsically 
connected to what it means to be a species at the same time as they must not be 
found in things that the ecocentrists deny moral status, this will not be an easy 
task. 
The inclusion of “folk biological” concepts such as ‘lily’ in the same 
ontological category as species that, to begin with, looked like an argument in 
favour of Boyd's version of natural kinds, may also present a problem of its own 
for the ecocentrists. The biological functioning of the species is very important 
for all ecocentrists. This means that including categories that have no clear 
biological status would considerably complicate the justification of their theory. 
Are natural kinds in Boyd’s sense real? The realism of natural kinds in the 
traditional form is a clear advantage from the viewpoint of ecocentrism. If we 
take away essentialism from the natural kinds, it is no longer obvious that they 
have to have an independent existence. On the other hand, the opposite is not 
necessary either. Dupré underlines that the question of whether species have 
essences should be kept apart from the question of whether species are real.735 
This is clearly correct even though essentialism would guarantee realism. For 
Boyd’s version of natural kinds, much seems to depend on how the clusters are 
limited. According to Robert A. Wilson, that problem would more or less solve 
itself as a result of the structure of the world. The homeostatic property cluster 
view is thus, according to Wilson, realistic since it claims to inform us about the 
way the world is really organized.736 According to Boyd, natural kinds are human 
constructions.737 Even so, they are according to him real in a relativistic sense. 
They can be real within the framework of one discipline but not in the framework 
of another discipline.738 
I am not sure that this is enough for ecocentrism. It brings to mind Dupré’s 
“promiscuous realism” regarding pluralism, and Boyd explains that he believes 
that a pluralism of species definitions corresponds to and helps achieve a correct 
understanding of the different causal structures in biology.739 What ecocentrism 
needs, however, are not species that are real within the framework of an 
anthropomorphic theory, but species that are real in a way that is independent of 
us. If we are forced to deny or to leave the question open of whether species 
independently exist, this version of natural kinds has lost an important advantage 
in relation to the idea of species as classes from the point of view of ecocentrism. 
Comparing the pros and cons of the different versions of natural kinds, it 
still looks like Boyd’s version is a more promising ontology of species than 
traditional essentialistic natural kinds. From a strictly ecocentric perspective, 
however, it is probably not an improvement. It might even be more problematic. 
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6.1.8. Species as individuals 
 
In the previous sub-section we saw that one of the main problems with the idea 
of species as natural kinds is that species are spatiotemporally limited, which 
makes it difficult to conceive of them as kinds. Kinds are, as we noted, normally 
seen and treated as universals. Individuals, on the other hand, always exist in a 
particular spatiotemporal slot. An individual comes into existence at a particular 
place at a particular point in time, exists in a certain area for a certain period, and 
eventually ceases to exist. The same is the case with species, which means that at 
least in this particular respect, species seem to be more like individuals than like 
kinds. Some biologists and philosophers have therefore chosen to talk about 
species as individuals.740 
To see species as individuals fits very well with how species are conceived 
of in evolutionary theory. Since species are the entities that evolve according to 
evolutionary theory, it is more natural to see them as individuals than as kinds or 
classes.741 According to Hull, species in fact have to be conceived of as 
individuals bound in space and time because of the role they play in evolutionary 
theory.742 It is even held that evolutionary theory shows species to be 
individuals.743 At least, the idea of species as individuals has several advantages 
from an evolutionary perspective. To see species as individuals and not as kinds 
fits better with the fact that organisms can change and still belong to the same 
species.744 This posed a big problem for the idea of species as kinds but it seems 
only natural if we see species as individuals. Individual organisms, after all, 
retain their identity even though their bodies change. 
Talking about species as individuals also fits better with the belief held by 
many biologists and philosophers of biology that there can be no natural laws 
about species.745 
Another advantage is that if we see species as individuals, we do not have 
to rely on common properties to bind the species together.746 The parts of an 
individual can be very different from each other. An arm, a heart and a nail are 
very different from each other even though they are parts of the same 
organism.747 
This means that the idea of species as individuals does not fit with the 
phenetic species concept.748 On the other hand, this might not be a very big 
disadvantage as we saw that this concept has large problems of its own and is not 
very popular among the ecocentrists. 
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The other two species concepts that we investigated (the biological and the 
phylogenetic) are very compatible with the idea of species as individuals.749 
Christopher D. Horvath goes as far as equating the idea of species as individuals 
with the phylogenetic species concept,750 while Elliott Sober on the other hand 
equates it with the biological species concept (that he calls “the individuality 
thesis”).751 It seems clear, however, that both the biological and the phylogenetic 
species concepts are compatible with the idea of species as individuals, which 
ought to speak in favour of this idea. 
An interesting aspect of the idea that species are individuals is that it also 
affects the status of the organisms that make up the species. If we see species as 
kinds or classes, organisms become members or instances of the species. If we on 
the other hand see species as individuals, organisms instead become parts of the 
species just like limbs and cells are parts, not members or instances, of the 
organism they belong to.752 
This has implications for ecocentrism in that it affects how they can fit 
individual organisms into their theory. If we reason from an ecocentric basis, it 
will look something like this: 
The value of an entity according to ecocentrism is to a large degree 
determined by its role in the system. A part ought to be less autonomous and 
more integrated than a member in relation to the whole. Therefore, the value of a 
part is probably more closely connected to that of the whole than is the case with 
a member. This in turn means that, on the one hand, a part can more easily be 
sacrificed for the sake of the whole. On the other hand, a part that functions 
together with other parts might be a more substantial loss from the perspective of 
the whole than the loss of one of many members with the same essential 
properties.753 Even though parts of an individual can be sacrificed when called 
for, they are not exchangeable or expendable in the same way as members of a 
kind that are all identical when it comes to the properties that make them 
members of the whole. 
The conclusion is therefore that the interest of a part means less than the 
interest of a member in relation to the interest of the whole, but for the whole it 
ought to be more of a value loss if it loses some of its parts than if it loses some 
of its members – even if the loss does not kill it. If organisms are parts and not 
members of their species, the interests of the organisms will in the same way 
matter less in relation to the interests of the species compared to if the organisms 
were members of the species. On the other hand, it is more of a value loss for the 
species to lose some of its organisms if the organisms are parts than if they are 
members, even if the loss does not lead to the extinction of the species. 
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This conclusion is very important for how individual organisms should be 
regarded from an ecocentric, and also, to some extent from an anthropocentric 
position. If the notion of organisms as parts rather than members of their species 
implies a higher instrumental value for the individual organisms in relation to the 
species, it will strengthen our preservation duties. The non-human organisms do 
not have any moral status of their own from an anthropocentric perspective, but a 
reduction of the number of organisms that make up a valuable species has effects 
on the function of the species even if the species does not go extinct. It means 
that if species are integrated enough to be individuals we have to be more careful 
not just to avoid extinction but also to avoid losing too many parts of the species 
in order to not disturb the function of the species and thereby diminish the value 
the species has for us. 
From an ecocentric perspective, the most important aspect of the idea that 
species are individuals is probably that they get the same ontological status as 
organisms.754 This is important because individuals are traditionally seen as the 
paradigm cases of moral objects.755 If species have the same ontological status as 
organisms it will not be possible to dismiss ecocentrism on the account that 
species have the wrong ontological status unless one is also willing to deny that 
living organisms including human beings have moral status. 
Not surprisingly, the idea of species as individuals has caught on among 
ecocentrists. Rolston, Callicott and Johnson use the idea to support their 
standpoints.756 
We have seen that Rolston talks of species both as natural kinds and as 
individuals. This is a rather bold strategy considering that the two ideas are 
normally seen as contradicting each other.757 There are those who argue that they 
are compatible, however. Boyd, who advocates a rather unconventional version 
of natural kinds, is not a supporter of the idea that species are individuals. Even 
so, he claims that there is no real contradiction between seeing species as 
individuals and seeing them as kinds.758 On the contrary, those who claim that 
species are individuals must, according to him, also conclude that they are 
natural kinds (though apparently this does not go both ways).759 
John Dupré who, as we saw, is a pluralist regarding species concepts, is 
also a pluralist regarding ontologies.760 As we noted in the beginning of this sub-
section the idea that species are individuals fits very well with the role species 
play in evolutionary theory. Dupré argues, however, that for all other areas of 
biology, seeing species as individuals is not working very well. In ecology, for 
example, he believes that species have to be conceived of as kinds.761 His 
conclusion is that species play different roles in different theories. If species have 
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to be conceived of as individuals in evolutionary theory, we must conclude that 
species are individuals in that context, but that they are other things in other 
contexts.762 He argues that just like the cells in his body can be both members of 
a kind (the cell-kind) and parts of an individual (the organism), so organisms 
ought to be able to be both members of species that exist in the form of kinds, 
and parts of species that exist in the form of individuals.763 
From an ecocentric perspective, ontological pluralism presents the same 
problems as pluralism regarding species concepts: If all species can be seen as 
existing in both ways depending on perspective, it is not obvious that it is 
possible to maintain the realism that is originally built into the two ontologies. 
On the other hand, if different species exist in different ways, the ecocentrists 
will have to find more than one way of assigning moral status to species in order 
to cover all species. If finally, as Dupré seems to argue, all species actually exist 
in more than one sense simultaneously, ontological pluralism looks like a good 
option for Rolston. 
There is one problem, however: It is very important for both Rolston and 
Johnson that species play the role of individuals not just in evolution but also in 
the ecosystem. This will not be possible if Dupré is right. 
As we also saw before, Callicott seems to believe that the idea of species as 
classes is the predominant theory, and he was very cautious in his reference to 
Hull. Even so, when he argues for his own theory he clearly assumes that species 
are individuals.764 He uses this ontology, not only to argue for moral duties to 
species,765 but also as a basis for claiming that it is acceptable to sacrifice 
organisms for the good of species or ecosystems. 766 He reminds us that we 
sometimes sacrifice parts of a person for the good of the person as a whole, and 
he argues that we ought to do the same with parts of species even if these parts 
are sentient organisms.767 This seems to follow our conclusion above that the idea 
of species as individuals strengthens the instrumental value but weakens the 
moral standing of individuals in relation to species. 
Also others, both supporters and opponents of ecocentrism, have concluded 
that the idea of species as individuals is essential for the idea of species as moral 
objects.768 Tom Regan, who is one of the fiercest opponents to ecocentrism, 
believes that the faith of ecocentrism is closely connected to the question of 
whether species are individuals. Contrary to both the ecocentrists and a number 
of other philosophers and biologists, he does not believe that species are 
individuals, however, and he sees this as an important argument against 
ecocentrism.769 
According to Regan: 
                                                
762 Dupré 1993 pp.42f 
763 Dupré 1993 p.58 
764 Callicott 1980 pp.321ff 
765 Callicott 1980 p.322 
766 Callicott 1980 pp.320, 322f 
767 Callicott 1980 p.323 
768 Buege 1997 passim, Regan, Tom 1983 pp.245f, 359, 362, Schönfeld 1992 p.360 
769 Regan, Tom 1983 pp.245f, 359, 362 
 175 
 
The rights view is a view about the moral rights of individuals. Species 
are not individuals, and the rights view does not recognize the moral 
rights of species to anything, including survival.770 
 
Even though the idea of species as individuals has become quite popular, 
Regan is far from alone in being critical. There are a number of other critics,771 
and there are a number of problems of which some are quite severe. 
The big question is whether there is not more to being an individual than 
spatiotemporal boundness. At least some authors argue that there is, though they 
do not agree on whether this is a problem for the idea that species are individuals. 
Sober argues that a particular kind of causal connection between the parts is 
necessary for something to be properly called an individual.772 Ereshefsky argues 
for both cohesiveness and a causal connection,773 and Horvath argues for 
cohesiveness and integration in relation to the evolutionary forces that work on 
them.774 Robert A. Wilson argues that the difference between individuals and 
kinds is that the former, contrary to the latter apart from spatiotemporal unity, 
also have internal coherence, discrete boundaries, and a historical 
continuity,775while Bradley E. Wilson talks about internal organization and 
cohesion.776 
Cohesion, organization and integration seem to be popular criteria. The 
question is how these demands should be interpreted, and especially how they 
can be interpreted in such a way that they put species ontologically on par with 
organisms. The main point seems to be that the connection between the parts has 
to be both strong enough and of the right kind. We have seen that species might 
not be universal enough to be natural kinds, but are they bound enough to be 
individuals? It might just be that the spatiotemporal boundness of species makes 
them too cohesive to be kinds, but not cohesive enough to be individuals. 
Ereshefsky suggests that actual interbreeding is both necessary and 
sufficient to fulfil his criteria, but he also points out that only populations that 
count as species according to the strongest version of the biological species 
concept would then qualify as individuals.777 For ecocentrism this would mean 
that their realm of moral objects would be severely restricted, and most of what 
they call species would not qualify as individuals. 
Even if we weaken the criteria so that all populations that count as species 
according to the more conventional version of the biological species concept are 
seen as individuals, we would still have to exclude all non-sexually reproductive 
species. Besides, it is very doubtful that a potential to reproduce sexually can 
                                                
770 Regan, Tom 1983 p.359 
771 Boyd 1999 pp.168, 173, Dupré 1999 p.18, Ereshefsky 1991 p.96 
772 Sober 1993 p.150 
773 Ereshefsky 1991 pp.96f 
774 Horvath 1997 p.227 
775 Wilson, Robert A. 1999:1 p.191 
776 Wilson, Bradley E. 1995 p.340 
777 Ereshefsky 1991 p.98 
 176 
really be enough of a connection between organisms to conceive of the species as 
an individual. 
If we instead decide that historical continuity is what it takes to be an 
individual we would include all species according to the phylogenetic species 
concept. This would also take us closer to how we tend to look at individual 
persons. Historical continuity is often seen as necessary for personal identity 
among persons, but is it enough to define someone or something as an 
individual? When we discussed the phylogenetic species concept we saw that one 
problem is to find cut-off points between lineages that is good enough to work as 
species boundaries, and we did not find any satisfying solution to that problem. 
Seeing species as individuals will clearly not lessen the demands on what 
constitutes a good cut-off point. This is a problem considering that if we look at 
individual organisms (who are seen as the paradigm cases of individuals), it is in 
general very simple to distinguish between individual organisms even if they are 
historically connected. It is in general unproblematic to distinguish between an 
individual organism and its siblings, parents or offspring. A possible explanation 
for this is that individual organisms are internally physically united while 
physically clearly distinct from the surrounding world. Does this mean that 
internal physical unity and external physical isolation are necessary to be an 
individual? 
There are two obvious exceptions to the rule that individual organisms are 
physically isolated. Before a mammal is born and the umbilical cord is cut, it is 
not totally physically separate from its mother. The other case is Siamese twins. 
They count as different individuals although they are physically connected. In 
these cases we may be able to circumvent the problem by saying that not all parts 
of an individual must be separated from all parts of another organism. The 
important thing is that certain relevant parts are isolated from each other. In our 
case it ought to be the brain as the physical basis of our personality. For 
organisms that do not have a brain, maybe the reproductive organs would be used 
as the identifying physical part. The point is that even when we distinguish 
between individual organisms that are partly physically united, we still seem to 
use some form of physical isolation to decide whether we deal with one or two 
individuals, and it seems to be intuitively very clear which physical parts have to 
be isolated from each other. 
However, to use relevant physical isolation as the cut-off point between 
individuals does not seem to make any sense if the entities in question are not to 
some degree internally physically connected. The fact that there is often (at least) 
as much physical isolation between organisms belonging to the same species as 
there is between organisms belonging to different species means that we will 
never be able to use physical isolation to distinguish between species. The lack of 
physical connectedness within species also seems to be a problem in itself. 
Intuitively, close physical connection is probably the first thing that comes to 
mind when it comes to identifying something as an individual. 
At least this is true for many forms of individuals like individual organisms, 
individual pens, individual books etc, but we also tend to talk about individual 
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universities, individual companies, individual countries, etc. and they are not 
always internally physically connected. Callicott makes an analogy between 
species and human societies,778 and Ghiselin has compared species to 
companies.779 Both Ghiselin and Sober have also pointed out that we conceive of 
USA as an individual country even though Alaska is not physically united with 
the other states.780 
These are good points. We do tend to see countries as ontological 
individuals and they certainly play the role of individuals on the international 
arena. It is also clearly the case that at least some parts of countries sometimes 
are at least as physically disconnected as those of species. In the same way, 
companies play the role of individuals in the economic arena and many 
companies are spread all over the world. The same seems to be true (in their 
respective arenas) of universities and many other kinds of organisations. 
What keeps countries together seems instead to be things like common 
laws, a common economy and a common government that has some kind of 
control over the entire territory. When we talk about organisations and 
companies, the answer seems to go along the same lines. Both organisations and 
companies have a board, they have statutes, and they have a common economy. 
Individual organisms have a common system for collecting and digesting 
nutrients and some organisms have a brain connected to a nervous system that 
controls the entire organism. It might thus be that it is the way the parts are 
organised and the way they interact rather than simply their physical 
connectedness that are relevant for deciding whether something is an individual. 
We can, for the sake of simplicity, say that what is relevant is the way the parts 
cooperate.781 
If we look at our examples above regarding mothers/foetuses (or newborns 
connected with the mothers by an umbilical cord) and Siamese twins 
respectively, we concluded that they are distinguishable because it is possible to 
identify some relevant parts of the individuals that were not physically 
connected. Maybe that conclusion was premature? Maybe the real explanation is 
that they are distinguishable because they do not cooperate in some relevant 
respects? 
Apparently it is not always the same kind of organisation and interaction 
between the parts that keeps individuals together, and sometimes there might be 
more than one type of organisation and interaction within the same individual. In 
individuals, like organisms, it might even be that some parts cooperate for one 
function and other parts cooperate for something else, and the whole complex of 
co-operations bind all parts together even if not all parts cooperate with all other 
parts. 
How about very simple things like individual tables or coins? In these 
cases, the cooperation is not very sophisticated but it seems intuitively reasonable 
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to talk about atoms held together and organised in a certain way as a very close 
form of cooperation. 
Do species have enough co-operation, in this sense, among its organisms to 
count as individuals according to this criterion? Some populations, like a 
community of ants, seem like clear candidates. Hunting wolf packs are much less 
clear candidates, while I am very hesitant to count populations where the most 
substantial form of cooperation is in the form of actual interbreeding, as real 
candidates. Populations with even weaker connections between the organisms 
must be deemed to be well outside of what can reasonably be called cooperation 
even in our technical sense of the word. 
It therefore seems that if we decide that cooperation of the kind we find 
between the parts of organisms, physical objects and human societies and 
organisations is necessary to constitute an individual, then species can with a few 
exceptions not be conceived of as individuals. In some cases it even seems to 
point out other levels than species, such as ant colonies and possibly packs, as 
individuals. 
If we instead use a weaker set of criteria as sufficient for calling something 
an individual, we will not be able to say that species are individuals in the same 
sense as individual organisms. This still means that species can satisfyingly play 
the role of individuals in a weaker sense in, for example, evolution. It will 
however deprive the ecocentrists of the possibility of saying that species have the 
same ontological status as individual organisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.9. Species as lineages 
 
An alternative way of conceiving of species is to see them as segments of 
historical lineages. A historical lineage is, according to Bradley E. Wilson, “a 
sequence of reproducing entities, individuated in terms of its components”.782 
Kevin de Queiroz describes it as “a single line of direct ancestry and descent”.783 
A species is then a properly chosen segment of a historical lineage. The 
explanation to why it must be a segment and not a whole historic lineage is that 
species otherwise would be absurdly large. In fact, all organisms descend from 
the same RNA-molecule, which means that if we talked about whole historic 
lineages as species, all organisms would belong to the same species.784 Not any 
segment can count as a species, however. There is no consensus about how the 
segments should be cut, but for de Queiroz it is important that a segment that 
counts as a species has a demarcation line created by some critical event.785 
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The lineage idea is often seen as part of the idea that species are individuals 
but it has also been proposed as an independent ontology. Both de Queiroz and 
Bradley E. Wilson believe that the idea of species as segments of historical 
lineages (or for short – lineages) can be seen as an argument that species are 
individuals.786 Wilson also believes, however, that by only seeing species as 
lineages we can avoid the problems that follow with the notion of species as 
individuals.787 
This seems to be true about the most important problem we found in 
connection with the idea of species as individuals. By seeing species as lineages 
but not as individuals we do not have to claim that all organisms of a species are 
organised and interact in the same way as parts of an individual organism, 
organisation, country, etc. The only thing we have to maintain regarding the 
organisms belonging to the same lineage is that they share the same descendant 
or are descendants of each other. 
Another benefit of the term ‘historical lineage’ over the term ‘individual’ is 
that the former is less prone to misuse and misunderstanding. The paradigm cases 
of moral objects are organisms. If we see species as individuals in a way that is 
very different from the way in which organisms are individuals without being 
very clear about the differences, we run the risk that species are also regarded as 
organisms in a morally relevant sense. We would therefore also risk that what 
looks like a victory for ecocentrism turns out to be a simple linguistic shift of 
meaning. 
A major advantage of the lineage idea is, according to de Queiroz, that it 
fits with all species concepts. He claims that all species concepts actually assume 
that species are segments of lineages. Seeing species as lineages is, in his view, 
the one thing that all species concepts have in common.788 What distinguishes the 
different species concepts is, according to him, just how the segments are cut.789 
During my investigation of species concepts and ontologies I have found 
that many of the authors on the subject do, at least occasionally, talk about 
species as lineages independently of what concept or ontology they defend.790 
This seems to support de Queiroz’s claim. My investigation has, however, been 
very limited and there are others who have reached other conclusions. Thomas 
Reydon has consulted a number of overviews of species concepts, and concluded 
that only a minority of them see species as lineages or segments of lineages.791 
I do not believe that the question of whether most of the proponents of 
different species concepts talk about them as lineages is a conclusive argument in 
either direction, however. The really interesting question is whether species, 
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according to all the serious contenders among species concepts, can be seen as 
lineages. 
That phylogenetic species can be seen as existing in the form of historical 
lineages is quite clear.792 Seeing species as segments of historical lineages is in 
fact a perfect fit for the phylogenetic species concept. 
According to de Queiroz, the biological species concept can also be fitted 
into this ontology because interbreeding populations can be seen as “time-
limited” segments of historical lineages.793 
This might work as long as we have reasonably strong criteria for what 
counts as an interbreeding population, and as long as we do not use too restrictive 
time limits. To talk about a historical lineage of one generation seems absurd. 
The really troublesome case ought to be the phenetic species concept. It is 
not easy to see a species defined by common properties as a lineage the way 
lineages have been defined by de Queiroz and Bradley E. Wilson. Nothing 
guarantees that organisms with the same defining set of properties belong to the 
same segment of historical lineage. 
On the other hand, belonging to the same lineage can, in itself, be seen as a 
property even though this probably is quite far from the kind of properties that 
the proponents of phenetics traditionally have had in mind. Even so, this is how 
de Queiroz chooses to argue. If we instead see properties other than belonging to 
the same lineage segment as just contingent properties instead of necessary 
criteria, and concentrate on the species as lineage segments, the species problem 
will, according to him, disappear.794 
By maintaining that there is one property (being a segment of a certain 
historical lineage) that is unique for the species category and that defines all 
species as species, de Queiroz can maintain that species exist objectively as 
segments of lineages, but that different segments can be identified as species 
based on different contingent properties.795 
As an effect of this, he also believes that the lineage concept can account 
for both monism and pluralism. It allows for pluralism in the details but has a 
monistic basis – the lineage. Thereby he argues that the conflict between monism 
and pluralism disappears.796 
As I interpret him, all species exist in the form of lineages, but the lineages 
are cut off from other lineages in different ways. Some species – i.e. some 
lineage segments – are distinguished by their ecologic niche while other species 
are distinguished by intrinsic reproductive isolation, etc. 
One writer who opposes the suggestion that lineages can be an ontological 
category, is Walter Bock.  He claims that those who see species as lineages have 
conflated two distinct concepts, viz. representations and ontologies. According to 
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Bock, lineages are representations of a species history and do not really exist in 
nature.797 
I believe it does make sense to see lineages as a representation of a species 
history. On the other hand, I do not see that it only has to be a representation. We 
usually talk about human family lines as something that actually exist even 
though some or most of the human individuals who make up the family line are 
dead. It is true that we also say that a family line is dead when all members of 
that line are dead, but that does not contradict the previous statement. In fact, if 
we reason in the same way about species as lineages, it will solve one of the 
problems that haunted the ideas of species as classes and species as natural kinds, 
viz. that classes and natural kinds cannot really be exterminated even if all their 
members disappear. In order to talk about extinction we need an ontology that 
allows species to go extinct. We saw that the notion of species as individuals 
allowed that, and it seems that species as lineages also allows for it, which 
clearly talks in favour of this idea from an ecocentric perspective. 
The only ecocentrist who explicitly talks about species as lineages is 
Rolston, and he does it rather often.798 On the other hand, we have also seen that 
he talks about species both as natural kinds and as individuals. 
Once again, it might be possible to conceive of species as both kinds and 
individuals, but doing so makes things more complicated for the ecocentrists. 
Here we have seen that the idea of species as lineages is often used to support the 
idea of species as individuals, but that the best use of the idea that species are 
lineages might be an alternative to the idea of species as individuals. De Queiroz 
does not mention natural kinds but he claims that seeing species as lineages can 
be used to reconcile the idea of species as individuals with the idea of species as 
classes. His way of doing so takes the form of extracting lineages as the real 
ontology. However, doing this with classes leads to a problem. It implies that we 
see species as “the class or set of organisms that make up a particular population-
level lineage segment”.799 In this way, de Queiroz admits, classes will be 
spatiotemporally restricted which is not normally how they are conceived of in 
the classes/individuals debate.800 If we try the same manoeuvre with natural kinds 
we get the same result, and considering the central role the question of 
spatiotemporal restrictedness plays in the debate between the ideas of species as 
natural kinds and species as individuals, this is probably a very serious problem. 
Rolston only briefly states in one passage how he sees the relation between 
lineages and natural kinds. He explains that “species are the actual historical 
lineages through which the natural kinds travel through time”.801 He does not 
expand on what he means by this but it looks like he means that species are 
actually historical lineages while natural kinds are something else that move 
along the lineages. He does not give us any hint what the natural kinds that move 
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along the lineages consist of, however. Considering that he in other places, 
clearly states that species are natural kinds, the statement above is quite 
confusing. If he means that species are both lineages and natural kinds, we have 
to ask why and how do species move through species? 
What would Rolston and his colleagues say about dropping the other 
ontologies and just seeing species as lineages? It would make things much easier, 
and we would avoid the quite severe problems we have found in the other 
ontologies. The only draw back would be that it is intuitively less obvious that a 
lineage can be a moral object than that an individual can. However, as we saw 
above, this intuition can turn out to be an illusion based on a shift of meaning 
since we have found that the only way of conceiving of species as individuals is 
to accept a very different notion of ‘individual’ than we use when we talk about 
organisms as individuals. It might therefore instead be an advantage for the 
ecocentrists to have a “clean” terminology that lets them prove their point 
without any shift of meaning. All in all, it seems that seeing species as segments 
of historical lineages is the best bet for the ecocentrists. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.10. The demarcation problem 
 
A problem that is common to all the species concepts and ontologies is that it is 
not easy to find a natural place to draw the borderline between different species. 
For example, Wilkerson argues that even though species are useful tools “for 
field biologists, gardeners and zoo keepers”, the idea of dividing living nature 
into discrete entities with clear boundaries between them might not be a very 
good model of nature where discrete boundaries do not exist.802 Mishler argues 
along the same lines,803 and Richard Dawkins has described species as 
 
an arbitrary stretch of a continuously flowing river, with no particular 
reason to draw lines delimiting its beginning and end.804 
 
This is, of course, a rather incisive way of putting it, but it is a 
pedagogically effective picture of our problem. The problem looks slightly 
different for different species concepts and for different ontologies depending on 
how they conceive of species, but they all experience it in some form.805 
The phenetic species concept has to deal with individual variations that 
make it difficult to decide which and how large differences should count as 
constituting the border between species. It is rare that all organisms of a species 
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have a particular property and all other organisms do not. Often it is a matter of 
degree. Different organisms have more or less of the property or properties in 
question, and some properties gradually transcend into other properties. In some 
cases, the variation is as large or larger within as between species. 
The biological species concept has the problem that populations are not 
always perfectly isolated.806 Hybridisation is in some cases rather common – 
especially among fishes, amphibians, and above all, among plants.807 In some 
areas of the plant kingdom, the confusion is quite compact. In the genera rubus, 
for example, there are no sharp discontinuities, and there is no real consensus 
about how to divide it into species.808 Reproductive isolation is not always 
absolute. Just as with phenetic species, the border between interbreeding 
populations is often a grey area rather than a clear line. 
Sterelny and Sober argue that we can use external isolation to draw sharp 
lines between species.809 As Sterelny points out, isolation of populations can 
occur relatively instantaneous as a result of changes in the environment, even if 
the transition of internal properties is slow and gradual.810 
A serious problem with this solution is that it is only valid for the version of 
the biological species concept that accepts external barriers as borders between 
species, and as we saw above, this version is particularly troublesome both in 
general and for ecocentrism. 
The phylogenetic species concept is burdened by the fact that we are all 
related. Any two organisms have a common ancestor if we go far enough back in 
time. This means that it is possible to identify monophyletic groups of any size. 
How inclusive a species is therefore depends on where we choose to draw the 
line. This means that the phylogenetic species concept has two demarcation 
problems: Both the problem of drawing the line between different species, and 
the problem of drawing the line between species and other taxa. 
These problems also affect the different ontologies. If species are classes or 
kinds, there are always organisms that can equally be easy sorted into more than 
one class or kind and as a result of the unclear borders between the species, the 
borders between the classes or kinds will be equally unclear. If species are 
segments of lineages (whether the lineages should be seen as individuals or not) 
we have to decide where to cut the lineages into segments. Evolutionary lineages 
can be divided into species in different ways,811 and there is an ongoing debate 
about when two population lineages should be seen as distinct species.812 
Because of these problems, there is a pressing concern that the borderlines 
we draw between species might not always – or even at all – reflect something 
that exists independently of us. The borders might be drawn based on other 
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considerations such as what we choose to concentrate on, or just on what 
happens to be convenient.813 
This is, of course, most serious for the idea that species are individuals, but 
it is also troublesome for the notions of species as classes or kinds. Probably 
more for kinds than for classes because of the role natural kinds are supposed to 
play in natural laws, and because natural kinds are defined as existing 
independently of us. For those who see species as segments of historical lineages 
it is possible to maintain that the historical lineages exist objectively even though 
the borders between the segments are unclear or based on subjective criteria. 
For the ecocentrists this can hardly be enough, however. Many ecocentrists 
have been worried about the demarcation question – and for good reasons, I 
believe. If the border between species is unclear or decided by us rather than by 
nature, it will be more difficult to claim that any duty to, for example, preserve a 
particular segment or kind is a duty to the segment or the kind rather than a duty 
to human beings. It will also make it much more difficult to make sense of the 
idea that species have interests qua species and independent of our interests. The 
vagueness of the borders is also problematic for ecocentrism in another way. 
When ecocentrists claim that species have an interest in existing, they talk about 
interests had by the “individual” species. It is not a matter of a general interest 
had by nature or by the whole historical lineage of life. The idea is instead that 
each species has an interest in its own survival. This means that the interests 
emerging from the species are supposed to be discrete units with discrete sources 
and goals. It is very difficult to imagine how this can be the case if the species 
are arbitrary stretches of a continuously flowing river. 
The demarcation problem thus means both that it is difficult to maintain 
that species have an independent objective existence – which seems to be 
necessary in order to maintain that their interests are independent of us – and that 
they are independent of each other to such an extent that each species can have 
its own self regarding interests isolated from the interests of other species. 
Ben Bradley even believes that it is difficult to attribute intrinsic value to 
species because of what he sees as an arbitrariness of their boundaries.814 
Whether that is the case depends on what we mean by ‘intrinsic value’. If we just 
mean ‘moral standing’, than he is clearly right due to the problems I have 
sketched above. If we by ‘intrinsic value’ mean ‘valued as an end in itself by a 
sentient valuer’ I am not sure that he is right, however. If we decide the borders 
between species based on criteria that we find relevant, I do not see why we 
cannot assign end value to the resulting species even if the borders are either in 
the form of a grey area or in the form of a line drawn by us through a grey area. It 
might mean that our interest in the species gets weaker when we deal with 
organisms that belong to the grey area, or it might mean that our interest is 
enhanced in the form of fascination for nature’s “unwillingness” to be easily 
divided into discrete units. The vagueness of the borders can thus give species 
more or less end value depending on the attitude of the valuer, but it does not 
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show that it is impossible to value the stretch of life that we have picked out and 
designated species status to as an end in itself. 
Among the ecocentrists, Callicott concludes that the ontological status of 
species is sufficient to assign intrinsic value to species, but not enough to talk 
about species rights.815 Both Rolston and Johnson argue that species are discrete 
enough to have duty-generating interests (none of them talk in terms of rights). 
In spite of all the problems, some authors claim that there are as a matter of 
fact sharp discontinuities between species.816 Admittedly, it is quite easy in most 
everyday situations to distinguish between different species, at least as long as 
we stick to the big mammals and birds that we tend to think of when we talk 
about species.817 When we talk about other species and particularly about plants, 
it will, as we saw above, be much more complicated. Even when we talk about 
“easy” species in this respect it is only easy as long as we stick to contemporary 
life. Historically, all species fade into each other.818 Evolution is still going on in 
nature and the speciation process happens right under our noses. Even species 
that we can easily distinguish between today have common ancestors and the 
question remains where we should draw the borderline. The species borders are 
therefore, as Dawkins puts it, "definable only because the awkward intermediates 
are dead."819 
A possible solution to this problem is to limit ourselves to talk about the 
now living individuals and possibly the fossils we have managed to find and 
identify, while we ignore the rest. It seems to be good enough for most everyday 
situations, and Dawkins himself claims that given the information we have, it is 
possible to find one correct taxonomy, even though it is only correct as long we 
do not have a complete fossil record.820 
Species do not only change gradually through history, however. There is 
also gradual change around the earth. Some species are spread all the way around 
the globe but each local population is a little different from its neighbour 
populations. The differences are not big enough to prevent interbreeding – except 
at one point where the differences are too large. This means that population 1 can 
interbreed with population 2 and is therefore the same species, population 2 can 
interbreed with population 3 and they are therefore the same species, and so on 
around the earth until we are back where we started and population N meets 
population 1 with which it cannot interbreed.821 The question is: Is this one or 
two (or more) species? In the area where both population 1 and population N 
exist the populations count as two species but everywhere else around the globe 
it is only one species. Ring species are rare but they do exist and they show us 
that gradual change, not just historically but also geographically, is a problem 
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both for our efforts to find a way to distinguish between species, and for the 
question of their ontological status. 
Ignoring history does therefore not solve the entire problem with gradual 
change – just one dimension of it. Even though it is the dimension that contains 
most of the problematic cases, it is not satisfying to leave the remaining cases 
unattended. 
A view of species that only works in the absence of some facts also looks 
like a rather unappealing solution for ecocentrism. It is difficult to see how 
species can play the role they are assigned by ecocentrism if the borders between 
them can only be upheld as long as we lack (or ignore) parts of their history. 
On the other hand, accepting that there are no clearly distinguishable 
borders between species does not look like a good option either. Species may be 
able to play their assigned roles in ecology, evolutionary theory, palaeontology, 
etc. without being discrete entities, but how can each species have its own 
interest if the species are not discrete entities, or at least have a core that is 
clearly it? 
Dupré sees the idea of clearly defined discrete species as a remnant from 
the creationist view of biology,822 and he believes that it is no longer reasonable 
to assume that evolution has produced discrete species.823 Eugene Hargrove even 
concedes that the old pre-Darwinian – view that species were created in their 
present shape and are fixed once and for all would be a stronger foundation for 
species protection than the evolutionary theory.824 This does not mean that he is 
willing to accept a pre-Darwinian view, but that he acknowledges the problem 
that an ongoing evolution creates for ecocentrism. Of course, ongoing evolution 
is a fact and if that is a problem for ecocentrism, then ecocentrism is in big 
trouble. 
Lawrence Johnson mentions the idea of punctuated equilibrium as a 
possible solution.825 The punctuated equilibrium-theory states that evolution 
works in sudden leaps rather than at an even pace.826 If this is correct, it will 
mitigate the problem by providing us with evolutionary gaps that can be used as 
natural demarcations between species. Both Johnson and Dawkins note that it 
would be much easier to see species as discrete entities if we accept punctuated 
equilibrium, compared to a more gradualist view of evolution.827 
However, punctuated equilibrium is still a controversial theory. David 
Resnik argues that it is an ad hoc theory and that there is no independent 
evidence that evolution has proceeded with different speeds at different times.828 
Also, Johnson and Dawkins are unconvinced by the idea of punctuationism. Even 
though Johnson mentions it as a possible saviour of his theory, he does not argue 
for it. Instead, he concedes that he is rather sceptical and leans more in the 
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direction of gradualism.829 Dawkins is even more sceptical. He points out that 
even though punctuated equilibrium assumes that there have been short periods 
of very rapid development and long periods with slow or no development, it is 
still a gradual evolution when we get down in detail. The steps are just not 
dramatic enough to give us the gaps we need. They just make it more unlikely for 
us to retrieve a complete fossil record, and thereby make it easier for 
palaeontologists  especially to maintain their taxonomic groups.830 According to 
Dawkins, no one really believes that 
 
there really was a first human, whose mutant brain was twice the size of his 
father's brain and that of his chimp-like brother.831  
 
In other words, punctuated equilibrium might not be able help us find the 
clear natural borders we need, and even if it does in some cases, not all species 
have come into existence in that way, so the ecocentrists would still need another 
way of distinguishing between remaining species. 
An alternative way of dealing with the demarcation problem is to admit the 
vagueness but deny that this causes the problems I sketched above. This strategy 
is ultimately chosen by both Johnson and Rolston. Rolston admits that the edges 
of species are “sometimes fuzzy”, and that species “slide into another over 
evolutionary time”, but he denies that this means that they do not objectively 
exist.832 Johnson argues that it is not necessary for his theory that species have 
precise boundaries.833 
 Some writers have dealt with this problem by using analogies. Ereshefsky 
makes an analogy with baldness. The border between being bald and not is far 
from clear but that does not stop us from saying that there are bald people and 
there are people who are not bald.834 Other authors have referred to height. It is 
not possible to say exactly where to draw the line between being tall and being 
short, but we can still agree that there objectively exist tall people and short 
people. Johnson has compared the “fuzziness” of species borders with the planet 
Jupiter, which is primarily made up of lightweight gases,835 and therefore does 
not have any exact boundaries. Still, no one hesitates to call Jupiter an 
objectively existing discrete entity.836 
These seem like good analogies, though there are some problems. Even 
though the borderlines of Jupiter as well as of many other celestial bodies are 
somewhat "fuzzy", they still have a core that is clearly “planet”. The same does 
not seem to be the case with species. A species is made up of individual 
organisms that are clearly separate (Johnson has to agree about that since he also 
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uses an analogy with organisms that he sees as obvious examples of discrete 
entities). When we talk about baldness or tallness it does not seem to matter that 
many people are “a little bald” or neither tall nor short. When we divide 
organisms into species we need to be more stringent, however. It is generally 
held that each and every organism belongs to one and only one species. This 
means that if we just accept that the species borders are unclear we will in many 
cases have to make a decision that has no basis in nature. We will therefore again 
have to question the independent existence of species. When we talk about 
tallness/shortness or baldness/non-baldness we do not have to do that. We can 
admit that the borders are unclear, and that many people are not clearly one or 
the other. We therefore do not have to impose borders that are not there. In the 
case of tallness/shortness and baldness/non-baldness we are also dealing with two 
extremes. It is easy to identify the extreme points on a one-dimensional scale 
even if it is not easy to say when we should stop talking about one extreme and 
start talking about the other. When we talk about species we are dealing with 
many segments on a many dimensional scale, and it is not even obvious how 
many segments we should divide the scale into. The most important difference 
between the analogies and species is that we need species to have interests. Even 
if the analogies we have seen here would be enough to grant that species have 
independent objective existence, we have not come any closer to showing that 
species with unclear borders still can have discrete self-regarding interests. 
Analogies have also been made with individual organisms. If we could 
show that individual organisms have unclear borders in the same way as species 
do, we would have a good case for arguing that it is possible to be a moral object 
even with unclear borders. 
Both Johnson and Rolston have made this analogy. Rolston claims that 
“taxonomists can often distinguish between two species more readily than 
between two individuals within a species”,837 while Johnson points out that both 
the spatial and the temporal borders of organisms are "fuzzy".838 
Rolston’s exclamation is a clear exaggeration, although it is true that the 
borders of individual organisms are not totally clear. If we start with the temporal 
borders, it is not totally obvious when a new organism comes to be. It is easier 
for sexually reproducing organisms than for organisms who reproduce by fission, 
but even for sexually reproducing animals it is not easy. Does the organism come 
into existence at the moment of conception, the moment of birth or some time in 
between? In fact, even the “moment” of conception is not really a moment but 
something that gradually progresses.839 Also the moment of death is not totally 
clear. There are different ideas of when someone is to count as dead, and the 
dying is, in some cases, a rather extended process.840 
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When it comes to the spatial borders, they seem rather clear as long as we 
talk about animals,841 but for some life forms it is not totally clear what should 
count as one organism. When we talk about plants it can sometimes be quite 
tricky. Sober has pointed out that a stand of aspens connected by underground 
runners may or may not be seen as the same organism.842 When we talk about 
more “primitive” organisms it is sometimes even more difficult. According to de 
Queiroz, the difficulties of determining the number of and exact boundaries 
between individual organisms of some species is not considered a problem for 
the organism concept, so it should not be a problem when we talk about 
species.843 Ciliates are an example where it is rather confusing to try to determine 
the number of, or exact boundaries between, individual organisms.844 
Johnson also points out that as living organisms we undergo “radical 
changes during our lifetime.”845 This is true. The same individual can have very 
different appearances at different times. It is true even of human beings, and it is 
even truer of for example insects who go through very different life stages. Even 
so, it does not really cut to the point. Even though one individual can go through 
different stages in life that are quite different, there is no problem to point it out 
as being the same individual – at least not if you have followed it closely trough 
its history. With species it is the other way around. It becomes more difficult, not 
less, to identify species if you follow them closely through their history. 
A general problem with these analogies is that even if the borders of 
organisms are somewhat “fuzzy”, they are decidedly less “fuzzy” than the 
borders between species. An important difference is also that we have a core that 
is obviously “us”. The same does not seem to be the case with species. The 
individual members of a species are sometimes scattered around the whole 
planet, and it is therefore difficult to conceive of a species as having a spatial 
core. It is the same problem when we talk about the time dimension. Even if the 
exact times for the beginning and the end of an organism’s existence may be 
argued about, for most of its lifetime it is quite clear that this is one organism. It 
is therefore not really comparable with the problem of when one species begins 
and another ends. 
What is even more important is that when we talk about what it takes to be 
a moral object, we have to remember that the competing theories that we are 
investigating (anthropocentrism and sentientism) only endow moral status to 
animals that are clearly distinguishable – as human beings in the case of 
anthropocentrism and sentient organisms in the case of sentientism. This means 
that even if there are organisms, like single-cell organisms or some plants that 
can be compared with species in terms of “fuzziness”, species are still a long way 
from the distinctness of organisms that are normally seen as moral objects.846 
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The result seems to be that the difficulty of finding clear borders between 
many species causes more or less problems for all species concepts and 
ontologies. In spite of that, species can probably play the roles they are assigned 
in most sciences and everyday situations. It also seems possible to exist 
objectively with unclear borders. When we need clear borders it seems that we 
have to draw the lines based on our interests, however, which means that these 
borders will not exist independently of us. For ecocentrism this is a very big 
problem because if species do not have their own discrete self regarding interests 
it is difficult to see how we can have a moral duty to protect them for their sake. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. In the interest of species 
 
In order to have moral standing one must have interests for moral agents to 
consider. 847 In order for ecocentrism to make sense, species must have at least 
one interest: Continued existence. This is an absolute minimum requirement, 
which everyone involved in the debate seems to agree on.  
The problem is that it is not clear in what sense species can be said to have 
interests. This is probably the most serious problem for ecocentrism, and it is also 
a problem that has been given much attention by both ecocentrists and their 
opponents. 
Normally, only sentient beings are believed to have interests. Even if 
species are individuals in some sense, they are not sentient individuals.  
Therefore, it is very difficult to conceive of them as having interests in any 
morally relevant sense. 
I will start this part of the investigation by trying to figure out why it is 
generally assumed that it is necessary to be sentient in order to have interests in a 
morally relevant way. After that I will look at how the ecocentrists try to refute 
some central pillars of this assumption, 848 i.e. that an ability to feel pain, 
experience things as good or bad, or have preferences is necessary in order to 
have interests in a morally relevant way. After having scrutinised these ideas and 
the ecocentrists’ attempts to refute them I will investigate the ecocentrists’ own 
suggestions in the form of biological wellbeing, self-definition, self-maintenance 
and goal-directedness. 
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6.2.1. The necessity of sentience 
 
Why is it claimed that sentience is a necessary prerequisite to have interests in a 
morally relevant way? It is common to claim that it is, but few have presented 
any arguments for it other than intuitions. This, in a way, is understandable. The 
belief that sentience is necessary in order to have interests is very basic and very 
intuitive. The lack of arguments has however been pointed out by ecocentrists,849 
and led some of them to claim that the demand for sentience is either arbitrary,850 
or biased by the fact that human beings typically are sentient.851 
There are, however, some philosophers who have supplied arguments for, 
or at least clues to, why sentience is necessary in order to have interests. Bennett 
Helm is one of them. He explains that “if someone were not affected emotionally 
by something no matter what happened to it, we would be hard pressed to say 
that it had import to her”.852 
This looks reasonable. Being affected emotionally seems like something 
that has a close connection with having interests. At least human beings tend to 
be emotionally involved in the things we have interests in. A problem with the 
word ‘emotion’ is that it is used in different ways by different authors. Some 
authors see emotions just as phenomena with no necessary connection to positive 
or negative evaluations,853 while some use the word in a way that does not even 
imply sentience.854 Perhaps ‘feeling’ or ‘passion’ would be better suited for the 
idea that Helm wants to promote. 
No matter which of these terms we use, the advocates of ecocentrism would 
no doubt respond that the connection between interests and the phenomena in 
question looks reasonable to humans because humans are beings who have their 
interests connected to emotions (or passions or feelings), but that this does not 
prove that interests have to be connected to emotions (passions/feelings). To base 
our claims on the human case is just bias. 
Johnson states that: 
 
Unlike the species, we human individuals are geared to feel about our 
interests, so it is hardly surprising that our interests are commonly tied to 
our feelings. Species however, our own included, are not organized in 
such a fashion.855 
 
I believe, however, that Helm’s point should be interpreted on a principal 
level that would avoid both these problems. Emotions/feelings/passions are 
important because it can be claimed that to have an interest in something is to 
care about it. In order to be able to care about something one has to be sentient. 
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Therefore sentience is a necessary prerequisite for having interests in a morally 
relevant way.856 Rick O’Neil for instance argues that 
 
… there is no reason to consider x’s interests if x itself doesn’t care about 
those interests. Why bother about an interest if it never has and never 
will concern or matter to the holder of the interest?857 
 
To argue that someone has an interest she does not care about even seems 
contradictory. To claim that we have an obligation to consider an interest that no 
one cares about looks like a misuse of ethics. We might ask: If a species does not 
care about what we do to it why should we care? 
I can, in fact, imagine several answers to that question. All of these answers 
will, however be in terms of the instrumental value or end value of the species 
for sentient organisms who do care. None of the answers will be in terms of the 
value the species has for itself, that is, none of them will be based on a respect for 
interests had by the species itself. 
The advocates of ecocentrism do not, in general, claim that species care 
about what happens to them. Instead, they claim either that this demand too is a 
bias that begs the question in favour of consciousness,858or that there are other 
ways to have interests that do not require caring – at least not in “the familiar 
sense of ‘care’” as Rolston puts it.859 According to Rolston, the demand for 
sentience is a bias that 
 
takes a part for the whole … values a late product of the system, 
psychological life, and subordinates everything else to this. It mistakes a 
fruit for the whole plant, the last chapter for the whole story.860 
 
The argument seems to be that sentience is not worthy of its special status, 
partly because it is a latecomer and partly because it is only one small aspect of 
the world and of the function of living entities. This argument seems to miss the 
point, however. The assumption that sentience is necessary in order to have 
interests is not a matter of assigning a special value to sentience. Whether 
sentience is worthy of any particular honour or fascination, or whether it has 
value as an end in itself is not what this discussion is about. Sentience is pointed 
out as a necessary prerequisite for having interests. Whether sentience is a good 
thing or not has nothing to do with this question. Even if we assume that 
sentience or being sentient is value neutral or even something bad, we still have 
to address the fact that by existing it gives those who possess it a point of view 
from which things are subjectively better or worse. The question is not whether 
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this makes them more or less valuable but of whether it makes other things, 
events, etc. valuable for them. 
Johnson seems to admit that caring in some form is important: “An interest 
(or good) must in some way make some sort of a difference to whatever being 
has the interest”.861 Even so, he also believes that “it is question-begging to just 
assume that the being must be able to conceive of the interest (good) that makes 
the difference to it.”862 He argues that animals can act so as to promote an interest 
even if they do not conceive of it as an interest. We humans can, for example, 
promote our happiness without having happiness as the aim of our actions.863 
Johnson has a point in that, but the point is misdirected. It is quite clear that 
we can promote our happiness without having it as our aim. It also seems correct 
to say that one can have an interest without conceiving of it as an interest. The 
problem for Johnson is that these facts do not have any bearing on the question of 
whether it is possible to have an interest without caring about the thing (state, 
event, etc.) that we have an interest in. In order to answer that question with a 
negation we have to show something more, viz. that something can be in 
someone’s interest even if that someone does not have any subjective feelings for 
it. At least, this is how I interpret Helm’s call for emotions, and it seems to be a 
reasonable demand. 
The question of subjectivity is important here. Both since it clearly requires 
sentience, and because it seems to be clearly required by interests. Mark 
Bernstein uses the term ‘subjective well-being’, and he defines subjective well-
being in terms of phenomenology: “On a subjective account of well being, an 
individual’s doing well and doing poorly is constituted by the phenomenology 
that the individual experiences”.864 
However, that there is something phenomenological going on inside is not 
enough to have well-being in a relevant sense according to Bernstein. It is also 
necessary to be able to feel good or bad, i.e. to have what Bernstein calls a 
“hedonic dimension”.865 He also demands that the inner life of a moral patient is 
modifiable.866 I suppose that by the last claim he means modifiable from the 
outside. If it is not modifiable from the outside, there is nothing we can do to 
make the entity in question better or worse off, and we can therefore not have 
any moral duties on its account. I believe this is something that everyone 
involved in the debate would agree on. 
The other two demands by Bernstein also seem very plausible. It looks 
reasonable indeed to claim that being in someone’s interest must have something 
to do with what is subjectively experienced as good by the possessor of the 
interest. To describe subjectivity in terms of phenomenological experiences 
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seems intuitively reasonable, and to talk about a hedonic dimension seems to fit 
with Helms demand for emotions. 
Joseph Levine’s reasoning about consciousness seems to go roughly along 
the same lines. He explains the subjectivity of consciousness as meaning that 
there is something it is like to have conscious experiences while there is nothing 
it is like to be in an unconscious state.867 I believe that this is a very important 
clue to the special status of consciousness. If something happens to a conscious 
experiencer there is something it is like for that individual to be subjected to the 
event in question. There is nothing it is like for a non-conscious entity to be 
subjected to anything. There is something it is like for me to be in pain. There is 
something it is like for you to be thirsty. There is, however, nothing it is like for a 
plant to be thirsty even though it reacts physiologically to that state, and there is 
nothing it is like for a species to be culled even if it affects its future evolution. 
Dale Jamieson demands “a perspective from which their lives can go better 
or worse”,868 and Janna Thompson uses the having of a point of view as criteria 
for moral standing.869 I believe these suggestions are synonymous, and they seem 
to provide a good summary of the ideas we have seen above. To say that 
something is in your interest must reasonably imply that it is good from your 
perspective, or point of view. Talking about a perspective or a point of view in 
turn must reasonably imply subjectivity. It also seems to imply that there is 
valuation involved – subjective valuation. All of this, in turn, clearly implies 
consciousness. 
Michael Nelson admits that species do not have a point of view,870 but he 
expresses doubt that the group of beings that have a point of view coincides with 
the group of beings that possess sentience, though he does not offer any 
argument for his doubt.871 He also believes that if we use the having of a point of 
view as criteria for moral standing, many humans including “the profoundly 
senile, the very severely retarded, and newborn infants” would be excluded since 
they according to him, “obviously lack a point of view”.872 
It seems to me that Nelson is putting too much and too little into the term. 
Exactly how he defines ‘point of view’ is not clear but it does not seem to have 
much in common with the way we have talked about it above. 
I believe the sense of the term according to which it includes all and only 
sentient beings, and at the same time answers the question why it is necessary in 
order to have interests can be best understood trough an analogy: 
If someone breaks my computer we would say that the computer has been 
severely damaged. Maybe we would even say that it has been harmed (though 
this is much less obvious). We would probably also say that harm has been 
inflicted on me, since it affects me negatively if my computer is destroyed. 
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There seems to be a relevant difference between my computer and me, 
however. That the computer is damaged or harmed is a judgement made by 
someone outside the computer. It is judged as a damage or a harm by me and 
maybe also by other human observers. It is, however, not judged by the computer 
to be a harm of the computer. The computer might have a program that checks it 
for malfunctions and if it is not totally dead, that program might still work. In 
that case, we might say that the computer notices the harm at least in some sense 
of ‘notice’. Maybe a sign turns up on the screen saying that something is wrong. 
Even so, it is not the computer that judges the change that has happened to 
it as a harm or even as a malfunction. It “notices” a change and finds that the 
change fits with the criteria of harm that have been set by the human(s) who 
programmed the computer and therefore the program labels the changes as 
harms. 
The effect on me that results from the damage of my computer might also 
be observed by other human beings. Different humans may have different 
opinions about whether what has happened to me (the loss of my computer) 
should be classified as a harm. Contrary to the computer, however I myself can 
also judge what has happened to me as a harm. The standard explanation for this 
difference between my computer and me is that I am a sentient being while the 
computer is not. This means that even if both my computer and I are harmed 
from an exterior perspective, only I am harmed from an interior perspective. The 
computer might break, it might stop working, or it might just change the way it 
works in a way that is judged by me as an impairment. It does not itself 
experience this as an impairment, however. It does not feel pain, agony or anger 
when it happens. It did not wish for it not to happen, and it was not afraid that it 
would happen – or to put it bluntly: It just does not care. It does not have any 
subjective feelings about it. 
One might say that the computer is not a subjective I, or that it does not 
have its own perspective or point of view from which things can be felt as good 
or bad. A sentient being has a subjective viewpoint that the computer lacks and 
from which things are judged as good or bad. That is why I care about what 
happens to me – and to my computer – in a way that the computer does not. 
Even if we were to assume that there is an objective way in which the 
computer is harmed, it does not help the case in question. As long as it is not 
subjectively harmed from the point of view of the computer, we do not seem to be 
able to talk about what has happened as something that frustrates an interest of 
the computer. As a result, any moral duties we might have concerning the 
computer cannot be duties to the computer, or more precisely to consider any 
interests of the computer. My subjective point of view thus seems to me to be the 
morally relevant difference between the computer and me. 
Three phenomena that are used to be seen as closely connected with both 
sentience and interests are pain, experiences and preferences. These phenomena 
are generally assumed to presume sentience, and they all seem to be subjective 
phenomena. The abilities to feel pain or to have experiences or preferences are 
also often mentioned individually or together as being necessary for the 
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possession of interests.873 The ecocentrists – especially Johnson – have also spent 
quite a lot of effort trying to refute this belief. I will therefore use the three 
following sub-sections for a closer look at this particular debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2. Pain 
 
In the previous sub-section we found several strong reasons to assume that 
sentience really is a necessary prerequisite to have interests. The most important 
was that the most compelling analysis of what it means to say that someone has 
an interest is that something is good or bad from the subjective perspective of the 
entity that has the interest. To have a subjective perspective – or a point of view – 
clearly demands sentience. 
One phenomenon that fits very well with this analysis is pain. Avoiding 
pain is often used as a paradigm example of a thing that is in the interest of moral 
objects. It is also generally agreed that the ability to feel pain is something that 
requires sentience, and it is often used as a criteria for moral standing. Because 
the ability to feel pain is so widely held as requiring sentience and as being a 
paradigm example of interests, ecocentrists have been very eager to downplay 
the direct moral relevance of pain. They argue that pain is not even bad in itself. 
It is not the subjective experience as such that is bad, but the underlying threat to 
our biological functions that the pain indicates. Pain, it is claimed, is just 
information. It is a useful ability in sentient beings since it keeps us informed 
about things that threaten us, but it does not mean that things that cannot 
experience pain cannot be threatened in the same way – and therefore has the 
same interest in avoiding these threats. They just lack our particular means of 
being informed about the threat.874 
According to Callicott: 
 
Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil if 
our appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological biology. Pain 
in particular is primarily information. In animals, it informs the central 
nervous system of stress, irritation, or trauma in outlying regions of the 
organism.875 
 
                                                
873 See e.g. Anderberg 1994 pp.93f, Egonsson 1990 p.79, Warren 1996 p.14. Sober points out that it is 
difficult to imagine what it would mean to have an interest for someone or something that does not have a 
mind (Sober 1986 p.184). It seems that a ‘mind’, the way Sober uses it, is the same as a subjective 
consciousness. 
874 Callicott 1980 p.332, Johnson 1991 pp.105f, 147, Morito 1993 p.61, Rolston 1988 p.60 
875 Callicott 1980 p.332 
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He even calls the idea that pain is intrinsically bad “life-loathing” and 
”biologically preposterous”,876 and he compares it with the lacking logic of a 
tyrant who decapitates the messenger because he brings bad news.877 
The claim that pain is nothing but information is clearly wrong. It is in fact 
just as much motivation as information.878 Pain is not just calmly informing the 
organism that this or that has happened. It immediately motivates the organism in 
pain to do something about it – to withdraw the hand from the hot stove or to 
move the bodyweight from the wounded foot for example. This is important 
because this role can only be fulfilled if pain is experienced as intrinsically bad 
by the individual in pain. 
One argument against the claim that pain is intrinsically bad is, as Callicott 
points out, that pain sometimes is experienced as good rather than bad.879 A 
possible explanation to why that is the case is proposed by Helm who claims that 
pain in these instances are associated with something good and therefore 
experienced as good.880 Given what we know about conditioning, this seems like 
a plausible explanation. We also have to remember that even in the cases where 
pain is experienced as good, it is still motivational – though in the opposite 
direction. Pointing out that pain sometimes is experienced as good therefore does 
not give the ecocentrists the argument they need. 
It has been argued that even when pain is experienced as bad it is still a 
good thing that we have the pain because it helps us avoid certain greater evils,881 
and it would be disastrous to just concentrate on relieving the pain and not do 
anything about the cause of the pain.882 This in turn can be seen as supporting the 
claim that alleviating the threat to the biological wellbeing is the real interest of 
the organism. 
This argument can be answered by pointing out that the destruction of 
biological functions in turn causes more pain and other types of bad experiences, 
or goes against other sentient interests of the organism. What sentientistic 
ethicists claim is not that avoiding pain is the only interest but that it is the most 
basic type of interest and even that demands sentience. We also have other types 
of sentient interest,883 and a well functioning body is in general instrumentally 
important for these interests to be satisfied. If we turn the situation around and 
change the functions of the organism in such a way that it does not in any way 
affect any sentient interest, have we then done anything wrong? 
It is also important to distinguish between pain and the ability to feel pain. 
The ability to feel pain is instrumentally very valuable for sentient organisms 
because it helps us (through both information and motivation) to keep away from 
things that might injure our instrumentally important body functions. The 
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explanation why this works so well is that pain typically is experienced as 
intrinsically bad. 
An important problem with the ecocentric claim that pain is just an 
indicator of the real threat is that it just assumes that the biological role of pain 
totally decides its ethical relevance. It is perfectly correct that the ability to feel 
pain is an effective way of making organisms avoid things that tend to make the 
organism less fit in an evolutionary sense, and that this undoubtedly is the 
explanation why pain has evolved. This fact does not show, however, that it is 
the biological malfunctions that are the real interests. That A is the evolutionary 
cause of B does not tell us anything of whether A or B qualifies as an interest. 
To sum up: The ecocentric argument was that pain is not in itself 
intrinsically bad but only an indication that a biological malfunction is 
threatening the organism – and that this shows that the real interest at stake is not 
in the form of the subjective experience (the feeling of pain) but in the form of an 
objective biological fact. As far as I can see, however, this is not what the 
argument shows. That pain has an instrumental biological function does not show 
that the subjective experience is not a real interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3. Experiences 
 
The avoidance of pain is only one of the things that are in the interest of moral 
objects. There is still a possibility that some of the other interests are not in the 
form of subjective experiences. This is precisely what the advocates of 
ecocentrism try to show. They do not argue that interests are never in the form of 
subjective experiences, only that some interests are not. By showing that interests 
do not have to be tied to experiences, they hope to be able to establish that 
interests do not have to be in the form of mental states, and therefore that 
sentience is not necessary to have interests.884 
Probably, the most famous argument against the mental states theory of 
interests was first formulated by Robert Nozick. It takes the form of an 
experience machine that is a fictive device that can give you different kinds of 
experiences by stimulating your brain directly. When you are hooked up to the 
machine, you believe that the things you experience are actually happening. That 
way you can have a perfect life in terms of experiences even though none of the 
things you experience are really happening.885 
If subjective experiences were all that are relevant, then it would be 
irrational not to agree to be hooked up to the machine all the time and live our 
lives through it. Nozick thinks, however, that most people would not want to be 
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confined to this kind of life, and the explanation that Nozick gives is that 
experiences or mental states are not the only things that matter to us.886 
Johnson agrees with Nozick both that people would not want to hook up to 
the machine, and that this example shows that experiences are not the only things 
that are relevant.887 Johnson goes a step further, however, by arguing that if we 
acknowledge this, “the way starts to open up for even non-conscious beings to 
have morally significant interests.”888 
Nozick’s experience machine has been the subject of many discussions,889 
but I will not deviate too much from our main subject by a detailed description of 
this discussion. I think that the thought experiment is convincing enough to be 
taken seriously, and instead of dwelling on the experiment or on Nozick’s 
conclusion, I will simply take them for granted, and concentrate on Johnson’s 
conclusion that this opens up the possibility that non-conscious beings have 
interests. 
One way of objecting to this conclusion is to argue that the reason why we 
are not satisfied with the experience machine is that we want the things we 
experience to really happen, but that the experience is still necessary. 
Experiences are not always sufficient, but they are always necessary. This would 
explain why people are not satisfied with being connected to the machine. 
Johnson has an answer to this objection in the form of another thought 
experiment. In this experiment, an athlete collapses over the finish line. She is 
taken to the hospital where she briefly recovers consciousness, and then dies 
before anyone manages to tell her the result. According to Johnson, victory is in 
her interest even though she will never experience the victory.890  
This conclusion is controversial but not totally unreasonable. Other 
philosophers have also argued that one can have interests regarding things that 
will happen after one’s death.891 It does not seem unreasonable, for example, to 
claim that it is in someone's interest that his grandchildren have good lives when 
he is dead. In that case he cannot experience the satisfaction of seeing his 
grandchildren prosper, which means that it would be an example of an interest 
that cannot be explained by saying that subjective experiences are necessary but 
not sufficient. In this case, it looks like no subjective experience is necessary. 
We do not have to accept that things that happen after our death can be in 
our interests in order for Johnson’s answer to be valid, however. Johnson points 
out that many sincere and thoughtful people have held many other things than 
pleasure and pain to be intrinsically important in their lives.892 I think this can be 
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generalized to say that many sincere and thoughtful people have held other things 
than their own experiences to be intrinsically important. 
Jason Kawall points out that it is almost universally held that we can value 
other things than our wellbeing. We can even value things higher than our own 
wellbeing. A scientist may be so devoted to searching for the truth that she is 
prepared to sacrifice her own wellbeing.  Parents are often more devoted to the 
wellbeing of their children than to their own wellbeing.893  
Other authors have reasoned in the same way. It has, for example, been 
pointed out that it is possible to live a valuable life even if one is unhappy,894 and 
that people often are prepared to sacrifice short-term happiness for other goals.895 
I agree with these points. Not just scientists are prepared to have fewer 
positive experiences in their lives in order to accomplish other things. The same 
seems to be the case with, for example, athletes, artists and activists of different 
kinds. I also believe that few of us can sincerely say that we do not care about 
anything other than our own experiences. Few of us would probably seriously 
maintain that what you don’t know can’t harm you.896 The only way of avoiding 
that conclusion must be to hold that experiences are not necessary to have 
interests.897 
The general conclusion must be that an interest in something does not have 
to imply an interest in experiencing it, and that an interest for something not to be 
the case does not have to consist solely of an interest not to experience it. 
Sometimes it is said that things we do not experience ourselves cannot 
make our lives fare better or worse, and that this is the really relevant criterion 
that something is in our interest.898 It is true that if we do not experience 
something, or in any way get to know about it, the thing or event cannot make 
our lives better or worse. I do not think this the criteria of what is in our interests, 
however. We found in the beginning of this section that the question about what 
is in our interest must be a matter of what is good or bad from our subjective 
point of view. If we want something to happen in another part of the world, the 
issue is not whether that makes our life better (from one perspective or other) but 
whether that thing is better from our perspective. If something happens to us that 
make our lives better seen from someone else’s perspective but not from our 
own, we can say that what happened was in their interest – not that it was in our 
interest. 
The next question will be whether the conclusion that experiences do not 
have to be in the form of experiences also grants that – as Johnson puts it – “the 
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way starts to open up for even non-conscious beings to have morally significant 
interests.”899 
According to Johnson: 
 
The most plausible reason why sentience should be necessary in order for 
interests to be morally significant is that it should make a felt difference 
to the interest haver whether its interests are satisfied.900 
 
It is not the only reason, however, and I do not agree that it is the most 
plausible reason. It does not follow from the conclusion above that something 
that never has any experiences at all can have any interests. It is still possible to 
claim that even though we can have interests in things without having an interest 
in experiencing them, we cannot have an interest in anything if we have never 
had any experiences at all. It is at least not obvious that preceding experiences 
are irrelevant to the question. It is quite possible that you need to have had some 
kind of experience that has been good or bad from your subjective perspective in 
order to be able to hold that it would be a good or a bad thing that something 
happens – whether you experience that particular event or not. I do not think, for 
instance, that Johnson’s story about the athlete who collapses on the finish line 
would have been very convincing if it were a race between objects – robots for 
example – that have never experienced anything at all, neither before, nor after 
the race (independently of whether the winning robot crashes so it can never be 
repaired). The athlete in Johnson’s example never got to experience the victory, 
but she certainly had experiences before the victory that among other things, 
might have given her a preference to win the race. 
Even if it is not the case that we need to have had positive and negative 
experiences in order to be able to value things as good or bad (whether 
experienced or not), it can hardly be denied that we need to be sentient in order 
for things to be good or bad from your perspective. We saw above that the most 
plausible explanation of what it means to have an interest in something is that the 
something is subjectively evaluated as good or bad from someone’s point of 
view. This does not exclude that other things than subjective experiences have 
subjective value and therefore is in someone’s interest, but it does exclude that 
things that have no subjective value from someone’s perspective can be in that 
someone’s interest. 
The most common alternative to interests in the form of experiences is not, 
in fact, interests that do not presuppose sentience, but interests in the form of 
preferences or desires. To have a preference for something is a way of 
subjectively valuating something as good or bad (whether one will experience it 
or not). In the next sub-section we will therefore take a closer look at preferences 
as interests – and the ecocentric arguments that preferences are not necessary to 
have interests. 
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6.2.4. Preferences 
 
The next alternative answer to the question of what constitutes an interest are our 
preferences. In order to have preferences it is necessary to have a subjective point 
of view and therefore to be sentient. It might be that preferences can account for 
the cases where we have interests in things without having an interest in 
experiencing them. 
This is not something that the ecocentrists believe, however. On the 
contrary: In order to maintain that it is not necessary to be a sentient individual to 
have morally relevant interests, the ecocentrists have to deny that the ability of 
having either experiences or preferences is a necessary prerequisite for someone 
to have interests.901 
Johnson’s main argument for why our interests can be constituted by 
something else other than preferences is the intuition that people sometimes have 
preferences for things that are not good for them.902 This sounds like a plausible 
intuition, and it is also pointed out by not only ecocentrists.903 We sometimes do 
feel that fulfilling certain preferences is not good for the individual who has the 
preference. The question is: How should we interpret that intuition? 
We could say that the intuition is just wrong, that what we prefer is 
necessarily what is in our interest, and that when it seems that what we prefer is 
not good for us, then we have confused the question of what is in our interests 
with some other sense of ‘good for us’ (perhaps a medical or evolutionary sense). 
This answer will however just reduce the question to an intuitive level and it will 
not convince those who do not already share this intuition. 
Another possibility is that those who claim that satisfying someone’s 
preference is not good for her, just projects their own preferences or the 
preferences that are standard in the society on those who have other preferences. 
They therefore conclude that there must be something wrong with the person 
who has the deviating preference, and that she has not understood what is really 
in her interest. 
I believe that this is a correct explanation in some cases, but not always. 
There are still cases where it is probably correct to say that satisfying a certain 
preference is not in the interest of the individual whose preference it is. I will try 
to find an explanation for this that is compatible with the assumption that only 
preferences can constitute interests. 
One might be tempted to explain the occurrences of preferences that it 
would not be good for us to satisfy, by pointing out that in some cases we have 
preferences for things that will decrease the number of positive experiences. As 
we saw above, however, it is not obviously true that experiences must be more 
important than other interests. We saw, for example, that it is quite common that 
people are prepared to sacrifice good experiences in order to promote other 
interests, and we did not find that unreasonable. 
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One possible explanation to why it sometimes is bad for us to have a 
particular preference satisfied is that we have conflicting preferences. 
Considering how many preferences most of us carry around, it would not be 
surprising if some of them where in conflict. Neither should this suggestion be 
particularly surprising for most of us. I guess that every human by introspection 
can conclude that he or she sometimes has conflicting preferences. 
This in turn means that we have a good chance of being able to explain 
cases where the satisfaction of a preference would not be good for us, by 
referring to other preferences. The phrase ‘the satisfaction of this preference 
would not be good for him’ might well mean that the satisfaction of this 
preference would go against some other preference of his. 
An apparent problem with this suggestion is that it does not tell us how to 
decide in cases like this. It looks like we would have to say that ‘satisfying the 
preference would not be good for him (since it frustrates another preference) but 
the same is true for not satisfying the preference (since that would of course 
frustrate this preference)’. This would be a rather simplified way of looking at 
things however. There are several ways of prioritizing between preferences. One 
simple way is to prioritize based on a majority rule. The pursuit and eventual 
satisfaction of a certain preference tends to have effects on more than one other 
preference. If satisfying a certain preference has the effect that the total sum of 
satisfied preferences for the person in question will be lower than it would if we 
do not satisfy that particular preference, then we might have a good reason for 
saying that satisfying that preference would be bad for the preference holder.904 
This would in practice mean that we apply some kind of “intra-personal 
utilitarianism”. But as we know, utilitarianism has its own problems. One such 
problem is pointed out by Derek Parfit: Imagine a drug that will make you 
addicted to the drug if you have it once. The addiction works like this: Every 
morning you will feel a desire to have an injection of the drug. As long as you 
get the drug within an hour, nothing will happen other than that you get the 
desire fulfilled. It will not give you any pleasure or any pain. If you do not get the 
drug within an hour you will experience great pain. You will get ample supplies 
of the drug so the attaining of the drug will not give you any problems and there 
will not be any other side effects.905 
In this example we have chemically created a desire in you that you will 
have every morning – and that will be fulfilled every time you have it. If we base 
our concept of interests on preferences and also accept a summative method for 
prioritizing between preferences, it will be a good thing to take this drug in the 
first place since it will increase the number of fulfilled preferences in your life. 
According to Parfit, it would however be very improbable that it would be better 
for you to have and fulfil this desire.906 This conclusion looks plausible. The 
question is how it should be interpreted. It might be seen as an argument against 
preferentialism, but it might also be interpreted, as just an argument against the 
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idea that the only thing that is relevant is the sum of satisfied interests. It seems to 
me that it is the summative approach rather than preferentialism as such that 
makes Parfit’s example counterintuitive, and that is also in accordance with how 
Parfit uses the example – i.e. as an argument against “summative theories”, and 
not against preferentialism.907 
Parfit also dismisses an attempt to save the summative theory by suggesting 
that the preference in the example should not count because it is a preference that 
we would prefer not to have. He points out, however, that if you are sick and in 
great pain you probably have a preference not to be in that state. This also 
implies however that you have a preference not to have the preference not to be 
in that state. Should that preference therefore not count?908 
An alternative way of approaching the problem is to deny that it is as 
counterintuitive as it first looks. Maybe it just looks counterintuitive because the 
preference is chemically triggered. We are as Egonsson points out, used to drugs 
having negative effects. We may therefore have difficulties ignoring that when 
we consider Parfit’s example.909 In this example the only effect of the drug was 
that it creates easily satisfied preferences, which means that we might not be able 
to trust our initial reactions in this case. 
It might also be that we have troubles connecting this preference to my 
interest since it is artificially induced from the outside. It is not obvious, 
however, that preferences that are artificially induced from the outside of the 
preference holders cannot be interests of that individual. Dogs are in general bred 
by human beings with the aim of promoting certain properties. That is also the 
case with preferences. Dogs are picked out for breeding not just because they are 
good at tracking, retrieving, guarding, herding, pulling, etc., but also, because 
they like to do these things. In the future we will probably be able to influence 
the preferences of individual animals by genetic engineering. Putting the question 
of whether we should do that aside: If we assume that we are dealing with an 
animal that is genetically engineered to have a strong preference for a certain 
activity, is the fact that the preference is artificially induced from the outside a 
valid argument for disregarding the preference or deciding that it is not a real 
interest? 
It is, in fact, quite difficult to maintain that evolving a wider range of 
satisfiable interests is not a good thing independently of how it is triggered. So 
maybe our initial reaction is just a result of an unwarranted prejudice against 
chemically induced preferences. 
Another alternative explanation of the counter-intuitiveness of Parfit’s 
problem is that when we judge the example, we do it based on our present 
preferences. From this position, taking the drug seems meaningless since we do 
not now have a preference for taking the drug, and we probably do not have a 
preference for satisfied preferences as such. It is not until we have taken the drug 
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once that we will have a preference for taking the drug every morning. We 
therefore need to take this into account when we set our priorities. 
There are also other problems than the one pointed out by Parfit in 
connection with summative theories. Johnson points out one such problem when 
he notes that for some people like infants and mentally handicapped people, the 
majority of their preferences are about things that are bad for them.910 
One way of dealing with this problem is to say that the cause of the problem 
is that the persons in question lack rationality and that only informed (or rational 
or prudent – different terms are used by different authors) preferences constitute 
morally relevant interests.911 If we accept this solution, we must ask what kind of 
information can do the job of weeding out all unacceptable preferences and leave 
all acceptable ones. An answer that seems close at hand and that would fit well 
into Johnson's reasoning is that it would be information of what is really in our 
interest. Preferences would then just serve as more or less accurate indicators of 
interests, and it would after all be possible to have interests without preferences. 
Johnson says that: 
 
What makes an object of actual or would-be desire good for us, when it is 
good for us, is that what is or would be desired contributes to our 
wellbeing. At best, reference to prudent desires can serve only as a 
criterion of an individual's good, not as its definition.912 
 
That preferences are just more or less accurate indications of our real 
interests is not the only, or the most plausible answer to why some people have a 
majority of preferences that are not good for them, however. An important aspect 
of preferences is that we have both final and instrumental preferences. By final 
preferences I mean preferences for things because they have final value (or end 
value) from our subjective perspective. By instrumental preferences I mean 
preferences we have for things because we believe that they are useful means to 
things that have end value from our subjective perspective. When we talk about 
instrumental preferences it seems quite natural to see them as more or less 
rational since they are a result of how informed we are in a certain matter.913 
This distinction is probably important when it comes to explaining why 
some people have a majority of preferences that are bad for them. Considering 
that there can be long threads of instrumental preferences before we reach a final 
preference, and considering that there is often more than one way of 
accomplishing a final preference, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority 
of our preferences are instrumental preferences. This, in combination with the 
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nature of instrumental preferences, makes the distinction between final and 
instrumental preferences a good candidate for explaining how it can be that for 
some people the majority of their preferences are bad for them. The majority of 
their instrumental preferences are simply bad ways of attaining their final 
preferences, which are really what are in their interests since they are the result of 
their subjective perspectives. 
There is also another aspect of the relations between preferences and 
rationality that might play a part in the explanation. Sometimes we have a 
preference for something because we falsely believe it has properties that from 
our perspective give it end value. We may, in other words, be mistaken regarding 
the nature of the things we have preferences for. Strictly speaking one should say 
that in this case we really do not have a preference for that thing but for 
something else with the right properties. So, we are not really mistaken here 
about our preferences (we do prefer things with these properties),914 but about 
some factual assumption of the world (we believe that a certain entity has these 
properties). It might not always be easy to distinguish between these things in 
practice, which means that we may sometimes erroneously claim that it is not 
really in our interest to get a preference satisfied when we should say that 
achieving that particular thing will not really satisfy our preference since it does 
not really have the properties we think it has, and things that have these 
properties are really what we prefer. 
Egonsson points out another strictly preferential answer to why it is 
sometimes not in our interest to have certain preferences satisfied, viz. that we 
have both long-term and short-term preferences.915 To that we should add that 
there are preferences of different strength.916 Both these facts are probably very 
important parts of the explanation since it is quite clear that it would be 
preferentially bad for the individual to satisfy a weak or short-term preference if 
it frustrates other, stronger or more long-term preferences. 
It seems, thus, that it contrary to Johnson’s assumption is possible to 
explain why it is sometimes bad for someone to have certain preferences 
satisfied, without having to accept Johnson’s answer that preferences cannot be 
our real – or at least not our only real – interests. 
Johnson has one more argument however. He tells us that it is 
 
absurdly superficial to say that we have an interest in nutrition because 
we have an interest in, or preference for, avoiding the pangs of hunger. 
Rather, we are organized in such a way as to feel the pangs of hunger 
because we have an interest in nutrition …917 
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He also claims that it would be 
 
an utter absurdity, totally back to front, to think that the role of the rest 
of our being was to make pleasure and pain possible …918 
 
Finally, he claims that it would be 
 
nearly as absurd to think that the role of our being was to make our 
preferences and their satisfaction possible.919  
 
Apparently, according to Johnson, preferentialism is slightly better than the 
mental state theory of interests that we discussed in the previous sub-section. It 
does not seem much better though, and it seems that the preferentialist too has 
got it all backwards. 
Bruce Morito presents essentially the same argument slightly differently. 
He too argues that we have got it all backwards. According to him, our identity, 
and therefore our interests, are the result of our environment, including the 
evolutionary process. This in turn means that the value of nature is prior to our 
interests. Therefore, the value of nature cannot in turn depend on our preferences. 
Instead, we have to conclude that our preferences are there because they are 
instrumental to something else that really has value, like the survival of the 
organism.920 
Rolston continues along the same track. He argues that our valuing system 
has evolved to make us better adapted to our niche. If it were not like that, it 
would be difficult to explain how we can have a valuing system. Because of this, 
Rolston concludes that our valuing reflects value that is actually there.921 He also 
points out that: 
 
Science has been steadily showing how the consequents (life, mind) are 
built on their precedents (energy, matter), however much they overleap 
them.922  
 
This shows, according to Rolston that value exists in all of nature, not just 
where there are humans and higher animals present.923 
This argument is puzzling in all its formulations. It seems that the 
ecocentrists assume that we and our different capacities have been assigned 
certain roles, and they seem to assume that the real question is to determine what 
the different roles are. This way of arguing has no persuasive power for anyone 
who does not have a teleological view of the world or of ourselves. 
                                                
918 Johnson 1991 p.147 
919 Johnson 1991 p.147 
920 Morito 1993 pp.57f, passim 
921 Rolston 1988 p.210 
922 Rolston 1988 p.216 
923 Rolston 1988 p.216 
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The ecocentrists argue from the fact that our preferences depend on and 
have evolved from more basic phenomena, to the conclusion that these 
phenomena therefore must be more important interests than the preferences. This 
does not follow, however. The question of which of two things that are more 
important cannot be decided by which of these things that is the cause of the 
other. 
The factual statement is probably correct but it does not grant the 
conclusion. It would be very difficult to explain how our valuing system could 
spread in nature the way it has if it did not make us more adapted to our 
environment and if it did not increase our evolutionary fitness. Does this mean 
that the things behind this adaptation are what are really in our interest, while our 
preferences are just more or less fallible indications of these things? Let us make 
an analogy. Let us say that we were created by a self-centred god who gave us 
the capacity for making value judgement because he wanted us to value him. Let 
us then assume that as time went by we found other things that fitted better with 
the template he had blessed us with, and that we came to value them higher than 
our creator. Would it be reasonable to say that we are just wrong and that no 
matter how much we value these things it is really the god that has value because 
we got our valuing capacity in order to value the god? This conclusion does not 
seem plausible. Let us look at another, more down to earth, analogy. Let us say 
that a couple decide that they want a daughter who will one day grow up to be 
the leader of a certain political party. As it turns out, however, the daughter 
becomes a sympathiser of a different party or does not care about politics at all. 
Would we then say that it is still in her interest to become the leader of the party 
her parents wanted her to lead? This conclusion seems equally counterintuitive. 
Rolston presents another argument for why we have both ‘psychological’ 
and ‘biological’ interests, as he puts it. The argument is that following one’s 
psychological interests might be detrimental to one’s biological interests.924 
It seems quite clear, however, that Rolston is actually begging the question. 
Johnson argued above that some or most of our preferences might go against our 
interests and that a possible explanation for that was that our biological wellbeing 
is what is really in our interest. At a distance, Rolston’s argument might look 
similar, but it is not. Rolston does not base his argument on a reasonable intuition 
that needs to be explained, and he does not use biological interests as a possible 
solution. Instead he starts by assuming that there is such a thing as biological 
interests that are different from, and sometimes collide with, our preferences. At 
the same time, this is what Rolston wants to conclude and therefore not 
something he can use as an argument for that same conclusion. That the 
satisfaction of some preferences can have certain effects on some biological 
functions seems quite clear. Are these cases contrary to any biological interests? 
That of course depends on whether we have any biological interests (and not just 
biological states whose functionality is judged relative to our preferences) – and 
that is what Rolston still needs an argument for. 
                                                
924 Rolston 1988 p.108. He adds within parenthesis that this in turn results in psychological suffering but 
that does not stop him from focusing on the biological interests. 
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To sum this up, it looks like the standard examples of sentient interests still 
hold up. Not all interests must be in the form of experiences, but we have not 
found any credible example of an interest that cannot be accounted for by 
referring to preferences, and we have not found any viable argument for 
accepting that the real interests are to be found beyond our sentient preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.5. Biological wellbeing 
 
Preferences, as we have seen, seems to be a good candidate for constituting 
interests. Since the ecocentrists acknowledge that only sentient beings can have 
preferences they cannot accept preferences as the only type of interest, however. 
If they did, non-sentient beings as well as species and ecosystems would have to 
be left out. Finding something else than preferences that can constitute interests 
is therefore of utmost importance for the ecocentrists. 
The most popular alternative answer among the ecocentrists to what 
constitutes an interest is what I will call ‘biological wellbeing’ for short.925 The 
basis of this idea seems to be that it is in our interest that our body works in a 
certain way, and it is in our interest that it does whether we have preferences 
about it or not. The same is supposed to be the same for species and ecosystems. 
Aldo Leopold defines the health of the land as its capacity for self-renewal.926 
According to Johnson, health (in a broad sense), “is a matter of our 
effective overall integrated functioning”.927 This means that what is in our 
interest, “are those things that contribute to the overall effective functioning of 
our life process as a whole.”928  
Effective functioning thus seems to be some sort of key. What then is 
“effective functioning”, and how can we define it without referring to 
preferences? 
Johnson admits that he cannot present any fully developed definitions of 
'effectively' or of 'functioning', but he does not think that it is necessary to have 
such definitions. He believes that it is enough to point out that there must be such 
a thing as physical and mental good health in terms of effective integrated 
functioning even though we cannot yet say what it amounts to.929 He also claims 
that he is not presupposing, and does not have to presuppose, a particular concept 
of the good.930  
                                                
925 Johnson uses the even shorter term ‘wellbeing’. Rolston in turn uses the term biological interests. 
926 Leopold 1970 p.258 
927 Johnson 1991 pp.143f 
928 Johnson 1991 p.133. See also pp.141f, 145 
929 Johnson 1991 p.144 
930 Johnson 1991 p.145 
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I am not convinced by Johnson’s guarantees that it is not necessary to 
present any fully developed definitions of ‘effective’ or of ‘functioning’. He 
might not need any exact definitions, but he needs to tell us how to recognise 
effective functioning, and he needs to convince us that it is possible to define 
effective functioning in a way that is independent of any perspective of sentient 
beings. Both terms ‘effective’ and ‘functioning’ seem to be of an instrumental 
nature. To say that something is functioning better or worse normally assumes 
that it is functioning better or worse in relation to some goal. The same seems to 
be the case with ‘effective’. If we say that something is effective, we usually 
assume some kind of goal that it is effective as a means to. I therefore believe 
that if someone (like Johnson) sees effective functioning as an interest in its own 
right, we are entitled to some explanation of what that means. 
Johnson’s main argument for seeing biological wellbeing as an interest is 
negative. In the previous two sub-sections we have seen that he dismisses both 
experiences and preferences as the sole types of interest. When we discussed 
experiences above, we concluded that he is probably right that not all interests 
can be reduced to experiences. The main argument for that was in the form of 
Nozick’s experience machine. On the other hand, it is only fair to ask whether 
Johnson’s alternative answer in the form of biological wellbeing would fare any 
better in that respect. Samuelsson does not think so. He points out that we could 
modify the experience machine so that it also takes care of our bodily needs. One 
machine can provide our bodies with nourishment and exercise, etc. while 
another machine stimulates our brains with experiences.931 This shows that not all 
interests can be reduced to biological wellbeing of experiences. Johnson does not 
claim that all interests can be reduced in this way. He acknowledges that 
organisms with preferences also have preferential preferences, but he does 
maintain that in a case of conflict, biological wellbeing overrules desires. 932 This 
seems to imply that if we follow Johnson and if Samuelsson’s improvement of 
the experience machine is so good that our bodily functions would be better 
taken care of by the machine than by us (which does not seem too far-fetched), it 
would actually be irrational not to be hooked up to the machine. 
Johnson’s main argument for concluding that not all interests can be in the 
form of preferences was that it is sometimes bad for people to have a certain 
preference or set of preferences satisfied. He therefore concludes that there must 
be some other type of interest that is even more basic than experiences and 
preferences. He claims that while the interests of sentient beings in some 
instances are in the form of sentient desires or preferences, or at least are 
influenced by our sentient choices, some preferences are just indicators of 
something else that is really in our interest – indicators that sometimes are 
accurate but sometimes are deeply mistaken. Other interests in turn have no 
relation at all to our sentience.933 The only thing that, according to Johnson, can 
constitute these non-preferential, non-experiential interests is our biological 
                                                
931 Samuelsson 2008 pp.132f 
932 Johnson 1991 pp.108ff 
933 Johnson 1991 pp.6, 106f, 109, 113, 116f 
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wellbeing,934 or as he also describes it: What is good for us – whether we desire it 
or not.935 
As we saw in the previous sub-section, however, Johnson’s conclusion 
regarding preferences was premature. We found several alternative explanations 
why it is sometimes bad for us to have a preference or set of preferences satisfied 
– explanations that themselves were based on preferences. We therefore 
concluded that even though it is sometimes bad for us to have certain preferences 
satisfied, it is bad because of other preferences. Preferentialism, therefore, does 
not leave the void that Johnson relies on. In order to establish that there are other 
types of interest that do not presuppose sentience, the ecocentrists therefore need 
other independent arguments. 
That there must be something else behind our preferences and that this 
something makes up the real interests is a track that also Bruce Morito has 
explored. He argues that the fact that our food preferences are directed at the 
things our bodies need shows that our interests are decided by our biological 
needs. Horses, for instance, are not attracted to meat and we are not attracted to 
hay.936 He also points out that pain teaches us about how to comply with our 
basic needs – so obviously it is the basic needs and not the pain that are 
important.937 
This is not enough to prove that our real interests are to be found in our 
biological functions, however. It only informs us about the evolutionary 
background of our interests. It does not tell us that our biological functions are 
interests in themselves whether we care about them or not, or whether they have 
any instrumental import to our preferences or not. Neither does it tell us that 
biological functions in beings that do not have any preferences can be interests. 
Using the word ‘needs’, as Morito does, is very suggestive. It seems 
intuitively obvious that if anything is in our interests, it is to satisfy our needs. 
‘Needs’ is a very slippery term, however. I suspect that when we usually talk 
about our needs and the importance of having them satisfied we are talking about 
things that have a high degree of instrumental value for many or maybe all of our 
preferences. Food, as Morito mentions, is very instrumentally valuable, and I 
cannot imagine how food could have value that cannot be referred to a 
preferential value or to some function that is instrumentally important for one or 
more of our preferences. Neither has Morito presented any value of food that 
cannot in the end be referred to preference satisfaction – for humans or horses. 
The same goes for other basic bodily needs. 
Let us imagine a change of a bodily function of a sentient being that the 
being does not care about, and that does not have any effect on anything that he 
or any other sentient being cares about. In what way is it then important? Is it 
even comprehensible to talk about it as important? 
                                                
934 Johnson 1991 pp.109, 114. Johnson uses the term ‘wellbeing’ only in relation to our biological 
functioning. 
935 Johnson 1991 p.98 
936 Morito 1993 p.58 
937 Morito 1993 p.62 
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Just like Johnson, Val Plumwood also claims that health can and should be 
defined in purely biological non-preferential terms. She argues that it is 
impossible to define the health of inner organs without referring to the function 
of the organism. If our bodily functions were to change in such a way that our 
bodies would need a kidney that works in a totally different way from how 
kidneys we consider healthy work today, then our criteria for a healthy kidney 
would change accordingly.938 
That is probably true, but the explanation for that in turn must reasonably 
be interpreted in terms of our preferences. It is necessary for most of our 
preferences that our bodies work in a certain way, which includes that our 
kidneys fulfil certain functions. On the other hand, if our bodily functions were to 
change in a way that does not in any way affect our preferences, would it then 
still be in our interest that the kidneys adapt to the new body functions? 
Some environmental policy texts as well as some biological texts do talk 
about ecosystem health.939 It is seldom made clear what that means, however. 
One article tells us that: “Ecosystem health is determined by biophysical criteria, 
including system structures and functions.”940 Nothing in this text indicates that 
this definition is independent of the perspective of sentient beings. On the 
contrary, it seems quite clear that the author is talking from the perspective of a 
biologist who likes to study nature. The same seems to be true of other such 
texts. In policy texts, it is equally clear (at least) that the health of the natural 
systems is defined from an anthropocentric instrumental perspective. 
Another attempt to define wellbeing (or welfare) by the help of biological 
functioning is presented by Donald M. Broom. He defines the welfare of an 
individual as “its state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment”.941 
Feelings are, according to him, important and have to be included in his 
definition of welfare, but that is not all.942 He also wants to include “behaviour, 
physiology, brain functioning, immune system functioning, pathology, injury, 
and life expectancy”.943 Some measurements of welfare, like immune system 
function, may, according to Broom, not have anything at all to do with 
feelings.944 
Broom is, in ethical terms, best described as an ‘animal welfarist’, but his 
definition seems to open the possibility that also other entities can have moral 
standing. Can it be of any help to the ecocentrists? A problem with his definition 
of welfare is that it, just like Johnson’s is very obscure. What does it mean to 
cope with one’s environment? Is it only about survival or does it mean something 
more? Another problem is that Broom has not explained why the kind of welfare 
he talks about is relevant. Considering, however, that Broom believes that it is 
                                                
938 Plumwood 1991 p.146 
939 Farber 2000 p.s492 
940 Farber 2000 p.s492 
941 Broom 1998 p.394 
942 Broom 1998 p.394 
943 Broom 1998 p.394 
944 Broom 1998 p.397 
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only meaningful to talk about the welfare of individual animals,945 and that he is 
working with animal welfare from a veterinarian perspective, we can expect that 
in spite of the seemingly ecocentric approach, he implicitly assumes that the 
things he mentions are relevant because they are (instrumentally) important for 
satisfying the preferences of the animals in question. Interpreted in that way they 
make much more sense than as interests in their own right. Broom’s aim is to 
identify the things we should consider in practical animal care. Animals are not 
as good as we are at expressing their preferences in words, and feelings are not 
easy to measure and interpret. This means that in practice we often have to rely 
on behavioural and physical indicators. However, it is still important to 
remember that we are talking about indicators, not about the interest in itself. I 
therefore suspect that ‘welfare’ as it is used by Broom should not be confused 
with the ‘interests’ we talk about here. The kind of welfare Broom talks about 
can be a reasonable aim for practical animal care because it is reasonably 
measurable and a reasonable indicator of real interests, but it cannot be used as a 
form of interests in itself. If we see coping with the environment as an 
independent form of interest, we cannot, in fact, even motivate why we should 
exclude mechanical constructions or other human constructs like nations. 
Rolston provides his own version of the idea of interests as biological 
wellbeing. He distinguishes between psychological interests and biological 
interests, where the former are about experiences, while the latter are about what 
is needed to stay alive.946 
This version has the advantage that it is simpler and clearer than Johnson’s. 
It is not clear, however, why staying alive is relevant if it is not connected to any 
preference of the entity in question, or is at least an instrumental prerequisite for 
preferences to be fulfilled. We are still in need of an explanation how something 
can be in someone’s interest without being subjectively good from the 
perspective of that someone. It is one thing that staying alive is, in general, 
instrumentally important for fulfilling real interests, but why is it an interest of its 
own? 
Rolston refers to ground squirrels who take junk food from tourists as an 
example of how a psychological interest can be detrimental to ones biological 
interests.947 This example cannot in itself be seen as an argument that biological 
wellbeing is an interest in itself, however.  It might still be the case that satisfying 
the interest for junk food is bad for the squirrels because the resulting bad health 
will frustrate other interests that together are stronger than the preference for junk 
food. It is thus perfectly compatible with the purely preferential explanations 
presented in the previous sub-section for why it can be bad for someone to have 
certain preferences satisfied. We are still in need of an example of how biological 
health can be an interest even when it is not a prerequisite for the satisfaction of 
preferential interests. 
                                                
945 Broom 1998 p.394 
946 Rolston 1988 p.52 He also talks about “genetically based preferences” (Rolston 1988 p.109). 
947 Rolston 1988 p.52 
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It is also unclear why staying alive in a biological meaning is relevantly 
different from other forms of continued existence. Why is not the maintenance 
and fuel needed for machines to continue working an interest of the machine? 
Elliott Sober has, for example, argued that if we, by a need, just mean something 
that is necessary for continued existence, then species have needs only in the 
same sense as things like cars and buildings have needs.948 
This question is even more pressing since Rolston is talking about the 
continued existence of species, which is already a widening of what we normally 
mean by ‘staying alive’. 
Rolston’s distinction between psychological and biological interests looks a 
lot like Tom Regan’s distinction between preference-interests and welfare-
interests. Regan does not want to include welfare-interests in the category of 
morally relevant interests, however. According to him, “we can make sense of 
saying that cars and flowers need water without implying that they desire it.”949 
According to Regan, animals – including humans – have needs of the same type 
as cars and flowers, but contrary to cars and flowers, animals also have 
psychological and social needs.950 What seems to be the key difference, however, 
is that animals have preferences: 
 
Like flowers, animals have a basic biological need for water and 
nourishment; but like us, and in this respect unlike flowers, they prefer to 
have these needs satisfied rather than unsatisfied.951 
 
Singer makes a similar point. He argues that a tree has an interest in water 
only in the sense that it needs it in order to survive and grow. To see that as an 
interest in a moral sense would, according to him, be almost like saying that 
lubrication is in the interest of a car because it needs it to run.952 
Ecocentrists deny that interests have to be in the form of preferences, but at 
the same time they do not want to grant moral standing to cars.  They therefore 
owe us an explanation why things needed to uphold the functions of an entity or 
a system can constitute interests in some cases (living beings, species and 
ecosystems) and not in others (e.g. cars). 
Mark Bernstein argues that if we say that something has wellbeing, it must 
be intelligible for us what it means. Otherwise it will just become an Alice-in-
Wonderland-type word game.953 He even goes (what I perceive as) one step 
further and argues that the harm or benefit must be “analogous or comparable to 
                                                
948 Sober 1986 p.184 
949 Regan, Tom 1983 pp.88f 
950 Regan, Tom 1983 p.90. It is somehow difficult to imagine solitary animals having social needs, but on 
the other hand, even these animals have occasional interactions with other members of its species: They 
sometimes fight off competitors, males and females sometimes meet if only to propagate, and most 
mammals (as we are talking about here) take care of their offspring for a period of time. 
951 Regan, Tom 1983 p.89 
952 Singer 1979 p.195 
953 Bernstein 1998 pp.48ff 
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our own harms and benefits.” Otherwise we will, according to Bernstein, never 
be able to recognise it as harm or benefit.954 
He admits that it is problematic to claim that the question of another being’s 
properties should depend on what we are able to understand. He defends his 
position by pointing out that he is not claiming anything ontological, but rather 
that a statement needs to be intelligible for us in order for us to be able to relate 
emphatically to it.955 
This sounds a lot like the statement that we cannot have positive duties to 
human beings far into the future because we will not be able to psychologically 
handle such a claim. When we discussed that statement in sub-section 4.1.4, I 
argued that it must be enough that we can intellectually understand that they have 
certain interests. The same should be the case when we talk about the interests of 
species. That the interests we are talking about here are too different from our 
normal preferential interests to be able to identify with them or relate 
emphatically to them should not be an excuse not to consider them, as long as it 
is intellectually possible to understand that there are such interests. The problem 
is that it does not seem to be possible to make sense intellectually of how the 
biological needs or effective functioning we are talking about can be interests for 
those that have them – other than in the form of preferences or as something that 
has instrumental value in relation to these preferences. 
Let us return to Bernstein. He points out a possible solution to the problem 
in the form of analogies. Those who claim that non-sentient entities have 
wellbeing can argue that trees, for instance, have living functions like we do. If 
one of our body functions is wounded it would make us worse off so we can, by 
analogy, make sense of the statement that a wound of a root of a tree makes the 
tree worse off.956 
Bernstein’s own answer is that this analogy would also work for machines, 
and he does not believe that anyone would agree that a machine has wellbeing.957 
It looks, in other words, like we are back at the same problem we encountered 
above. 
Considering how evolution actually works there is also a general problem 
for the idea that our biological functions or needs constitute interests as such. Our 
biological functions are actually a result of what worked for our forefathers: That 
I prefer not to be hungry is not literally because nourishment is important for my 
biological functions but because it was important for the biological functions of 
my forefathers. This makes it even harder to understand how my biological 
functions can be what constitutes my interests. 
Paternalism is something that all moral theories have to deal with 
independently of what constitutes the interests of the moral objects. It is, 
however, particularly problematic when we base interests on something other 
than preferences. If we assume that there are other interests such as biologic 
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wellbeing, and that these interests sometimes collide with our preferences, it is 
quite possible that in some cases someone else than the being that has the interest 
is the best judge of what is in the interest-bearer’s interest. 
Johnson admits that this is a problem,958 and he points out that even if we 
build our theory around wellbeing we must — for the sake of their wellbeing — 
base our practical considerations on their preferences (if they have preferences). 
This is both because people, according to Johnson, in most cases probably are the 
best judges of what is good for them, because it is important for them to be 
accepted as the best judges of their own interests, and because we need to avoid 
people promoting their own interests while claiming to promote someone else’s. 
According to Johnson, this is not a restriction of his theory. It is just a practical 
application of the theory built on wellbeing. We should not, according to him, let 
this kind of practical considerations define the concept of interest.959 
It seems that things are a little more complicated than Johnson indicates 
here, however. He acknowledges that people should be allowed to make their 
own decisions, but he also makes it very clear that there is a limit. If it is clear 
that someone goes against her biological wellbeing, Johnson thinks, to a large 
extent, it is proper to declare the person in question mentally incompetent, and he 
is quite explicit that in a conflict between preferences and biological wellbeing 
only the latter counts.960 This in turn means that his attempt to avoid the 
suspicion that his theory invites to paternalism does not make it all the way to the 
main target of the suspicion. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.6. Self-definition and self-maintenance 
 
One of the major problems with Johnson’s, Rolston’s and Morito’s attempt to 
explain how biological wellbeing can be an interest is that their suggestions can 
be applicable to many other things than species and living beings. Johnson’s way 
of dealing with that problem is to add another criteria viz. self-definition. The 
argument goes like this: When we say, for example, that a machine is harmed we 
assume that the machine has a certain role that we have defined, and it is relative 
to that role that it has been harmed. Something harms a tractor given its identity 
as a tractor if it, as a result, becomes less good at performing its task as a tractor 
– as defined by the owner or constructor of the tractor. If someone decides to 
take a tractor and make it into a work of art, it might be that exposing the tractor 
to things that would harm it as a tractor, would improve it as a work of art. Even 
in this case, its identity is decided by someone outside of the tractor. The 
question of whether we want to regard it as a tractor or as a piece of art is entirely 
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960 Johnson 1991 pp.108ff 
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up to us. Were this object to turn up as a "freak of nature" on an uninhibited 
planet, it would just be an object and it would be meaningless to talk about it as 
harmed or benefited. 961 
This looks somewhat like my explanation above for why computers cannot 
have interests. There is a relevant difference, however. I did not talk about the 
identity of the computer or about who has defined it. I was talking about the 
perspective from which it was harmed. Only sentient beings can have 
perspectives, but how about definitions? Can species and non-sentient life forms 
define their own identity in a way that machines cannot, and is it morally relevant 
whether they can? 
Johnson answers both these questions in the affirmative.962 Living beings 
including species and ecosystems can, according to Johnson, have assigned 
identities just like tractors, but they also define their own identities.963 Living 
things have optimal states that constitute their interests and that are defined by 
the entity itself. 964 On the question of what gives living organisms their identity, 
Johnson uses several expressions. He tells us that an organism is “a process 
which hangs together. It maintains itself in a fluctuating environment which, 
unless countered, would terminate it.”965 He also uses phrases like “ongoing 
coherent organic whole, a thing-process, with past, present, and orientation and 
drive toward the future”,966 “integrated wholeness” or “organic unity” which in 
turn means that “its character is an integrated expression of its subsidiary 
system.”967 
What does all this mean? Johnson gives us an example: Living beings 
control their body temperature and the control methods are “integral features” of 
the system. This is not the case with mere things. Refrigerators, for example, also 
control their temperature, but only thanks to a thermostat that is not an integrated 
part of their identity as refrigerators (a refrigerator without a thermostat would 
still be a refrigerator), and the thermostats in turn are controlled by an exterior 
will (ours).968 
It is true that a refrigerator without a thermostat is still a refrigerator, but 
what if we instead used the thermostat as our example? A ‘thermostat’ that does 
not regulate temperature is not a thermostat. Johnson could avoid this problem by 
pointing out that the thermostat is still controlled by an exterior will and it was 
constructed and manufactured in order to fulfil a role decided by someone 
outside of the thermostat. 
If he uses this way out he might well go from bad to worse, however. This 
solution implies that the way something actually works is not enough to decide 
whether it is self-identifying in Johnson’s terminology. If a thermostat were to 
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turn up on an uninhabited planet as a “freak of nature” Johnson would probably 
say that, like with the tractor, it would not be meaningful to talk about it in terms 
of benefit and harm. Such a thermostat is self-regulating, and contrary to the 
thermostat in my refrigerator, it is not controlled by or constructed and 
manufactured in accordance with the will of someone else. Why then is it not a 
self-defining entity with its own interests and moral standing? Apparently it is 
not enough not to be controlled by, or constructed and manufactured in 
accordance with an exterior will in order to have interests. Maybe it is necessary 
to have a will of one’s own? That suggestion sounds reasonable, but would of 
course be devastating for Johnson’s theory since it would take us back to sentient 
beings as the only entities with interests. Plants and species do not have a will, so 
why are they not just “freaks of nature” about whom it would be meaningless to 
talk about benefits and harms if there were no sentient beings around? 
Johnson has another suggestion for how something can define its own 
identity – an answer that does not presuppose sentience. The key concept here is 
self-maintaining.969 A living organism can, according to this view, be seen as a 
process that maintains itself against an environment that would otherwise destroy 
it.970 This in turn is, according to Johnson, the main interest of living beings.971 
He also claims that this characterization is applicable to both species and 
ecosystems,972 and it gives them “interests in their own right.”973 
One might question whether there is no self-maintenance to be found in 
other things than those Johnson wants to pick out as moral objects. Janna 
Thompson, for instance, argues that “virtually anything can be regarded as a self-
contained system … be it a liver, a molecule, or a solar system”.974 
One might also question whether species and ecosystems really work to 
maintain themselves. It seems more reasonable to say that they are the result of 
what the individuals do. 
Finally one might question whether self-maintenance is sufficient for 
having interests. 
When Johnson discusses ecosystems he asks whether “some things go on in 
an ecosystem because their going on serves to maintain the ecosystem”.975  
Apparently he believes that the answer to this question is yes, and that it is an 
argument in favour of his thesis. Maybe this can be a clue to how he imagines 
that species can have interests in virtue of being self-maintaining. 
In a way, I think the answer to Johnson’s question is yes. Things do go on, 
both in ecosystems and in species, because they as a matter of fact maintain the 
system or the species in the meaning that if all or most processes that went on 
were pernicious to the system, then the system would crash and take the process 
in question with it in the fall. Therefore, if we interpret the sentence in a rather 
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broad, but certainly possible way, and take it to mean something like 'some 
things go on in an ecosystem because they happen to maintain the system', then 
the answer is yes. If Johnson means something stronger than that, regrettably the 
answer has to be no. 
The trouble is to show that this kind of maintenance constitutes an interest. 
It is very doubtful whether a totally blind, unintentional process can be seen as 
manifesting an interest, and it is even more doubtful that such a process can be 
seen as an interest in spite of the fact that the system behind the process does not 
care about the result – i.e. it does not have any point of view from which it is 
good or bad that the process leads to a certain result. This is still the key 
question, and we still lack a good answer. Even if species are self-identifying by 
being self-maintaining in the way Johnson claims ecosystems to be, he has not 
yet showed that they care about their existence. That a process is upholding itself 
in a way that is defined by the process is fascinating, but it is still nothing but a 
blind process. I cannot see that Johnson has showed that there is anything that 
can be seen as a point of view of the species from which things that happen to it 
can be good or bad. If an external force causes the process to deviate from its 
self-identified optimal state then … well then what? Why is that a bad thing for 
the process? It is different but why is it bad? The process might end but again – 
that is different but why is it bad? 
Self-maintaining is also a key element for Rolston. He argues that when 
organisms utilise resources in their environment they do it because they value 
themselves intrinsically. This is also the case with species. To defend the species 
is according to Rolston “to defend a form of life as an end in itself.”976 He does 
not clearly spell out how his examples with a warbler who eats insects “and 
makes more warblers as she can”, and falcons who eat warblers,977 are cases of 
species defending themselves rather than individual organisms defending acting 
in certain ways that have the effect that the species is maintained. 
Just like Johnson, Rolston points out that the identity and goal of a machine 
is defined by human beings.978 Machines are not “self-generating” or “self-
defending”, and therefore they do not have what Rolston calls a good-of-its-
kind.979 An organism on the other hand defends its own life as a-good-of-its-
kind.980 It does that based on the defining information of the genetic code, which 
has a very special status in Rolston’s theory. The genetic code is what 
distinguishes living processes from machines,981 and it is what gives organisms 
and species their telos. The information stored in our DNA is thus not just a 
descriptive, but also a prescriptive code, and according to Rolston, the genetic 
information belongs to the species at least as much as it belongs to the 
individual.982 
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It is true that only living beings have genes, and it does not seem unreasonable to 
confer the genetic code to the species as well as to the individual organisms. This 
means that we have a way of sorting out the kinds of things to which ecocentrists 
want to assign moral standing from things like computers, guided missiles and 
thermostats. The question is whether this difference – the possession of DNA – 
can serve as a basis for interests. I must admit that I have big problems in seeing 
DNA as a teleological molecule. DNA is a catalyst of chemical processes in 
living organisms but it is not fundamentally different from other molecules, and 
it is very difficult to see how it can be a bridge between what actually happens in 
an organism and what is valuable or morally required. DNA-molecules just do 
what DNA-molecules do, and they have no point of view from which things can 
go good or bad. At least, I cannot see that Rolston has established anything of the 
kind. I can therefore not see that Rolston’s attempt would be any more successful 
than Johnson’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.7. Goal-direction and potential 
 
Several ecocentrists claim that species are goal directed, and see this as a proof 
that species have interests: Since species tend to behave and evolve in a certain 
direction, they can be said to have some kind of built in goal. This goal is, 
according to the ecocentrists, a form of interest for species and moral concern for 
the species ought to be in the form of concern about that goal. 
Two questions present themselves here: Are species goal-directed, and is 
goal-directedness an interest? 
Harley Cahen answers the second question with a yes but the first with a 
no.983 The explanation for the yes is that he believes that goal directedness can 
play the same role as sentience for pointing out what is good from the 
“standpoint” of the entity in question.984 
The explanation of the ‘no’ is that he believes that what looks like goal-
directedness is just the result of a goal-directedness in the organisms.985 The only 
way a species or an ecosystem could be goal-directed, according to Cahen, is if 
group selection is true – something he does not believe.986 
I think there is another problem with the claim that species are goal-
directed, viz. that it is a basic tenet of evolutionary theory that evolution has no 
goal or even direction. It is not the case that a certain species always evolves in a 
particular direction. The evolution of species is decided by what happens to take 
place in the genes of the individuals together with a selection pressure from the 
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environment – and the environment constantly changes. A property that increases 
the fitness of the organisms of a certain species in a certain environment at a 
certain period may in another environment or another period decrease the fitness 
of the organisms that possess it. We cannot know today what properties will be 
fitness-increasing tomorrow. In some cases features first evolve and then 
disappear. 
It might be possible to avoid this problem by not including direction in the 
definition of goal-directedness. We may then say that even though evolution 
always changes direction it is still evolution. Species constantly adapt to the 
environment and are therefore goal-directed. This is a very weak notion of goal-
directedness, however, and it is unclear how this can constitute an interest. 
Direction is in fact not the only thing, or the most crucial, that we have to 
exclude in order to be able to say that species are goal-directed. We also have to 
exclude intentionality and motivation in the form of expected results valued from 
the subjective perspective of the goal-directed entity. Maybe it is possible to talk 
about goal-directedness without direction and without intentionality, but these 
concessions make it very hard to see goal-directedness as interests. 
We might be able to claim a connection between goal-directedness and 
interests, and we might be able to say that species are goal-directed. We just do 
not seem to be able to do these things simultaneously. I.e. we do not seem to be 
able to claim that species are goal-directed and that goal-directedness signifies 
interests according to the same definition of ‘goal-directedness’. 
Rolston does not believe that the evolution of species is just about blind 
forces. According to him, species have a telos.987 He does not claim that there is a 
conscious power behind what happens in nature but that the telos is coded in the 
genes, and that the genes belong as much to the species as to the individual.988 
The species runs, according to Rolston, “a telic course through the environment, 
using individuals resourcefully to maintain its course over much longer periods 
of time.”989 
It is quite difficult to understand exactly what Rolston means by this. In 
particular it is difficult to understand in what way this gives the species a 
perspective from which things can be good or bad, on a basis of which we can 
have a duty to things for the sake of the species. 
Val Plumwood also reasons in teleological terms. She argues that we should 
respect things that have “a teleology, a goal, an end, or direction to which it tends 
or for which it strives, and which is its own.”990 To be sentient is not necessary, 
according to Plumwood, since things do make a difference to teleological entities 
even if they are not sentient.991 It is unclear exactly what she means by that, 
however. It is quite obvious that entities that are not sentient can be affected in an 
objective meaning by what happens to them even if they are not teleological or 
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goal-directed, so she must reasonably mean something more. On the other hand, 
she does not believe that things matter “to” something unless it is conscious.992 
If nothing matters to an entity, how can we then have a moral duty to do or 
not do certain things for the sake of that entity? 
Janna Thompson argues against the idea that goal-directedness can 
constitute an interest by pointing out that some machines too, are goal-directed. 
This is basically the same analogy with machines as was used to criticise the idea 
that interests could be in the form of self-identification and self-maintenance. She 
takes it one step further, however, in order to get around the objection that the 
goals of machines but not of species are decided by humans. What she says is 
that even though it is human beings who decide the purpose of machines, the 
machines have their own way of running things and we often have to adapt our 
goals to fit how the machines work. Sometimes, we also find new goals when we 
realise what a machine can do.993 She therefore argues that if we consider goal-
directedness an interest, we can say that the good of a machine is decided by how 
the machine works.994 
Plumwood does not accept Thompson’s argument. She argues that the 
potentials and purposes of machines are still built into them by their human 
constructors, and not by themselves.995 Samuelsson argues along the same lines 
and points out that the new goals we adopt as a result of how the machine works 
are still not a goal of the machine, only an accidental result of how we 
constructed the machine.996 
In a way they are both correct. Even if we find new goals for a machine 
when we see how it works, it works the way it does because of how we built it – 
even though that is not necessarily in accordance with how we intended it to 
work. It is also the case that even if the machine actually accomplishes certain 
things we had not expected, these things do not become goals until we say they 
are. If they do not fit our interests we are not going to see them as new goals. 
Instead we will try to change the machine. Natural non-sentient entities like 
species do not work the way they do because we have built them in a certain 
way. On the other hand, no one has built them to work the way they do. Should 
we then not say that they do not have any goals at all? The fact that no one 
outside the entity has given it a goal does not automatically mean that it has 
given itself a goal even if it, as a matter of fact, has certain tendencies. Helm 
sums up the problem well. He emphasises the importance of distinguishing 
between desires and mere goal-directedness.997 His point seems to be that the 
latter cannot be seen as a substitute for the former. Mere goal-directedness is, 
according to him, just dispositions, whereas desires are motivations in their own 
right because they are implicitly evaluative.998 
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Another way of trying to find a telos in non-sentient entities is in terms of 
their potential. We can say that a species or an organism does not just have a 
tendency to move in a certain direction, but that it has a built-in potential to do it 
and that the goal of the entity in question is decided by its potential. This might 
be a way of explaining the telos that Rolston and Plumwood talk about: A 
species has a telos in the form of a potential that is built into, for example, the 
genetic code of its organisms. Christian Munthe discusses potentiality in non-
sentient beings but he is not convinced that it can constitute an interest. He 
objects that the environment in which an organism lives is also important for the 
way the organism develops. A particular organism would for instance live longer 
in one kind of environment than in another. 999 One might say that the organism 
has both the potential to live long and to die young. Which potential that 
becomes instantiated depends on the environment. When the environment 
changes, another potential comes to the foreground. If we step in and change the 
environment in such a way that the organism dies earlier than it would do 
otherwise, why is that an interference in the potential of the organism rather than 
just a change of which potential becomes instantiated? 
To this one could answer that the environment is not an inherent part of the 
organism the way its genes are. It is true that the organisms alive today have a 
certain genetic makeup because this makeup was well adapted to the 
environment in which their forefathers lived, so the environment took part in the 
shaping of the potential of the organism anyway, but that shaping did not work 
on that organism but on its forefathers. On the other hand, that still means that 
the potential of the organism is not decided by that organism. It was decided by 
its forefathers and the environment in which they lived. 
If we talk about species instead of individual organisms the objection 
becomes even stronger. A species lives much longer than individual organisms, 
and it changes, as pointed out by the ecocentrists, by its environment. So again, 
why should human-induced changes not count as changes of what potential of 
the species that becomes instantiated rather than as an interference of the 
potential of the species? 
Elliott Sober presents two other arguments against the idea that species and 
other natural objects have interests in the form of potentiality, or as he calls it, 
“natural inclinations.” He points out that even if it is possible to say that a 
mountain will continue to be unexploited if no one interferes, it is equally 
possible to say that the mountain will become exploited if no one interferes in the 
developing plans.1000 He also points out that most species that have existed have 
gone extinct, so if we base our concept of what it means to want something in 
terms of natural tendencies, maybe we would have to say that extinction is what 
species want.1001 
Both these objections are serious and in need of an answer from the 
ecocentrists. If we see natural inclinations, tendencies, potentials, etc. as 
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interests, how do we know how to sort the real interests out from the inclinations, 
tendencies and potentials that go against the interests of the organisms or the 
species? 
It seems that we have to finish not just this sub-section but the entire section 
by concluding that we have not managed to find any answer that does not 
presuppose sentience to the question of what constitutes an interest. This in turn 
means that we have to conclude the entire chapter by acknowledging that we 
have not found any way in which species can have interests in their own right, 
and therefore there is no way in which we can claim that we have moral duties to 
preserve species for the sake of the species themselves. 
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7. Intrinsic value 
 
Ecocentrists often talk about species as having intrinsic value, and they typically 
contrast this view with anthropocentric instrumentalism (that they invariably just 
call “anthropocentrism”). In general, they seem to assume that these ideas are the 
only alternative answers to our question, and that thery are two distinct and 
contradictory answers: Either species have intrinsic value, or species have merely 
instrumental value for human beings. 
It is not obvious, however, either that we are dealing with just two 
alternatives, or that intrinsic value and human-based value are necessarily 
contradictory. In the next chapter we will look at a non-anthropocentric form of 
instrumentalism. In this chapter we will see that the value of species for human 
beings does not have to be only of the instrumental kind. 
I will start by looking a little closer at the term ‘intrinsic value’. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Different meanings of ‘intrinsic value’ 
 
The term ‘intrinsic value’ seems, at a closer look, to harbour not just one but 
several different types of value. If we look at the philosophical literature we will 
in fact find that the term is used in several very different ways.1002 Even among 
ecocentrists the term is used in different ways. Some philosophers (not just 
ecocentrists) also add to the confusion by conflating different senses of the term. 
Other philosophers have tried to lessen the confusion by distinguishing between 
different senses of ‘intrinsic value’: John O’Neill distinguishes between three 
meanings of ‘intrinsic value’: (1) Non-instrumental value, (2) the value 
something has because of its non-relational properties, and (3) objective 
value.1003 Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen distinguish between 
two senses of intrinsic value: (1) Final value, and (2) the value something has in 
virtue of its internal features.1004 Val Plumwood also distinguishes between two 
senses: (1) Non-instrumental value, and (2) objective value.1005 Tom Regan 
distinguishes between: (1) Moral standing, and (2) non-instrumental value.1006 
Rick O’Neil distinguishes between three senses: (1) Non-instrumental value, (2) 
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objective value, and (3) moral standing.1007 Dale Jamieson also distinguishes 
between three senses: (1) Value due to intrinsic properties, (2) moral standing, 
and (3) subjective non-instrumental value.1008 
These authors have different opinions about which of their definitions 
should really be called ‘intrinsic value’. I will not take a stand in that discussion. 
My aim is to figure out in what way it is morally wrong to contribute to 
extinction. I will therefore concentrate on whether species can have a value that 
is neither in the form of moral standing, nor instrumental value for other human 
beings, but that can help answer our question. What this value should be called is 
less important. I will, however, try to be as transparent as possible in my 
terminology. I will therefore avoid the term ‘intrinsic value’ and instead try to 
use more descriptive terminology in the following discussion. 
The distinctions made by the different authors listed above overlap to a 
great deal but not totally. It is possible to find at least five different meanings of 
‘intrinsic value’ in the list above (in some cases it is not altogether clear whether 
the authors mean the same thing): (I) Value as an end rather than as a means to 
something else,1009 (II) The value something has due to its internal properties, 
(III) The value something has due to its non-relational properties, (IV) Value that 
is independent of a valuer,1010 and (V) Moral standing. In environmental ethics, 
‘intrinsic value’ is used primarily in three of the senses mentioned above, viz. (I), 
(IV) and (V). These are therefore the three types of intrinsic value I will 
concentrate on.1011 
These three definitions of intrinsic value – value as an end, objective value 
and moral standing – are not just different ways of saying the same thing, but 
three genuinely different concepts. To claim that something has end value is to 
say that it has value independently of whether it promotes some other value. To 
say that something has objective value is to say that it has value independently of 
whether it is valued, and to say that something has moral standing is to say that 
moral agents have a duty to consider its interests. Claiming or denying one of 
these things does not compel us to claim or deny any of the other. 
Even so, conflation is common – not least among ecocentrists. In particular, 
this is the case with Rolston who frequently conflates all three of these senses.1012 
In at least one instance he apparently mixes all of the first four senses mentioned 
in the list above: When discusses whether value is in the valued object or in the 
mind of the valuer, he concludes that if it is in the mind of the valuer it is the 
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valuer who has value, not the valued object.1013 Clearly this is a case of confusing 
the question of whether something has objective value with the question of 
whether it has end value. For Rolston this conflation is apparently not just an 
oversight. He is clearly aware that other authors have assigned subjective end 
value to objects in nature.1014 He even acknowledges it as a step in the right 
direction compared to anthropocentric instrumentalism. He admits that referring 
to the subjective end value of nature “affords enormously more environmental 
respect and protection than weaker theories.”1015 He does not believe that it is 
enough, however, and he also believes that it is philosophically questionable to 
talk about intrinsic value in this way. His argument for the latter claim is that if 
the value emerges in the relation between the valued object and the valuer, the 
value does not exist in the valued object and is therefore not really intrinsic 
value.1016 For Rolston it is important that the intrinsic value is located in the 
object and not in the person who values.1017 
Here, it looks like Rolston is invoking one or possibly two other definitions 
of intrinsic value from my list above – viz. (II) the value something has in virtue 
of its internal properties and/or (III) the value something has in virtue of its non-
relational properties – in order to show a necessary connection between senses (I) 
and (IV). 
Linguistically he has a point. ‘Intrinsic’ seems more suitable for one of 
these two meanings than for any of the other three on the list.1018 This is just a 
matter of naming, however. The question of whether it is reasonable to call 
subjective end value ‘intrinsic’ does not in itself tell us anything about whether it 
is a reasonable position – which must reasonably be the more important question. 
Is there anything more to Rolston’s argument than linguistics? At first 
glance, the relation between objective value and internal or non-relational value 
that Rolston seems to assume looks quite clear. The term ‘objective value’, the 
way it is most often used in the environmental ethics debate means that the value 
is independent of external valuers. This is sometimes stated as value that is 
located in the object in question and not in the mind of an external valuer or in 
the relation between the object and an external valuer. It therefore looks like a 
value cannot be truly of type (II) or (III) if the value emerges from a valuer or in 
the relation between the object and the valuer. 
In the same way the relation between end value and internal or non-
relational value also looks solid. If we value something as an end rather than as a 
means to something else it seems that the valuable property must be internal in 
the object and not depending on its relation to any external objects or 
circumstances. 
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If we look at these two apparent connections together we reach the 
conclusion that something cannot be valuable in itself unless the value is 
objective. 
 As it turns out, however, both connections are illusions. To claim that 
something has objective value in the sense we are talking about here, is to claim 
that the value does not depend on a valuer that might be external to the object. 
This is not the same as saying that the value carrying property is not external. 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen point out that the constitutive base of value 
on the one hand, and the supervenience base on the other are two different things. 
They belong to two different disciplines – meta ethics and axiology respectively. 
If we argue for the possibility of subjective end value we have only claimed that 
the constitutive base of value is located in the valuer. The supervenience base 
might still be located in the valued object.1019 O’Neill essentially makes the same 
point. He distinguishes between the source and the object of value, and he also 
points out that the question of whether something has objective value is not a 
question of ethics, but of meta-ethics.1020 
This looks very reasonable. To say that something is valuable due to its 
internal or non-relational properties is not the same as saying that the value is in 
the object in the meaning that it is independent of an external valuer. It is 
possible to subjectively value something because of its internal properties or 
because of its non-relational properties, just as it is possible to subjectively value 
an object because of something external to the object or because of its relation to 
something else. If something can be valuable independently of valuers, there is in 
the same way no contradiction in saying that it has objective value due to 
something external to the object including its relations to something else. 
Whether something has end value also seems totally independent of 
whether the value giving properties are internal or external, and whether they are 
relational or non-relational. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen mention works 
of art that have non-instrumental value because of their relation with a certain 
artist, and different artefacts that are valuable because of their relation with a 
certain person, or a certain object or event. This is not a matter of instrumental 
value since we may value something because of its relation to someone or 
something, even if it is not a means to promote that thing.1021 
This can be stressed even further by noting that we can value something as 
an end because of its relation to something that we do not value or even attach 
negative value to. A soldier might attribute end value to the boots he wore during 
the war because of their connection to a very significant period in his life – even 
though he hated the period in question and wished he had never have had to 
experience it. 
To try to connect end value to objective value via connecting them both to 
internal and non-relational value must therefore be concluded to be unsuccessful. 
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The conflation of end value with objective value is not the only or possibly 
even the most problematic type of conflation. If we look at Rolston again, we can 
see that he also conflates end value with moral standing.1022 He claims, for 
instance, that according to the standard view of ethics, species cannot assign 
value to anything and therefore they do not have intrinsic value – only 
instrumental value – and therefore, in turn, we cannot have direct duties to 
them.1023 This is a conflation of end value and moral standing. That species 
cannot evaluate means that they have no interests, and therefore no moral 
standing in their own right. This does not mean that they cannot have value in a 
non-instrumental way e.g. by being valued by someone else as ends in 
themselves. 
Another illustrative example of this conflation provided by Rolston is when 
he asks why we assign intrinsic value only to subjective life while we only assign 
instrumental value to objective life.1024 Here again, he conflates end value with 
moral standing. In reality, nothing stops us from assigning end value to objective 
(i.e. non-sentient) life while assigning moral standing only to subjective (i.e. 
sentient) life. 
In the same way, Rolston asks: “Why not value the whole process with all 
its product organisms, rather than restrict valuing to the subjective aspect of the 
process?”1025 Again it seems that Rolston confuses 1. Demanding sentience when 
assigning moral standing, with 2. Valuing sentience 
I agree with O’Neil who points out that sentience is a 
 
criterion for moral significance not because states of consciousness have 
intrinsic value, but because there is no reason to consider x’s interests if x 
itself doesn’t care about those interests.1026 
 
That sentience is the criterion of moral standing is not because it is valuable 
(from any perspective including that of the sentient being in question – it might 
be but it does not have to be). It is because when someone has it, what happens to 
that someone becomes relevant for that someone. It seems to me that there is no 
contradiction in stating that a sentient organism can have moral standing due to 
the fact that things have value for that organism, and also state that the organism 
in question has no final value for anyone including itself – or the other way 
around.1027 Neither would there be any inconsistency in regretting the existence 
of sentience, but still acknowledge that all and only sentient beings have moral 
standing. That things can only have value to sentient beings means that only 
sentient beings can have moral standing. It does not mean that only sentient 
                                                
1022 See e.g. Rolston 1987 p.253, Rolston 1988 pp.190f, Rolston 1994 passim, and the following 
examples. 
1023 Rolston 1988 p.150 
1024 Rolston 1988 p.107 
1025 Rolston 1988 p.111 
1026 O’Neil 1997 p.52 
1027 If someone has no or negative end value for himself we can respect his moral standing by assisting his 
death. 
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beings can have value – not even that only sentient beings can have value as ends 
in themselves. That an object has moral standing has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the value of the object. What is relevant is instead whether things have value 
for that object. 
If we do not acknowledge the distinction between moral standing and end 
value we will get very confused in many valuing situations. We would, for 
instance, have to say about an ancient vase either that it cannot have any non-
instrumental value, or that it has moral standing. Both alternatives seem absurd. 
Regan illustrates the difference between end value and moral standing by 
pointing out that, according to mental state theories, the only thing that has value 
is mental states, though no one claims (and it would be a category mistake to do 
so) that mental states can be the objects of respect or duties.1028 This can be 
generalised beyond mental states. According to Regan, a painting can have end 
value but we cannot show respect for the beauty of a painting. He even finds the 
idea unintelligible. If anything we can show respect for the painter.1029 There is 
no necessary connection between the statement that X has end value, and the 
statement that we have duties to X.1030 
Rolston is not the only one who makes the mistake of conflating end value 
with moral standing. It actually seems to be a very common mistake – made by 
ecocentrists and non-ecocentrists alike.1031 Even ecocentrists who, like 
Plumwood and Callicott (in his later writings), explicitly deny that species have 
objective value, or that it is necessary to claim that species have objective value 
to maintain that they have non-instrumental value, tend to conflate non-
instrumental value and moral standing.1032 
Callicott never discusses the possibility of assigning end value to species 
without accepting them as moral objects. He just assumes that it is the same 
thing. This conflation in combination with his firm belief that there are no 
objective values, leads him to a moral theory according to which someone’s or 
something’s moral standing depends on her or its relation to the community of 
moral agents (who have to be human beings). This in turn means that not just 
human beings or sentient beings can have moral standing, but all living 
organisms as well as inanimate natural objects, species, ecosystems and even the 
Land itself. Callicott’s basic tenet that something’s moral status depends on its 
                                                
1028 Regan, Tom 1992:2 pp.167, 169 
1029 Regan, Tom 1992:2 p.169 
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relation to the community of moral agents also means that things have different 
degrees of moral status – the closer the relation, the stronger the moral status. He 
therefore divides the world of moral objects into different communities. We have 
stronger obligations to members of our more immediate communities and 
members of more prominent communities than we have to members of more 
distant and less prominent communities. How we should prioritise in practice 
between the interests of different moral objects depends both on which 
community the object belongs to, and on the relative strength of the interests at 
stake. How to prioritise between these two principles is not clear, however. 
Callicott gives us several examples but it is not easy to extract a system from 
them, and he does not supply us with any ready-made principle.1033 
Callicott’s approach is thus not to deny that species, ecosystems, etc. have 
moral standing and instead affirm that they have end value. Neither is it simply 
an instance of ethical nihilism in its traditional form. What he is attempting is a 
theory that endows genuine moral standing to wholes without running the risk of 
downplaying individuals, and without having to claim that something can have 
value without being valued. 
Apart from the problem of figuring out how to prioritise between the 
different principles of priority, it is also difficult to understand why only some 
things have moral standing according to Callicott’s system. Why do living 
beings, species, etc. have moral standing but not cars, shopping malls, and other 
competing entities? One might think that since just about anything can be valued 
as an end in itself, just about anything should also be able to qualify as a moral 
object in Callicott’s theory. The solution is probably that Callicott does not 
believe that cars, shopping malls etc have any interests to consider and therefore 
that they cannot really be valued as ends in themselves. As we saw above, 
however, there is no necessary connection between these things. By demanding 
that something has interests in order to accept that it can have non-instrumental 
value, Callicott ends up in the peculiar situation mentioned above of having to 
deny that things like ancient vases can have non-instrumental value. 
The most difficult problem with Callicott’s account is, however, that as 
long as he has not managed to show that species and other wholes have interests 
in the form of a subjective point of view from which things can be good or bad, 
we cannot meaningfully talk about species as being the objects of duties no 
matter how highly valued they are. 
The conflation of end value and moral standing by ecocentrists is noted and 
criticised in particular by Eugene C. Hargrove, Rick O’Neil and Dale 
Jamieson.1034 This particular conflation is problematic in many ways. In relation 
to our investigation it is especially problematic because it means that arguments 
that are perfectly legitimate for attributing end value to species are used to argue 
that we have duties to respect the interests of species, while arguments that work 
well against the claim that species have moral standing are said to show that 
                                                
1033 Callicott 1987:2 pp.207f, Callicott 1988 passim, Callicott 1992:1 passim, Callicott 1998 passim, 
Callicott 1999 pp.165ff 
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species cannot have end value. This means, which O’Neil points out, that 
“individualists needlessly deny intrinsic value to species, while holists falsely 
attribute moral standing to species.”1035 
We saw that Rolston is an example of the latter. Janna Thompson, on the 
other hand, is an example of the former. She dismisses the possibility of an 
environmental ethic after having defined it in terms of intrinsic value and at the 
same time conflated senses (I) and (V) of intrinsic value:  
 
An environmental ethic, as I understand it, is an ethic which holds that 
natural entities and/or states of affairs are intrinsically valuable, and thus 
deserve to be the object of our moral concern.1036 
 
By conflating moral standing and end value under the common heading of 
intrinsic value,1037 she leaves out the possibility that species can have non-
instrumental value without being moral objects. This possibility is, however, 
taken seriously by several others who suggest that species have non-instrumental 
value by being subjectively valued as ends in themselves by human beings. If we 
accept that suggestion we are back in anthropocentrism, but the value of species 
is no longer just instrumental. We therefore have a possibility to extend the moral 
duties regarding species that we established in chapter 2 by adding end value of 
species to the instrumental value of species we have already found. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Subjective end value 
We have seen that it is possible and legitimate to assign end value to 
something without claiming that the value is objective or that it means that the 
object in question has moral standing. End value can supervene on many 
different properties that are reasonably easier to find in species than interests. 
Several authors have suggested that subjective end value in nature is an 
important reason for preservation,1038 and many different properties found in 
species have been mentioned as value adding. Elliot, for example, mentions 
“diversity, stability, complexity, beauty, harmony, creativity, organization, 
intricacy, elegance and richness” – each by itself or in combination, as examples 
of aesthetic qualities that endow end value to wild nature.1039 Plumwood 
mentions “stability, harmony, diversity, and integrity” as properties that might 
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1037 Thompson 1990 passim 
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accord subjective end value to natural entities.1040 Anderberg mentions variation 
and originality as examples of aesthetic values in nature.1041 Angermeier 
mentions naturalness,1042 and Elliot mentions naturalness and rarity.1043 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen mention wilderness, rarity and the property 
of being untouched by humans.1044 Apart from these properties, many other 
value-adding properties can be found in particular species. 
Plumwood is not the only ecocentrist who point out properties that 
intuitively seem like reasons for subjectively valuing species as ends. Aldo 
Leopold has formulated what must be the most famous ecocentric principle: 
 
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.1045 
 
That something has any or all of these properties does not say anything 
about whether it has interests in a morally relevant meaning. All these properties 
seem well worthy of protection however, and an object that possess these 
properties seems well worthy of subjective appreciation. 
Another good place to look for species properties that are perfect candidates 
for subjective end value is, surprisingly, in the works of Rolston. If we take a 
closer look at his arguments for the moral standing of non-sentient life forms, 
species, ecosystems, etc. we find that a substantial part of the arguments would 
be excellent arguments for valuing these entities subjectively as ends. He spends 
much time and effort describing how species and other entities in nature have all 
kinds of fantastic and admirable properties.1046 Consider, for example, this 
exposition of why the Florida panther is worth preserving in spite of its 
inconveniences to human beings: 
 
To be gained is the continued existence of an animal handsome enough 
to be chosen as the state symbol, highly evolved on the top trophic rung 
of a rare Everglades ecosystem, thought by many to be the most 
aesthetically exciting animal on the North American continent.1047 
 
None of this comes close to, or has anything at all to do with establishing 
that the species has interests to respect. Therefore, it totally misfires as an 
argument for moral standing, but it makes a good case for arguing that the 
species should be valued as an end. This is quite typical for many of Rolston’s 
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arguments, and it is a good illustration of O’Neil’s point: The conflation of end 
value and moral standing makes ecocentrists falsely attribute moral standing to 
species, while some of the arguments they use may be very good arguments for 
the totally different but still very important conclusion that species should be 
values as ends. 
Rolston also mentions a cave section that is closed to human visitors except 
for the odd scientist because of some very fragile crystal formations called “angel 
hair”. Because the cave section is closed its beauty cannot be enjoyed by the 
public. This in turn leads Rolston to the conclusion that it must be a case of 
objective value.1048 Since we have already seen that it is possible to value things 
that we have no hope of experiencing, we do not have to conclude that it is a case 
of objective value. Instead it looks like a splendid example of something that is 
protected because of its subjective end value. 
Especially aesthetic arguments are heavily relied upon by Rolston.1049 He 
spends several pages working hard to convince the reader that all nature is 
beautiful. Even parts of nature that appear ugly contribute to the beauty of the 
whole picture.1050 He also argues that knowledge of ecology enhances the 
aesthetic appreciation of nature.1051 If it were not for his persistence that the 
beauty is objectively there, he would have made a very good case for the idea of 
subjective end value in nature. 
Rolston’s reasoning is particularly interesting and useful for our purpose 
when he describes how wildlife have properties that cannot be transferred to 
canvas or even to film without aspects getting lost.1052 This makes our case even 
stronger since it minimizes the problem of substitutability. It shows that it is not 
enough to preserve species in the form of pictures (even moving pictures). Some 
aspects of nature have to be experienced “live” so to speak. One of these aspects 
is the element of unpredictability.1053 There can obviously be elements of 
unpredictability in a poem or a piece of music or an exhibition, but it is not 
genuine unpredictability. It is a prearranged order of words, notes or artefacts 
that give you a sense of surprise, but you know that someone has thought it out 
and planned it. In nature the unpredictability is genuine due to the fact that there 
are several individuals and forces involved acting in real time. The next time you 
hear the poem or see the exhibition the element of surprise is gone but the next 
time you visit nature your experience will be different.1054 Nature does not have a 
monopoly on this aspect. It can also be created by artistic happenings or in 
sports. My point is, however, not that it is unique but that there are aspects of 
living nature that cannot be reproduced. There is also a difference compared to 
sport and artistic happenings in that what happens in nature is a matter of life and 
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death to a degree that sports and happenings can never come close to in a 
civilized society. Nature is “for real” in a way that art and sport are not. 
Another important aspect are the circumstances under which the plant or 
animal or scenery is enjoyed.1055 There is a large difference between, on the one 
hand, enjoying a photograph of a beautiful flower, and on the other, enjoying the 
flower on location on a windy mountaintop in thin air after having walked a 
whole day, spent the night in a tent and then climbed up the mountain. Another 
difference is that a piece of wildlife in a painting or a photograph, or even in a 
poem is a segment of a larger picture that not only contains what you see or hear, 
but also an intricate relationship between the plants or animals you see and the 
rest of the ecosystem they and you are in. 
It is thus not possible to preserve the entire end value of species by 
reproducing some aspect of them in the form of photographs, paintings or film, 
or in the form of stuffed animals or pressed flowers in a museum. Neither is it 
sufficient to place instances of the animals in a zoo or a botanical garden. 
If we add the intricacy and elements of surprise of the ongoing evolution to 
the value-adding properties of species the points above are even stronger. 
There are as we see plenty of good reasons to value other species as ends in 
themselves, and this in turn is a good reason for those of us who appreciate these 
values to preserve the species. The question is: Can the attribution of subjective 
end value to species play a part in answering why it is morally problematic to 
contribute to extinction? The answer is yes for the same reason that instrumental 
value can play such a role. If a species is valued as an end by moral objects, then 
we (other things being equal) help destroy value for these moral objects when we 
contribute to extinction. We are thus not considering the interests of the moral 
objects as we should as moral agents. This means that we do have a prima facie 
duty to preserve things that have subjective end value to moral objects even 
though these things do not have moral status in their own right. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.  Some problems with subjective end value – can they be 
solved by objective end value? 
 
Subjective end value taken together with the instrumental values discussed in 
chapter 2, present a rather strong case for arguing that the causing of extinction is 
prima facie morally problematic from an anthropocentric perspective. Even so, it 
is quite clear that a case built on the value of species for human beings cannot be 
as strong or far reaching as the moral duties suggested by ecocentrism, according 
to which the species themselves are moral objects. 
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When we discussed the instrumental value of species for human beings we 
noted that there are also several competing values of which many are quite 
strong. The same is true about end values. People value many other things than 
species and not everyone value species equally high.1056 Leopold starts the 
foreword to A Sand County Almanac by the words: "There are some who can live 
without wild things, and some who cannot."1057 There are probably many who 
can and maybe even prefer to live without wild things or at least with fewer wild 
things, at least when they have to choose between these wild things and other 
things they value. This means that just as with instrumental values the end value 
of species will sometimes be overridden by other values in a trade off.1058 How 
often this happens is an empirical question and the answer to this question 
probably varies with both time and place.1059 
The fact that appreciation of end value in other species is largely an 
“acquired taste” probably means that it will quite often lose out when it competes 
with values that are more easily appreciable for a larger number of people. Some 
species are also easier to value than others, which means that the end value of a 
species will not be an equally strong argument for preservation for all species.1060 
Singer points out, for example, that if only a few experts can distinguish between 
two adjacent species, then most other people it will probably not be consider it as 
important to preserve both.1061 
Thomas Anderberg believes that we will see a decline in people’s 
appreciation of nature because nature is disappearing and more and more people 
live in cities and do not have any close or regular contact with nature.1062 
Whether these things really have the effect that Anderberg suspects is also an 
empirical question, though I do not believe that the answer to that question has to 
be along the lines foreseen by Anderberg. Things that become rarer also tend to 
be more highly valued, and things that are exotic to us also tend to be assigned a 
higher value than things that are part of our everyday life (everything else equal). 
In chapter two, section six, we found that species can have so called 
transformative value, meaning that species have instrumental value because of 
their ability to increase our ability to value them. In connection with that we also 
discussed Anderberg’s and Radetzki’s point that we can also be transformed in 
the other direction. We can learn to stop missing some things if we have to do 
without them for a period of time. I then noted that this is probably correct, but if 
it is a good thing for a human being to have a wider range of values, then it is 
still a loss, and it is better to go the other way and learn to value more things. In 
chapter 2, this reasoning was used to show that transformative value is a positive 
instrumental value for species. Here, we can note that it is also relevant when we 
talk about end value – since end value is the value that is produced by the 
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transformative process. What this means primarily, is that it is possible (though 
doubtlessly difficult) to mitigate the problems above by educating people in 
different ways, including exposing them to the transformative ability of wild 
nature. Jamieson gives some other examples of how we can bring people’s 
attention to values in nature, even if they do not value these things to begin with. 
He mentions things like cultural and social processes, and education in the form 
of both informing and changing the way people look at and think about the thing 
in question.1063 Anderberg claims that only “aesthetic illiterates” can avoid seeing 
that some changes of nature make it aesthetically inferior.1064 This must 
reasonably mean that it is possible to change at least part of the attitudes we are 
wrestling with here. 
Changing people’s values is thus possible but it is far from easy and we will 
probably have to live with the fact that in many cases the subjective end value of 
species will be out competed by other subjective end values, and by instrumental 
values promoting other subjective end values. 
This brings us to the question of whether we can do better by objective end 
values, that is, the position that even though species do not have moral standing, 
they do have end value that is independent of a valuer. We would be able to 
claim that they have end value even if people do not see it, which looks like a 
decisive advantage over the idea that species have subjective end value given the 
problems we have just noted regarding the latter position. Objective end value 
might also be a more palatable position for the ecocentrists who, if my analysis in 
chapter six is correct, have to give up the idea that species have moral standing. 
The step from moral standing to objective end value might be an easier step to 
take than the step from moral standing to subjective end value. 
Unfortunately, the idea of objective end value has its own problems. First of 
all, it is very controversial if there really is such a thing as objective value. This 
has been discussed back and forth by many philosophers and I will not take part 
in that debate here. Instead, I will focus on three other serious problems. 
The first of these problems is that even if we assume that there are objective 
values we still have to establish that species have that kind of value. How to do 
so is far from clear. Other things that exist objectively are established 
empirically. So far we are not been able to do that with values. This means that if 
we want the same standard of proof as for other statements we make regarding 
what is objectively the case (which seems like a reasonable position), we have to 
remain silent about the question of what has objective end value, including the 
question of objective end value for species even if we assume that objective end 
value exists. If we are prepared to accept a lower standard of evidence in this 
case, it seems that the best we can do is to refer to our intuitions. This means that 
we are back in the same position where we left subjective end value. This is not 
surprising considering that the arguments people tend to use when they argue that 
something has objective value are virtually indistinguishable from arguments 
used to convince people to value something subjectively. We saw, for instance, 
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that Rolston’s attempts to establish objective value for species were in fact 
identical with a good attempt to convince valuers to value species subjectively. 
The conclusion has to be that it is no easier to establish that species have 
objective value than to convince people to value species subjectively. 
The second problem is that even if there is value in nature that is 
independent of valuers, it does not follow that this value has to be higher than the 
value of things that are subjectively valued.1065 This in turn implies that assigning 
objective value to species does not help us avoid the problem that species can be 
out competed by things we value higher. It therefore seems that we will not solve 
that problem either by shifting from subjective to objective end value. 
The third and probably most serious problem is that it is not clear how to 
establish moral obligations based on objective value. When we talked about 
subjective value this was quite easy. Subjective value is per definition connected 
to the subjective judgement of a sentient being – i.e. to the interests of a moral 
object. That means that if something has subjective end value there is always a 
moral object behind it whose interests we have to consider. Objective value on 
the other hand lacks this connection – also per definition. Referring to objective 
value for species (as an alternative to, not as a synonym for, moral standing) 
therefore actually means that we disconnect the value from any moral duties.1066 
In that respect a shift to objective value would therefore place us in a 
considerably worse position compared to subjective end value. 
These three problems seem to show that the idea of objective end value for 
species cannot help us. If we also consider that there is far from any consensus 
that they exist at all, the best we can do regarding end value is to rely on 
subjective end value in spite of its problems. It will not be as strong or as far 
reaching as ecocentrism, but in combination with the instrumental values of 
species that we found in chapter 2, the subjective end value of species will still 
produce a rather strong case for pronouncing many cases of human induced 
extinction immoral. We do not have to stop there, however. 
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8. Sentientism 
 
So far we have discussed two types of entities as possible objects of moral 
standing, viz. species and human beings. These are not the only alternatives, 
however. In chapter 6 we saw that consciousness is probably a necessary 
prerequisite to have interests in a morally relevant meaning, and therefore to be a 
moral object. Species are not sentient, while the typical human being is. As a 
result, the suggestion that species have moral standing in their own right failed, 
while the typical human being is the paradigm case of a moral object. Human 
beings are not the only sentient entities, however. Many non-human animals are 
sentient. Since it has become common to claim that sentience is not only 
necessary but also sufficient to be a moral object – sentientism as this position is 
sometimes called – many non-human individual animals are good candidates for 
being moral objects. That sentient non-human animals are moral objects has 
been forcefully, and in my view, successfully argued by many authors,1067 and I 
will not kick in open doors by repeating these arguments here. Instead I will 
concentrate on whether moral concern for the interests of sentient non-human 
animals can help us answer our question of why it is morally problematic to 
contribute to the extinction of species. 
Several authors have argued that such a concern provides an incentive for 
preservation of species and of nature in general (different authors have different 
opinions regarding how strong and far reaching it can be).1068 Other authors have 
been much more negative and argued that sentientism cannot be of much use 
when it comes to the question of species preservation, or even that it is more 
contrary to, than supportive of, preservation.1069 
Callicott is a special case. In his earlier writings he had a very low opinion 
of animal ethics as applied to environmental issues – and in particular to the 
question of species loss.1070 In his later writings he has instead argued that animal 
ethics and environmental ethics have very much in common both in theory and in 
practice.1071 In his 1988 article “Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: 
Back Together Again” he even expressed regret over the estrangement between 
animal ethics and environmental ethics for which he also partly assumed the 
blame.1072 
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Even so, he does not believe that they are in total agreement. He 
emphasizes that there are conflicts between concern for individuals and concern 
for wholes.1073 By bringing them together as parts of the same theory he tries, 
however, to find a coherent way of solving these conflicts. We have different 
obligations to members of different moral communities. Sentient individuals, 
non-sentient individuals and wholes like species and ecosystems “inhabit” their 
own moral communities. Domesticated animals, wild animals and wholes belong 
to different communities and endow different duties. As we noted in the previous 
chapter, Callicott’s theory is not built on the belief that sentience is either 
necessary or sufficient for moral standing. Instead, Callicott’s idea is that both 
individuals and wholes have moral standing in their own right depending on their 
different degrees of “intrinsic value” for human moral agents. Callicott’s theory 
is therefore still not a question of basing our concern regarding species on a 
concern for the interests of sentient animals – an approach that he is still very 
critical of. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Sentientism as a basis for species preservation – a 
construction on two pillars 
 
The idea we are discussing here – that the moral problem of contributing to 
extinction at least in part can be explained by moral concern for the interests of 
sentient individual non-human animals – is basically built on two pillars: 1. If a 
species is made up of sentient animals, then doing things that contribute to its 
extinction is to do things that harm its individuals, and this is morally wrong 
because by doing that we are not properly considering the interests of the 
individual members of the species.1074 2. If a species is important (usually by 
having instrumental value) for sentient individual members of another species 
then we are not giving due moral consideration to the interests of these other 
individuals when we cause the species in question to go extinct.1075 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1073 Callicott 1988 p.164, passim, Callicott 1998 p.462, Callicott 1999 p.68 
1074 For suggestions along these lines see e.g. Broom 1992 p.94ff, Jamieson 1998 p.42, Midgley 1992:1 
p.63, Regan, Tom 1983 pp.360, 363, Singer 1979 p.198, Singer 1993 pp.275f 
1075 For suggestions along these lines see e.g.. Callicott 1998 p.463, Fisher 1987 p.207, Norton 1982 p.28, 
Jamieson 1998 pp.42, 46, Midgley 1992:1 p.63, Persson, Ingmar 1994 p.34, Regan, Tom 1992:1 pp.52, 
59, Schönfeld 1992 p.357, Singer 1993 p.275, Webster 1992 p.89 
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8.1.1. The first pillar 
 
The first pillar supplies us with a very strong preservation incentive since any 
attack on members of the species must be deemed prima facie morally wrong – 
even when the species is not threatened. This in turn means that if we follow this 
approach we will not even end up in a situation where the species becomes 
threatened by human activities. This might be seen as too strong given how our 
main question is formulated. On the other hand, I think it fits very well with 
people’s moral intuitions. Take whale hunting as an example.1076 Many people 
seem to have a very negative attitude to the hunting of whales even when the 
species to which the whales belong is not immediately threatened. This seems to 
be the case also with other species whose members are sentient. In fact, some 
environmentalists even seem disappointed when researches find that a species is 
less threatened than it was believed to be or is becoming less threatened than it 
was, and as a result the protective regulations based on concern for the whole 
species are lessened. The disappointment may partly be explained by a suspicion 
that the species really is more threatened than investigations have found. I would 
not be surprised, however, if at least a part of the explanation is a genuine 
concern for the members of the species that is independent of whether the species 
is threatened. 
Most species are not composed of sentient beings however, which means 
that most species are not covered directly by the first pillar. This has been 
pointed out as a big problem for the sentientistic approach.1077 As we will see in 
the next section, this problem can to a large extent be dealt with by the second 
pillar. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1.2. The second pillar 
 
The second pillar is in fact an extension of our reasoning in chapter 2. We then 
concluded that many species have instrumental value for human beings. Here, we 
simply extend the group of moral objects for which species have instrumental 
value to also include non-human sentient beings. This means that the group of 
moral objects for which the species have value becomes much larger and more 
diverse. Even though most individual organisms are non-sentient, the number of 
sentient organisms in the world is still quite impressive, and it is very likely that 
in comparison with humans, their interests are much more centred on basic 
biological needs and less on the things that tend to compete with preservation.1078 
                                                
1076 As Singer points out: If whale hunters change their habits to only harvesting a sustainable yield, then 
thousands of whales will still be slaughtered (Singer 1979 p.205). 
1077 Callicott 1985 p.367, Callicott 1986 p.152, Hargrove 1992 pp.x, xxi, Kellert 1986 p.60 
1078 Anderberg 1994 p.95 
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In many cases their preferences are probably also less flexible than humans and 
more dependent on their particular environment.1079 It is therefore highly 
plausible that the inclusion of other sentient beings, as well as human beings 
among the stakeholders, in a trade off situation, would tip the scale quite 
drastically in favour of preservation. It is not just a matter of sheer numbers, 
however. The diversity of sentient beings in nature means that if a particular 
species is not instrumentally valuable for the sentient members of one species it 
is almost certainly instrumentally important for another. This means that 
extended instrumentalism reasonably endows many more species with 
instrumental value compared to purely anthropocentric instrumentalism. The 
webs of dependence relations in nature are very complex and the number of 
species that have no instrumental value whatsoever to any sentient being is 
probably very small, not to say negligible.1080 It therefore seems that sentientism 
will both widen and strengthen the instrumental value of species compared to 
anthropocentric instrumentalism by making more species more instrumentally 
valuable for a larger number of moral objects. 
We can also turn the reasoning around and point out that many sentient 
animals are very important for the function of ecosystems and for the survival of 
other species.1081 Protecting sentient animals will therefore often automatically 
help the preservation of other species. 
A possible problem is pointed out by Thomas Anderberg. He claims that if 
we weigh preferences on the basis of their quality rather than on any quantitative 
measurement, human preferences will outweigh the preferences of other 
animals.1082 
Ranking preferences on the basis of their qualitative standard is 
controversial however. Ingmar Persson argues for instance, that the only 
plausible version of qualitative difference between preferences is intrapersonal. 
He claims that it is possible for one person to rank the importance of his own 
desires based on their qualities, but it is not possible to make interpersonal 
comparisons based on anything else than the importance of the desire for the 
individual who has the desire.1083 This seems reasonable. It also seems that given 
the subjectivist view of desires that Anderberg professes, it is not possible to rank 
desires on the basis of anything else than the importance a desire has for the 
individual who has the desire. 
One might also argue against Anderberg that normally we find it more 
important to satisfy basic needs than more highly sophisticated desires. 
That many species have instrumental value for a larger number of moral 
objects if we follow the sentientistic approach compared to the anthropocentric 
approach, does not make a relevant difference from a deontological perspective, 
                                                
1079 Anderberg 1994 p.96 
1080 See e.g. Schönfeld 1992 p.357. Norton on the other hand denies this (Norton 1984 pp.28, 30). It seems 
however that Norton has a rather simplified conception of the interdependencies in nature as well as a 
rather outdated conception of the distribution of sentient life forms on the planet. 
1081 Midgley 1992:2 p.114 
1082 Anderberg 1994 pp.97f, 125 
1083 Persson, Ingmar 1994 pp.26ff 
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though. According to deontological ethics, we cannot outweigh one moral 
object’s interests by aggregating the interests of a number of other moral objects. 
On the other hand, negative rights are in general stronger than positive rights. 
The right not to be severely harmed is in general stronger than the right to 
improve an already good position. Trade off situations between preservation on 
the one hand and competing interests on the other most often means that a benefit 
for human beings is compared to a loss for non-humans. In most cases the 
preservation interest will therefore have priority according to deontological ethics 
independently of the number of stakeholders on either side.1084 
When we discussed the first pillar we found that concern for the interests of 
sentient animals sometimes goes further than ecocentrism in its preservation 
demands. We can see a corresponding effect when we look at the second pillar. 
Meta-systems are in general more resilient than sub-systems. If an organism 
disappears, the species will still survive, but if the species dies, it implies that all 
its individuals are dead. If a species disappears, the ecosystem will probably 
survive, but if the system collapses, it will be a disaster for the species in the 
system. This means that the higher the level we are concerned about, the more 
things will be expendable. If we are only concerned with the future of the 
biosphere, we can afford to lose quite a lot of species. If we are only concerned 
with species, we can afford to lose quite a lot of organisms. If we, on the other 
hand, care for individual organisms, our preservation duties will be much more 
far reaching, and the species and other wholes to which the individuals belong 
and the species and other wholes on which the individuals depend, will in most 
cases also be protected. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2. Conflicts of interest between species preservation and 
concern for individuals 
 
In spite of what we have seen above, there are still conflicts between sentientism 
and the preservation of species. In this section I will look at some of these 
conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1084 Regan, Tom 1983 pp.286f, 360 
 244 
8.2.1. Intervention to save individual animals 
 
It seems to follow from sentientism that we should intervene and help animals 
that are suffering in nature. To do so can, however, in certain situations, be 
contrary to the preservation of the species. In particular, it seems contrary to the 
commonly held assumption that in order to preserve viable species, it is 
important that less fit individuals are weeded out by the forces of natural 
selection.1085 
Both the anthropocentric Hargrove and the ecocentric Rolston refer to the 
policy to not help wounded or sick animals in national parks (with the exception 
of animals that have been wounded by humans or represent endangered 
species).1086 
Rolston also mentions the case where two grey whales were trapped in the 
ice outside Alaska 1988 and was saved by a joint US/Soviet effort. Rolston 
argues that it would be best for the species if individuals who let themselves get 
trapped in the ice were left to die and do not get the chance to propagate their 
genes.1087 
Different representatives of animal ethics react somewhat differently to 
these accusations. David Wilkins, veterinary advisor to the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), agrees that it could be claimed that 
to help and give medical treatment to sick or injured wild animals is interfering 
in the natural selection process that helps keep the population fit.1088 Still, he 
stresses that: “[he] would never turn the back on a sick or injured animal. Nor 
would, or should, the RSPCA.”1089 Richard Ryder also seems to acknowledge a 
moral obligation to help wild animals with veterinary treatment, at least in 
principle.1090 Tom Regan, being a deontologist, does not accept that we sacrifice 
individual moral objects for the common good. On the other hand, he seems to 
only acknowledge negative rights in relation to wild animals, and he exclaims: 
“With regard to wild animals, the general policy recommended by the rights view 
is: let them be!”1091 
This clearly indicates that he is not in favour of interfering. The question 
here, is why we only have negative rights in relation to wild sentient animals. 
That is not at all clear from Regan’s writings. 
If one takes a utilitarian standpoint, things get more complicated. We 
cannot recourse to a difference between positive and negative rights, and we have 
to consider the total sum of good. As a result we will probably reach different 
conclusions in different cases. There are probably some cases where it is clear 
that we can interfere without causing more harm in the long run than we 
eliminate in the short. In most cases I suspect, however, that we will reach the 
                                                
1085 Rolston 1988 pp.55, 148, Rolston 1994 p.112, Wilkins 1992 p.79 
1086 Hargrove 1992 p.xxiii, Rolston 1988 pp.53, 182f, Rolston 1994 pp.111ff 
1087 Rolston 1994 p.110. This case is also mentioned in Ricklefs 1997 p.610f. 
1088 Wilkins 1992 p.79 
1089 Wilkins 1992 p.79 
1090 Ryder 1992 p.7 
1091 Regan, Tom 1983 p.361 
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conclusion that it is best to let evolution continue as undisturbed as possible, 
especially if we also counts the good of future individuals. Too much 
interference undermines the forces of evolution, which may have detrimental 
effects on future individuals. On the other hand, we have to be careful not to beg 
the question. Letting natural selection weed out whales who let themselves get 
trapped in the ice will eventually lead to a population of individuals with less 
tendency to let themselves get trapped in the ice. Whether this will be a benefit to 
future whales depends on whether it is detrimental to their interests to get trapped 
in the ice. Whether that is the case in turn depends to a large degree on whether 
or not there are human beings who come to their rescue. Human rescuers are 
today a part of the whales’ environment just like ice is. In an environment with 
human rescuers, it is just not a big disadvantage to let one self get trapped in the 
ice.  For short: If we really decide to intervene and help sentient animals in 
trouble, and if we do that consistently we will change the rules, and what would 
have been a weakness without us will not be a weakness anymore. 
On the other hand again, this means that we will take on an enormous 
responsibility that I am not sure we are really ready to handle. We will make 
these animals dependent on us, which seems like a risky future. We also have to 
remember that helping some animals often means harming others. If nothing else, 
we will take away the food for animals who would otherwise eat the carcasses of 
the dead animals. This, together with the great complexity of the relations 
between different organisms in nature, makes me believe that there is, in many 
cases, a real possibility that we will cause more trouble than we resolve. If we 
consider this, plus the mayhem we risk by interfering in systems that we do not 
fully understand, the precautionary principle tells us to be very restrictive when it 
comes to interference, even from a strictly sentientistic perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.2.  Intervention to save species 
 
In some cases we have the opposite problem, viz. that preservation of species 
calls for human intervention in nature in a way that will harm sentient 
individuals. I am thinking of two types of situations: The behaviour of individual 
species members sometimes risks undermining the future of its own species, 
which might call for culling. Sometimes it might also be necessary to kill 
members of one species to ensure the future existence of another species. 
Typical examples of the first situation are when a species rapidly increases 
its population size and thereby undermines its resource base. As an example, 
Rolston mentions an island in the San Francisco Bay where a deer population has 
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been fluctuating dramatically due to diseases and starvation in lack of 
predators.1092 
An example of the second kind of situation is forest fires that kill individual 
organisms – even sentient organisms – but help certain species to survive in that 
environment.1093 It has become more common to let such fires rage as long as 
they do not threaten human settlements or large economic interests. Sometimes 
forest fires are also started by humans with the expressed purpose of promoting 
some rare species. 
Another example is when members of one species directly threaten the last 
remaining instances of another species. In cases like that, authorities sometimes 
interfere and cull the aggressive species in order to save the threatened species. 
Rolston’s favourite example is that of San Clemente Island: The island is the 
only habitat for three endangered plant species (Malacothamnus clementinus, 
Castilleja grisea and Delphinium kinkiense), but the island is also the home of a 
few thousand feral goats. The goats eat the plants and if they are allowed to 
continue, the plant species will soon be gone. Some of the goats have been 
rounded up and relocated but a few thousand of them have been shot.1094 Rolston 
also mentions Santa Barbara Island where introduced rabbits were shot to protect 
an almost extinct plant (Dudleya traskiae).1095 
Callicott argues that 
 
to hunt and kill a white-tailed deer in certain districts may not only be 
ethically permissible, it might actually be a moral requirement, necessary 
to protect the local environment, taken as a whole, from the 
disintegrating effects of a cervid population explosion.1096 
 
This quote is from “the early” Callicott, but he does not seem to have 
changed his mind on this point. Even in 1999, after he stated that animal ethics 
and environmental ethics have common concerns, he pointed out that protecting 
plant species often involves the killing off of feral animals, and that preserving a 
community often involves culling some of the members of the community.1097 
Jamieson admits that there is a conflict between respecting sentient 
individuals and preserving species in both types of situation mentioned above.1098 
He emphasizes, however, that this does not mean that individualistic ethics 
always tells us to sacrifice the species. He compares to conflicts between human 
interests where we sometimes (presumably on an anthropocentric basis) come to 
                                                
1092 Rolston 1988 p.87 
1093 Johansson, Birgitta 2005:1 p.237, Rolston 1988 p.147 
1094 Rolston 1988 pp.141, 182f, Rolston 1994 pp.64f. He also refers to this example when he argues that 
individuals should be culled for the good of the ecosystem (Rolston 1987 p.265). See also Andersson 
2007 p.54 
1095 Rolston 1988 pp.141f 
1096 Callicott 1980 p.320. He refers to the same example in Callicott 1985 p.368f. see also Callicott 1987:2 
p.196 where he argues that it would be wrong not to interfere when increasing animal populations 
threaten a biotic community. 
1097 Callicott 1999 p.68 
1098 Jamieson 1998 p.52 
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the conclusion that it is worth sacrificing individual human lives in order to 
preserve other values hold to be very high by many humans.1099 
Ryder asks: “Should overcrowded wildlife populations be culled for their 
own benefit?”1100 He does not answer the question however, and he does not 
address the question of whether it can be acceptable to sacrifice individual 
sentient animals to preserve other species. 
Regan also mentions the question of culling, and he discusses whether it 
might be better that the animals die quickly from a bullet than slowly from 
starvation.1101 He does not accept this as an argument for killing sentient animals, 
however. First, he points out that it is not always true that hunting or trapping is 
more humane than natural death. Whether this is the case is, of course, an 
empirical question, but Regan persists that the burden of proof rests on the 
hunters.1102 His second objection is that this argument for killing is based on ‘the 
principle of maximum sustainable yield’. This principle tells us that a “game-
population” should be managed in such a way that the hunters can get the largest 
possible “harvest” from the population without decreasing the size of the 
“harvest” in the future.1103 This is an argument that would fit well with 
anthropocentric instrumentalism, and it is clearly not a matter or respecting the 
moral standing of the animals. It would not be acceptable from an ecocentric 
perspective either, and Rolston in fact agrees with Regan that it is not acceptable 
to keep an overpopulation of animals just for them to be killed.1104 
Regan also presents another argument against the idea that culling is 
morally preferable to starvation. He points out that starvation in a population is a 
general problem, but killing is very “personal” so to speak – some individual 
animals are sacrificed for the good of all. Regan apparently sees this as a 
utilitarian way of looking at things and therefore rejects that solution.1105 
He is probably right that a utilitarian would be more sympathetic to culling, 
not for the sake of the species, but because it might lead to less suffering on the 
whole among sentient animals. Singer tells us that: 
 
If it is true that in special circumstances their population grows to such 
an extent that they damage their own environment and the prospects of 
their own survival, or that of other animals who share their habitat, then 
it may be right for humans to take some supervisory action1106 
 
It thus seems that the conflict over culling is at least in part a conflict 
between deontological and utilitarian ethics: Is it acceptable to sacrifice some 
                                                
1099 Jamieson 1998 pp48f. Jamieson does not use this terminology. Instead he talks about primary value 
and derivative value. 
1100 Ryder 1992 p.7 
1101 Regan, Tom 1983 p.354 
1102 Regan, Tom 1983 p.354f 
1103 Regan, Tom 1983 p.355f 
1104 Rolston 1988 p.90 
1105 Regan, Tom 1983 p.356 
1106 Singer 1995 p.234 
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individuals to promote the interests of other individuals? It can be about the 
interest of other members of the same species, or it can be about the interests of 
members of other species (including human beings). 
It seems also in part to be a conflict between different beliefs regarding the 
empirical question of what implies the least harm for the animals in question. We 
saw that Regan did not believe that culling is always less painful for the animals 
in question than is starvation. The question is when and how often this is true. 
There are probably different beliefs about how these questions should be 
answered. 
Mary Midgley notes that when an animal population starts to outgrow its 
habitat it is most often a result of human encroachments, but she also 
acknowledges that even so, we must find a way to deal with the problem.1107 To 
let the habitat be destroyed is, according to her, not an acceptable solution since 
it will cause suffering to all animals in the area – both the members of the species 
in question, and members of other species.1108 She believes that if we have to 
choose, the death from a bullet “often” involves less suffering than starvation.1109 
Therefore, she thinks that when a population is causing severe destruction of its 
environment and there is no other option, killing is required.1110 Even so, she 
emphasizes that: “To legitimise culling is itself an evil, and it may risk 
encouraging other, much less justifiable, slaughter.”1111 
Midgley is apparently more optimistic than Regan when it comes to the 
possibilities of decreasing suffering by culling, but she does not specify how 
often or when culling is an acceptable alternative. Broom, on the other hand, 
seems to go along the same track as Regan. He argues that “a high proportion of 
the animals which are hunted will not die instantaneously”,1112 and that “a high 
proportion of animals which are shot will carry lead shot for a while, will die 
after a long period – in many cases days or weeks – and there is a substantial 
amount of suffering when this happens.”1113 
If culling, at least in some situations, turns out to be acceptable from a 
sentientistic viewpoint, the conflict between sentientism and species preservation 
is smaller than was first assumed. It does not disappear, however. It is one thing 
to accept culling when the welfare of other sentient animals (of the same or 
different species) is on the line, but sentientists would hardly accept the killing of 
individual sentient animals to preserve species of non-sentient organisms. As we 
saw above, Jamieson argues that the interests of some individuals to preserve 
things with high value – like species – will sometimes outweigh the interest of 
other individuals in surviving. I do not believe this will be the case in all, or even 
a majority of the conflicts, however. 
Norton points out another problem. He argues that 
                                                
1107 Midgley 1992:1 p.65 
1108 Midgley 1992:1 p.66 
1109 Midgley 1992:2 p.120 
1110 Midgley 1992:1 p.65, Midgley 1992:2 pp.120f 
1111 Midgley 1992:1 p.66 
1112 Broom 1992 p.96 
1113 Broom 1992 p.96 
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the disanalogy [between species preservation and] individual rights is not 
avoided by emphasizing the right to be spared unnecessary suffering and 
by arguing that herd culling, etc., is necessary for the survival of the herd. 
In order for this analogy to hold, it would, contrary to fact, have to be 
considered permissible for the problem of human famine to be solved by 
the “culling” of human populations.1114 
 
I believe, however, that the moral discrepancy between culling of humans 
and culling of other sentient beings can be explained by the sentientists. They 
could, for example, point out that there are other relevant differences. Human 
beings tend to be more aware of what happens to them and to others, and this 
seems to imply that culling humans means a bigger harm to them and their kin 
compared to the culling of other sentient animals. Culling of humans would 
probably also lead to more violence since humans can defend themselves and 
organise themselves in a way that non-humans cannot. The sentientists could also 
point out that when we deal with humans there are other options at hand that 
cannot be used with other species, such as education, birth control and changed 
socio-economical structures. 
Birth control in the form of contraceptives has been suggested and even 
tried on other species but it is controversial whether it can be used on a big scale. 
Midgley points out several problems: 
 
Now just think for a minute what that involves. Contraceptives do not 
grow on trees in doses of which only one would be taken by each deer 
each year. To do that job you would have to take in all the deer in every 
year, weigh and measure them and give them their dose, and feed them 
while you did it. By the time you had let them out you would have 
domesticated deer who are no longer likely to be able to fend for and 
defend themselves as they previously did. You would have a lot of hinds 
who lived without having any fawns, and nobody quite knows what 
effect that would have.1115 
 
She also points out that it would be even less sensible to use this solution on 
mice and rats, and she mentions that the development of contraceptives for 
animals would certainly mean a lot of animal experimentation.1116 
When all this is said, I still think there is one important reason why culling 
is in general not a very good solution either for the purpose of animal protection, 
or for the purpose of species preservation. The thing is that unless the species in 
question is hunted to the brink of extinction, its members will not stop breeding 
after the culling is done. The temporarily vacant niche will also be a “magnet” 
for other members of the species migrating from other areas. This means that the 
problem will reappear the next season or a few seasons later. Culling can 
                                                
1114 Norton 1982 p.29 note 26 
1115 Midgley 1992:1 pp.66f 
1116 Midgley 1992:1 p.67 
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therefore never really solve an overpopulation problem. The only way to solve 
the problem is to change the environment in which the species lives in such a 
way that the ecosystem can sustain itself. This in turn means that in a long-term 
perspective, we still need solutions that do not imply the kinds of conflict we 
have discussed here. 
This does not mean that we will totally avoid conflicts between respect for 
the interests of sentient non-human animals on the one hand, and our interests of 
preserving species on the other. In many situations, such as those we have seen in 
this sub-section, there will be conflicts. There are also many other situations that 
we have not had room to discuss here but that will also involve conflicts. 
Sentientism will clearly not always lead to the same result as ecocentrism. Often, 
sentientism does not go as far as ecocentrism when it comes to preserving 
species. On the other hand, sometimes it goes further, and I think that in both 
cases it is actually in better accordance with most people’s moral intuitions. 
In the cases where there are genuine conflicts it is very important to be clear 
about which positions that conflict. We saw that some of the conflicts are 
actually conflicts between different beliefs regarding empirical questions, and 
sometimes the conflict is between utilitarianism and deontology. In many cases it 
is probably a matter of genuine conflicts of interests between different sentient 
individuals (human and/or other). 
In all cases it is a matter of conflicting interests/beliefs of individual 
sentient beings – sometimes between humans and other sentient organisms, 
sometimes between organisms of different non-human species, and sometimes 
between different human beings. Based on our findings in chapter 6, we can be 
highly confident that it is never a conflict between the interests of individuals and 
the “interests” of species. 
This is important because if we are not clear about what and whose interests 
are at stake we will never be able to find a workable way of dealing with the 
conflicts. 
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9. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this investigation has been to answer the question of why it is morally 
problematic – even prima facie morally wrong – to cause or contribute to the 
extinction of species. 
The first potential answer we investigated is also the most common one, 
viz. that other species are instrumentally valuable for human beings. We looked 
at several different kinds of instrumental value, ranging from the use of other 
species as raw material and fuel, via important ecosystem services, to benefiting 
from their ability to transform our values and thereby giving us more things to 
value. As a result, we found that it is indeed correct that many species are 
instrumentally valuable for human beings. Some species are very important. We 
also noted, however, that not all species are equally valuable in all cases, and 
sometimes it is extremely difficult to assess the instrumental value of a particular 
species. The instrumental values of different species also have to compete with 
other human values. Sometimes these other values probably outweigh the value 
of the continued existence of the species. 
We found that in many cases we do not know enough to be sure about 
whether it is best from an anthropocentric perspective in that particular case to 
preserve the species, or to exploit it, or go through with some other enterprise 
that contributes to its extinction. In cases like that, it transpired that the most 
rational principle to act upon is probably the precautionary principle. This 
principle tells us that in cases where there is a high degree of uncertainty, and the 
values we might lose if something goes wrong are high, we need to be extra 
careful and in many cases even abstain from the project. This is particularly the 
case when the value that we stand to lose may be irreplaceable and the loss of the 
value is irreversible, when we are dealing with values that are systematically 
downplayed by other decision methods, when there is a cost involved in waiting 
for more facts, and when a false negative is at least as bad as a false positive. All 
these circumstances seem to be present when we talk about the extinction of 
species. We also discussed some problems with the precautionary principle, but 
they did not turn out to be devastating for our definition of the principle. 
We also found that we have a duty to consider the interests of future 
generations and that these duties, in general, speak in favour of preservation – 
even more so than our duties to consider the interests of our contemporaries. 
We could therefore conclude that anthropocentric instrumentalism provided 
us with rather strong reasons to consider acts that contribute to extinction as 
morally problematic and in many instances, even prima facie morally wrong. 
Even so, we had to conclude that anthropocentric instrumentalism did not fully 
account for the moral intuition we set out to investigate. 
The next theory that became the target of this investigation was therefore a 
theory that assigns moral standing directly to the species, viz. Ecocentrism. We 
are not talking about indirect moral standing or moral standing in a way that is 
reducible to the moral standing of the member individuals of the species or of 
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other individuals. According to ecocentrism, species have their own interests that 
are not reducible to, and can even conflict with, the interests of individuals 
including the individual members of the species in question. We found, however, 
that there are some very severe problems with this theory. It turned out that it is 
not quite clear how to define ‘species’ and it is not quite clear in what way – if 
any – species exist outside of our imagination. We investigated several different 
answers to these questions and found that none of the answers were fully in 
accordance with the way ecocentrists think about species. The other main 
problem was that the ecocentrists have not managed to establish that species have 
interests in a morally relevant sense. We found that the most reasonable way of 
explaining what it means to claim that ‘something is in someone’s interest’, was 
that it is subjectively good from the perspective of that someone. It therefore 
seems that one has to be sentient in order to have interests to consider, which in 
turn disqualifies species as moral objects. 
This negative result does not mean that we have to suffice with the 
instrumental value of species for human beings. Apart from their instrumental 
value, species can also have value as ends in themselves for human beings. This 
means that it is still a matter of anthropocentric value, but it also means that more 
species will be more valuable for quite a lot of human beings. That species have 
end value for human beings is not enough in itself to answer our question, but the 
combination of end value and instrumental value will take us further than if we 
only consider their instrumental value. 
Finally, we found that even though we have had to dismiss the idea that 
species have moral standing in their own right, we do not have to suffice with the 
value species have for human beings. There are many other sentient beings in the 
world apart from human beings, and it seems safe to assume that our 
contributions to the extinction of species in most cases go clearly against the 
interests of many non-human sentient beings. This is true if the species in 
question is made up of sentient individuals, and it is also true when the species in 
question is made up of non-sentient individuals that have instrumental value for 
sentient individuals of other species. 
There are exceptions to this rule, but all in all it seems that the inclusion of 
non-human sentient individuals together with us humans as stakeholders in a 
trade off situation, will, in most cases, tip the scale drastically in favour of 
preservation. 
While trying to resolve the remaining conflicts it is very important to be 
clear about the nature of the conflicts. Since ecocentrism turned out to be a non-
viable alternative, we can conclude that we are not dealing with conflicts 
between individual interests and species interests. What we are dealing with are 
conflicts between the interests of individuals – in the form of instrumental value 
and end value for human as well as non-human moral objects. 
The result of the investigation is thus, that there is not one but several 
explanation to why it is prima facie morally wrong to contribute to the extinction 
of species – and all of them are about duties to respect the interests of individual 
sentient animals. 
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It is from this insight we have to take off in our continued search for 
ethically viable solutions to the increasing number of conflicts between 
preservation on the one hand, and things that contribute to extinction on the 
other. 
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